

PART IV

Occupation of Japan

Initial Planning and Operations

The war was over, but the victory was not yet secure. Foremost among the multitude of new and pressing problems confronting Allied planners was the question of how the Japanese military would react to the sudden peace. On bypassed islands throughout the Pacific, on the mainland of Asia, and in Japan itself, over four million fighting men were still armed and organized for combat. Would all of these men, who had proven themselves to be bitter-end, fanatical enemies even when faced with certain destruction, accept the Emperor's order to lay down their weapons? Or would some of them fight on, refusing to accept or believe in the decision of their government? Would the tradition of fealty to the wishes of the Emperor overbalance years of conditioning that held surrender to be a crushing personal and national disgrace?

Logically, the focal point of Japanese physical and moral strength was the seat of Imperial rule. If Tokyo could be occupied without incident, the chances for a successful and bloodless occupation of Japan and the peaceful surrender of outlying garrisons would be greatly enhanced. Plans for seizure of ports of entry in the Tokyo Bay area by occupation forces received top priority. Speed was essential and the spearhead troops of the occupying forces were selected from those units with the highest state of combat readiness.

From General MacArthur's command, the 11th Airborne Division was to stage from Luzon through Okinawa

to an airfield outside of Tokyo. Admiral Nimitz ordered the Third Fleet, cruising the waters off Japan, to form a landing force from ships' complements to supplement the force that was to seize Yokosuka Naval Base in Tokyo Bay. To augment this naval force, FMFPac was directed to provide a regimental combat team for immediate occupation duty. These Marines, and others who followed them, were destined to play an important role in the occupation of Japan.

THE YOKOSUKA OPERATION¹

Months before the fighting ended, preliminary plans and concepts for the

¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: Eighth U. S. Army in Japan Occupational Monograph, v. I, Aug45-Jan46, n.d., hereafter *Eighth Army Monograph I* (Army Sec, WWII RecDiv, NA); CinCPac WarDs, Aug-Sep45; *CinCPac Surrender and Occupation Rpt*; CTF 31 AR, Occupation and Securing of the Yokosuka Naval Base and Airfield, 18Aug-8Sep45, dtd 8Sep45, hereafter *Yokosuka Occupation Force AR*; CTG 31.3 AR, Initial Occupation of Yokosuka Naval Base Area, Japan dtd 7Sep45, hereafter *Fleet Landing Force AR* (OAB, NHD); CTU 31.3.2 Record of Events, dtd 6Sep45; CTU 31.3.3 AR, Initial Landings Incident to the Occupation of Tokyo, 20Aug-4Sep45, dtd 5Sep45; MAG-31 WarDs, Sep-Dec45; 3/4 WarD, Jan46; 2d SepGdBn (Prov) WarDs, Feb-Jun46; Kenneth W. Condit and Edwin T. Turnbladh, *Hold High The Torch: A History of the 4th Marines* (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1960); Henry I. Shaw, Jr., *The United States Marines in the Occupation of Japan—Marine Corps Historical Reference Series No. 24* (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1961), hereafter Shaw, *Marine Occupation of Japan*.

occupation of Japan had been formulated at the headquarters of MacArthur and Nimitz. Staff studies, based on the possibility of swift collapse of enemy resistance, were prepared and distributed at army and fleet level for planning purposes. In the early summer of 1945, as fighting raged on Okinawa and in the Philippines, dual planning went forward for both the assault on Japan (OLYMPIC and CORONET) and the occupation operation (BLACKLIST). (See Map 26.)

Many essential elements of the two plans were similar, and the Sixth Army, which had been slated to make the attack on Kyushu under OLYMPIC, was given the contingent task of occupying southern Japan under BLACKLIST.² In like manner, the Eighth Army, utilizing the wealth of information it had accumulated regarding Honshu in planning CORONET, was designated the occupying force for northern Japan. The Tenth Army, also scheduled for the Honshu assault by CORONET, was given the mission of occupying Korea in BLACKLIST plans.³

When, in the wake of atomic bombings and Russian entry into the war, the Japanese government made its momentous decision to surrender, the "only military unit at hand with sufficient power to take Japan into custody at

short notice and enforce the Allies' will until occupation troops arrived"⁴ was Admiral William F. Halsey's Third Fleet, at sea off the enemy coast. Advance copies of Halsey's Operation Plan 10-45 for the occupation of Japan, which set up Task Force 31, the Yokosuka Occupation Force, were distributed on 8 August. Two days later, Rear Admiral Oscar C. Badger (Commander, Battleship Division 7) was designated the commander of TF 31, and all commanders of carriers, battleships, and cruisers in the Third Fleet were alerted to organize and equip bluejacket and Marine landing forces from amongst their crews. At the same time, FMFPac directed the 6th Marine Division to furnish one RCT to the Third Fleet for possible early occupation duty in Japan.⁵

General Shepherd, the division commander, without hesitation selected the 4th Marines. This was a symbolic gesture on his part, as the old 4th Marine Regiment had participated in the Philippine Campaign in 1942 and had been captured with other U. S. forces in the Philippines. Now the new 4th Marines would be the main combat formation taking part in the initial landing and occupation of Japan.⁶

Brigadier General William T. Clement, Assistant Division Commander, was named to head the Fleet Landing Force.

On 11 August, IIIAC prepared preliminary plans for the activation of Task Force Able, which consisted of a skeletal headquarters detachment, the


² Sixth Army Rpt of the Occupation of Japan, 22Sep-30Nov45, n.d., p. 10, hereafter *Sixth Army Rpt* (Army Sec, WWII RecDiv, NA).

³ On 13 August 1945, MacArthur's headquarters substituted XXIV Corps for Tenth Army as the Korean Occupation Force. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁴ Halsey and Bryan, *Halsey's Story*, p. 247.

⁵ IIIAC WarD, Aug45, p. 3.

⁶ BGen Louis Metzger ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 6Jan66, hereafter *Metzger ltr*.



T.L. RUSSELL

4th Marines, Reinforced,⁷ an amphibian tractor company, and a medical company. Concurrently, officers designated to form General Clement's staff were alerted and immediately began planning to load out the task force. Warning orders, directing that the RCT with attached units be ready to embark within 48 hours, were passed to the staff.

The curtain of secrecy surrounding the proposed operation was lifted at 0900 on 12 August so that task force units could deal directly with the necessary service and supply agencies without processing their requests through the corps staff. All elements of the task force were completely reoutfitted, and the 5th Field Service Depot and receiving units went on a 24-hour day to complete the resupply task. The 4th Marines joined 600 replacements from the FMFPac Transient Center, Marianas, to fill the gaps in its ranks left by combat attrition and stateside rotation.

Dump areas and dock space were allotted by the Island Commander, Guam, to accommodate the five transports, a cargo ship, and an LSD of

Transport Division 60 assigned to lift Task Force Able. The mounting-out process was considerably aided by the announcement that all ships would arrive in port on 13 August, 24 hours later than they were originally scheduled. On the evening of the 14th, however, "all loading plans for supplies were thrown into chaos"⁸ by news of the substitution of a smaller type of transport for one of those of the original group. The resultant reduction of shipping space was partially made up by the assignment of an LST to the transport force. Later, after the task force had departed Guam, a second LST was allotted to lift most of the remaining supplies, including the tractors of Company A, 4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

Loading began at 1600, 14 August, and continued throughout the night. The troops boarded ship between 1000 and 1200 the following day, and that evening, the transport division sailed for its rendezvous at sea with the Third Fleet. "In a period of approximately 96 hours the Fourth Regimental Combat Team, Reinforced, had been completely re-outfitted, all equipment deficiencies corrected, all elements provided an initial allowance to bring them up to T/O and T/A [Table of Allowance] levels, and a thirty-day re-supply procured for shipment."⁹

Two days prior to the departure of the main body of Task Force Able, General Clement and a nucleus of his headquarters personnel left Guam on the LSV (landing ship, vehicle) USS *Ozark* to join the Third Fleet. There had been

⁷ The 4th Marines was reinforced by the following units: 1st Battalion, 15th Marines; Company C, 6th Tank Battalion; Tank Maintenance Section, 6th Service Battalion; Company A, 6th Engineer Battalion; Company A, 6th Pioneer Battalion; Company A, 6th Medical Battalion; Truck Company, 6th Motor Transport Battalion; 1st Platoon, Ordnance Company, 6th Service Battalion; Service Platoon, 6th Service Battalion; Supply Platoon, 6th Service Battalion; Band Section, 6th Marine Division Band; and a Shore Party Communication Team, Ships Fire Control Party, and Air-Ground Liaison Team of the 6th Assault Signal Company. *Fleet Landing Force AR*, p. 2.

⁸ *Fleet Landing Force AR*, p. 6.

⁹ *Ibid.*

no opportunity for preliminary planning, and no definite mission had been received, so the time en route to the rendezvous was spent studying intelligence summaries of the Tokyo Bay area. Halsey's ships were sighted and joined on 18 August. The next morning, Clement and key members of his staff transferred to the battleship *Missouri* for the first of a round of conferences on the coming operation.¹⁰

Admiral Badger formed TF 31 on 19 August from the ships assigned to him from the Third Fleet. The transfer of men and equipment to designated transports by means of breeches buoys and cargo slings began immediately. Carriers, battleships, or cruisers were brought along both sides of a transport to expedite the operation.¹¹ In addition to the landing battalions of bluejackets and Marines, Third Fleet units formed base maintenance companies, a naval air activities organization to operate a Yokosuka airfield, and nucleus crews to take over captured Japanese vessels. Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings' British Carrier Task Force contributed a landing force of seamen and Royal

Marines. In less than three days, the task of transferring at sea some 3,500 men and hundreds of tons of weapons, equipment, and ammunition was accomplished. The newly formed units, as soon as they reported on board their transports, began an intensive program of training for ground combat operations and occupation duties.

On 20 August, the ships carrying the 4th RCT arrived and joined the burgeoning task force. General Clement's command now included the 5,400 men of the reinforced 4th Marines, a three-battalion regiment of approximately 2,000 Marines taken from 33 ships' detachments,¹² a naval regiment of 956 men organized from the crews of 10 ships into a regimental headquarters, landing battalions, and 8 nucleus crew units to handle captured shipping,¹³ and a British battalion of 250 seamen and 200 Royal Marines. To act as a floating reserve for the landing force, five additional battalions of bluejackets were organized and appropriately equipped from within the carrier groups.

¹⁰ Upon arrival at Tokyo Bay, "General Clement and his small staff were assigned a destroyer escort for several days" to be used as a "taxicab" for visiting and holding conferences on the flagships of the key commanders involved in the landing. "Transfers of the General and staff were made in breeches buoys ranging in quality from mail pouches to Admiral Halsey's fancy fringed model." Col Orville V. Bergren ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 14May66, hereafter *Bergren* ltr.

¹¹ "It was quite a sight to see a transport ship under way in open sea with an aircraft carrier on one side and a battleship or cruiser on the other transferring their Marine detachments or bluejackets to the transport." *Ibid.*

¹² This regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William T. Lantz, came from the Marine Detachments of the following Third Fleet ships: USS *Alabama*, *Indiana*, *Massachusetts*, *Missouri*, *North Carolina*, *South Dakota*, *Wisconsin*, *Bataan*, *Belleau Wood*, *Bennington*, *Bon Homme Richard*, *Cowpens*, *Hancock*, *Independence*, *Lexington*, *Monterey*, *Randolph*, *San Jacinto*, *Ticonderoga*, *Wasp*, *Yorktown*, *Amsterdam*, *Atlanta*, *Boston*, *Chicago*, *Dayton*, *Duluth*, *Oklahoma City*, *Pasadena*, *Quincy*, *Springfield*, *Topeka*, and *Wilkes Barre*. CTU 31.3.2 Rec of Events, dtd 6Sep45, *passim*.

¹³ CTU 31.3.3 AR—Initial Landings Incident to the Occupation of Tokyo—Period 20Aug-4Sep45, dtd 5Sep45, pp. 3, 6 (OAB, NHD).



FLEET LANDING FORCE personnel are transferred from USS Missouri to USS Iowa somewhere at sea off the coast of Japan prior to the initial occupation landings. (USN 80-G-332826)

Halsey had assigned TF 31 a primary mission of seizing and occupying the Yokosuka Naval Base and its airfield. (See Map 27.) Initial collateral missions included the demilitarization of the entire Miura Peninsula, which formed the western arm of the headlands enclosing Tokyo Bay, and the seizure of the Zushi area, tentative headquarters for MacArthur, on the southwest coast of the peninsula. To accomplish these missions two alternative schemes of maneuver were considered. The first contemplated a landing by assault troops on beaches near the town of Zushi, followed by an overland drive east across the peninsula to secure the naval base for the landing of supplies and reinforcements. The second plan involved a direct landing from within Tokyo Bay on the beaches and docks of Yokosuka Naval Base and Air Station, followed on order by the occupation of Zushi and the demilitarization of the entire peninsula. All planning by TF 31 was coordinated with that of the Eighth Army, whose commander, Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, had been appointed by MacArthur to command the forces ashore in the occupation of northern Japan.

On 21 August, General Eichelberger, who had been informed of the alternative plans formulated by TF 31, directed that the landing be made at the naval base rather than in the Zushi area. Admiral Halsey had recommended the adoption of the Zushi landing plan since it did not involve bringing shipping into restricted Tokyo Bay until assault troops had dealt with "the pos-


sibility of Japanese treachery."¹⁴ The weight of evidence, however, was rapidly swinging in support of the theory that the enemy was going to cooperate fully with the occupying forces and that some of the precautions originally thought necessary could now be held in abeyance. But the primary reason for the selection of Yokosuka rather than Zushi for the landing area was the problems that would arise in moving the landing force overland from Zushi to Yokosuka. "This overland movement would have exposed the landing force to possible enemy attack while its movement was restricted over narrow roads and through a series of tunnels which were easily susceptible to sabotage. Further, it would have delayed the early seizure of the major Japanese naval base."¹⁵

Eichelberger's directive also included the information that the 11th Airborne Division was to establish its own airhead at Atsugi airfield a few miles northwest of the north end of the Miura Peninsula. The original plans of the Fleet Landing Force, which had been made on the assumption that General Clement's men would seize Yokosuka Air Station for the airborne operation, had to be changed to provide for a simultaneous Army-Navy landing. A tentative area of responsibility including the cities of Uruga, Kubiri, Yokosuka, and Funakoshi was assigned to Clement's force, and the rest of the peninsula became the responsibility of the 11th Airborne Division.

To ensure the safety of Allied warships entering Tokyo Bay, Clement's

¹⁴ Halsey and Bryan, *Halsey's Story*, p. 275.

¹⁵ Metzger *ltr.*



MAP 27

T. L. RUSSELL

operation plan detailed the British Landing Force to land on and demilitarize four small island forts in the Uraga Strait at the entrance to Tokyo Bay. To erase the threat of shore batteries and coastal forts, the reserve battalion of the 4th Marines (2/4) was given the mission of landing on Futtsu Saki, a narrow point of land jutting into the eastern side of Uraga Strait. After completing its mission, 2/4 was to reembark in its landing craft and rejoin its regiment. Nucleus crews from the Fleet Naval Landing Force were to enter the inner Yokosuka Harbor prior to the designated H-Hour and take over the damaged battleship *Nagato*, whose guns commanded the landing beaches.

The 4th Marines, with 1/4 and 3/4 in assault, were scheduled to make the initial landing at Yokosuka on L-Day. The battalions of the Fleet Marine and Naval Landing Forces were to land in reserve and take control of specific areas of the naval base and air station, while the 4th Marines pushed inland to link up with elements of the 11th Airborne Division landing at Atsugi airfield. The cruiser *San Diego*, Admiral Badger's flagship, 4 destroyers, and 12 gunboats were to be prepared to furnish naval gunfire support on call. Although no direct support planes were assigned, approximately 1,000 fully armed aircraft would be airborne and available if needed. Despite the hope that the Yokosuka landing would be uneventful, TF 31 was prepared to deal with either organized resistance or individual acts of fanaticism on the part of the Japanese.

L-Day had been originally scheduled for 26 August, but on 20 August, a

threatening typhoon forced Admiral Halsey to postpone the landing date to the 28th. Ships were to enter Sagami Wan, the vast outer bay, on L minus 2. On 25 August, word was received from MacArthur that the anticipated typhoon would delay Army air operations for 48 hours, and L-Day was consequently set for 30 August and the entry of the Sagami Wan ordered for the 28th.

The Japanese had been warned as early as 15 August to begin minesweeping in the waters off Tokyo to facilitate the operations of the Third Fleet. On the morning of the day stipulated for American entry into Sagami Wan, Japanese emissaries and pilots were to meet with Rear Admiral Robert B. Carney, Halsey's Chief of Staff, and Admiral Badger on board the *Missouri* to receive instructions relative to the surrender of the Yokosuka Naval Base and to guide the first Allied ships into anchorages. Halsey was not anxious to keep his ships, many of them small vessels crowded with troops, at sea in typhoon weather, and he asked and received permission from MacArthur to put into Sagami Wan one day early.¹⁶

The Japanese emissaries reported on board the *Missouri* early on 27 August. They said a lack of suitable minesweepers had prevented them from clearing Sagami Wan and Tokyo Bay, but the movement of Allied shipping to safe berths in Sagami Wan under the guidance of Japanese pilots was accomplished nonetheless without incident. By late afternoon, the Third Fleet was anchored at the entrance of Tokyo Bay. American minesweepers checked the

¹⁶ Halsey and Bryan, *Halsey's Story*, p. 275.

channel leading into the bay and reported it clear.

On 28 August, the first American task force, consisting of combat ships of Task Force 31, entered Tokyo Bay and dropped anchor off Yokosuka at 1300. Vice Admiral Totsuka, Commandant of the *First Naval District* and the Yokosuka Naval Base, and his staff reported to Admiral Badger in the *San Diego* for further instructions regarding the surrender of his command. Only the absolute minimum of maintenance personnel, interpreters, guides, and guards were to remain in the naval base area; the guns of the forts, ships, and coastal batteries commanding the bay were to be rendered inoperative; the breech-blocks were to be removed from all antiaircraft and dual-purpose guns. Additionally, the Japanese were told to fly a white flag over every gun position and to station at each warehouse and building an individual who had a complete inventory of the building and keys to all the spaces. "Both of the above were meticulously carried out."¹⁷

As the naval commanders made arrangements for the Yokosuka landing, a reconnaissance party of Army troops landed at Atsugi airfield to prepare the way for the airborne operation on L-Day. Radio contact was established with Okinawa, where the 11th Division was waiting to execute its part in BLACKLIST. The attitude of the Japanese officials, both at Yokosuka and Atsugi, was uniformly one of docility and cooperation, but bitter experience caused the Allied commanders and troops to view with a jaundiced eye the

picture of the Japanese as meek and harmless.

On the evening of 27 August appeared a reminder of another aspect of the war. At that time, two British prisoners of war hailed one of the Third Fleet picket boats in Tokyo Bay and were taken on board the *San Juan*, command ship of a specially constituted Allied Prisoner of War Rescue Group. Their harrowing tales of life in the prison camps and of the extremely poor physical condition of many of the prisoners prompted Halsey to order the rescue group to stand by for action on short notice. On 29 August, the *Missouri* and the *San Juan* task group entered Tokyo Bay. At 1420, Admiral Nimitz arrived by seaplane and authorized Halsey to begin rescue operations immediately.¹⁸ Special teams, guided and guarded by carrier planes overhead, immediately started the enormous task of bringing in the prisoners from the many large camps in the Tokyo-Yokohama area. By 1910 that evening, the first RAMPs (Recovered Allied Military Personnel) arrived on board the hospital ship *Benevolence*, and at midnight 739 men had been brought out.¹⁹

Long before dawn on L-Day, the first group of transports of TF 31 carrying 2/4 began moving into Tokyo Bay. All

¹⁸ General MacArthur had directed that the Navy role in the POW rescue operations be held up until it could be coordinated with the work of specially constituted Eighth Army rescue teams. Admiral Nimitz, however, realized that MacArthur would understand the urgency of the situation, and gave the go-ahead signal to Halsey. Halsey and Bryan, *Halsey's Story*, p. 278.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Metzger ltr.

the plans of the Yokosuka Occupation Force had been based on an H-Hour of 1000 for the main landing, but last-minute word was received from MacArthur on 29 August that the first serials of the 11th Airborne Division would be landing at Atsugi airfield at 0600. Consequently, to preserve the value and impact of simultaneous Army-Navy operations, TF 31 plans were changed to allow for the earlier landing time.

The first landing craft carrying Marines of 2/4 touched the south shore of Futtsu Saki at 0558; two minutes later, the first transport plane rolled to a stop on the runway at Atsugi, and the occupation of Japan was underway. In both areas, the Japanese had followed their instructions to the letter. On Futtsu Saki the coastal guns and mortars had been rendered useless, and only the bare minimum of maintenance personnel, 22 men, remained to make a peaceful turnover of the forts and batteries. By 0845, the battalion had accomplished its mission and was reembarking for the Yokosuka landing, now scheduled for 0930.

With first light came dramatic evidence that the Japanese would comply with the surrender terms. On every hand, lookouts on TF 31 ships could see white flags flying over abandoned and inoperative gun positions. Nucleus crews from the Fleet Naval Landing Force boarded the battleship *Nagato* at 0805 and received the surrender from a skeleton force of officers and technicians; the firing locks of the ship's main battery had been removed and all secondary and AA guns had been dismounted. On the island forts, occupied by the British Landing Force at 0900,

the story was much the same—the coastal guns had been rendered ineffective, and the few Japanese remaining as guides and interpreters amazed the British with their cooperativeness.

The Japanese had not only cleared the naval yard and the airfield areas as directed, but had removed from the immediate area all Japanese whom they considered 'hot-headed' or whom they believed would not abide by the Emperor's decree. Additionally, uniformed police from Tokyo had been brought down and were stationed outside of the Initial Occupation Line which effectively cordoned the occupation forces from the Japanese population. It was obvious that the Japanese fully intended to carry out the terms of the surrender.²⁰

The main landing of the 4th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Fred D. Beans, was almost anticlimactic. Exactly on schedule, the first waves of 1/4 and 3/4 crossed the line of departure and headed for their respective beaches. At 0930, men of the 1st Battalion landed on Red Beach southeast of Yokosuka airfield and those of the 3d Battalion on Green Beach in the heart of the Navy yard. There was no resistance. The Marines moved forward rapidly, noting that the few unarmed Japanese present wore white armbands, according to instructions, to signify that they were essential maintenance troops, officials, or interpreters. Leaving guards at warehouses, primary installations, and gun positions, the 4th Marines pushed on to reach the designated Initial Occupation Line.

General Clement and his staff landed at 1000 on Green Beach and were met by a party of Japanese officers, who

²⁰ Metzger ltr.



MEMBERS of the Yokosuka Occupation Force inspect a Japanese fortification on Futtsu Saki. (USMC 134741)



GENERAL CLEMENT looks over Yokosuka Naval Base after its surrender by the former commander (r.). (USMC 133863)

formally surrendered the naval base area. "They were informed that non-cooperation or opposition of any kind would be severely dealt with."²¹ Clement then proceeded to the Japanese headquarters building, where an American flag presented by the 6th Marine Division was officially raised.²²

Vice Admiral Totsuka had been ordered to be present on the docks of the naval base to surrender the entire *First Naval District* to Admiral Carney, acting for Admiral Halsey, and Admiral Badger. The *San Diego*, with Carney and Badger on board, tied up at the dock at Yokosuka at 1030. The surrender took place shortly thereafter with appropriate ceremony, and Badger, accompanied by Clement, departed for the Japanese Naval Headquarters building to set up the headquarters of TF 31.

With operations proceeding satisfactorily at Yokosuka and in the occupation zone of the 11th Airborne Division, General Eichelberger took over operational control of the Fleet Landing Force from Halsey at 1200. Both of the top American commanders in the Allied drive across the Pacific set foot on Japanese soil on L-Day; General MacArthur landed at Atsugi airfield at 1419 to begin *de facto* rule of Japan, which was to last more than five years, and Admiral Nimitz, accompanied by Halsey,

came ashore at Yokosuka at 1330 to make an inspection of the naval base.

Reserves and reinforcements landed at Yokosuka during the morning and early afternoon according to schedule. The Fleet Naval Landing Force took over the area that had been secured by 3/4, and the Fleet Marine Landing Force occupied the airfield installations seized earlier by 1/4. The British Landing Force, after evacuating all Japanese personnel from the island forts, landed at the navigation school in the naval base and took over the area between the sectors occupied by the Fleet Naval and Marine Landing Forces. Azuma, a large island hill mass, which had been extensively tunnelled for use as a small boat supply base, was part of the British occupation area. It was investigated by a force of Royal Marines and found deserted.

The 4th Marines, relieved by the other elements of the landing force, moved out to the Initial Occupation Line and set up a perimeter defense for the naval base and airfield. Patrol contact was made with the 11th Airborne Division, which had landed 4,200 men during the day.

The first night ashore was uneventful, marked only by routine guard duty. General MacArthur's orders to disarm and demobilize had been carried out with amazing speed. There was no evidence that the Japanese would do anything but cooperate with the occupying troops. The Yokosuka area, for example, which had formerly been garrisoned by about 50,000 men, now held less than a tenth of that number in skeletal head-

²¹ *Fleet Landing Force AR*, p. 18.

²² This was the same flag that had been raised by the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade at Guam and the 6th Marine Division at Okinawa. Cass, *6th MarDiv Hist*, p. 203.

quarters, processing, maintenance, police, and minesweeping units. It was clear that, militarily at least, the occupation was slated for success.

On 31 August, the Fleet Landing Force continued to consolidate its hold on the naval base area. Company L of 3/4 sailed in two destroyer transports to Tateyama Naval Air Station on the northeastern shores of Sagami Wan to reconnoiter the beach approaches and to cover the 3 September landing of the 112th Cavalry RCT. Here again, the Japanese were waiting peacefully to carry out their surrender instructions.

Occupation operations continued to run smoothly as preparations were made to accept the surrender of Japan on board the *Missouri*. Even as the surrender ceremony was taking place, advance elements of the main body of the Eighth Army occupation force were entering Tokyo harbor. Ships carrying the headquarters of the XI Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division docked at Yokohama. Transports with the 112th Cavalry RCT on board moved to Tateyama, and on 3 September, the troopers landed and relieved Company L of 3/4, which then returned to Yokosuka.

As the occupation operation proceeded without the discovery of any notable obstacles, plans were laid to dissolve the Fleet Landing Force and TF 31. The 4th Marines was selected to take over responsibility for the entire naval base area. By 6 September, ships' detachments of bluejackets and Marines had returned to parent vessels and the provisional landing units were disbanded.

While a large part of the strength of the Fleet Landing Force was returning to normal duties, a considerable augmentation to Marine strength in northern Honshu was being made. On 23 August, AirFMFPac had designated Marine Aircraft Group 31, then at Chimu airfield on Okinawa, to move to Japan as a supporting air group for the northern occupation. Colonel John C. Munn, its commanding officer, had reconnoitered Yokosuka airfield soon after the initial landing, and on 7 September the first echelon of his headquarters and the planes of Marine Fighter Squadron 441 flew in from Okinawa. Surveillance flights over the Tokyo Bay area began the following day as additional squadrons of the group continued to arrive. Initially, Munn's planes served under Third Fleet command, but on 16 September, MAG-31 came under operational control of Fifth Air Force.

Admiral Badger's TF 31 had been dissolved on 8 September when the Commander, Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, assumed responsibility to SCAP for the naval occupation area. General Clement's command continued to function for a short time thereafter while most of the reinforcing units of the 4th Marines loaded out for return to Guam. On 20 September, Lieutenant Colonel Beans relieved General Clement of his responsibilities at Yokosuka, and the general and his Task Force Able staff flew back to Guam to rejoin the 6th Division. Before he left, however, Clement was able to take part in a ceremony in which 120 RAMPs of the "old" 4th Marines captured at Corregidor, received the colors of the "new" 4th from the hands of the men who had carried on the regi-

mental tradition in the Pacific war.²³

After the initial major contribution of naval land forces to the occupation of northern Japan, the operation became more and more an Army task. As additional troops arrived, the Eighth Army area of effective control was enlarged to include all of northern Japan. In October, the occupation zone of the 4th Marines was reduced to include only the naval base, airfield, and town of Yokosuka. In effect, the regiment became a naval base guard detachment, and on 1 November, control of the 4th Marines passed from Eighth Army to the Commander, U. S. Fleet Activities, Yokosuka.²⁴

In addition to routine security and military police patrols, the Marines also carried out Eighth Army demilitarization directives, and collected and disposed of Japanese military and naval material. Detachments from the regiment supervised the unloading at Uraga of Japanese garrison troops returning from bypassed Pacific outposts.

On 20 November, the 4th Marines was detached from the administrative control of the 6th Division and placed

directly under FMFPac. Orders were received directing that preparations be made for 3/4 to relieve the regiment of its duties in Japan, effective 31 December. In common with the rest of the Armed Forces, the Marine Corps faced great public and Congressional pressure to send its men home for discharge as rapidly as possible. Its world-wide commitments had to be examined with this in mind. The Japanese attitude of co-operation with occupation authorities fortunately permitted considerable reduction of troop strength.

In Yokosuka, Marines who did not meet the age, service, or dependency point total necessary for discharge in December or January were transferred to the 3d Battalion, and men with the requisite number of points were concentrated in the 1st and 2d Battalions. On 1 December, 1/4 completed loading out and sailed for the States to be disbanded. The 3d Battalion, reinforced by the regimental units and a casual company formed to provide replacements for ships' Marine detachments, relieved 2/4 of all guard responsibilities on 24 December. The 2d Battalion, with the

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 205. This was an occasion of deep personal significance to General Clement, who had been present in Manila as Marine officer on the staff of the Commander, Asiatic Fleet, at the outbreak of the war. He had volunteered to serve with the 4th Marines on Corregidor when fleet headquarters withdrew from the area, but he was ordered to leave the island fortress by submarine just before the American surrender.

²⁴ Shortly after the 4th Marines occupied the Yokosuka naval base, the small Japanese naval garrison there entertained a group of officers from the regiment. During the course of the gathering, "it developed that a Japanese Lieutenant Commander present had been in the

garrison at New Georgia Island and had headed the SNLP [Special Naval Landing Party] that was occupied, among other things, in trying to locate and capture the Marine Coast-Watcher who had been providing intelligence from New Georgia Island for some time. The Coast-Watcher happened to be Major Clay Boyd, who was present at the party. It was interesting to hear these two former enemies describing their experiences and exchanging questions regarding their New Georgia activities. It provided an interesting [situation] whereby two officers of different countries could exchange such friendly conversation after having been such deadly enemies only months before." *Bergren ltr.*

Regimental Weapons and the Headquarters and Service Companies, loaded out between 27–30 December and sailed for the United States on New Year's Day.

The 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, assumed the duties of the regiment at midnight on 31 December, although a token regimental headquarters remained in Yokosuka to carry on in the name of the 4th Marines. On FMFPac order, this headquarters detachment left Japan on 6 January to join the 6th Marine Division at Tsingtao, in North China.

On 15 February 1946, 3/4 was reorganized and redesignated the 2d Separate Guard Battalion (Provisional), FMFPac. Its military police and security duties in the naval base area remained the same. Most of the occupation tasks of demilitarization in the limited area of the naval base had been completed, and the battalion settled into a routine of guard, ceremonies, and training that was little different from that of any Navy yard barracks detachment in the United States.

The continued cooperation of the Japanese with SCAP occupation directives and the lack of any overt signs of resistance considerably lessened the need for the fighter squadrons of MAG-31. On 7 October, Fifth Air Force returned control of the group to the Navy. Regular reconnaissance flights in the Tokyo area were discontinued on 15 October, and the operations of MAG-31 were confined largely to mail, courier, transport, and training flights. Personnel and unit reductions similar to those imposed on the 4th Marines also occurred in the air units. By the spring of 1946, the need for Marine participation in the occupation of Japan had

diminished, and early in May, MAG-31 received orders to return to the United States. By 20 June, all serviceable aircraft had been shipped out and on that date, all group personnel were flown out of Japan. The departure of MAG-31 marked the end of Marine occupation activities in northern Japan and closed the final chapter of the Yokosuka operation.

SASEBO-NAGASAKI LANDINGS ²⁵

The favorable reports of Japanese compliance with surrender terms in northern Japan allowed a considerable number of changes to be made in the operation plans of Sixth Army and Fifth Fleet. Prisoner of war evacuation groups could be sent into ports of southern Honshu and Kyushu prior to the arrival of occupation troops, and the main landings could be made administratively without the show of force originally thought necessary. In fact, before the first troop echelon of Sixth Army arrived in Japan, almost all of the RAMPs and civilian internees had been

²⁵ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: CinCPac WarDs, Sep-Oct45; *CinCPac Surrender and Occupation Rpt*; ComFifthFlt AR—The Occupation of Japan, 15Aug–8Nov45, n.d., hereafter *ComFifthFlt AR*; *Sixth Army Rpt*; ComPhibGru 4 Rpt of Occupation of Sasebo and Nagasaki and of Fukuoka-Shimonseki Areas, dtd 11Nov-45; VAC OpRpt, Occupation of Japan, dtd 30Nov45, hereafter *VAC OpRpt*; VAC WarD, Sep45; 2d MarDiv OpRpt, Occupation of Japan, dtd 1Dec45, hereafter *2d MarDiv OpRpt*; 5th MarDiv OpRpt, Occupation of Japan, dtd 5Dec45, hereafter *5th MarDiv OpRpt*; 5th MarDiv WarD, Sep45; MAG-22 WarD, Sep45; Shaw, *Marine Occupation of Japan*.



THE “NEW” 4TH MARINES passes in review for members of the “old” 4th, recently liberated from prison camps. (USMC 135287)



26TH MARINES moves into Sasebo. (USMC 139128)

released from their prisons and processed for evacuation by sea or air.

Japanese authorities received orders from SCAP to bring Allied prisoners into designated processing centers on Honshu and Kyushu. In the Eighth Army occupation zone, Yokohama was the center of recovery activities, and by 21 September, 17,531 RAMPs and internees (including over 7,500 from the Sixth Army area) had been examined there and hospitalized or evacuated.²⁶ On 12 September, after Fifth Fleet minesweepers had cleared the way, a prisoner recovery group put into Wakayama in western Honshu and began processing RAMPs. In less than three days, the remainder of the prisoners in the Sixth Army area on Honshu and those from Shikoku—in all 2,575 men—had been embarked in evacuation ships.

Atom-bombed Nagasaki, which has one of the finest natural harbors in Japan, was chosen as the evacuation port for men imprisoned in Kyushu. Minesweeping of the approaches to the port began on 8 September, and the RAMP evacuation group was able to enter on the 11th. The operation was essentially completed by the time occupation troops began landing in Nagasaki; over 9,000 prisoners were recovered.

At the time that the Eighth Army was extending its hold over northern Japan, and the recovery teams and evacuation groups were clearing the fetid prison compounds, preparations for the Sixth Army occupation of western Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu continued. The occupation area contained 55 percent of

the total Japanese population, including half of the presurrender home garrisons, three of the four major naval bases in Japan, all but two of its principal ports, four of its six largest cities, and three of its four main transportation centers. Kyushu, which was destined to be largely a Marine occupation responsibility, supported a population of 10 million in 15,000 square miles of precipitous terrain. Like all of Japan, every possible foot of the island was intensively cultivated, and enough rice and sweet potatoes were produced to allow inter-island export. The main value of Kyushu to the Japanese economy, however, was its industries. The northwest half of the island contains extensive coal fields, the greatest pig iron and steel producing district in Japan, and most important shipyards, plus a host of smaller industrial facilities.

The V Amphibious Corps, initially composed of the 2d, 3d, and 5th Marine Divisions, had been given the task of occupying Kyushu and adjacent areas of western Honshu and Shikoku in Sixth Army plans, at the same time that the I and X Corps of the Eighth Army took control of the rest of western Honshu and Shikoku. The Fifth Fleet, under Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, was responsible for collecting, transporting, and landing the scattered elements of General Walter Krueger's army.²⁷ Because of a lack of adequate shipping, the Marine amphibious corps was not able to

²⁶ *Eighth Army Monograph I*, pp. 23–28.

²⁷ On 19 September, Admiral Spruance as Commander, Fifth Fleet, relieved Admiral Halsey of his responsibilities in the occupation of Japan and assumed command of all naval operations in the Empire.

move its major units to the target simultaneously.²⁸ Therefore, it was necessary that the transport squadron that lifted the 5th Marine Division and VAC Headquarters from the Hawaiian Islands be sent to the Philippines to load out the 32d Infantry Division, which was substituted on 6 September for the 3d Marine Division in the occupation force.²⁹

The first objective to be secured in the VAC zone under Sixth Army plans was the naval base at Sasebo in northwestern Kyushu. (See Map 28.) Its occupation by the 5th Marine Division was to be followed by the seizure of Nagasaki 30 air miles to the south by the 2d Marine Division. When the turn-around shipping arrived, the 32d Infantry Division was to occupy the Fukuoka-Shimonoseki area, either by an overland move from Sasebo or a direct landing, if the mined waters of Fukuoka harbor permitted. Once effective control had been established over the entry port area, the subordinate units of VAC divisions would gradually spread out over

the entire island of Kyushu and across the Shimonoseki straits to the Yamaguchi Prefecture of Honshu to complete the occupation tasks assigned by SCAP.³⁰

Major General Harry Schmidt, VAC commander, opened his command post on board the *Mt. McKinley* off Maui in the Hawaiian Islands on 1 September and sailed to join the 5th Division convoy, already en route to Saipan. LST and LSM groups left the Hawaiian area on 3 September with corps troops and the numerous Army augmentation units necessary to make the combat units an effective occupation force. At Saipan, the various transport groups rendezvoused and units of the 2d Marine Division embarked. Conferences were held to clarify plans for the operations, and two advance reconnaissance parties were dispatched to Japan. One, led by Colonel Walter W. Wensinger, VAC Operations Officer, and consisting of key staff officers of both the corps and the 2d Division, flew to Nagasaki, where it arrived on 16 September. The second party of similar composition, but with beachmaster representatives and 5th Division personnel included, left for Sasebo by high speed transport (APD) on 15 September. The mission of the parties was:

. . . to facilitate smooth and orderly entry of U. S. forces into the Corps zone of responsibility by making contact with

²⁸ Had there been sufficient shipping, other problems would have arisen, for unloading facilities were either primitive or badly damaged by bombing. At Sasebo, there were only two or three docks available, no unloading equipment, and inefficient loading crews. MajGen William W. Rogers ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 12Jan66, hereafter *Rogers ltr*.

²⁹ In order to guard against any possible treachery on the part of the thousands of Japanese troops on bypassed Central Pacific islands, the Navy "requested that one full Marine Division remain in the Marianas prepared for any eventuality." Aurther and Cohlmiia, *3d MarDiv Hist*, p. 331. The 3d Marine Division was given the stand-by job, and consequently the 32d Infantry Division was attached to VAC as a replacement unit.

³⁰ There are seven prefectures or *kens* on Kyushu: Fukuoka, Oita, Miyazaki, Kagoshima, Kumamoto, Nagasaki, and Saga. The prefecture very much resembles the American county in political form. Each of the seven takes its name from the largest city in the *ken*, the location of the prefectural headquarters.

key Japanese civil and military authorities; to execute advance spot checks on compliance with demilitarization orders; and to ascertain such facilities for reception of our forces as condition and suitability of docks and harbors, adequacy of sites selected by map reconnaissance for Corps installations, condition of airfields, roads, and communications.³¹

After issuing instructions to Japanese officials at Nagasaki, Colonel Wensinger and the corps staff members proceeded by destroyer to Sasebo where preliminary arrangements were made for the arrival of the 5th Division. On 20 September, the second reconnaissance party arrived at Sasebo, contacted Wensinger, and completed preparations for the landing.

At dawn on 22 September (A-Day), the transport squadron carrying Major General Thomas E. Bourke's 5th Marine Division and corps headquarters troops arrived off Sasebo. Members of the advance party transferred from an APD which had met the convoy, and reported to their respective unit command ships. At 0859, after Japanese pilots had directed the transports to safe berths in the inner harbor of Sasebo, the 26th Marines (less 3/26) began landing on beaches at the naval air station. As the men advanced rapidly inland, relieving Japanese guards on naval base installations and stores, ships carrying other elements of the division moved to the Sasebo docks to begin general unloading. The shore party, reinforced by the 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, was completely ashore by 1500 and started cargo unloading operations which continued through the night.

The rest of the 28th Marines, in division reserve, remained on board ship on A-Day. The 1st Battalion of the 27th Marines landed on the docks in late afternoon and moved out to occupy the zone of responsibility assigned its regiment. Before troop unloading was suspended at dusk, two artillery battalions of the 13th Marines and regimental headquarters had landed on beaches in the aircraft factory area, and the 5th Tank Battalion had disembarked at the air station. All units ashore established guard posts and security patrols, but the first night of the division in Japan passed without any noticeable event.

On 23 September, as most of the remaining elements of the 5th Division landed and General Bourke set up his command post ashore, patrols started probing the immediate countryside. Company C (reinforced) of the 27th Marines was sent to Omura, about 22 miles southeast of Sasebo, to establish a security guard over the naval air training station there. Omura airfield had been selected as the base of Marine air operations in southern Japan.

A reconnaissance party, led by Colonel Daniel W. Torrey, Jr., commanding officer of MAG-22, had landed and inspected the field on 14 September, and the advance flight echelon of his air group had flown in from Okinawa six days later. Corsairs of VMF-113 reached Omura on 23 September, and the rest of the group flight echelon arrived before the month was over. The primary mission of MAG-22 was similar to that of MAG-31 at Yokosuka: surveillance flights in support of occupation operations.

³¹ VAC *OpRpt*, p. 7.

As flight operations commenced at Omura and the 5th Division consolidated its hold on Sasebo, the second major element of VAC landed in Japan. The early arrival at Saipan of the transports assigned to lift the 2d Division, coupled with efficient staging and loading, had enabled planners to move the division landing date ahead two days. When reports were received that the approaches to the originally selected landing beaches were mined but that the harbor at Nagasaki was clear, the decision was made to land directly in the harbor area. At 1300 on 23 September, the 2d and 6th Marines landed simultaneously on the east and west sides of the harbor.

The two regiments moved out swiftly to occupy the city and curtain off the atom-bomb-devastated area. The Marine detachments from the cruisers *Biloxi* and *Wichita* were relieved by 3/2, which took up the duty of providing security guards in Nagasaki for RAMP operations. Ships were brought alongside of wharfs and docks to facilitate cargo handling, and unloading operations were well underway by nightfall. A quiet calm ruled the city to augur a peaceful occupation.

On 24 September, as the rest of Major General LeRoy P. Hunt's 2d Division began landing, the corps commander arrived from Sasebo by destroyer to inspect the Nagasaki area. General Schmidt had established his CP ashore at Sasebo the previous day and taken command of the two Marine divisions. The only other major Allied unit ashore in Kyushu, an Army task force that was occupying Kanoya airfield in the south-

ernmost part of the island, was transferred to General Schmidt's command from the Far East Air Forces on 1 October. This unit, which was built around a reinforced battalion (1/127) of the 32d Infantry Division, had been flown into Kanoya on 3 September to secure an emergency field on the aerial route to Tokyo from Okinawa and the Philippines.

General Krueger, well satisfied with the progress of the occupation in the VAC zone, assumed command of all forces ashore at 1000 on 24 September. The first major elements of the other corps of the Sixth Army began landing at Wakayama the next day. On every hand, there was ample evidence that the occupation of southern Japan would be bloodless.

Among the VAC troops, whose previous experience with the Japanese in surrender had been "necessarily meager," considerable speculation developed regarding:

... to what extent and how, if at all, the Japanese nation would comply with the terms of surrender imposed. . . . The only thing which could be predicted from the past was that the Japanese reaction would be unpredictable.³²

And it was. In fact, the eventual key to the pattern and sequence of VAC occupation operations was "the single outstanding fact that Japanese compliance with the terms was as nearly correct as could be humanly expected."³³

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

³³ *Ibid.*

Kyushu Deployment to December 1945

KYUSHU OCCUPATION¹

Original plans for the occupation of Japan had contemplated military government of the surrendered nation, coupled with close operational control over the disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese armed forces. During the course of conferences with enemy surrender emissaries at Manila, radical modifications of these plans were made, however, "based on the full cooperation of the Japanese and [including] measures designed to avoid incidents which might result in renewed conflict."²

Instead of instituting direct military rule, the responsible occupation force commanders were to supervise the execution of SCAP directives to the Japanese government, keeping in mind MacArthur's policy of using, but not supporting, that government.³ An important element of the surrender was the clear statement by the Allied powers that from the moment of capitulation,

the Emperor and the Japanese Government would be under the absolute authority of SCAP. The Japanese military forces were to disarm and demobilize under their own supervision, and the Allied forces were to occupy assigned areas at the same time that Japanese demobilization was underway.

The infantry regiment (and divisional artillery operating as infantry) was to be "the chief instrument of demilitarization and control. The entire plan for the imposition of the terms of surrender was based upon the presence of infantry regiments in all the prefectures within the Japanese homeland."⁴ In achieving this aim, a fairly standard pattern of occupational duties was established with the division of responsibilities based on the boundaries of the prefectures so that the existing Japanese government structure could be utilized. In some instances, especially in the 5th Marine Division zone, the vast size of certain prefectures, the density of civilian population, and the tactical necessities of troop deployment combined to force modifications of the general scheme of regimental responsibility for a single prefecture.

Generally speaking, the method of carrying out the regimental mission varied little between zones and units, whether Army or Marine. After selected advance parties of staff officers from higher headquarters and the unit con-

¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: CinCPac WarDs, Sep-Nov45; *Sixth Army Rpt*; VAC *OpRpt*; VAC WarDs, Sep-Nov45; *2d MarDiv OpRpt*; *5th MarDiv OpRpt*; 5th MarDiv WarDs, Sep-Nov45; Fukuoka Base Comd *OpRpt*, Occupation of Japan, dtd 25Nov45; Conner, *5th MarDiv Hist*; Shaw, *Marine Occupation of Japan*.

² *Eighth Army Monograph I*, p. 12.

³ SCAP, Summation No. 1 of Non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea, Sep-Oct45, p. 3 (Army Sec, WWII RecDiv, NA).

⁴ *Sixth Army Rpt*, p. 35.

cerned had established initial liaison with local Japanese authorities, the regiment moved into a bivouac area in or near the zone of responsibility. Reconnaissance patrols were sent out to verify the location of military installations and check inventories of war material submitted by the Japanese. With this information, the regimental commander was able to divide his zone into battalion areas, and the battalion commanders could, in turn, assign their companies specific sectors of responsibility. Billeting and sanitation details preceded the troops into these areas to oversee the preparation of barracks and similar quarters, since many of these buildings were in a deplorable state of repair and rather filthy.

The infantry company or artillery battery then became the working unit that actually accomplished the occupation duties. Company commanders were empowered to seize any military installations in their zone and to use Japanese military personnel not yet demobilized or laborers furnished by Home Ministry representatives to dispose of all material within the installations. SCAP directives governed disposition procedures and divided all material into the following categories:

1. That to be destroyed or scrapped (explosives and armaments not needed for souvenirs or training purposes).
2. That to be used for our operations (telephones, radios, and vehicles).
3. That to be returned to the Japanese Home Ministry (fuel, lumber, etc.).
4. That to be issued as trophies.
5. That to be shipped to the U. S. as trophies or training gear.⁵

⁵ *Ibid.*

The dangerous job of explosive ordnance disposal was handled by the Japanese with a bare minimum of American supervision. Some explosives were either dumped at sea or burned in approved areas, some were exploded in underground sites; and because it was too dangerous to enter certain explosives storage tunnels, these were sealed and the contents left buried.⁶ Weapons and equipment declared surplus to the needs of occupation troops were converted into scrap, mainly by Japanese labor, and then turned over to the Home Ministry for use in essential civilian industries. Foodstuffs and other nonmilitary stocks were returned to the Japanese for distribution.

Although prefectural police maintained civil law and order and enforced democratization decrees issued at the instance of SCAP, constant surveillance was maintained over Japanese methods of government. American intelligence and military government personnel, working with the occupying troops, acted quickly to stamp out any suggestion of a return to militarism or evasion of the surrender terms. Regarding the handling of war criminals, the JCS, on 14 September, had directed MacArthur to "proceed without avoidable delay with the trial before appropriate military courts or tribunals and the punishment of Japanese war criminals as have been or may be apprehended, in accordance with the desire of the President."⁷ Known or suspected war criminals were therefore apprehended and sent to Tokyo for processing and possible arraignment before an Allied tribunal.

⁶ Col Saville T. Clark ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 8Dec65.

⁷ CinCPac WarD, Sep45.

In addition to the apprehension of war criminals and the exercise of supervisory control of Japanese demobilization of the home garrison, occupation troops were responsible for ensuring the smooth processing of hundreds of thousands of military personnel and civilians returning from the outposts of the now defunct Empire. At the same time, thousands of Korean, Formosan, and Chinese prisoners and "voluntary" laborers had to be collected, pacified at times,⁸ housed and fed, and returned to their homelands. In all repatriation operations, Japanese vessels and crews were used to the fullest extent possible in order to conserve Allied manpower and allow for an accelerated program of postwar demobilization.

Soon after the initial VAC landings on Kyushu, investigation disclosed that the Japanese had begun repatriation of their own people from Korea and were returning Koreans home from Japan. The port of Hakata, a short distance up the coast from Fukuoka, was being utilized as an embarkation point, and Moji and Shimonoseki were employed as receiving and holding areas. The Japanese used small craft for the repatriation program, "and processing centers, records, sanitation, etc., were conspicuous by their absence."⁹ Confronted by the first groups of incoming Japanese, the 5th Marine Division set

up a repatriation center at Uragashira, which shortly after 26 September was receiving and processing nearly 3,000 repatriated and demobilized Japanese troops a day. Soon after, Hakata and its receiving area were operating under occupation supervision. The ports of Moji and Shimonoseki were closed down and not authorized for purposes of repatriation because the harbor approaches were still heavily mined and had not yet been cleared.

According to reliable information available to the occupation authorities, there were well over a million Koreans to be repatriated from Japan, and additional ports and receiving centers were set up immediately. Following their inspection, Sensaki, Hakata, Sasebo, and Kagoshima were authorized as VAC zone ports of embarkation and the Japanese were instructed to improve and expand facilities there. Available Japanese shipping, however, fell far short of port capacity.

In addition to the Koreans discovered in the zone, the Americans found that some 40,000 Chinese had to be repatriated; 6,000 of these were in the VAC zone of responsibility along with approximately 7,000 Formosans and 15,000 Ryukyu Islanders. Higher headquarters advised VAC that the Ryukyuans and Formosans—half of whom were demobilized soldiers—could not be repatriated yet, but the Chinese could. The return home of the Chinese on Japanese shipping began early in October from Hakata, and it was found necessary to place U. S. guard detachments on many ships to prevent disorder because the Japanese crews could not control the returnees. The Koreans,

⁸ Deep-rooted feelings of antipathy towards the Japanese among the Koreans and Chinese, coupled with delays in the repatriation program caused by lack of shipping, sometimes led to riots and disturbances. Most of these were handled by Japanese police, but American troops occasionally had to intervene to prevent serious trouble.

⁹ VAC OpRpt, Anx D, App 3, pp. 1-2.

on the other hand, were relatively docile.

With "their constant drift out of nowhere"¹⁰ into repatriation centers, the Koreans soon clogged these points beyond the capacity of available shipping. SCAP authorized the use of 80 LSTs for a China-to-Sasebo run for the repatriation of Japanese, and a Sasebo-to-Korea or -China run for others. After 30 November, the port of Kagoshima was used as a repatriation center. The first Chinese repatriates, a total of 2,800, left Sasebo on 24 November under this system.

The pattern of progressive occupation called for in SCAP plans was quickly established by VAC:

After the 2d and 5th Marine Divisions had landed, VAC's general plan was for the 2d Marine Division to expand south of Nagasaki to assume control of the Nagasaki, Kumamoto, Miyazaki, and Kagoshima Prefectures. The 5th Marine Division in the meantime was to extend east to the prefectures of Saga, Fukuoka, Oita, and Yamaguchi. The latter division was to be relieved in the Fukuoka, Oita, and Yamaguchi areas upon the arrival of sufficient elements of the 32d Division.¹¹

Troops occupying Sasebo found a serious breakdown in those sanitary and public services¹² ordinarily rendered by

¹⁰ *VAC OpRpt*, Annex D, App 3, p. 4.

¹¹ *Sixth Army Rpt*, p. 26.

¹² For example, the telephone service in Sasebo, and western Japan as well, was atrocious. "A telephone call to a point 50 miles away often took many hours for a connection and then [one was able to get] only an unintelligible response." To improve these conditions, VAC established a line of sight system similar to that used in Hawaii, where there was a scrambler unit at the origin and an automatic unscrambler at the receiver. "An

the city. Containing the third largest naval base in Japan, Sasebo was a city whose normal population was approximately 300,000 until 29 June 1945. On that day, Sasebo suffered its only B-29 raid of the war which destroyed a large portion of the city, but left the Navy yard area relatively undamaged. This raid made over 60,000 Japanese homeless and killed 1,000.

On 27 September, four days after he had first landed at Sasebo, General Bourke moved his CP to the naval recruit training center at Ainoura, seven miles to the west of Sasebo.¹³ The 5th Pioneer Battalion, with military police and motor transport units attached, garrisoned Sasebo. This reinforced battalion furnished working parties for the 5th Division quartermaster, unloaded ships, provided guards for supply dumps and water points, and established military police patrols for the city.

As the 5th Marine Division established order in the Sasebo area, it began preparations to extend the occupation throughout the northern area of Kyushu and onto nearby islands, including southern Honshu. A reinforced company of the division was established at Omura almost immediately after landing, and motorized patrols reconnoitered the approaches to Sasebo. Very poor road conditions existing along the route from Sasebo to Omura were particularly bad on the outskirts of the

unsung triumph of the communicators," this system was used throughout the VAC area and was "finally extended to Tokyo" with excellent results. *Rogers ltr.*

¹³ It was later discovered that the defenders of Tarawa had trained at Ainoura. BGen Clarence R. Wallace ltr to CMC, dtd 4Jan66.

former city. The many narrow bridges encountered were often in poor repair or entirely impassable. Japanese males met by the patrols were usually friendly, but the woman and children appeared frightened. As the Japanese populace grew more accustomed to the presence of the Marines and became assured that the occupation forces would not harm them, their shyness and fear disappeared.

During the latter part of the first week of occupation, VAC continued to extend its zone of occupation operations, guarded Japanese military installations and arms and supply dumps, and began to inventory and dispose of the material in these dumps in line with prescribed regulations. The 2d Marine Division established detachments at Isahaya (northeast of Nagasaki) and Kawatana at the same time that patrols exercised surveillance over all roads and strategic areas.

One week after the initial landings, the 5th Division zone of responsibility (Z/R) was extended to include Yagihara, Miyazaki, Arita, Takeo, Sechibara, and other small towns to the north and west of Sasebo. The normal occupation missions of the division continued to proceed in a satisfactory manner. Japanese equipment was inventoried rapidly and Japanese guards were relieved by Marine sentries as soon as the inventories were completed. On 29 September, VAC published an operation order for the occupation of Fukuoka. (See Map 28.)

FUKUOKA OCCUPATION

The decision to occupy Fukuoka, largest city in Kyushu and administra-

tive center of the northwestern coal and steel region, was made almost immediately after the initial landings. Because the waters of Fukuoka harbor were liberally sown with mines, the movement to the city was made by rail and road from Sasebo. An advance party, consisting of officers from VAC and the 5th Division, reached Fukuoka on 27 September and began making preliminary arrangements for the entry of the troops. Meetings were held with Japanese military and civilian authorities regarding the conduct of the occupation. Leading elements of the occupation force began arriving on 30 September. Brigadier General Ray A. Robinson, Assistant Division Commander of the 5th Marine Division, was given command of the Fukuoka force which consisted of the 28th Marines (Reinforced) and Army augmentation detachments.

The Fukuoka Occupation Force (FOF), which was placed directly under VAC command, began sending reconnaissance parties followed by company- and battalion-sized occupation forces to the major cities of northern Kyushu and across the Straits of Shimonoseki to Yamaguchi Prefecture in southwestern Honshu. Because of the limited number of troops available to FOF, Japanese guards were left in charge of most military installations, and effective control of the zone was maintained through the use of motorized surveillance patrols.

In order to prevent possible outbreaks of mob violence, Marine guard detachments were set up to administer the Chinese labor camps found in the area, and Japanese Army supplies were

requisitioned to feed and clothe the former POWs and laborers. Some of the supplies were also used to sustain the swarms of Koreans who gathered in temporary camps near the principal repatriation ports of Fukuoka and Senzaki (Yamaguchi Prefecture) while they awaited shipping to return to their homeland. The Marines supervised the loading out of the Koreans and made continuous checks on the processing and discharge procedures used to handle the Japanese troops who returned with each incoming vessel. In addition to its repatriation activities, the FOF located and inventoried vast quantities of Japanese military material for later disposition by the 32d Infantry Division.

On 1 October, General Robinson conferred with ranking Japanese officers concerning orders and instructions pertaining to the occupation. At the direction of higher authority, the FOF commander ordered sentries posted at the more important buildings and dock facilities, and in a swift move to crush a suspected black market operation in foreign exchange, he immediately closed the branches of the Bank of Chosen throughout the FOF zone, posted guards at these branches, sealed their safes and vaults, and impounded the records of the bank.

Further establishment of occupation forces throughout the zone began on 4 October with the movement of a reinforced company from 3/28 into Shimonoseki as the Shimonoseki Occupation Group. On 6 October, another reinforced company of the battalion was sent into the Moji area. The rest of the battalion moved into Moji on 10 October, the day that the Shimonoseki-

Moji Occupation Group was formed. A detachment was sent from Shimonoseki to Yamaguchi the next day, and eight days later, occupation forces were set up at Senzaki.

As General Robinson's force took control of Fukuoka and Yamaguchi Prefectures, the 5th Marine Division expanded its hold on the area east of Sasebo. On 5 October, the division Z/R was extended to include Saga Prefecture and the city of Kurume in the center of the island. The 2d Battalion, 27th Marines, moved to Saga city, operating for a short time as an independent occupation group. On 24 October, the regiment (less 1/27) established its headquarters in Kurume and assumed responsibility for the central portion of the division zone, which now extended to the east coast (Oita Prefecture). Through all of these troop movements, the maintenance of roads and bridges was a constant problem since the inadequate road net quickly disintegrated when punished by the combination of heavy rains and extensive military traffic. The burden of supplying and transporting the scattered elements of VAC was borne by the Japanese rail system.¹⁴

After it had moved to Saga, 2/27 discovered on the airfield there 178 Japanese fighter planes, all but 8 of which

¹⁴ The state of the Kyushu road net, much of which would not support even medium-sized vehicles, and the extensive rice paddy areas contiguous to these roads would have constituted extremely serious obstacles to the prosecution of OLYMPIC, the projected invasion of Kyushu. Fortunately, the extensive Japanese rail network was capable of handling most of the supply requirements of the occupation forces.

had been damaged by typhoons. The battalion also uncovered a vast "ammunition dump where the Japanese had stored approximately one-fifth of the country's ammunition for home defense."¹⁵ A battalion patrol located an internment camp at Shimizu, where Dutch, British, Italian, Portuguese, Swiss, and Belgian nationals had been confined during the war. Upon entering the camp, the Marines found that:

The only remaining internee was an 82-year old Swiss who amazed everyone by proving that he was an ex-U. S. Marine. Edward Zillig had enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1888 in Philadelphia, had been discharged in 1893, and then had reenlisted during the Spanish-American War. He produced a letter from the Veterans Administration showing that he had received a pension. From 1936 until his house was blown to bits, he had lived in Nagasaki with his Japanese wife. Zillig turned over two items to the patrol: (1) a statement of the kind treatment he had received from a Japanese police sergeant, and (2) a request for renewal of his \$60-a-month pension.¹⁶

Zillig also had a request for the "one more thing I want to see in life," a full-dress Marine Corps parade.¹⁷ The old man received his wish shortly thereafter, when he stood beside Lieutenant Colonel John W. A. Antonelli 2/27 commander, and "watched the modern Leathernecks swing by—and he remembered to salute at the right time."¹⁸ The former Marine's pension was renewed, for as soon as the Veterans Ad-

ministration received evidence of Zillig's existence, it began sending him a check again. Veterans legislation that had been passed in Congress during the war years had increased Zillig's pension to \$75 a month. Unfortunately, he did not live long enough to cash more than a few checks, for he committed suicide on 9 March 1946.

FURTHER EXPANSION

When it was decided to occupy Oita Prefecture, the entire 180-mile trip from Sasebo to Oita city was made by rail. The occupation force, Company A (Reinforced) of the 5th Tank Battalion, operating as infantry,¹⁹ set up in the city on 15 October and conducted a reconnaissance of the military installations in the coastal prefecture by means of motorized patrols. The company served as an advance party for 32d Infantry Division troops, and because of its small size, was forced to rely on Japanese labor for most of its material inventory work.

The Marines found that the naval air station at Oita had been almost completely destroyed by American bombs, although nearly 100 dispersed Japanese planes remained in semi-operable condition. Despite the fact that Oita had never been singled out as a primary target for AAF raids, approximately 40 percent of the city had been razed because B-29s

¹⁵ Conner, *5th MarDiv Hist*, p. 153.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Washington Star*, 3Dec45.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ "Tanks were never used even for show purposes because the soft roads would not bear their weight. The Iwo-scarred Shermans had been landed and parked at the Sasebo naval air station, and there they stayed." Conner, *5th MarDiv Hist*, p. 155.



BATTERED BUDDHIST FIGURES *symbolize the atomic destruction suffered at Nagasaki. (USMC 136176)*



MORE THAN 200 Japanese planes *are destroyed at Omura as part of the Allied disarmament program. (USMC 139991)*

had been diverted there when their primary target could not be hit or when the a bomb load left over from those dropped on the initial target. From Oita, the occupation spread northwest along the east coast of Kyushu to Beppu, where the most famous beaches and shore resorts of Japan are located.

The 13th Marines, occupying the area to the south and east of Sasebo in Nagasaki and Saga Prefectures, supervised the processing of Japanese repatriates returning from China and Korea, and handled the disposition of the weapons, equipment, and ammunition that were stored in naval depots near Sasebo and Kawatana. The 1st Battalion, 27th Marines, which was detached from its regiment, was stationed in Sasebo under division control, and furnished a portion of the garrison for the city as well as detachments that investigated the island groups offshore. The division reconnaissance company was sent in DUKWs to Hirado Shima, north of Sasebo, on 2 October. Finding everything in order, the company returned to Sasebo on the 4th.

The 26th Marines, whose patrols ranged the hinterland north and east of Sasebo, had a very short tour of duty in Japan. On 13 October, the regiment was alerted for transfer to the Palau Islands.²⁰ While the 26th was making

preparations to move to Peleliu and supervise the repatriation of Japanese troops from the Western Carolines,²¹ the first elements of the 32d Division began landing at Sasebo. An advance party of the division had arrived in Fukuoka earlier, on 3 October. The 128th Infantry, followed by the 126th Infantry and division troops, moved straight on through the port and entrained for Fukuoka, where the Army units came temporarily under the control of FOF. The V Amphibious Corps placed the 127th Infantry (less 1/127), which landed on 18–19 October, under the operational control of the 5th Division to take over the zone of responsibility of the 26th Marines.

The Fukuoka Occupation Force was dissolved on 24 October when it was relieved by the 32d Division, which opened its command post in Fukuoka on the same day.²² At this time, the Fukuoka Base Command, composed of the service elements that had been assigned to General Robinson's force, was set up to support the operations in northern Kyushu and continued to function until 25 November, when the Army division took over its duties. The 28th Marines

²¹ See pt III, chap 3, "Return to the Islands," above.

²² "The movement of the 32d Army Division to the Fukuoka area created a problem. It was unsafe to send [it] by sea because of the remaining harbor mines. Overland was almost impossible because of the narrow bridges and turns" facing the division's heavy equipment, and surmounting all of this was the impossible loading situation in Sasebo. The 32d "finally went overland in what was a really remarkable logistic feat." *Rogers ltr.*

²⁰ The 6th Marines of the 2d Marine Division was originally scheduled to answer this call from CinCPac, and when its Palau alert was cancelled, it was directed to stand by to move to Sasebo to replace the 26th Marines. On 17 October, this second alert was cancelled when VAC attached the 127th Infantry Regiment to the 5th Marine Division.

and the 5th Tank Battalion occupation forces were relieved by Army units: the 128th RCT²³ took over Yamaguchi Prefecture, the 126th patrolled Fukuoka and Oita Prefectures, and the 127th, after it was relieved by the 28th Marines in the zone formerly occupied by the 26th Marines, occupied Fukuoka and the zone to the north.

The 26th Marines began boarding ship on 18 October and 127th Infantry units moved into the vacated billets. On 19 October, the Marine regiment was detached from the division and returned to FMFPac control as loading continued. Before the transports departed on 21 October, orders were received from FMFPac designating 2/26 for disbandment, and the battalion returned to the Marine Camp, Ainoura—the 5th Division headquarters outside of Sasebo. On 31 October, 2/26, the first of many war-born Marine infantry battalions to end its Pacific service passed out of existence and its men were transferred to other units.

While Brigadier General Robert B. McBride, Jr.'s 32d Infantry Division moved north to take over the area occupied by the Fukuoka and Oita Occupation Forces, the 2d Marine Division gradually expanded its hold on southern Kyushu. Immediately after landing, the

2d and 6th Marines moved into billets in the vicinity of Nagasaki, with the missions of surveillance in their assigned areas and of disposition of enemy military material in the nearby countryside and on the many small islands in the vicinity of the coast. The 8th and 10th Marines went directly from their transports to barracks at Isahaya, where they began patrolling the peninsula to the south and the rest of Nagasaki Prefecture in the 2d Division zone.

On 4 October, VAC changed the boundary between divisions to include Omura in General Hunt's zone. The 5th Division security detachment at the Marine air base was relieved by 3/10 and returned to parent control. Shortly thereafter, the 10th Marines took over the whole of the 8th Marines area in Nagasaki Prefecture.

The corps expanded the 2d Division zone on 5 October to include all of highly industrialized Kumamoto Prefecture. An advance billeting, sanitation, and reconnaissance party of the 8th Marines travelled to Kumamoto city in the southwestern part of the island to make contact with the Japanese authorities and pave the way for regimental assumption of control. By 18 October, all units of the 8th Marines established themselves in and around Kumamoto and began the by-now familiar process of inventory and disposition. In line with SCAP directives outlining measures to restore the civilian economy to a self-supporting level, the Marines assisted the local government wherever necessary to speed the

²³ The infantry units of the 32d Infantry Division were organized as RCTs comprising an infantry regiment, an artillery battalion, and other attached division and corps troops to perform occupation duties. In the Marine divisions, where the artillery regiment was an organic unit, it was reinforced and used as an occupation force in the same manner as the infantry regiments.

conversion of war plants to essential peacetime production.²⁴

The remaining unoccupied portion of Kyushu was taken over by the 2d Division within the next month. Advance parties headed by senior field grade officers contacted civil and military officials in Kagoshima and Miyazaki Prefectures to ensure compliance with surrender terms and adequate preparations for the reception of division troops.²⁵ Miyazaki Prefecture and the half of Kagoshima east of Kagoshima Wan were assigned to the 2d Marines. The remaining half of Kagoshima Prefecture was added to the zone of the 8th Marines; later, the regiment was also given responsibility for conducting occupation operations in the Osumi and Koshiki island groups, which lay to the

south and southwest respectively of Kyushu.

On 29 October, a motor convoy carrying the major part of 1/8 moved from Kumamoto to Kagoshima city to assume control of western Kagoshima. The battalion had to start anew the routine of reconnaissance, inspection, inventory, and disposition that had occupied it twice before. The 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, assigned to the eastern half of Kagoshima, found much of its preliminary occupation spadework already done. The Army task force at Kanoya had been actively patrolling the area since it had come under VAC command. When 2/2, loaded in four LSTs, arrived from Nagasaki on 27 October, it was relatively easy to effect a relief. The Marines landed at Takasu, port for Kanoya, and moved by rail and road to the airfield. On 30 October, 2/2 assumed from 1/127 operational control of the Army Air Force detachment manning the emergency field, and the 32d Division battalion prepared to return to Sasebo to rejoin its regiment.

The remainder of the 2d Marines also moved by sea from Sasebo to Takasu and thence by rail to Miyazaki Prefecture in early November. Regimental headquarters and 3/2 set up their bases of operations at Miyakonojo, and the 1st Battalion moved into billets in the city of Miyazaki.²⁶ By 14 November, with the occupation of Miyazaki complete,

²⁴ A military government team, composed primarily of Army and Navy officers, was assigned to each regimental headquarters and performed a valuable liaison function between the Marine commanders and local government agencies. LtCol Duncan H. Jewell ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 3Jan66.

²⁵ Colonel Samuel G. Taxis, the G-3 of the division, headed up the team which went to southern Kyushu to meet with the commanders of the *Forty-seventh* and *Fiftieth Armies* and the head of the *Naval Base Force* at Kagoshima to explain the provisions of the surrender. When Colonel Taxis compared the strength of the Japanese forces with that of the occupation forces, he came to the conclusion that "a boy was sent to do a man's job." BGen Samuel G. Taxis comments to HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 28Dec65. General Taxis also recalled that his team was purposely composed of only a few Marines in the belief that if a show of force had been made in the south, the Japanese armed forces there would react. *Ibid.*

²⁶ Subsequently, one reinforced company was deployed to a small coastal town half-way between Miyazaki and Oita, and remained there until the entire regiment was withdrawn. *Ibid.*

VAC had established effective control over its entire zone of responsibility.²⁷

At the end of November, VAC could report substantial progress in its major occupation tasks. Over 700,000 Japanese returning from overseas had been processed through ports and separation

²⁷ In late November, in order to determine whether the VAC plan for OLYMPIC was valid and feasible, Brigadier General William W. Rogers, VAC chief of staff, called into Sasebo for a three-day war games session the commanders, chiefs of staff, and principal staff officers of the Japanese forces which were to have defended Kyushu. In the course of these sessions, the play of the games was based on the VAC plan and the defense orders and plans which the Japanese participants brought with them, after some initial reluctance to do so on their part. Questions were asked at random, capabilities and reaction times were measured, and all conceivable factors were taken into consideration. The Japanese were asked how long it would have taken them to move one division. Instead of the 36 hours that the Marines had expected, the answer was 9 days. The reason was that the former enemy commanders could only move their troops at night, and by foot, because of the complete American air superiority over the target by day. At the completion of the war games, it was decisively proven that U. S. air superiority had in fact guaranteed success to the VAC plan. In addition, although the strength of Japanese forces in the south of Kyushu was great, many soldiers were armed with spears only. The more than 2,000 aircraft on Kyushu posed a threat to the American landing, but these planes were held back to be employed in a mass *Kamikaze* attack which was never ordered. The entire three days of sessions were conducted on a thoroughly professional basis with attention paid to mutual courtesy and respect. In the end, General Rogers was satisfied that the VAC plan would have been valid, if OLYMPIC had been consummated. Col Robert D. Heinl, Jr., comments to HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 19Aug66.

centers under corps control. The tide of humanity had not all flowed from one direction, since 273,276 Koreans, Chinese, and Okinawans had been sent back to their homelands. On 1 December, only about 20,000 Japanese Army and Navy personnel remained on duty, all employed in demobilization, repatriation, minesweeping, and similar activities. On that date, in accordance with SCAP directives, these men were transferred to civilian status under newly created government ministries and bureaus. The destruction or other disposition of war material in the Corps area proceeded satisfactorily with surprisingly few mishaps,²⁸ considering the enormous quantity of old and faulty munitions that had to be handled.

The need for large numbers of combat troops in Japan steadily lessened as the occupation wore on, and it became increasingly obvious that the Japanese intended to offer no resistance. Reporting to Washington in September, General MacArthur told General Marshall that he had inspected the occupied areas about Tokyo Bay, and that he believed that Japan was very near to economic and industrial collapse. MacArthur went on to say: "It appears the fire raids have so destroyed the integrity of the industrial establishment as to prevent con-

²⁸ In November, several accidents in the VAC zone occurred during the munitions disposition program. At Kanoya, a dump of parachute flares was accidentally ignited and the resulting fire touched off a major explosion. At Soida, in the 32d Infantry Division zone, a cave full of propellant charges and powder exploded in a devastating blast, which spread death and destruction among nearby Japanese. No American personnel were injured in either accident.

tinuance of modern war.”²⁹ MacArthur continued:

Manpower alone is the only warlike resource available or potential. The Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Staff are fully cognizant of these conditions and as near as can be judged are completely through with this war. Their attitude encourages the strong belief that these agencies are striving to their utmost to effect rapid disarmament and demobilization. They are submissive and apparently sincere. . . . I feel confident that the strength of occupation forces may be cut and retrograde movement of units to the United States well under-way by the 1st of the year or shortly thereafter.³⁰

The first major Marine unit to fulfill its mission in southern Japan and return to the United States was MAG-22. On 14 October, Admiral Spruance, acting for CinCPac, had queried the Fifth Air Force if the Marine fighter group was still considered necessary to the Sasebo area garrison. On 25 October, the Army replied that MAG-22 was no longer needed, and it was returned to the operational control of the Navy. Both the group service squadron and its heavy equipment, which had just arrived from Okinawa, remained on board

ship, and in less than a week AirFMFPac directed that the unit return to the United States. Its planes were flown to an aircraft replacement pool on Okinawa, and low-point men were transferred to MAG-31 as replacements for men eligible for rotation or discharge. On 20 November, after picking up MAG-31 returnees at Yokosuka and similar Army troops at Yokohama, MAG-22 left for home. The Marine Air Base, Omura, remained in operation, but its aircraft strength consisted mainly of light liaison and observation planes of the observation squadrons assigned to VAC divisions.³¹

The redeployment of MAG-22 was only a small part of the general pattern for withdrawing excess occupation forces. On 12 November, VAC informed the Sixth Army that the 5th Marine Division would be released from its duties on 1 December for return to the United States. By the turn of the year, the 2d Marine Division would be the only major Marine unit remaining on occupation duty in southern Japan.

²⁹ CinCAFPac Adv 041207Z of Sep45 to WARCOS in CinCPac WarD, Sep45 (OAB, NHD).

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ MAG-22 WarDs, Oct-Nov45. A third Marine air base at Iwakuni to support operations in the Kure area had been a part of original occupation plans. It was not established, however, and the transport squadrons of MAG-21 intended for it were reassigned, VMR-353 to Guam and VMR-952 to Yokosuka. *ComFifthFlt AR*, pt VI, sec L, p. 2.

Last Months in Japan

Americans, uncertain of how the Japanese people would accept the occupation, had their doubts allayed within a short time after the troops had landed and begun fulfilling their missions. Original Japanese qualms about associating with their conquerors were quickly dispelled after the children:

. . . were the first to lose their fear. These doll-like small fry, most of them wearing uniforms and thoroughly accustomed to saluting, soon began to line the streets and gaze with wide eyes at the Marines and their vehicles. The children's curiosity was soon shared by their elders. Old and young alike seemed especially amazed at the American jeeps and trucks which, regardless of heavy rains and bad roads had the power to travel where their drivers took them. Bulldozers and other earthmoving equipment brought even more amazement. And not the least of the startling sights were the Marines themselves. Men with blue eyes and light hair were astonishing enough, but red-haired Marines were beyond imagination.¹

Japanese cordiality and hospitality became evident as the Marine occupation forces spread out over the island of Kyushu. Other signs of the presence of American troops were the English language safeguard markers placed on churches, religious shrines, and schools, warning occupation troops away and exempting these places from search and trespass.

Although fraternization with the Japanese was not permitted at first, these restrictions were soon eased and it did not take too long for the Marines to learn more than they had known previously of the Japanese way of life and to appreciate Japanese customs and culture. At the same time, the Japanese were often awestruck by the manner and means by which the Americans could accomplish tasks which the Japanese considered difficult but which the Marines considered normal routine. Japanese standards of living and efficiency were woefully below those of the Western world, and the former enemy nation sadly lacked transportation and construction equipment and tools. Most Japanese primary and secondary industry had been devastated in the air raids. Besides, Japanese industrial facilities had long been geared to the production of war materiel rather than consumer goods, or housing, or any of the other products that the civilian population of the Allies was able to obtain, even in wartime.

Japanese men and women alike labored days to accomplish what the Americans with their heavy equipment and know-how could do in minutes. The backward conditions of the Japanese could be blamed partially on the war, but even more so on a way of life and a social structure that had remained largely unchanged for centuries. Although the opening of Japan by the West

¹ Conner, *5th MarDiv Hist*, p. 138.

in the mid-19th Century caused a severe jolt to Japanese attitudes and sensibilities, it was nothing compared to the changes wrought by the American occupation.

There had indeed been many changes and much accomplished by the end of the first few months of occupation, during which time the occupation forces enforced the surrender terms. The Japanese armed forces had been almost completely demobilized, 90 percent of the military facilities in the Home Islands had been razed, and approximately 20 percent of the ammunition and explosives stored in bunkers all over Japan had been destroyed. Eighty percent of the war materiel and equipment still in usable condition had been turned over to the Japanese Home Ministry for conversion to peacetime use.

In the 5th Division area, the 13th Marines alone had supervised the scuttling at sea or the destruction by other means of 188,000 rounds of artillery and mortar ammunition, 25,000 aerial bombs, 1,800 machine guns, 270 torpedoes, 4,500 mines and depth charges, 83 large guns, 400 tons of aircraft parts, 30 tons of signal equipment, 650 tons of torpedo parts, and 161 miscellaneous types of machines that were geared for the manufacture of war materiel. Other VAC units completed similar demolition missions. Even while they enjoyed their stay in Japan and carried out their occupation duties, "Home, when do we go there?" was the single most important topic of conversation among the Marines in Kyushu.²

MARINE WITHDRAWAL³

By 30 November, only about 10 percent of the Marines in VAC had been returned to the States, although discharge and rotation directives had made more than 15,000 men eligible. Marine divisions were under orders to maintain their strength at 90 percent of T/O, and these restrictions severely curtailed the number of men that could be released. Replacements were almost nonexistent in this period of postwar reduction. Still, the 2d Division, which was to remain in Japan, had 7,653 officers and men who were entitled to return home.⁴ To meet this problem, VAC ordered an interchange of personnel between the 2d and 5th Marine Divisions.

High-point men of the 2d Division would be transferred to the 5th Division, and men not yet eligible for discharge or rotation would move from the 5th to the 2d in exchange. Almost half of the 2d Division and 80 percent of the 5th Division, in all about 18,000 Marines and corpsmen, were slated for transfer. At the same time that the personnel exchanges took place, elements of the 2d and 32d Divisions occupied the 5th Division zone of responsibility so that the occupation mission of surveillance, dis-

³ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *Eighth Army Monograph I*; Occupational Monograph of the Eighth U. S. Army in Japan, v. II, Jan-Aug46, n.d.; I Corps Hist of the Occupation of Japan, Dec45-Jun46; VAC OpRpt; VAC WarDs, Nov45-Jan46; 2d MarDiv Occupational Hist-Rpts, 1Mar-15Jun46; 5th MarDiv OpRpt; 5th MarDiv WarDs, Nov-Dec45; Shaw, *Marine Occupation of Japan*.

⁴ 2d MarDiv OpRpt, Anx B, p. 4.

² *Ibid.*, p. 173.

position of materiel, and repatriation could continue without interruption.

On 24 November, control of Saga and Fukuoka Prefectures passed to the 2d and 32d Divisions respectively. (See Map 29.) In the first of a series of comparable troop movements, 2/6 entrained for Saga to take over the duties and absorb the low-point men of 2/27. The 6th and the 10th Marines occupied the 5th Division zone, relieved units of the 13th, 27th, and 28th Marines, and effected the necessary personnel transfers. The 2d and 8th Marines sent their returnees to Sasebo, the 5th Division port of embarkation, and joined new men from the infantry regiments of the 5th. Separate battalions and headquarters troops of both divisions exchanged men with their opposite numbers.

The 5th Division began loading out as soon as ships were available at Sasebo, and the first transports, carrying men of the 27th Marines, left for the States on 5 December. The 2d Division assumed all of the remaining occupation duties of the 5th on 8 December, and the last elements of the 5th Division departed Sasebo 11 days later.

Beginning on 20 December, with the arrival Stateside of the first troopships of the 27th Marines, a steady stream of officers and enlisted men passed through reassignment and discharge centers at Camp Pendleton. During January, most of the organic elements of the division were skeletonized and then disbanded. On 5 February 1946, the Headquarters Battalion followed suit "and the 5th Marine Division passed into history."⁵

⁵ Conner, *5th MarDiv Hist*, p. 176. "Exactly one year after the Division had landed on Iwo Jima, Headquarters and the 3d Battalion, 26th

On the same date that the 2d Marine Division took over the duties of the 5th, VAC received a dispatch directive from the Sixth Army stating that the corps would be relieved of occupation responsibilities on 31 December, when the Eighth Army was to assume command of all Allied occupation troops in Japan, and plans were laid to reduce American strength to the point where only those units considered a part of the peacetime Armed Forces would remain. I Corps, with headquarters at Osaka (later Kyoto), would take over the area and troops of VAC.

The VAC spent most of its remaining time in Japan completing its current occupation missions, supervising the transfer of low-point men to the units of the 2d Division, and preparing to turn over the area to I Corps. As had been ordered, the changeover took place on 31 December 1945, and VAC troops began loading out the following day, some units for return to the United States and others for duty with Marine supply activities on Guam. On 8 January, the last elements of VAC, including General Schmidt's headquarters, left Sasebo for San Diego where on 15 February 1946, it was disbanded.⁶

Not long after the departure of VAC from Japan, the 2d Marine Division became responsible for the whole of what had been the corps zone. The 32d Infantry Division, a former Michigan-

Marines, arrived at San Diego from Peleliu. Disbandment came quickly for these units. The 1st Battalion completed its mission on Peleliu in March and moved to Guam where it, too, died an honorable death." *Ibid.*

⁶ *Muster Rolls*, H&S Bn, VAC, Feb46 (Diary Unit, Files Sec, Pers Dept, HQMC).

Wisconsin National Guard outfit, was one of the Army units slated for deactivation early in 1946. In preparation for taking over the duties of the 32d Division in Yamaguchi, Fukuoka, and Oita Prefectures, the 2d Division began moving units of the 6th Marines north to the Army zone and increasing the size of the areas assigned to the other regiments. On 31 January, when the 2d Division formally relieved the 32d, the prefectural responsibilities of the major Marine units were: 2d Marines, Oita and Miyazaki; 6th Marines, Yamaguchi, Fukuoka, and Saga; 8th Marines, Kumamoto and Kagoshima; 10th Marines, Nagasaki. (See Map 30.)

At this time, the 2d Division command post was in Sasebo, and the CPs of the regiments were located as follows: 2d Marines, Miyazaki; 6th Marines, Fukuoka; 8th Marines, Kumamoto; and the 10th Marines, Nagasaki. An increase in the size and number of areas assigned to the 2d Division meant that Marine occupation responsibilities were similarly enlarged. The routine of guard, patrol, repatriation, and disposition duties grew apace with the areas in which they were accomplished.



A typical regimental disposition in this phase of the Marine occupation may be seen in the deployment of the 6th Marines on 31 January. (See Map 31.) The regimental headquarters and 1/6 CP were at Fukuoka; the CP of 2/6 was at Saga. The battalion headquarters company and Companies K and L of 3/6 were located at Kokura; Company I was at Senzaki in Yamaguchi Ken. From these widely separated localities, units of the 6th Marines maintained a daily occupation routine that remained

largely the same until the entire division departed Japan.

When Major General Roscoe B. Woodruff, commander of I Corps, returned to the United States on temporary assignment on 8 February, Major General LeRoy P. Hunt, Jr., the commander of the 2d Marine Division and senior division commander in the corps, flew to Kyoto and assumed command of the corps, a position he retained until General Woodruff's return on 5 April. The corps zone of responsibility underwent one more change during this period. Advance elements of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) began moving into Hiroshima Prefecture on 4 February and formally took control from the 24th Infantry Division on 7 March. On the 23d, the BCOF formally relieved the 6th Marines in Yamaguchi Prefecture, reducing the 2d Marine Division zone to the island of Kyushu.

By April, it seemed that the constant shifting of units was largely over and that the divisions of I Corps could concentrate mainly on reinstituting regular training schedules. The 2d Marine Division had been pared down to peacetime strength by 11 February, when the third battalion of each infantry regiment and the last lettered battery of each artillery battalion were relieved of occupation duties, assembled at Sasebo, and then sent home for disbandment. Insofar as possible, the remaining units were assembled in battalion-sized camp areas, which served as centers from which surveillance of the local zone of responsibility was maintained. When not undertaking occupation missions, the Marines at-

DEPLOYMENT OF 2D MARDIV,
31 JANUARY 1946



NOTE:
PREFECTURAL BOUNDARIES ----
(A) FUKUOKA
(B) OITA
(C) MIYAZAKI
(D) KUMAMOTO
(E) KAGOSHIMA
(F) NAGASAKI
(G) SAGA
(H) YAMAGUCHI

MAP 30

T.L. RUSSELL

tended classes in basic military subjects, fired individual and crew-served infantry weapons, and carried out field exercises in combat tactics. An efficient air courier service of liaison planes and occasionally transports, operating out of the Marine air base at Omura, connected the scattered battalions and enabled the division and regimental commanders to maintain effective control of their units. The Marines had disposed of most of the Japanese war materiel and the tremendous repatriation flow of the first months of the occupation had slowed. The Japanese, as well as their conquerors, had settled into a routine of mutual tolerance, and often a relation much closer and stronger than that.

Soon after General Hunt had returned from Kyoto, he received word from Eighth Army that the 2d Division would be returned to a permanent base in the United States. The 24th Infantry Division would move to Kyushu and take over the Marine zone. Preparations for the movement got underway before the end of April, when reconnaissance parties of the relieving Army regiments arrived to check their future billeting areas.

General Hunt planned to relieve his outlying units first and then gradually to draw in his men upon Sasebo until the last unit had shipped out from the port. Oita and Miyazaki were the first prefectures to be handed over to the Army, and their former garrison, the 2d Marines—whose CP had been moved from Miyazaki to Oita on 18 March—was the first unit to complete loading out. The regiment left Sasebo on 13

June bound for Norfolk, and the 8th Marines followed soon after. General Hunt turned over his zone to the 24th Division on 15 June, and Marine responsibility for the occupation of Kyushu ended.⁷ Division headquarters left on 24 June, and with the exception of service troops and rear unit echelons, which remained to load out heavy equipment, the major elements of the 2d Marine Division all had departed by 2 July.⁸ General Woodruff attested to the accomplishments of the 2d Marine Division in the following farewell message to General Hunt:


Today the 2d Marine Division comes to the end of its long trail from Guadalcanal to Japan. Its achievement in battle and in occupation: 'Well Done.' The cooperation and assistance of your splendid Division will be greatly missed. I Corps wishes you bon voyage and continued success in your next assignment. Woodruff.⁹

As a result of the acceptance of defeat by the Japanese, it was never necessary to institute complete military rule. General MacArthur's directives outlining a program of demilitarization and democratization were put into effect by a Japanese Government that disarmed and demobilized its own military forces and revamped its political structure without serious incident.

⁷ On the same date, Marine Air Base, Omura, was deactivated.

⁸ Before the 2d Marine Division left Japan, it transferred 2,349 of its men into a China draft, which furnished replacements for the last major Marine unit remaining in the Far East, the 1st Marine Division.

⁹ Cited in LtCol Michael S. Currin, "Occupation of Kyushu," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 30, no. 10 (Oct46), p. 21.



T. L. RUSSELL

MAP 31

As MacArthur recalled in his memoirs:

From the moment of my appointment as supreme commander, I had formulated the policies I intended to follow, implementing them through the Emperor and the machinery of the imperial government . . . the reforms I contemplated were those which would bring Japan abreast of modern progressive thought and action. First destroy the military power. Punish war criminals. Build the structure of representative government. Modernize the constitution. Hold free elections. Enfranchise the women. Release the political prisoners. Liberate the farmers. Establish a free labor movement. Encourage a free economy. Abolish police oppression. Develop a free and responsible press. Liberalize education. Decentralize the political power. Separate church from state.

These tasks were to occupy me for the next five years and more. All were eventually accomplished, some easily, some with difficulty . . . I cautioned our troops from the start that by their conduct our own country would be judged in world opinion . . . Their general conduct was beyond criticism . . . They were truly ambassadors of good will.¹⁰

The Marines in Kyushu stood by as observers and policemen during many phases of the occupation operation, but were directly concerned with others. They supervised the repatriation of

thousands of foreign civilians and prisoners of war and handled the flood of Japanese returning from the defunct overseas empire. Using local labor, the Marines collected, inventoried, and disposed of the vast stockpile of munitions and other military materiel that the Japanese had accumulated on Kyushu in anticipation of Allied invasion. Where necessary, they used their own men and equipment to effect emergency repairs of war damage and to help re-establish the Japanese civilian economy.

Within three months after its landing on Kyushu, the V Amphibious Corps had established effective surveillance over the entire island and its ten million people and had set up smoothly functioning repatriation and disposition procedures. The task was so well along by the end of 1945 that responsibility for the whole island could be turned over to one division. Perhaps the most significant benefit to accrue to the Marine Corps in the Japanese occupation was the variegated experience gained by the small unit leaders in fields widely separated from their normal peacetime routine of training and guard duty. Facing heavy responsibilities, the Marines' ability to adapt themselves to new situations and learn as they went along made the occupation of Kyushu a success.

¹⁰ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, pp. 282-283. A peace treaty with Japan was signed in San Francisco on 8 September 1951 by the U. S. and 48 other countries.

PART V

North China Marines

Background for Military Assistance

China is a troubled land. In the 20th century its people have known little of peace and much of war and internal strife. By the date of Japan's surrender, China needed a breather—time to recover its strength, to rebuild its economy, and to stabilize its government. Instead, a smoldering civil war flared up with increased intensity.

The mutual distrust and hatred of the Chinese Communists and Nationalists had its foundation in two decades of vicious infighting and campaigns of suppression. In retrospect, it seems that there was no real chance of bringing the two sides together in peace. Yet the United States attempted the impossible role of mediator—impossible because it was not the equal friend of both sides. The presence of American forces in China, particularly North China, can be explained only in terms of the peculiar situation created by the National Government's concurrent fight against the Communists and the Japanese.

*HISTORICAL SITUATION REPORT*¹

The first treaty signed by the United States with China in 1844 contained a

most favored nation clause which gave to the United States any right given another power by the Chinese Government. The intent of this agreement and others like it negotiated by Western nations was to ensure equality of commercial opportunity; the practical effect was to saddle China with a legacy of foreign extraterritorial rights. The fact that the Manchu Emperor of China did not share the enthusiasm of occidentals for opening his country to trade, or their penchant for seeking converts to Christianity, really made little difference. The major European powers, sparked by Great Britain and France, forced the establishment of foreign concessions ruled by foreign law and police in China's major cities. Although the United States popularly is supposed to have been blameless in this period of unbridled expansion, it nevertheless got a share of many concessions and was not unwilling to use force whenever it appeared necessary.

The first Marines to serve ashore in China, the ship's detachment of the sloop of war *St. Louis*, landed at Canton in 1844 with bluejacket support to protect the American trade station there

¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: John King Fairbank, *The United States and China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958, rev. ed.), hereafter Fairbank, *U. S. and China*; Herbert Feis, *The China Tangle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), hereafter Feis, *China*

Tangle; F. F. Liu, *A Military History of Modern China 1924-1949* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), hereafter Liu, *Military History of China*; U. S. Department of State, *United States Relations with China* (Washington, 1949), hereafter *U. S. Relations with China*.

from mob violence.² (See Map 32.) In the years immediately following, ships' landing parties were often in action at trouble spots along the China coast when American businessmen or missionaries required protection. Armed intervention to enforce the terms of treaties and to protect lives and property was the order of the day for every nation strong enough to maintain a share of the Chinese market. Small wars with limited objectives were fought in which the Imperial troops were soundly thrashed by British and French expeditionary forces; and each Western success diminished China's sovereignty as the victors demanded further concessions to enhance their already privileged positions.

Japan bought into the favored nation category by an easy victory in war with China in 1894, and acquired Formosa and the Pescadores as part of its booty. The appalling weakness of the Manchu dynasty, its inability to hold onto its territory or to resist foreign pressures, encouraged the more rapacious powers to improve their own positions by forcing the grant of leaseholds and exclusive spheres of economic influence. To the Chinese, it appeared that "the rest of mankind is the carving knife and dish, while we are the fish and meat."³ The aptness of this characterization was amply demonstrated in the five years


following the end of the Sino-Japanese War.

In North China, Russia acquired the right to build a railroad across Manchuria to its port of Vladivostok, and, after forcing Japan to withdraw its claim, leased the Kwantung Peninsula with its all-weather harbors of Port Arthur and Talienwan (Dairen). To counter the Russian move, Britain developed a naval station at Weihaiwei on Shantung Peninsula directly across the Gulf of Chihli from Kwantung. Germany, moving in all haste to join the land grab, forced the lease of a holding centered on Tsingtao with exploitation rights in Shantung Province. Britain pressured an acknowledgement of its extensive investments and interests in the Yangtze River Valley by obtaining an agreement giving it paramount rights in this area. In South China, the Imperial Government signed a promise to Japan that no other nation would exploit Fukien Province opposite Formosa; Britain acquired Kowloon Peninsula to guard its colony of Hongkong; and France added substantially to the area under its thumb along the borders of its Tongking-Annam protectorate.

By 1899, the United States faced the possibility that it might be squeezed out of an influential position in China and moved to prevent this happening. The American Secretary of State, John Hay, obtained agreement of the other powers to the "Open Door" principle—that in their spheres of influence they would maintain the equality of rights of other foreign nationals. The following year an anti-foreign uprising with open Imperial support, the Boxer Re-

² Clyde H. Metcalf, *A History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), pp. 91-92.

³ Sun Yat-sen, *San Min Chu I—The Three Principles of the People* (Chungking: Ministry of Information of the Republic of China, 1943), p. 12.



T. L. RUSSELL

MAP 32

bellion, broke out in North China. By dint of hard fighting, an international relief force which included several battalions of American Marines broke through to the besieged foreign legations at Peking. Secretary Hay acted quickly to forestall a further parceling of China's territory by the victorious powers, and circulated a statement of policy which said that the United States would:

. . . seek a solution that would bring about permanent safety and peace in China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.⁴

The stand of the United States, aided in large part by the wary regard of the interested governments in maintaining a balance of power, won China a respite from dismemberment. Consistently maintained through the 20th century, the American advocacy of China's integrity also won the United States a deserved reputation as a "friend of China." This title came to signify a moral and emotional commitment far more powerful than the original acknowledgement of enlightened self-interest.

By Western standards, the China of the era of foreign intervention was a backward country, a land with little national spirit whose people were wholly concerned with a hand-to-mouth struggle to exist. Most Chinese were provincial in outlook, caring and knowing little of those things outside their

immediate experience. Significant geographical barriers had helped foster the development of a number of semi-autonomous regions, each with its own speech, dress, and customs. China was in fact a nation of separate states, but one with no federal tradition. A strong central government was needed to weld together the varying elements, but the Manchu Dynasty had long since ceased to fill that need. The Manchus held power, such as it was, by default.

The opposition to Peking's rule was widespread but ineffectual until the decade following the Boxer uprising when Imperial officials belatedly attempted to institute government reforms. The sands had run out for the Manchus, however, and the try at modernizing the Imperial structure merely gave impetus to those who advocated its overthrow. One man became the symbol of the diverse forces which sought to win control of China—Sun Yat-sen. Under Sun's inspirational leadership, a revolutionary party dedicated to republican principles was formed which drew its strength primarily from the merchants, students, and factory workers of the cities of South China where Western influence had been greatest. Associated with Sun's following were a number of groups whose primary aim was to achieve provincial self-rule, men who did not want a strong government in Peking. After a series of abortive attempts, the Chinese Revolution was successfully launched at Hankow on 10 October 1911. The revolt spread quickly and with little bloodshed; by the year's end the Manchu regent had resigned.

⁴ *U. S. Relations with China*, p. 417.

Sun Yat-sen was installed as Provisional President of the Republic of China on 1 January 1912 and an attempt was made to set up a parliamentary democracy. It was soon obvious that a strong man, backed by military power, was needed to force the provinces to adhere to the new government. Sun stepped aside for such a man, Yuan Shih-k'ai, a northern military leader who tried by increasingly undemocratic methods to rule China. When Yuan died in 1916, the Peking government retained only nominal strength. Regional warlords, relying on conscript coolie armies for their power, seized control throughout the country. The experiment in Western-style democracy had failed. The system of government which finally evolved after a decade of turmoil was tailored closer to China's tradition of one-man rule.

During World War I, Japan, taking advantage of the deep involvement of the Western powers in Europe to force compliance with its demands for the privileged foreign position, tried to set up a protectorate over China. Although the United States was instrumental in partially blocking this power grab, the Japanese were able to improve their political and economic hold on Manchuria, a presence which stemmed from their defeat of Russia in 1904-1905. Japan's blatant attempt to subjugate their country aroused in many Chinese a long-dormant spirit of nationalism.

The principal beneficiary of this new awareness was the Kuomintang (National People's Party) whose leader was Sun Yat-sen. Disillusioned in his attempt to establish a republic in the Western pattern, Sun had next tried to

work through the warlords to achieve national unity. Turning from this fruitless effort, he devoted himself to the Kuomintang which became the vehicle by which he spread his political philosophy for the new China. Essentially, he wanted to ensure the people an adequate livelihood, to develop nationalism, and to institute a guided democracy compatible with Chinese tradition which in "four thousand years, through periods of order and disorder, [had] been nothing but autocracy."⁵ The mission of the Kuomintang was to achieve Sun's goals through a revolutionary process—first would come the unification of China by military power, then a period of political tutelage, and finally a consitutional democracy shaped to Chinese needs.

A disciplined political structure and an efficient and powerful army were elements essential to Kuomintang success. Soviet Russia, realizing the potential for its own ends in Sun's party, began to provide needed organizational and military advisors. Members of the infant Chinese Communist Party, organized in 1921, were encouraged to join the Kuomintang and lend their zeal to the revolutionary movement. A trusted lieutenant of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, was sent to Russia to secure extensive aid and to observe Russian military organization. Early in 1924, at Whampoa outside Canton, a military academy was organized in the Russian pattern with Chiang as superintendent to train and indoctrinate officers for the Revolutionary Army. The Whampoa graduates and cadets, fiercely loyal to China, to the Kuomintang, and to Chiang, were the

⁵ Sun Yat-sen, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

men who were to lead the Nationalist forces for the next quarter century.

In 1925 Sun Yat-sen died, leaving two claimants to his political estate, the Communist-dominated faction in the Kuomintang and the anti-leftist majority who looked to Chiang for leadership. The rift between the two factions widened steadily while Chiang led the Revolutionary Army in a successful campaign against the northern warlords in 1926-27. Finally in April 1927, an open break occurred and Chiang began to root the Communists out of the Kuomintang and the army. His purge was bloody and bitterly contested, but successful. By the year's end the militant remnants of the Communist Party had fled for refuge to the mountains of Kiangsi Province. (See Map 32.)

The northern campaign ended in 1928 after the fall of Peking, renamed Peiping (Northern Peace) to celebrate the victory. The new National Government of the Republic of China was established at Nanking, and the various foreign powers, including the U.S.S.R., recognized its legitimacy. Although the government was the strongest that had held sway in China during a century of disorder, the unification of the country was far from complete. Warlord armies had been incorporated in the Nationalist forces for expediency's sake, but their leaders still held tremendous local power and their men were unreliable when compared with the Whampoa-led troops of South China. The Communists holed up in Kiangsi under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung posed a cancerous threat that could not be ignored. And even though the warlords of Manchuria ac-

knowledgeed the rule of Nanking, the Japanese had their own ambitious plans for that rich territory. Altogether the situation called for strong measures and an authoritative leader not afraid to apply them. Chiang Kai-shek was that man.

Under a variety of titles, Chiang held the real power in the Chinese Government in the 1930s and '40s. He controlled the Kuomintang, and in short order the party apparatus became almost indistinguishable from the government itself. The deep animosity between the Communists and the Kuomintang festered, erupting repeatedly as Chiang strove to wipe out the Kiangsi stronghold. In 1934, under pressure of an annihilation drive against them, the Communists abandoned their mountain fastness and set out on a 6,000-mile trek to a new home at Yen-an in north central China. Only the most dedicated Communists survived the hardships and running battles of this legendary "Long March," and these veteran troops formed the hard core around which Mao began to organize a new base of operations. He needed time to develop his position and the Japanese gave it to him.

Japan's steady encroachment on Chinese territory had first call on Chiang's attention. In 1931 Japan established a protectorate over Manchuria and set up a puppet regime despite the protests of the United States and the League of Nations. Undisturbed by vocal opposition, Japan in the next year used its troops to drive the Shanghai garrison from the city after a boycott of Japanese goods led to furious fighting. When the

Japanese withdrew from Shanghai after capturing it, they transferred their attentions to North China and increased economic and military pressure on the border regions. Chiang, who was remodeling the National Army with German assistance and advice, held off from full-scale conflict as long as possible to give his troops training and equipment that would make them a better match for the Japanese. During 1936 an intermittent series of clashes between Chinese Government forces and invading Manchurian puppet troops of Japan's *Kwantung Army* were handily won by the Chinese. A Government spokesman in Nanking promptly warned that "the time has ended when foreign nations could safely nibble away at Chinese territorial fringes."⁶

The stage was set for the full-blown war which broke out on 7 July 1937 when Japanese troops attacked the defenders of Peiping. Almost immediately, leaders of all Chinese military factions, whether Government, warlord, or Communist, aligned themselves behind Chiang Kai-shek's leadership as Generalissimo and pledged resistance to the Japanese invasion. Mao's troops were designated the Eighth Route Army of the Central Government's forces and supposedly came under Chiang's control. Actually, the Communists played their own game, as Chiang had been sure they would when he was forced into a reluctant alliance with them by public and private pressure. During eight years of

war with Japan, Nationalist troops bore the brunt of the heavy fighting and suffered by far the greatest proportional casualties as they were committed to defend the prize cities and rice bowl farmlands of South and Central China. In North China, the Communists used the war as a means to increase their strength and expand the area under control of Yen-an, the Red capital.

In effect, the Communists gained a standoff by not contesting possession of the important strategic objectives that Japan wanted. Rather than dissipate his strength in set-piece battles for cities, mines, and railroads that he did not need, Mao concentrated on developing his followers into an effective guerrilla force which eventually controlled the countryside around the Japanese positions. The Communists' most effective recruiting aid was their policy of forced land redistribution in favor of the peasantry. The hundreds of thousands of peasants who directly benefited, or who saw at least the possibility of bettering an ageless cycle of impoverished and debt-ridden tenantry, were willing and militant converts to Communism. This ability of Mao's party to effect long-sought economic reforms by fiat was perhaps the greatest factor in its favor in the contest with the Kuomintang.

Reform proposals were sidetracked or given little attention by Chiang's government which was wholly concerned with a desperate struggle to maintain China's identity as a nation. Chinese troops were driven slowly from the important coastal cities and the major

⁶ *The Central Daily News* (Nanking), dtd 28Nov36, quoted in Liu, *Military History of China*, p. 114.

communication centers of the interior. The national capital was moved deep inland to Chungking, in the mountains of Szechwan Province on the upper reaches of the Yangtze. A wearying and costly war of attrition was fought during which dogged Chinese resistance and the vast and rugged expanse of China itself combined to limit but not halt Japanese expansion.

During the early years of its fight China received trickles of aid from various foreign powers, notably Germany and the U.S.S.R., until the outbreak of war in Europe shut off help. After 1939, the United States became the principal supporter of China's war effort. Men, trucks, and materiel from the States were furnished to keep open the Burma Road, the sole supply route to Nationalist China after Japan blockaded the coastline. American fighter pilots and ground crewmen, some of them volunteers from the armed forces, were allowed to serve in the Chinese Air Force against Japan. Military and economic missions were sent to Chungking to initiate aid programs, and President Roosevelt made China eligible for Lend-Lease supplies by declaring that "the defense of China was vital to the defense of the United States."⁷ All this effort was just getting into full swing when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. One of the priority targets of Japanese troops in Asia was the Burma Road, and with the fall of its southern terminus, China was cut off from all supplies except those brought in by air.

⁷ *U. S. Relations with China*, p. 26.

At this juncture, the United States sent a veteran of service in China, Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell, to command American troops in the newly created China-Burma-India Theater. He had a parallel duty as Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek for a projected joint Allied staff that never materialized and a mission of training and building the Chinese Army into a more effective fighting force with the aid of American equipment and instruction. Stilwell was also made responsible for the effort to reopen overland supply routes to China and to step up the pace of aerial supply. The tasks given the American general were bewildering in their complexity, but he had a single-minded tenacity of purpose which drove him to carry out his orders despite any obstacles. This very drive was his undoing, as he was unable to appreciate Chiang's position as head of state in many military matters. Since Stilwell's actions were characterized by what one Chinese officer called "a monumental lack of tact,"⁸ friction between the two strong-willed men was inevitable. The Generalissimo forced Stilwell's recall in September 1944.⁹ The largest rock on which their stormy relationship foundered was the difference in attitude toward the Chinese Communists whom Stilwell wanted

⁸ Liu, *Military History of China*, p. 178.

⁹ A lucid and detailed examination of the complex situation which led to Stilwell's recall can be found in the official Army history by Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sutherland, *Stilwell's Command Problems—China-Burma-India Theater—United States Army in World War II* (Washington: OCMH, DA, 1956).

to arm, train, and equip to fight against Japan.¹⁰

To replace Stilwell in China, and to harvest the ripe fruits of his labors in training and logistical fields, President Roosevelt sent Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer to become commanding general of what was now to be the China Theater. In addition to a far-reaching and able military training and advisory organization, Wedemeyer as theater commander had control of the principal American combat unit in China, the Fourteenth Air Force. The Fourteenth was the full-grown child of the early American Volunteer Group of 1941-1942 raised by Major General Claire Chennault, who was still its commander. Where Stilwell had strongly questioned the practicality of Chennault's concept of air war against the Japanese home islands, a concept that found favor with Chiang Kai-shek and President Roosevelt, Wedemeyer had a firm directive to carry out air operations from China.¹¹ In this respect, as well as others, the personable American leader was armed with instructions that

smoothed the way for a restoration of cordial relations in Chungking. At Chiang's invitation, and with JCS approval, Wedemeyer served as his Chief of Staff in directing operations against the Japanese and in coordinating the organization, equipment, and training of Chinese forces during the closing months of the war.¹² Japan's fortunes were on the downgrade in China as well as in the Pacific, and the prospect in spring and early summer of 1945 was for mounting Chinese military success.

WAR'S END IN CHINA ¹³

In late May 1945, Japanese *Imperial General Headquarters* issued orders to its area commander in China, General Yasuji Okamura, to contract his battle lines in the southwest and withdraw the main body of his troops to the central and northern provinces. At the same time, Okamura's *China Expeditionary Army* was directed to concert its movements with the *Kwantung Army* in

¹² Wedemeyer ltr, *op. cit.*

¹⁰ The commander of the Marine occupation forces in China recalled that at a meeting in September 1945, General Stilwell described the Chinese Communists as being primarily "agrarian reformers." LtGen Keller E. Rockey interviews by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 14-15Apr59, 29Apr59, and 9Jul59, hereafter *Rockey interview* with appropriate date. General Wedemeyer commented that the Generalissimo "was confident the Communists would not fight the Japanese but would simply prepare for postwar takeover." Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer ltr to ACofS, G-3, HQMC, dtd 26Aug61.

¹¹ Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1958), p. 271, hereafter *Wedemeyer, Reports*.

¹³ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: MilHistSec, HqAFFE, Japanese Monograph No. 129, ChinaArOpsRec Comd of the China ExpeditionaryA, dtd 13Feb52 (OCMH 8-5.1 AC 121), Japanese Monograph No. 154, Rec of Ops Against Soviet Russia, Eastern Front (Aug45), dtd 6Apr54 (OCMH 8-5.1 AC 179), and Japanese Monograph No. 155, Rec of Ops Against Soviet Russia on Northern and Western fronts of Manchuria and in Northern Korea (Aug45), dtd Sep54 (OCMH 8-5.1 AC 180); Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, *Hearings on the Military Situation in the Far East, 3 May-17 August 1951* (Washington, 1951), hereafter *Military Situation in the Far East; U. S. Relations with China*.

Manchuria and the *Seventeenth Area Army* in Korea. Japanese intelligence predicted that a large-scale American amphibious assault was probable in the Shanghai-Hangchow area, with other possible landings on the Shantung Peninsula and in South Korea. Looming even larger in Japanese defense plans was the clear and ominous threat that the U.S.S.R. would at last enter the war against their country.

The enemy prediction of U. S. landings in China was now incorrect, although such operations had once been planned; the Japanese estimate, however, was based on logical assumptions of American intentions. In the case of Soviet moves, the Japanese were able to read the signs without difficulty and all too correctly. Even before the end of the war in Europe, a buildup of troops in Siberia was evident. Within weeks of Germany's surrender, the border area fairly bristled with Soviet soldiers and their weapons and equipment. Early September was the expected date for an attack, but Soviet armor-led columns cracked the Japanese defenses on 9 August, three days after the dropping of the first atomic bomb. Within a week the war was over.

The *Kwantung Army* which met the Soviet attack was only a shadow of what once was Japan's military showpiece unit. Its first-line divisions had been committed to bolster defenses in Burma, China, and especially in the Pacific islands. In their place, much weaker garrison divisions, largely composed of new conscripts, had been raised. Strong border defenses which barred the avenues of approach from Siberia to the industrial heartland of Eastern Man-

churia had been skeletonized to obtain heavy weapons for more active fronts. Significantly, the Japanese themselves rated the effective strength of the ten divisions and one brigade which held Eastern Manchuria at just $2\frac{3}{4}$ first-line divisions. The combat efficiency of other major *Kwantung* units was equally low.

When the Soviet Far East General Army struck, its tanks and motorized infantry poured over the border on three widely separated fronts. Japanese out-post resistance was brushed aside and stronger defenses were contained or overwhelmed as the multi-pronged attacks converged on the Changchun-Mukden area. Although the *Kwantung Army* reeled back from Soviet blows, most of its units were still intact and it was hardly ready to be counted out of the fight. The Japanese Emperor's Imperial Rescript which ordered his troops to lay down their arms was the only thing which prevented a protracted and costly battle.

Before the end of August the *Kwantung Army* was no more, and Soviet troops controlled most of Manchuria and North Korea. Dispensing with formal surrender ceremonies, the Soviets swiftly disarmed the Japanese, broke up existing military formations, separated officers from enlisted men, and organized hundreds of labor battalions. In short order, a complex military organization was reduced to pieces, its only visible remnants columns of weaponless soldiers trudging north and east to Siberian labor camps.

The asking price of the U.S.S.R.'s entry into the Pacific War was high. At Yalta in February 1945, Marshal Stalin agreed to attack Japan in two to three

month's time after the surrender of Germany. In return for this promise, Stalin wanted all former rights of Imperial Russia in Manchuria, rights which had been lost in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. In addition to the virtual control of Manchurian railroads and the Kwantung Peninsula that this demand meant, Stalin insisted that China write off its claim to Outer Mongolia by recognizing the status quo in that Soviet-dominated country. All of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands were to be turned over to the U.S.S.R. as war booty. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill both agreed "that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan is defeated."¹⁴ Despite its deep concern, China was not a participant in the Yalta Conference nor a signatory power to the Yalta Agreement, because it was believed that the secret of Soviet entry into the war against Japan could not be kept in the lax security situation then prevailing in Chungking.

President Roosevelt undertook the task of persuading Generalissimo Chiang to accept the Yalta terms by signing a treaty of friendship and alliance with the Soviet Union. As the one nation, next to China, most deeply involved in fighting Japan, the United States was extremely anxious that the U.S.S.R. add its power to the final battles. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had advised the President before he left for Yalta to insure "Russia's entry at as early a date as possible consistent with her ability to engage in offensive operations."¹⁵ No Allied leader knew in Feb-

ruary or even in the first days of August that the war with Japan would end as suddenly as it did, and that the expected heavy toll of Allied lives would not have to be paid.

The Generalissimo accepted the proffered treaty, despite its unfavorable bent, in hope that the Soviet Union would honor its written guarantee of China's "sovereignty and territorial integrity" and its recognition of "the National Government as the central government of China."¹⁶ Chiang was too much of a realist not to appreciate the fact that Stalin might take all that he wanted without Chinese sanction. If the Soviet Union violated the letter or spirit of its treaty, however, world moral condemnation would become a practical asset to Nationalist China in soliciting aid.

The Chungking Government was sorely in need of any support that it could muster at home or abroad at the war's end. The Kuomintang had been unable to effect significant political or economic reforms during eight years of fighting. Stripped of the shield and purpose of a popular anti-foreign war, it drew the blame for continued poverty, rampant inflation, and corruption. The majority of the Chinese people were war-weary and eager for a better chance in life; as events were to prove, they would not continue to support a government that postponed or was unable to effect necessary reforms.

¹⁵ Quoted in *Military Situation in the Far East*, p. 3332.

¹⁶ Quoted in *U. S. Relations with China*, pp. 586, 587; Chiang Kai-shek, *Soviet Russia in China* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957), p. 227, hereafter Chiang, *Soviet Russia*.

¹⁴ Quoted in *U. S. Relations with China*, p. 114.

The Chinese Communists, who had none of the obligations and few of the problems of an internationally recognized government emerging from a disastrous war, were able to pursue their end of dominating China with fanatical singleness of purpose. While Chungking had devoted most of its resources to the defeat of Japan, Yen-an had expanded its hold on North China and Western Manchuria. The Communists concentrated on economic reforms which would expand their base of popular support. In the summer of 1945, American military intelligence agents could truthfully report:

... since the Chinese Communists provide individuals, especially laborers and peasants, with greater economic opportunity than the Kuomintang Nationalists provide, the Communists enjoy wider popular support in the area held by their own armies than do the Nationalists in their areas of control. This is the Communists' greatest source of strength in China.¹⁷

Chiang Kai-shek had no intention of letting a rival government exist in China, and Mao Tse-tung showed no signs of turning over the territory he controlled to Chungking. Into this situation of a nation divided, of a civil war ready to flame anew, the United States committed its troops to help repatriate the Japanese and, in a limited manner, to aid the Nationalists in regaining possession of North China. The resultant entanglement with the cause of the National Government was to have an in-

¹⁷ MIS, WD, "The Chinese Communist Movement," ca. Jul45, in *Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session* (Washington, 1949), v. 95, pt 15, p. A5501.

calculable effect on United States foreign policy for the next decade.

U. S. COMMITMENT ¹⁸

After the publication of the Japanese Imperial Rescript, the *China Expeditionary Army* reversed its wartime role and became a quasi-ally of the National Government. In North China, the Japanese garrison was the only force that could prevent the Communists from seizing the major cities and the communication routes that linked them. The *North China Area Army*, with headquarters in Peiping, complied with a Chungking directive that its troops surrender only to properly designated representatives of Chiang Kai-shek. Although Mao Tse-tung's men were able to pick off outlying Japanese detachments and force the defection of large numbers of puppet troops, the bulk of Japanese soldiers held their discipline and complied with the orders passed to them from above. They continued to mount guard as they had in years past and to fend off Communist attacks, while they waited for relief by Nationalist troops.

The decision to use the Japanese to hold North China was seconded in Washington where President Truman approved plans to use American troops, ships, and planes to aid the Nationalist recovery of the area.¹⁹ Chiang Kai-

¹⁸ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: CinCPac-CinC-POA JStfStudy BELEAGUER, dtd 13Aug45; CinCPac WarD, Aug45 (OAB, NHD); *Military Situation in the Far East*; Wedemeyer, *Reports*.

¹⁹ Harry S. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope—Memoirs*, v. II (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1956), p. 62.

shek's armies had no organic transportation capable of moving large bodies of men for long distances, and the country's road, rail, and shipping facilities were totally inadequate for the job at hand. Following a JCS directive of 10 August 1945, General Wedemeyer issued orders to the American units under his command to assist the National Government in occupying key areas, in receiving the enemy surrender and repatriating Japanese troops, and in liberating and rehabilitating Allied internees and prisoners of war. While furnishing this assistance, theater forces were admonished to make every effort "to avoid participation in any fratricidal conflict in China."²⁰ This warning to steer clear of involvement in civil strife followed the consistent pattern of American policy instructions carried through from the earliest days of the Stilwell mission.

Alarmed by the possibility of U.S.S.R. encroachment in North China and Manchuria, General Wedemeyer asked that seven American divisions be sent to his command to create a barrier force which would discourage further Soviet expansion. In reply, the JCS indicated that the absolute priority of occupation operations in the Japanese home islands would use up all immediately available troops and shipping. In furtherance of plans then being laid at Admiral Nimitz' headquarters, however, General Wedemeyer was offered the Marine III Amphibious Corps to assist the National Government in reoccupying North China and repatriating the Japanese.

The preliminary concept of operations involving IIIAC units called for

²⁰ USForChinaThtr OpDirective No. 25, dtd 20Aug45 (Wedemeyer File, TAGO, KCRC).

the use of Marine divisions to occupy Shanghai and gain control of the Yangtze's mouth, but the revised CinCPac plan for occupation operations, published on 14 August, covered landings in the Taku-Tientsin and Tsingtao areas instead.²¹ (See Map 33.) China Theater had advised that Nationalist troops would be airlifted to Shanghai and Nanking by American planes; the Marines would not be needed there. A considerable time gap would occur, however, before National Government forces in strength could reach North China, and the presence of American occupation forces as stand-ins for the Nationalists would help to stabilize the situation.

On 19 August, at Manila, representatives of CinCPac, Seventh Fleet, and China Theater met to coordinate plans for China operations. The assignment of IIIAC to General Wedemeyer's command was confirmed and 30 September set as the earliest practical date for landing the Marines without undue interference with the occupation of Japan and Korea.

*IIIAC PLANS*²²

In order to keep abreast of the rapidly changing situation in the

²¹ CinCPac-CinCPOA OPlan 12-45 (Revised), CAMPUS-BELEAGUER, dtd 14Aug45 (OAB, NHD).

²² Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: CinCPac WarD, Aug45; ComSeventhFlt OPlan No. 13-45, dtd 26Aug45, corrected through Change 10, dtd 18Sep45; ComVIIPhibFor OPlan No. A1703-45, dtd 19Sep45, hereafter *VIIPhibFor OPlan 1703-45*; IIIAC WarD, Aug45; IIIAC OPlan No. 26-45, dtd 1Sep45, corrected through Change 4, dtd 27Sep45, hereafter *IIIAC OPlan 26-45*.

Pacific and to have a planning edge for future operations, III Amphibious Corps monitored the radio traffic of higher headquarters. As a result, the corps commander, Major General Keller E. Rockey, and his staff were aware of the impending China commitment of IIIAC several days before any word was received from CinCPac.²³ Even prior to this alert, however, the major units of the corps were readying themselves for occupation duty. The swift mounting out of Task Group Able for the occupation of Japan was sufficient warning of a probable role for other Marine units.²⁴

The presence of CinCPac and FMFPac Advance Headquarters on Guam helped speed preparations for the coming operations and allowed changes in plans to be made with a minimum of disruption. Before the switch of targets for IIIAC to the Tsingtao and Tientsin areas was effected, Rear Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, the operations officer for CinCPac, held a briefing on the proposed landing at Shanghai for Generals Geiger and Moore of FMFPac and Rockey and his chief of staff, Brigadier General William A. Worton.²⁵ By the

time the North China objectives were confirmed, with Shanghai as an alternative operation, the coordination of naval plans with those of the landing force at the corps level was well underway. A formal warning order was issued by CinCPac on 21 August; IIIAC alerted its subordinate units the following day.

The Seventh Fleet, under Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, was assigned the mission of conducting naval operations off the coast of China and western Korea in Admiral Nimitz' operation plan of 14 August. On the 26th, Kinkaid published his own plan which covered the landings of the Army XXIV Corps in South Korea and the III Amphibious Corps in North China.

Kinkaid's concept of operations called for a Fast Carrier Force (TF 72) and a task grouping of cruisers, destroyers, minesweepers, and close fire support landing craft, North China Force (TF 71), to arrive in the Yellow Sea prior to Japan's surrender. By means of extensive air and sea sweeps, the U. S. ships and planes would exercise control of the Yellow Sea and the Gulf of Chihli. Simultaneously, other task forces of the fleet would move in on the South and Central China coasts, and, as Nationalist troops advanced to take the ports, set up patrol bases at Canton and Shanghai.

Amphibious operations were to be conducted by Task Force 78, led by Vice Admiral Daniel E. Barbey, Commander, VII Amphibious Force. Barbey's task was to land and establish the XXIV Corps ashore in the Seoul area of Korea, and then to lift and land IIIAC at Tsingtao and at Tientsin's ports, Taku-

²³ MajGen William A. Worton ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 12Jan59 and interview by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 10Feb59, hereafter *Worton ltr* and *Worton interview*, respectively. General Rockey recalled that Marine officers on the CinCPac staff also had passed the word of the China commitment of IIIAC before the official notification was received. LtGen Keller E. Rockey comments on draft ms, dtd 6Feb62, hereafter *Rockey comments*.

²⁴ See pt IV, "The Occupation of Japan," *supra*.

²⁵ *Worton interview*.

Tangku and Chinwangtao. After the initial III Corps landings, some turn-around shipping was scheduled to bring on the follow-up echelons of the corps while other transports moved to South China to pick up Nationalist forces scheduled to relieve the Marines.

In order to facilitate joint planning for the operation, Admiral Barbey sent a liaison party from the VII Amphibious Force to Guam to live and work directly with IIIAC staff officers. The men he picked were empowered to make major decisions without constant referral to the admiral.²⁶ Although Barbey's operation plan was not issued until 19 September, its essential elements were well known to IIIAC as they developed. The corps itself was able to send out a tentative schedule of operations on 29 August and follow it up three days later with its basic plan.

General Rockey, as Commander, Naval Occupation Forces (TF 79), was assigned his own corps as the China landing force. In addition, the 3d Marine Division on Guam and the 4th Marine Division on Maui reported for planning purposes as CinCPac area reserve. III Corps Artillery was given the role of corps reserve, and was to move from Okinawa to China when and if needed. The heavy artillerymen were ordered to be prepared to operate as infantry.²⁷ To augment IIIAC ground forces and to give it a substantial air capability, CinCPac added the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing to Rockey's command. The fighter groups of the wing

were released from operational control of MacArthur's Far East Air Forces on 27 August, shortly after the wing command post had shifted from Bougainville to Zamboanga on Mindanao.²⁸ The wing's transport group, MAG-25, remained based at Bougainville temporarily, although its planes were continually in the forward area.²⁹

In all, with the normal reinforcements for a major amphibious operation, the initial troop list of General Rockey's command included approximately 65,000 men. Many of the units attached for planning were those that would have been needed if extensive combat or base construction activities were expected. But, in North China it appeared that there would be little need for additional Seabee battalions or hospitals. Once General Rockey had a chance to confer with Admiral Kinkaid and with General George C. Stratemeyer, General Wedemeyer's deputy, IIIAC strength was reduced by the deletion of a number of supporting units.³⁰ The paring process went on as the operation developed, and the peak strength of III Corps in China stayed close to 50,000 men.

As it first evolved, the IIIAC concept of operations included landings about ten days apart at two widely separated objectives. Rockey's headquarters and corps troops would mount out at Guam, move to Okinawa, be joined there by the reinforced 1st Marine Division, and then sail for Tientsin. The 6th Marine Division (less the 4th Marines, which

²⁶ *Rockey interview*, 14-15 Apr 59.

²⁷ III CorpsArty OPlan No. 11-45 (Tentative), dtd 4 Sep 45, p. 2.

²⁸ 1st MAW WarD, Aug 45.

²⁹ MAG-25 WarD, Sep 45.

³⁰ *Rockey comments*.

had been committed in the occupation of Japan) would follow from Guam on later shipping and make Tsingtao its destination. Elements of 1st MAW, loading at Mindanao and Bougainville, would move to China as soon as airfields at Tientsin and Tsingtao were ready.

In the main, command relationships for this operation were similar to those for combat landings in the later stages of the war. The transport squadron commanders who moved and landed the two assault echelons were charged with the responsibility for the success of operations ashore until the respective division commanders notified them that they were ready to take over. Admiral Barbey was to continue in command of amphibious forces afloat and ashore

until General Rockey had landed and established his headquarters. Once the IIIAC commander was ready to assume control of his forces, he would report to the China Theater commander for operational control.

The nature of the proposed operations at each objective varied so sharply as a result of differing geographical, political, and military factors that in many respects the further history of the Marines in North China became two different accounts. One, told at Tsingtao, has an aura of routine garrison duty through all but the last days of its telling. The other, based on activities along the rail line and roads connecting Peiping, Tientsin, and Chinwangtao, bristles with the constant threat and sometime reality of Communist attacks.

Ashore in North China

TARGET ANALYSIS¹

The North China plain encompasses most of Hopeh Province and extends two broad valleys through Shantung, one touching the sea near Tsingtao and the other reaching toward Central China. (See Map 33.) Irregular foothills rising into rugged mountain ranges border the plain, infringing on Hopeh's boundaries to the north and west and interrupting the lowland in Shantung in the south and east. The plain has long been the invasion route for armies bent on China's conquest; the Great Wall which separates Hopeh from Manchuria and Mongolia was built to check such incursions. Where the wall touches the sea, a narrow corridor begins which skirts the mountains shadowing the coast until it opens into the Manchurian plain.

In some ways the climate of North China is similar to that in the north central part of the United States. There is a significant range of temperature between the seasons, and the winters

are particularly cold, owing to biting winds which whip in from the sea and out of the mountains. Rainfall is light, averaging 20–25 inches the year round, but in North China almost half of that usually falls during two months, July and August. During this rainy season, the many rivers, streams, and canals that lace the plain habitually overflow their banks and flood the countryside. Roads become virtually impassable to any heavy traffic until the end of the rains returns them to their usual dusty state. The frequent dust storms from October through May are a particularly unpleasant feature of the colder weather. There is relatively little snow in winter months.

Any fertile land in the Hopeh-Shantung region is intensely cultivated; fields are terraced high on the hillsides and edge the salt marshes and mud flats that line a good part of the low-lying coast. The staple crops are cereal grains, principally rice and kaoliang,² augmented by family garden plots. Thousands of farm villages dot the orderly maze of small fields which give a monotonous sameness to the hinterland. Most of the seventy million people living in the two provinces in 1945 were indebted to absentee landlords and, tied to the land, eked out a marginal

¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in section is derived from: MID, OfcCofEngrs, USA, Strategic Engineering Survey No. 150, Hopeh-Shantung Region (China) (Summary) Terrain-Intel, dtd May45; CinCPac-CinCPOA Bul No. 48-45, "The Coast of North China," 2 vols., dtd 1Mar45; VIIPhibFor OPlan 1703-45; IIIAC IntelStudy ThtrofOps North China, dtd 29Aug45, hereafter *IIIAC IntelStudy*; IIIAC G-2 PeriodicRpt No. 1-M, Oct45, dtd 3Nov45 in IIIAC WarD, Oct45.

² Kaoliang is a grain sorghum which forms much of the diet of eastern Asia. The dry and pithy stalks, which often grow higher than a man's head, serve as fuel and thatch.

existence. Many townsmen and city dwellers made their living servicing and exploiting rural market areas. Trade with other parts of China and with foreign lands was funnelled almost entirely through a few large cities which lay along the principal communication routes.

From an economic viewpoint the most important city in North China at the war's end was its commercial hub, Tientsin. Second only to Peiping in size, with a population swollen by refugees to an estimated million and a half, the city dominated an extensive network of railroads and waterways. Since it had grown to importance only during the past half century, Tientsin was quite modern in many respects. Broad, paved streets and substantial masonry buildings of foreign styling characterized the area of the former international concessions which gave the city its pronounced Western cast. Even the predominantly Chinese quarters shared this appearance of openness, especially when contrasted with the jumbled and warren-like aspect of most older cities.

Although it was 36 miles from the Gulf of Chihli, Tientsin was still China's most important port north of Shanghai. The Hai Ho (River) and the railroad which paralleled its course from the sea were the means by which a constant flow of goods had reached and gone out from Tientsin in times of peace. An open roadstead off the entrance to the river gave anchorage over good holding ground to ocean-going vessels. Only lighters and coastal shipping drawing 14 feet or less were able to negotiate the Taku Bar, a barrier of silt across the river mouth that took its name from a

nearby village. Seven miles upriver on the north bank was Tangku, a town which served as Tientsin's gateway to the sea and as its railhead for transshipment of cargo. River traffic to Tientsin was extensive but confined to craft less than 300 feet in length which could negotiate the restricted turning basin at the city's wharves.

Tientsin's airport was about seven miles east of its outskirts near the village of Changkeichuang. The field, which was circular in outline, had three intersecting runways only one of which was paved. The comparatively short landing strips, just a bit over 4,000 feet long, and the poor drainage of the surrounding terrain often faced pilots with the prospect of coming down on a short runway that began in mud and ended in mud. Other air facilities at Changkeichuang Field were comparably limited, and the prospects for heavy use were poor without extensive construction.

In contrast to Tientsin's one poor airfield, Peiping had two first class military airdromes, each with considerable hangar, repair, and storage facilities. Lantienchang Field, nine miles northwest of the ancient city, had five runways, all shorter than those at Tientsin but in better operating condition. Eight miles south of the city was Nan Yuan Field which the Japanese had used as a training base. Most of its installations, including four runways and a grass infield suitable for takeoffs and landings, were located within a walled oval nearly two miles long and over a mile wide. Located just outside the enclosure was an airstrip a mile and a quarter long

that could accommodate the heaviest transports and bombers.

The excellent air facilities at Peiping were an indication of its strategic importance. The ancient city, China's capital for nearly 700 years, had a measureless value as a symbol of national power. It was the cultural and educational center of North China as well as its administrative headquarters under both Nationalists and Japanese. More than 1,650,000 people dwelt within its moated walls.

The massive walls of Peiping were the city's most distinctive feature and gave definition to sections within their bounds. The outer walls made of earth and cement faced with brick were 40 feet high, 62 feet broad at the base, and 32 feet across the top. A deep moat, water-filled in most places, extended all around the city. In general outline Peiping resembled a square set beside a rectangle, the square being the Tartar City, the rectangle the Chinese City. The Tartar City was roughly four miles along each side, while the Chinese City was five miles long and two wide. Towering gates in the outer walls and in the interior wall between the two cities opened into broad and straight thoroughfares. Sharp contrast to these main avenues was offered by the many patternless, twisting side streets and alleys which led off them. Most of Peiping's residents lived in family or communal compounds which lined the narrow streets.

Centered in the Tartar City to the east of an extensive system of artificial lakes was the Imperial City. Once the home of court officials and China's leading scholars, the Imperial City com-

pletely surrounded the former palace area of the Manchus—the Forbidden City. Within high palace walls were dozens of buildings and courtyards which offered impressive testimony to the richness of a bygone era. The walls of the Imperial City had been razed to make way for roads but its confines were still clearly discernible. In the southeast part of the Tartar City was the walled Legation Quarter, the home and commercial center for a sizeable foreign community. Scattered throughout Peiping were many colorful temples and buildings of the Imperial age which helped make the city an irresistible goal for tourists in peacetime.

Some 475 miles southeast of Peiping was the port of Tsingtao, the smallest of the three North China cities which had populations of over a million. Situated on Kiaochow Bay at the tip of a stout finger of land jutting out from the south shore of Shantung Peninsula, Tsingtao had the best harbor north of Shanghai. Foreign warships, including elements of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet, used its port facilities frequently in prewar years, and American naval officers were impressed with its suitability as a forward area base. Tsingtao was built up around several harbors with most of the large scale commercial activity centered on the mile-square Great Harbor in the northern part of the city where deep draft vessels could dock. Extensive rail yards and an industrial area dominated by textile mills were close to Great Harbor's wharves. Ringing the wide semicircle of shoreline of the Outer Harbor to the south were most of the city's public buildings.

As befitted its origin as a German leasehold, Tsingtao was laid out in orderly fashion with many Teutonic touches. Indeed, to some observers it "looked like a fragment of the Friesland or Westphalia rather than a Chinese port city."³ Its streets were wide and paved, and its buildings, most of them two- and three-stories high, were modern and Western in appearance. From an incoming ship or plane, the most striking aspect of the city was the almost universal color scheme of red tile roofs and white buildings.

Tsingtao was built on the foothill reaches of an isolated cluster of mountains standing to the east of the city. To the north, well drained flatland provided ample room for airfield construction. The Japanese had established two military airdromes in the area and, in addition, had expanded the facilities of the existing commercial airfield. This field near Tsangkou village about seven miles from the outskirts of the city was perhaps the best in North China. It had two main concrete runways with extensive paved taxiways and aprons and repair shops, storage sheds, and barracks adequate to handle a large volume of air traffic. The terrain in the vicinity provided almost unlimited opportunity for expansion.

No other coastal city in Shantung or Hopeh could rival Tsingtao's natural advantages as a port, but Chefoo, which had the best protected anchorage on Shantung Peninsula's north shore, had comparable strategic significance in the

Chinese civil war. Chefoo was 150 miles due south of Dairen and its possession gave the holder easy access to Manchuria across the mouth of the Gulf of Chihli or the capability of choking off such communication. The city had a war-swollen population of about 200,000 whose main concern was the agricultural life in the surrounding countryside. Chefoo had no rail connection with the interior and only a way-station airfield, but the rural roads leading into it were adequate to service a guerrilla army in all months but the rainy season.

The railroad network that traced its way across the North China plain was of paramount importance in determining the course of events in North China. The key line was the Peiping-Mukden Railroad; connecting and subsidiary lines reached south into Central China and north into Siberia from the terminal cities. At Tientsin the Peiping-Mukden connected with a railroad which led to Tsinan, Shantung's capital, and thence eventually to Nanking and Shanghai. Tsinan was linked directly to Tsingtao and the sea by rail.

The prize section of the Peiping-Mukden Railroad ran between Tangku and a small coastal town 150 miles to the north, Chinwangtao. The Kailin Mining Administration (KMA), a British-controlled company, had developed Chinwangtao as a shipping point for its coal mines near Tangshan. Coal was the basic fuel for many public utilities and factories throughout China and the output of the KMA mines figured strongly in any plans for economic recovery. Like the KMA, the Nationalist Government was attracted to Chinwangtao by the fact that its wharves and

³ 1stLt Alan T. Shilin, "Occupation at Tsing Tao," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 29, no. 1 (Jan-45), p. 36.

anchorage were never icebound, and it had rerouted the Peiping-Mukden tracks to go through the town. During a hard winter when the Hai River was frozen over, Chinwangtao served in Tangku's stead as Tientsin's port.

The Nationalists, the Communists, and the Japanese were agreed upon the strategic value—and the vulnerability—of the railroads. The Japanese were able to keep in operation only those portions of the rail system that their troops held in strength. Communist guerrillas laid waste unguarded stretches and attacked weak outposts in a ceaseless program of harassment which caused extensive damage to tracks, roadbeds, and rolling stock. The Nationalists moving into North China faced the same problem and planned the same solution as the Japanese. Chiang Kai-shek's forces would be able to use only as much track as they could keep tightly guarded.

Most Japanese troops in North China at the war's end were concentrated in rail junction cities and extended along the tracks between. There were 326,000 regular troops in Hopeh and Shantung and in the provinces immediately inland, Honan and Shansi, all under command of the *North China Area Army* of Lieutenant General Hiroshi Nemoto. Four armies, the *First* in Shansi, the *Twelfth* in Honan, *Forty-third* in Shantung, and the *Mongolian Garrison* in Hopeh had charge of area defense. In addition to the Japanese units, there were 140,000 Chinese in the puppet *North China Pacification Army* and an additional 340,000 village and county local defense troops under Japanese charge.

There was a marked absence of heavy supporting weapons in the Japanese Army organizations, which were composed largely of second-line troops formed from service units turned infantry and filled out with recent conscripts. The *North China Pacification Army* puppet units were even less well trained and equipped and the poorly armed local defense troops were of little military consequence except as manpower reserves.

In the areas where Marines of IIIAC were scheduled to land, approximately 116,000 Japanese regulars were present. In Peiping and its immediate environs were General Nemoto's area army headquarters troops as well as similar elements of the *Mongolian Garrison Army*. At Tientsin, Lieutenant General Ginosuke Uchida, Commanding General of the *118th Division*, had charge of 50,000 Japanese who defended the city and guarded the rail lines halfway to Peiping, two thirds the distance to Tsinan, and as far north on the Peiping-Mukden as Chinwangtao. The area commander at Tsingtao, Major General Eiji Nagano, had 15,000 troops, including his own *5th Independent Mixed Brigade*.

Communist regular forces in Hopeh and Shantung totaled 170,000 troops with at least that number in addition to partially trained rural militia. Most of the regular units were disposed near the big cities garrisoned by the Japanese, close enough to be troublesome, but far enough out of reach to avoid punitive expeditions. Nationalist strength in the two provinces was negligible, but the influence of Chiang Kai-shek was latent, not absent. Opportunists among local

government officials appointed by the Japanese puppet regime, as well as many puppet troop commanders, saw a more rewarding future in the pay of the Central Government than they did within the austere Communist setup.

The attitude of the puppet soldiers was typical of a traditional and pragmatic approach to warfare in China: "one army is pretty much the same as another."⁴ The introduction by the Communists, and to a lesser extent by the Kuomintang, of political indoctrination of the coolie and peasant soldiery brought about a radical change in this feeling. Political propaganda made a potent reinforcement to military power, and its skillful use by the Communists was a significant factor in the course of the civil war. Intelligence officers of III Amphibious Corps, in assessing the difficulties of the task assigned the Marines in North China, concluded that the Communist system:

... permits a policy of expansion and contraction according to need. Their closely-woven network needs neither highways nor railroads owing to Communist independence of the major transportation lines. The process of consolidation in the interim following Japanese capitulation and the arrival of Chungking forces would seem to strengthen their ability to resist the entry of a force to take over from the Japanese. If frustrated in the immediate achievement of their objectives the Communists (unless in the meantime their differences with Chungking are resolved) are prepared to combine political with military warfare for a protracted struggle against any internal or external opponent.⁵

⁴ Capt Edward Klein, "Situation in North China," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 30, no. 4 (Apr46), p. 14.

⁵ *IIIAC IntelStudy*, p. 3.

ADVANCE PARTY⁶

While accurate order of battle information on the former enemy forces in North China was available from Japanese sources, details regarding Communist dispositions and intentions were meager. The political situation was unstable, and Chungking was unable to supply reliable intelligence which would give American planners a firm picture of what they might find upon landing. This handicap, however, did not hinder the III Amphibious Corps in compiling a considerable body of geographic information on target areas.

Many officers and senior enlisted men in the IIIAC had served in China in the years of disorder between the world wars.⁷ Veterans of the Embassy Guard in Peiping and Tientsin, of the 4th Marines in Shanghai, and of the two expeditionary brigades and numerous ships' detachments landed to protect American lives and property were widely dis-

⁶ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: CinCPac WarD, Sep45 (OAB, NHD); *VIIIPhibFor OPlan 1703-45*; *IIIAC OPlan 26-45*; *IIIAC WarD*, Sep45; *IIIAC IntelStudy*; *Rockey interview*, 14-15Apr59; *Worton ltr*; *Worton interview*; MajGen William A. Worton ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 2Jan58.

⁷ The III Corps was fortunate in having a number of Chinese interpreters available to assist it in the initial months ashore in China. These men, some of whom were Chinese students in the U. S. and others Americans with considerable facility with the language, were recruited by the Marine Corps in 1944 when a landing in South China by the V Amphibious Corps was contemplated. LtCol Sherwood F. Moran ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 14Jul59 (Plans & Policies—Interpreters File, HistBr, HQMC).

tributed throughout both air and ground elements. Of the eight general officers in the corps' new task organization, seven had served at least one tour in China.⁸ Although the corps commander, General Rockey, had never been assigned China duty, he was fortunate in having a chief of staff, General Worton, who had over 12 years experience in the Orient, most of it spent in North China.

Worton and the Corps G-2, Colonel Charles C. Brown, were both qualified Chinese language interpreters and translators. During 1931-1935 the two officers were assigned to the American Embassy at Peiping as language students. Colonel Brown, moreover, had just returned from duty as Assistant Naval Attache in Chungking before he joined the IIIAC staff. The experience of Worton and Brown was of considerable value in processing intelligence data supplied by CinCPac, and in the planning for the landing, movement when ashore, and billeting of troops.

An up-to-date political-military briefing, even one which was scanty on particulars of the situation in Hopeh and Shantung, was needed. On 22 August a representative of General Wedemeyer's theater staff, Brigadier General Haydon L. Boatner, arrived on Guam for conferences with Admiral Nimitz. The Army general had known Worton as a fellow language student in Peiping during the '30s, and he was able to brief the Marine officer on the possible courses of action and the leaders and forces involved in the threatening civil strife. Boatner made a recommendation

to CinCPac that the III Corps send an advance party to China to sound out the situation and smooth the way for the projected landings. There was little question that the logical person to lead this party was General Worton, and following Admiral Nimitz' approval of the proposal, General Rockey made a formal request to that effect to General Wedemeyer. The response was favorable, and a tentative date of arrival in China was set for 20 September, 10 days before the Tientsin operation was to get underway.

General Worton named Colonel Brown as his executive in the advance party and added senior representatives of other corps staff sections. The officers chosen continued to take a prominent part in the intricate planning for the Marine landings, becoming familiar with the problems arising from the amount and type of forces and materiel committed. As a necessary precaution, these plans called for the first men ashore to be assault troops, but on the whole the operation contemplated was noncombat in nature. IIIAC units, standing in for Nationalist troops to arrive later, were to take over garrison duties from the Japanese and get the repatriation process started. Under these circumstances, the basic mission of the corps advance party was to contact Japanese commanders and Chinese officials to arrange barracks and storage facilities in areas where the Americans were to operate.

The actual territory to be occupied by Marine forces expanded considerably as plans evolved. In the initial assignment of objectives to IIIAC by Seventh Fleet, landings at Tsingtao and Tientsin

⁸ General Officer Biographies (SubjFile, HistBr, HQMC).

(including the Taku-Tangku area) were ordered and the possibility of a landing at Chinwangtao was considered.⁹ By 7 September the attraction of Chinwangtao's all-weather port status had brought about its addition to northern sector objectives. Peiping was a probable target in Marine plans from their earliest stages despite its lack of formal assignment by higher authorities. Both Generals Rockey and Worton strongly believed that IIIAC would have to occupy the walled city's airfields in order to ensure the arrival of the Nationalist forces which were to relieve the Marines.

Corps planners were well aware of the threat to peace in North China posed by Communist possession of Chefoo. General Rockey wanted to land a regimental combat team of the 6th Division at the strategically located port to take it over from the Japanese. He proposed this move to General Wedemeyer in mid-September through staff representatives of the China Theater who had visited Guam. On the 16th, theater headquarters radioed that Chiang Kai-shek and Wedemeyer had both approved IIIAC operation plans to include landing an RCT at Chefoo; the new objective was published the following day. In the same message Rockey was given a tentative schedule of arrival of Chinese Nationalist Armies (CNA) in Hopeh and Shantung. He was also informed that all questions relative to the corps move into North China would be covered in dis-

cussions after the advance party arrived in Shanghai on 20 September.¹⁰

On the recommendation of General Geiger, Colonel Karl S. Day, Commanding Officer of MAG-21 at Guam, was assigned as command pilot for the advance party. As finally constituted, Worton's group included a field officer from each of the general staff sections and the corps surgeon as well as several junior officers and a dozen enlisted men from the corps staff. No representatives of the divisions or the wing were included since corps was prepared to handle all arrangements for reception of troops and supplies. As a parting promise to the IIIAC commander, Worton stated that he would meet Rockey's command ship off Taku Bar on 30 September in a KMA tug; if all signs indicated an unopposed landing the tug would be flying a large American flag from its foremast.

Near midnight on 19 September the advance party took off from Guam in three transports, one primarily a fuel carrier. After a stop at Okinawa, the planes flew on to Shanghai, arriving in midafternoon. Worton commandeered a Japanese truck to move the whole party into the city where they put up at hotels. Few American or Nationalist troops were in Shanghai as yet, and the Marines were on their own for the three days they spent there while arrangements were made for the trip north.

On the day after his arrival General Worton reported to the China Theater representative, Major General Douglas

⁹ ComSeventh Flt OPlan No. 13-45, dtd 26-Aug45, corrected through Change 10, dtd 18Sep45, p. 14.

¹⁰ ComGenChina msg to CinCPOA AdvHq. dtd 16Sep45, in CinCPac WarD, Sep45, encl (B), p. 4.

L. Weart, for orders, and saw Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley who was on his way back to Washington for a round of conferences. Neither man could give Worton a clear picture of the current situation in North China, since the Nationalists had just begun to take hold in the cities under Japanese control. They did, however, confirm his freedom of action within the broad bounds of the corps mission. The Marine general fully intended to stretch his permissive authority to arrange for the seizure of "areas necessary to facilitate the movement of the troops and supplies in order to support further operations"¹¹ to include the occupation of Peiping. Even while this discussion was going on, Chungking was approving a revised directive to General Rockey which gave the corps a firmer basis for the Peiping move while still not naming the city as an objective. In the new wording, Rockey could, "for the security of his own forces" and of the major targets assigned to IIIAC, "occupy such intermediate and adjacent areas as he deems necessary."¹²

An Army liaison officer and a State Department advisor had been added to the advance party when it took off for Tientsin on 24 September. Colonel Day led his flight up the coast to Shantung Peninsula, across its mountains and on to the mouth of the Hai River, following its course to Changkeichuang Field outside Tientsin. Almost half of the runway was under water, forcing Day to make a very difficult landing and then act as a

landing signal officer to bring in the other planes. This first taste of what had been considered a major airdrome made the possession of Peiping's airfields even more attractive.

The Japanese were waiting for the Marines when they arrived and General Worton was soon set up in temporary headquarters at the Astor House, the city's principal hotel. After a conference with the *North China Area Army's* chief of staff that evening, which indicated that the Japanese were quite ready to comply with any instructions given them, the IIIAC staff officers turned to on the various tasks falling within their areas of responsibility. Arrangements were made with Chinese Nationalist officers to take over Japanese barracks, warehouses, school buildings, and headquarters within the city. Some houses and buildings owned by members of the German community were also requisitioned by the Chinese for American use. Negotiations through consular representatives were made to occupy public buildings in the former foreign concession areas. As a general rule, property of enemy nationals was taken without ceremony, while leases were executed for holdings which were owned by Allied residents or governments. Most of the property selected in the latter category had also been used by the Japanese military forces or civilian community.

General Worton set aside the French Municipal Building, Tientsin's most imposing structure, as IIIAC headquarters. He also laid claim to the French Arsenal, an extensive barracks and storage compound located on the road to the airfield, for wing headquarters. A reluctance to lease the arsenal on the

¹¹ IIIAC OPlan 26-45, p. 3.

¹² ComGenChina msg to ComSeventhFlt, dtd 25Sep45 in CinCPac WarD, Sep45, encl (B), p. 13.

part of local French officials was swiftly overcome when the general used the Japanese radio to contact Chungking and get pressure brought to bear by the senior French representative in the Chinese capital. The Italian Consulate, close to East Station of the Peiping-Mukden line, was chosen as the 1st Marine Division headquarters.

As soon as the billeting and storage program was well underway at Tientsin, General Worton flew on to Peiping where he arranged to take over many of Nan Yuan Field's facilities and to house most of the Marine units within the confines of the Legation Quarter. His State Department advisor was able to smooth the way within the diplomatic corps when any resistance arose to meeting the considerable space requirements of the proposed Marine garrison. As in Tientsin, the property taken over was mainly that seized by the Chinese from Japanese and Germans, or leased from friendly sources in continuation of usage made of it by the enemy. In both cities there were sizeable barracks once used to house troops protecting diplomatic missions following the Boxer Rebellion; these were naturally set aside for troop use.¹³

Few private owners were reluctant to have the Marines hold their property, even though the leases negotiated were

not very profitable. Marine billeting officers could promise that property would be adequately repaired and maintained, and in many cases improved upon.¹⁴

Japanese cooperation with the advance party was exemplary. Sullenness and foot-dragging tactics, which could well have been expected, were absent.¹⁵ General Worton flew to Tsingtao, Tangshan, and Chinwangtao to confer with local Japanese commanders. Arrangements were made in each place in keeping with the procedures used in Tientsin and Peiping for reception and housing of planned IIIAC garrisons. In Tsingtao the general left Colonel William D. Crawford, an Army officer who was serving in the Corps G-1 Section, to lay the groundwork for the 6th Marine Division arrival. Worton also flew to Weihsien in Shantung, the site of Japanese POW and civilian internment camps, to expedite the release and return to Tientsin of foreign railroad and KMA executives. He was convinced that the economic welfare of a large part of China depended upon the KMA mines getting back into full production.

Shortly after General Worton visited Peiping and indicated by his actions that the Marines intended to move troops there, he received a message that "the people opposed to Chiang Kai-shek"¹⁶ would like to talk to him. A meeting was set up that night at Worton's quarters with the full knowledge of Nationalist authorities. The caller who arrived was General Chou En-lai, the top Commu-

¹³ These barracks included the famous Marine Barracks at Peiping, which had been occupied from 1905 to 1941 by a crack detachment. When the Marines returned to Peiping, "the traditional spit-and-polish main gate sentry post at the entrance to the old American compound was immediately restored, at the instance of old-timers who remembered the days before the war." Col Robert D. Heinl, Jr., ltr to CMC, dtd 31Aug61.

¹⁴ *Rockey interview*, 9Jul59.

¹⁵ Col William K. Enright interview by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 10Mar58, p. 2.

¹⁶ *Worton interview*.

nist representative in wartime truce negotiations between Yen-an and Chungking. The substance of Chou's remarks was that Communist forces would fight to prevent the Marines from moving into Peiping. General Worton in reply told the Communist leader that the Marines most certainly would move in, that they would come by rail and road, and just how they intended to do so. Further, the Marine officer pointed out that III Corps was combat experienced and ready, that it would have overwhelming aerial support, and that it was quite capable of driving straight on through any force that the Communists mustered in its path. The stormy hour-long interview ended inconclusively with Chou vowing that he would get the Marines' orders changed; it was a grim warning of the clashes to come.

By the end of the week, the advance party had made all the most urgent arrangements for the reception of the incoming corps. They had deliberately established a pattern of direct handling of all local logistic support problems which was to hold throughout the Marines' stay in North China. There was to be little opportunity for the traditional Chinese "squeeze" that invariably would have marked such operations had they been turned over to middlemen. In this as well as many other respects, the experience of the old China Marines was of incalculable but obvious benefit.

HOPEH LANDINGS¹⁷


The responsibility for seizing and holding the Tientsin area rested with

Major General DeWitt Peck's 1st Marine Division. (See Map 34.) Although Corps planners recognized that the landing would be primarily a logistical problem, provision had to be made for overcoming resistance. The division designated the 7th Marines, organized as CT-7, as its assault troops. The 2d Battalion followed by 3/7 was to make the initial landing at Tangku and secure the town for use as the IIIAC main port of entry for Hopeh operations. The 1st Battalion of the 7th was detailed to take Chinwangtao in a separate landing.

Scheduled to follow the assault troops ashore at Tangku was the Assistant Division Commander, Brigadier General Louis R. Jones, and his command group plus detachments of the 1st Pioneer Battalion to perform shore party tasks. One battalion of CT-7 would guard the lines of communication between Tangku and Tientsin while the other secured the port area. The regiment was to be prepared to place a garrison in Tangshan on order and assume responsibility for security of the railroad south to Tangku. At the same time, 1/7 at Chinwangtao would take charge of the Peiping-Mukden line north of Tangshan.

1703-45; VIIPhibFor WarD, 15Aug-31Oct45 (OAB, NHD); ComTransRon 17 AR—Tientsin, China, dtd 1Nov45 (OAB, NHD); IIIAC OPlan 26-45; IIIAC WarDs, Sep-Oct45; IIIAC ShoreBrig OPlan No. 1-45, dtd 9Sep45; 1st MarDiv OPlan No. 3-45, dtd 10Sep45; 1st MarDiv WarDs, Sep-Oct45; 1st MAW WarDs, Sep-Oct45; MajGen Keller E. Rockey ltr to Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift, dtd 13Oct45 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQMC), hereafter *Rockey-Vandegrift ltr*, 13Oct45.

¹⁷ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *VIIPhibFor OPlan*



The 1st Marines Combat Team was assigned the mission of occupying the city of Tientsin and Changkeichuang Field. The 5th Marines Combat Team, moving to the target in a transport division arriving a few days after the main convoy, was slated to secure Peiping and its airfields. Tientsin was the projected base for those units of the 11th Marines and division separate battalions that were not attached to infantry regiments. The greatest part of Corps Troops was also scheduled for garrison duty at Tientsin in support of the 1st Division and 1st Wing.

One corps unit, the 7th Service Regiment, was given far-reaching responsibilities that tended to increase and expand as the occupation wore on. Designated as the functional supply agency for all IIIAC ground and air elements in Hopeh, the regiment's organization was such that it would adapt to rapidly changing conditions of service. Its logistic support companies formed the backbone of the Shore Brigade that corps organized to cope with the formidable problems presented by Tientsin's geographic situation.

The brigade, which was strictly a temporary organization, operated with a tiny headquarters of seven officers and men under Colonel Elmer H. Salzman. Two FMF units attached to IIIAC, the 1st Military Police and 11th Motor Transport Battalions, together with medical and signal detachments from Corps Troops augmented the elements of 7th Service Regiment which were to process all personnel and cargo coming ashore. The first echelon of the Navy advanced base organization, Group Pa-

cific 13 (GroPac-13), which was eventually to operate the port of Tangku, also came under Salzman. As soon as sufficient components of the GroPac arrived in North China, the Shore Brigade would be disbanded. For the first couple of weeks of the operation, however, General Rockey emphasized that the brigade "*must* have full authority over all unloading activities and must coordinate all movement of troops, equipment and supplies in the landing area."¹⁸

Much of the concern with the logistic aspects of the Tientsin area operations was generated by the fact that all traffic from ship to shore would have to funnel through the narrow seaward channel of the Hai, across the tide-altered depth of the Taku Bar, and up river to the Tangku piers. Although extensive use of ships' boats for unloading was planned, the strong possibility was recognized that only landing craft as large as LCTs would be practical for the long run from transport to pier. Since the condition of the river channel and the cargo handling facilities at Tangku was uncertain, plans for landing procedures were flexible enough to be adapted rapidly to the situation existing on 30 September.

The responsibility for embarking and moving the forward echelons of units headed for the Tientsin area, and for all follow-up echelons regardless of destination rested with Rear Admiral Ingolf N. Kiland, Commander, Amphibious Group 7. Under him, the commander of

¹⁸ IIIAC SO No. 119-45, dtd 23Sep45, in IIIAC WarD, Sep45, App I, p. 1.

Transport Squadron 17 (Transron-17), Commodore Thomas B. Brittain, was ordered to load, lift, and land the 1st Division and Corps Troops and to act as Senior Officer Present Afloat (SOPA) at the objective. General Peck would move to the target in Commodore Brittain's flagship, while General Rockey sailed with Admiral Barbey in the command ship *Catoctin*. Barbey intended to take the *Catoctin* to the Tientsin landing and thereafter to whatever point the progress of the operation demanded.

Corps Troops on Guam began loading supplies and equipment on vessels of their assigned transport division on 11 September. Three APAs and an AKA of the division, plus 15 LSMs for the heaviest vehicles and gear, were needed to move the first echelon; the remaining two transports, a cargo ship, and additional LSMs reported to Okinawa to load out the 7th Service Regiment. On 20 September, the day after the IIIAC advance party took off for China, the corps convoy sailed for Okinawa to rendezvous with ships carrying the 1st Marine Division and Headquarters Squadron of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

Three of the four transport divisions of Commodore Brittain's squadron assigned to lift the 1st Marine Division had returned to Okinawa from Korea and begun loading by 18 September. Bulk cargo of rations and fuel was taken on board off the Hagushi Beaches in the center of the island before the ships moved north to Motobu Peninsula and began loading unit equipment and supplies. Separate dumps were set up for each vessel's load, and ship-to-dump

radio contact was maintained to speed cargo handling. Landing craft were used to move light loads on all tides and heavier gear with high water; the amphibious vehicles of 3d DUKW Company, which were not hampered by shoal water, were in use all around the clock. Much division heavy equipment, particularly that of the engineer and pioneer battalions, was loaded directly into beached LSMs which could move up river without unloading at Tangku. The rail and road bridges between Tangku and Tientsin were none too sturdy, intelligence indicated, and the possibility that they could not be used by bulldozers, tanks, and similar vehicles had to be considered.

All units were loaded for minor combat employment after the movement to North China, but in practice there was a significant difference from wartime combat loading procedures. There was little inclination to leave anything behind on Okinawa that might be useful in China. The very uncertainty of what lay ahead prompted unit commanders to fill all available spaces, cutting down on the hold room needed to work combat cargo properly, and leading in some instances to lack of clear understanding of unloading priorities.¹⁹ The hurried acquisition of clothing and materiel to cope with North China's rugged winter continued right up to the time of sailing and further complicated the loading situation. Winter gear, particularly suit-

¹⁹ ComTransDiv 59 (CTU 78.1.12 and 78.1.5) AR—Occupation of Taku, Tangku and Tientsin, China, 30Sep–5Oct45, dtd 11Oct45 (OAB, NHD), p. E-4.

able clothing, was in short supply for some units until late in 1945.²⁰

In the original concept of the operation, the movement of a battalion landing team to Chinwangtao was deferred until after the main body of troops left for Tientsin. On 19 September, however, planning for concurrent movement began and an APA was detailed to load out 1/7. An LSM carrying a shore party detachment of the 1st Pioneer Battalion and a destroyer escort were scheduled to join the Chinwangtao landing force off Taku.²¹ Loading of the landing team was finished by 25 September, the same date that all elements of IIIAC at Okinawa completed embarkation.

Both the corps convoy from Guam and three LSTs from Zamboanga with the ground echelon of 1st MAW headquarters on board joined Transron-17 on the 24th. The flight echelon of wing headquarters had flown in on the 22d to establish a temporary command post on Okinawa. While the Assistant Wing Commander, Brigadier General Byron F. Johnson, stayed with the CP, the wing commander, Major General Claude A. Larkin, planned to board the 1st Marine Division command ship. General

Larkin intended to observe the airfield situation at Tientsin first-hand before calling in planes of his groups. The ground echelons of some wing units were already at sea by 25 September, and most of the squadrons were packed and ready to sail. Flight echelons were prepared to stage through Okinawa and Shanghai as soon as the wing declared North China airfields operational.

On the 26th the III Amphibious Corps, less the 6th Marine Division, left Okinawa bound for the Taku Bar. On board the convoy's ships were nearly 25,000 men, the vanguard of a planned strength of 37,638 scheduled for Hopeh garrisons. Heavy seas and leaden skies attended an otherwise uneventful trip.²² On 30 September, most ships reached their assigned anchorage off the Hai River's mouth slightly behind the time forecast and Admiral Barbey delayed H-Hour, originally 0900, to 1030. Worried by the rough water and delay in the landing as scheduled, General Rockey considered putting off the landing until the next day, but the arrival of General Worton at the *Catoctin* prompted him to carry through with the original landing plan.²³

The corps chief of staff had sent out several encouraging situation reports after he arrived in North China, and he was able to keep his promise and meet Rockey in a KMA tug flying an American flag that signified that all was well ashore. Worton brought with him the

²⁰ The former commanding general of the 1st MAW recalled that "aviation personnel, at least, stood guard until about the 1st of January in khaki when temperatures were below freezing." He credits an inspection trip by Major General James T. Moore, Commanding General, AirFMFPac, with the expediting of delivery of "a great amount of heavy clothing," for use of the division and wing. LtGen Louis E. Woods ltr to CMC, dtd 26Oct61, hereafter *Woods ltr*, 1961.

²¹ ComTransDiv 50 AR—The Chinwangtao Landing—19 Sep–4Oct45, dtd 4Oct45 (OAB, NHD).

²² General Rockey recalled that en route to China, the convoy encountered a number of floating Japanese mines that were the targets of interested gunners. *Rockey comments*.

²³ *Rockey interview*, 14–15Apr59.

mayor of Tientsin who requested that at least a token force of Marines reach the city that day. When he and Worton had started down river very early that morning people were already gathering for a welcoming ceremony; a tumultuous reception was planned. Rockey acceded to the Chinese official's request, which was seconded by Worton, and directed that one battalion of the 7th Marines go straight on through to Tientsin as soon as it landed.

The Navy's river control organization was getting into operation while General Worton was briefing General Rockey. The long run in from the anchorage to Tangku's docks—15 miles minimum—combined with rough water over Taku Bar to rule out the use of ships' landing craft to land troops and supplies. The unloading task was shifted entirely to LSMs, LCIs, such LCTs as could be made available from Korea and Japan, and locally hired Chinese lighters. Control officers in patrol craft were stationed in the rendezvous area off Taku Bar, in the river mouth just over the bar, and at the docks where liaison was maintained with the shore brigade. Loaded craft reported to the rendezvous control, were dispatched to the bar on the approval of the river control at the docks, and assigned to specific docks or beaches by the river mouth control.²⁴

General Jones, the ADC of the 1st Division, with some of his staff, arrived at Tangku via a patrol craft at 1030; the two hours it took him to travel from transport to dock was typical of the time lapse involved in reaching shore. It was 1315 before the initial assault battalion

of the 7th Marines, 2/7, reached land after transferring to LCIs from its APA. The 2d Battalion spread out through the port town to establish security for the incoming troops and supplies. The 3d Battalion, 7th, with the regimental headquarters attached, landed next and immediately boarded a train at the dock railyard for Tientsin. In late afternoon 3/7, which had been greeted by cheering, flag-waving Chinese all the way up the Hai River to Tangku and all along the rail line to Tientsin, stepped off its cars into the thick of an unbelievably noisy and happy crowd of thousands of people.²⁵

The corps advance party had arranged for Japanese trucks to carry the men to their billet, the commandeered race-course buildings on the western outskirts of the city,²⁶ but progress through the packed streets of the former concessions was kept to a snail's pace. The utility-clad Marines with full ammunition belts and mammoth transport packs must have looked little like the Marines of prewar years to the Chinese, but their welcome was as fervid as that for a long-lost friend.

Each man in 3/7 had only one day's ration in his pack when he went ashore,

²⁵ *Rockey comments.*

²⁶ A Chronological Hist of 3/7, 1st MarDiv Activities in China, 30Sep45–15Apr46, n.d. p. 1. General Worton, who belonged to the Tientsin Race Club, had the unique experience of voting approval of his action in taking over its property. When a sufficient number of members returned from internment camp, a meeting was held and a lease to IIIAC was authorized. Race Club members were accorded the privileges of the Corps Officers' Club which was established at the racecourse. *Worton interview.*

²⁴ ComTransDiv 59 AR, *op. cit.*



1ST MARINE DIVISION troops landing at Taku on 30 September 1945. (USN 80-G-417486)



TIENTSIN CITIZENS welcome first Marines to return to city since end of war. (USMC 225072)

since his unit, like all others in the corps, had loaded the remainder of the required five days' rations in organizational vehicles.²⁷ The trucks that should have stayed with the 3d Battalion according to original plans were left in Tangku when the battalion made its unexpected trip to Tientsin. The lack of food was acutely felt, but members of the advance party were soon able to arrange for locally procured rations.²⁸

The mix-up regarding rations was not uncommon during the first three days of the operation while Tangku port facilities were being adapted to handle the flood of heavy military equipment and bulk supplies directed to shore. One of the greatest problems was getting loaded vehicles off landing craft and onto dry land. The mud bank near the pier selected as a vehicle landing would not support the Marine trucks until hundreds of loads of stone ballast and layers of logs had provided a firm ramp. The high gasoline consumption rate of trucks hauling ballast and struggling through mud to shore resulted in unexpected priority requests from Shore Brigade that complicated unloading procedures. By 2 October, LSMs were proceeding upriver to Tientsin with the heaviest equipment and unloading ramp-to-ramp into LCMs that ferried the cargo to shore. Later,

a pontoon causeway was towed up to Tientsin and put into use for unloading the LSMs.²⁹

Corps planners had allowed for the near-certainty that there would be vexing logistical problems in making the landing at Tangku. After the assault battalions had established themselves ashore, the Shore Brigade was given the time to get itself set up and in efficient operation before calling in additional forces. More troops and supplies could have been landed on 30 September, but to no particular useful purpose. As it was, more than 5,400 men and 442 tons of equipment (including 115 vehicles) came ashore the first day. The total of unloadings increased rapidly as Tangku's piers, its warehouses and dump areas, and its freight yard maintained the driving pace dictated by the need to clear Transron-17 ships for further tasks.

Shortly after the first troops had reached the docks, a flying boat carrying Admiral Kinkaid and Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, who was commanding the China Theater while General Wedemeyer was in Washington with Ambassador Hurley, set down near the *Catocin*. The two officers immediately were apprised of the favorable situation ashore. In an ensuing conference, the future actions of IIIAC were discussed with Admiral Barbey and General Rockey. A decision made by the Marine commander earlier that day—to proceed immediately with the Chinwangtao landing—was approved; LT 2/7 was underway for its target that evening. The long-planned

²⁷ IIIAC AdminO No. 8-45, dtd 4Sep45.

²⁸ MajGen DeWitt Peck interview by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 8Jun59, hereafter *Peck interview*. Concerned by the sudden change in IIIAC orders which "had upset the planned schedule of procedure," Generals Peck and Worton had accompanied 3/7 to Tientsin. MajGen DeWitt Peck ltr to ACofS, G-3, HQMC, dtd 3Sep61, hereafter *Peck ltr*.

²⁹ ComTransDiv 59 AR, *op. cit.*

movement of Marines to Peiping was at last approved officially. In a joint reappraisal of the corps mission, a decision was made to cancel some of the reinforcing naval units assigned to its task organization. Three of six naval construction battalions, a fleet hospital, and some GroPac units were dropped from follow-up echelons of IIIAC. This reduction, though minor in nature, was merely the first whittling down of corps strength; the demobilization rush still to come would pare it to the marrow and eventually force it out of existence.

The sea was too rough for Admiral Kinkaid's seaplane to take off during the first few days of October, and he and General Stratemeyer finally left by land plane from Tientsin on the 3d. By the time of their departure, the operation was progressing smoothly; the reception of the Marines by the Chinese continued to be vocal and enthusiastic. Most of the unloading problems imposed by the lack of adequate facilities at Tangku had been solved. General Peck had landed with his headquarters group and set up the division CP in the ex-Italian Concession of Tientsin. The 1st Marines, charged with the security of the city, had established headquarters at the British Barracks, and sent guard detachments to the French Arsenal and Changkeichuang Field. On 5 October, the 11th Marines took over the arsenal guard when the artillery regiment's CP was opened there. The 7th Marines continued to keep its headquarters and one battalion in Tientsin, but moved from the racecourse to billets in the Japanese School in the ex-Russian Concession on the west side of the Hai River.

The detached 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John J. Gormley, began landing at Chinwangtao at 1010 on 1 October. The troops went ashore in four waves of landing craft but found no opposition; instead, cheering townsmen met them at the beaches. Gormley took command ashore with the landing of his last wave. At 1140 the battalion's transport moved to dockside and began unloading; its holds were cleared by the evening of the next day.³⁰

The situation in Chinwangtao was tense. Closely investing the town were regular and guerrilla forces of the Communist Eighth Route Army; exchanges of small arms fire were frequent. About 1,600 Japanese and puppet troops were in Chinwangtao and another 2,000 were at Peitaiho, a one-time summer resort 10 miles south down the coast.³¹ The Japanese regulars were ready to leave for Tangshan as soon as 1/7 took over, expecting to surrender there with the main area command. Gormley, however, disarmed the Japanese, pulled the puppet troops off the perimeter defenses where they were constantly harassed by the Communists and replaced them with Marines,³² and arranged to take the surrender of the garrison. Most of the Japanese troops and civilians were dispatched to Tangshan by rail on 3

³⁰ ComTransDiv 50 AR, *op. cit.*

³¹ A large Japanese hospital at Peitaiho offered barracks space for a considerable number of Marines and the town was therefore soon secured by 1/7 and later used as a regimental command post and billeting area by the 7th Marines.

³² Col John J. Gormley comments on draft MS, dtd 3Aug61.

October, and the formal surrender took place on the 4th. The Communist leaders in the area sent word that they would be happy to cooperate with the Marines, an attitude of friendliness that had a very short life.

The surrender of all the Japanese forces in the Tientsin area, some 50,000 men, was arranged to take place on the morning of 6 October. The Japanese were directed to turn in their arms, equipment, and ammunition and to keep only such supplies as were needed for health and subsistence. Japanese units were to continue their guard duties until relieved by Marines, and those that did surrender were allowed to keep one rifle with five rounds of ammunition for each ten men to safeguard persons and supplies until these could be placed in physical custody of Marine units. The 1st Marine Division was given the responsibility of collecting the Japanese materiel and controlling the surrendered troops. The attitude of the Japanese officers and men was so universally cooperative that most of the administrative and logistical arrangements for care of former enemy forces were left in the hands of the Japanese themselves.³³ The Japanese civilians in

the area, who were also to be repatriated with their military brethren under the terms of the surrender, followed suit and ran their own community in a disciplined manner which created few problems for the Marines.

The surrender ceremony itself, conducted with considerable formality, took place in the plaza in front of the French Municipal Building, now officially IIIAC Headquarters. General Rockey had assumed command ashore, reporting to China Theater for orders, on 5 October. An honor guard of company strength, the band, and the colors of the 1st Marine Division formed a background to the actual signing. Lieutenant General Ginnosuke Uchida, accompanied by a small representative staff, signed for the Japanese; symbolically, these officers laid down their treasured swords. General Rockey acting in the name of Chiang Kai-shek signed for the Allies. Looking on as official guests were the senior officers of the Marine units in China and representatives of the countries and other armed services who had contributed to the victory. Unofficial American observers lined the windows and roof of the corps headquarters, and the adjoining streets were filled with the citizens of Tientsin. Most appropriately, the Japanese surrender party filed off the plaza to the strains of "The Marine's Hymn."

Chinese Nationalist officers, who were beginning to arrive by air in increasing numbers, were quite interested in taking the prestige-laden surrender of the *North China Area Army*. General Rockey, who felt that the Tientsin cere-

³³ The former 1st Division Quartermaster noted that the Japanese "furnished us with what appeared to be a complete and honest inventory of all their stores and the location of each. They even had records of all furniture removed from private houses and where it was located. As a matter of fact, they were a sort of secondary supply depot. Many times when we needed items which were not available in regular supply channels we merely consulted the Jap list, called them on the phone, told them what was wanted, and where to deliver it." Col John Kaluf ltr to Head, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 25Aug61.

mony was a necessary and appropriate tribute to his own men, agreed to support this plan for the surrender at Peiping. The first elements of the 92d CNA to be airlifted to the old capital by American transports arrived on 6 October, and on the following day, a 95-vehicle convoy of the 5th Marines reached the city.

The violent Communist reaction to the Marine move, promised by General Chou En-lai to General Worton, had already made itself evident. Marine reconnaissance parties that went to Peiping in 5 October found a series of roadblocks on the Tientsin-Peiping road that narrowed passage room to jeep width. On the 6th, an engineer group guarded by a rifle platoon of the 1st Marines attempted to remove the roadblocks. They were fired upon by an estimated 40-50 troops at a point 22 miles northwest of Tientsin and withdrew to the city after a short firefight. Three Marines were hit and at least one of the attackers was struck by return fire. The engineers returned to their task the following day escorted by a platoon of tanks, a rifle company of the 1st Marines, and a covering flight of carrier planes.³⁴ The roadblocks were removed without incident, allowing the 5th Marines' vehicles to reach Peiping safely before nightfall.

³⁴ An interesting sidelight to this incident comes from a notebook General Peck kept at the time. He wrote: "7 Oct. Convoy to repair road to Peiping left at 0700. Japs fear yesterday firing on us may have been by Jap troops, so gave Jap officer permission to precede convoy by 1/2 hour in jeep with 2 American officers. (Did not go)." *Peck ltr.*

The 5th Marines transport division had arrived off Taku on the 2d and began discharging cargo on the 5th and troops on the 6th.³⁵ By this time almost all corps and division troops in the forward echelon, except the unit ship platoons left on board to unload cargo, were ashore. The LSTs of the 1st MAW Headquarters Squadron laid alongside the docks at Tangku on the 7th and began unloading.

When the CP of the wing shifted from Okinawa to Tientsin at midnight on 6 October, following the arrival of the first planes from wing and MAG-24 and -25 at Changkeichuang Field,³⁶ all but one of the major unit headquarters of Expeditionary Troops were ashore and in operation. The convoy carrying the 6th Marine Division was at sea proceeding to its objectives, but the Chinese Communists had already beaten them to one. Rear Admiral Thomas G. W. Settle, commanding a cruiser force which had put into Chefoo harbor, reported that the Japanese had evacuated the city and the Communists had seized it and were ill-disposed to any suggestions that they hand over control to anybody else. Admiral Kinkaid requested General Rockey to proceed to Chefoo with Admiral Barbey and investigate the advisability of landing Marines there in light of the altered situation. Immediately following the surrender ceremony in Tientsin, the two commanders boarded the *Catoclin* and headed for Chefoo. (See Map 33.)

³⁵ Com TU 78.1.14 (ComTransDiv 36) AR of (PhibLanOp) in Tientsin-Chinwangtao Area of China, dtd 23Oct45 (OAB, NHD).

³⁶ MAG-24 WarD, Oct45, and MAG-25 WarD, Oct45.

SHANTUNG LANDING ³⁷

The *Catoctin* dropped anchor in Chefoo city harbor in midmorning of 7 October under the protective guns of Admiral Settle's flagship, the cruiser *Louisville*. Two days of conferences on ship and ashore took place between the local Communist military and political officials and the senior American officers. Barbey and Rockey saw numerous Communist troops in the port and were told by their leaders that any attempt by the Nationalists to land with or after the Marines would be opposed.³⁸ The implication was clear that a Marine landing at Chefoo would not mean the liberation of a Japanese-held city but rather a partisan act for the Nationalists in the civil war. Under these circumstances, as the corps commander wrote shortly afterwards to the Commandant of the Marine Corps:

Admiral Barbey and I both felt that any landing there would be an interference

³⁷ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: ComSeventhFt WarD, Oct45 (OAB, NHD); VIIPhibFor WarDs, Aug-Oct45; ComTransRon 24 (CTG 78.6) AR, Landing of 6th MarDiv at Tsingtao, China, 23Sep-17Oct45, dtd 27Oct45 (OAB, NHD); IIIAC WarD, Oct45; 6th MarDiv OPlan No. 108-45, dtd 18Sep45; 6th MarDiv WarDs, Sep-Oct45; 1st MAW WarD, Oct45; MAG-32 WarD, Oct45; *Rockey-Vandegrift ltr*, 13Oct45; Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. interview by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 14Jul59, hereafter *Shepherd interview*.

³⁸ Admiral Barbey recalled that the "Communist commander at Chefoo made it unmistakably clear that any landing of the Marines, with or without Chinese Nationalist troops, would be opposed." VAdm Daniel E. Barbey ltr to ACofS, G-3, HQMC, dtd 8Nov61, hereafter *Barbey ltr*.

in the internal affairs of China; that it would be bitterly resented by the Communists and that there would probably be serious repercussions. Although the opposition would not have been very serious, there was apt to be some fighting, sabotage and guerrilla warfare. Upon our recommendation, the landing was cancelled.³⁹

After he received a dispatch recommendation from General Rockey on 8 October, General Stratemeyer conferred with Chiang Kai-shek and then radioed approval.⁴⁰ The China Theater deputy commander also suggested that the Chefoo landing force be sent ashore at Tsingtao.⁴¹ Word of the change in operation orders was passed to the 6th Marine Division on the 9th when its convoy was two days out of Tsingtao.

The cancellation of the Chefoo operation was not much of a surprise to Major General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., the 6th Division commander. General Rockey had warned him as early as 4 October that the presence of Communist troops might make it inadvisable to land Marines there. The division billeting plan issued the next day made tentative provision for the accommodation of the Chefoo landing force, the 29th Marines, in buildings in Tsingtao.

³⁹ *Rockey-Vandegrift ltr*, 13Oct45. Admiral Barbey made the recommendation not to land the Marines in a dispatch to Admiral Kinkaid; General Rockey was present during the drafting of the dispatch and concurred in its recommendations. *Barbey ltr*.

⁴⁰ General Rockey recalled that when he saw Chiang Kai-shek in November, the generalissimo was very upset about the elimination of the Chefoo landing and pointed out the proximity of Dairen to the Communist-controlled port. *Rockey comments*.

⁴¹ CGUSForChinaThtr disp to WDCOS, dtd 8Oct45 (Missionary Incoming Book No. 2, Wedemeyer File, TAGO, KCRC).

Before Chefoo was written off as an objective, the planned Tsingtao ground garrison consisted of the 6th Marine Division, less two of its rifle regiments, with sufficient supporting units to enable General Shepherd to perform his mission of securing the city and Tsangkou Field. Tsangkou, which was projected as the aerial port of entry for North China, was designated the home base of MAG-32 and of Marine Wing Service Squadron 1, which was to operate a processing center for all aviation personnel entering or leaving the area. Operational control of Tsangkou-based squadrons rested with General Larkin as wing commander rather than General Shepherd as area commander.

The 6th Marine Division's mounting out for China was an orderly and uneventful procedure as befitted the veteran status of the troops and naval elements involved. Transport Squadron 24 under Commodore Edwin T. Short assembled at Guam after its transport divisions had helped move occupation forces to Japan. Loading began on 23 September when the IIIAC convoy had cleared the island, and on the 29th the transports carrying the 29th Marines sailed to Saipan to relieve congestion in the loading area. The transron reassembled at sea on 3 October and sailed on past Okinawa for Shantung. On board the ships were 12,834 men of the landing force and 17,038 tons of supplies, including 1,333 vehicles.

Taking advantage of the delay in the Tsingtao operation caused by the shortage of shipping, General Shepherd had sent an advance party led by Colonel William N. Best, the Division Quartermaster, to China with the 1st Marine

Division. Best was directed to proceed to Tsingtao and to "take all possible steps to insure orderly and efficient arrival, discharge, and billeting of the division."⁴² On 7 October, General Shepherd followed up his advance party and transferred with a small staff to the destroyer escort *Newman* in order to reach Tsingtao a day ahead of Transron 24. The general wanted to check the situation ashore and explore the possibility of cancelling the planned assault phase of the operation and proceeding without delay to general cargo discharge over Tsingtao docks.

A typhoon which struck the Okinawa area on 8 October caught the ships of Transron 24 in its lashing edge. Rough seas slowed the convoy to such an extent that Commodore Short had to delay the landing date 24 hours. Toward the center of the furious storm, waves as high as 40 feet and winds that reached above 100 knots tore at the LSTs carrying the ground echelons of wing units to Tsingtao and Tangku. The turbulence was so great that the main deck of one landing ship split and it had to return to Okinawa for repairs.

The havoc wrought by the typhoon at Okinawa was even greater than it was at sea. Winds with gusts that destroyed measuring instruments swept across Chimu Field where planes and gear of 1st MAW squadrons were parked waiting on clearance for the move to China. The extent of the material damage was hard to believe; every plane in VMSB-244 and VMTB-134 was unflyable when the high winds abated on the 10th. Re-

⁴² CG, 6th MarDiv ltr of instruction to Col William N. Best, dtd 20Sep45, in 6th MarDiv WarD, Sep45, encl (L).

supply stores, personal baggage, and unit equipment were scattered and torn apart. The flight echelons of MAG-32 squadrons, working around the clock, performed a miracle of reconstruction on their battered ships. Searching out needed tools and materiel in dumps and storeships throughout the island and its anchorages, improvising and even improving as they made repairs, the pilots, gunners, and ground crews had their planes airborne within a week.⁴³

Weather is no respecter of person, and the typhoon that struck Okinawa gave General Shepherd, on board the *Newman*, "his roughest experience at sea."⁴⁴ All hands were thankful to see the hills of Tsingtao come up on the horizon on the morning of the 10th, and enjoy the prospect of setting foot on the ground again. Alerted by Colonel Best, the mayor of the city and a delegation of local officials met the general when he landed. Billeting preparations were well in hand, and the cooperation of the Japanese garrison was exemplary. Shepherd decided that there was no need to land assault battalions to secure the wharves prior to the main landing.

Admiral Kinkaid flew in from Shanghai on the 10th, shortly after the *Catoctin* arrived from Chefoo, and broke his flag on board the command ship. Generals Rockey and Shepherd and Admiral Barbey discussed the China situation with the Seventh Fleet commander, and reviewed the difficulties inherent in their instructions to cooperate with the Central Government

forces while avoiding any collaboration with the Communists. The schedules for arrival of the rear echelon of IIIAC units and for the initiation of repatriation of Japanese soldiers and civilians came under consideration. Since the JCS had stated that it was U. S. policy to assist the Chinese Government in establishing its troops in the liberated areas, particularly Manchuria, as rapidly as possible,⁴⁵ both the movement of follow-up echelons and the progress of repatriation hinged upon the extent to which American vessels were used to move Nationalist armies. Ships of Transron 17 were assigned to transport the 13th CNA from Kowloon to Hulutao and the 8th CNA from Kowloon to Tsingtao; and as soon as Transron-24 cleared its holds, it was to pick up the 52d CNA at Haiphong and take it to Dairen.

Commodore Short brought the 6th Division convoy into Kiaochow Bay on the 11th under a continuous cover of carrier air launched from ships of TF 72 which were keeping station at sea just off the Shantung coast. The standby air and naval gunfire support programmed for both the northern and southern sector landings had not been used, but both objective areas were well accustomed to flights of Navy planes overhead by the time the troops came ashore. The aerial show of force over Tsingtao was but one of a progression that had begun when the Fast Carrier Task Force first sailed into the Yellow Sea in August. Every city and town on the Marine occupation schedule and the countryside for many

⁴³ VMSB-244 WarD, Oct45; Maj Gerald Fink interview by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 8Mar60.

⁴⁴ *Shepherd interview.*

⁴⁵ JCS msg to CinCPacAdvHq, dtd 19Sep45 in CinCPac WarD, Sep45, encl (B), p. 9. (OAB, NHD).



NAVY CARRIER PLANES in a "show of force" flight over Peking with the Forbidden City in the background. (USN 80-G-417426)



REPATRIATED JAPANESE SOLDIERS salute American flag upon boarding LSTs returning them home to Japan. (USN 80-G-702992)

miles around had been made aware that the American combat aircraft supported the occupation. A good part of the task of 1st MAW squadrons would be to continue the surveillance and show of force flights started by the Navy carrier planes, which were calculated to impress the Japanese and cause the Communists to take heed.

After he had received the latest hydrographic information and arranged a docking schedule that suited the altered 6th Division landing priorities, Commodore Short brought his first transports into Great Harbor and authorized unloading to begin. The first unit over the side was the 6th Reconnaissance Company which landed at 1430 and boarded Japanese trucks provided by the advance party. These men got the initial taste of Tsingtao's welcome to the division, and found it to be fully as loud, enthusiastic, and memorable as that which had greeted the first Marines to enter Tientsin. The reconnaissance outfit threaded its way through the crowded streets and out past the city outskirts to Tsangkou Field where the Japanese guard was relieved.

Other elements of the division disembarked and moved to their billets on schedule, with the 22d Marines, which had been detailed as assault troops in the original scheme of maneuver, leading the way. The 22d moved into Shantung University Compound, a considerable collection of buildings which was also to house part of the 29th Marines and the 6th Medical Battalion. The Japanese girls' high school set aside as the barracks of the 15th Marines was gutted by fire on the night of the 10th. Subsequent investigation showed this to

be an act of arson by the school's caretaker without the sanction or encouragement of Japanese authorities. The Marine artillerymen moved instead into an old set of barracks built by the Germans and into another school. Most of the remainder of the division was billeted in Japanese schools also; the tank battalion occupied Japanese barracks near the tank and vehicle park which was established on open ground near the racecourse. The 6th Marine Division CP opened at the former Japanese Naval Headquarters Building on the shore of the Outer Harbor on the 12th; General Shepherd took command ashore reporting to IIIAC for orders on the 13th. All troops were off their ships by the 16th and the transon sailed the following day.

Admiral Kinkaid had stayed at Tsingtao just long enough to see that the operation was proceeding smoothly and then had flown out. On the 12th, the *Catoclin* followed suit and upped anchor for Chinwangtao with General Rockey still on board. The IIIAC commander and Admiral Barbey wanted to investigate the situation at the KMA port town, particularly with regard to the potential danger posed by the strong Communist forces in the vicinity. Seemingly, after the decision not to land at Chefoo was announced, the Communist leaders ordered a temporary respite in their harassment of the Marines. A Communist general in civilian clothes even called at corps headquarters in Tientsin to apologize for the attack on the road patrol.⁴⁶ But the lull was only fleeting

⁴⁶ *Rockey-Vandegrift ltr, 13Oct45.*

while attempts were made to sound out Marine commanders on their attitudes.

General Shepherd was approached by an emissary of the Communist commander in Shantung on 13 October with a letter that offered to assist the Marines in destroying the Japanese and puppet forces and in policing Tsingtao. It called attention to the fact that the Nationalist Army was going to land at the city under the protection of the Marines in a move that was sure to bring open war in Shantung; despite this, the Communist general hoped that his force and the Marines could still cooperate. General Shepherd carefully prepared a point by point reply and dispatched it by the same emissary on the 16th. The Marine commander pointed out that the mission of his division was a peaceful one and that it could not and would not cooperate in any way to destroy Japanese or Chinese forces. The city of Tsingtao was also peaceful, he noted; and should any disorders arise, "my Division of well-trained combat veterans will be entirely capable of coping with the situation."⁴⁷ Shepherd then stated that the movement of Nationalist troops into Tsingtao was a factor beyond his control, but that he could promise that the 6th Division would not take the part of either side in armed conflict. In the face of the Marine general's determination to carry out his orders to cooperate with the National Government and to avoid assistance to Yen-an's forces, the Communist commander could make no headway.

If there ever was a time when the Communist Eighth Route Army and the Marines could have coexisted peacefully,

it was in early October 1945. This chance, however slim, was soon thrown away with the outbreak of a series of harassing attacks against the 1st Marine Division units guarding the communication routes in Hopeh. In the 6th Marine Division zone, the more usual form of harassment became small arms fire against low-flying reconnaissance aircraft.

The first Marine squadron to establish itself at Tsingtao was VMO-6. On 12 October, its 16 light observation aircraft (OYs) flew into Tsangkou Field from the escort carrier *Bougainville* which had transported the squadron from Guam. Although the 1st Wing had administrative responsibility for VMO-6, operational control was assigned by corps to the 6th Division; a similar setup involving the 1st Division and VMO-3 applied in the Tientsin area. While the OYs' principal tasks would be liaison and surveillance flights for ground units, their ability to land and take off from makeshift airstrips also ensured their use for retrieving downed airmen.

The flight echelon of MAG-32 arrived at Tsangkou Airfield on 21 October amidst the preparations of the ground crewmen to get set up for extensive aerial operations. General Shepherd was anxious that regular reconnaissance flights over the interior of Shantung be made to report on the activities of the Japanese and of the Communists. He made an oral request to that effect; and on 26 October, the torpedo and scout bombers of the group began flying over Chefoo and Weihaiwei, the mountains of the Shantung Peninsula, and the

⁴⁷ 6th MarDiv WarD, Oct45, encl (B).

railroad leading into Tsinan, headquarters city for the Japanese *Forty-third Army* garrison.

The Japanese troops that were in the immediate Tsingtao vicinity, those controlled by the *5th Independent Mixed Brigade*, were fortunate since their repatriation was assured. Before the other units of the *Forty-third Army*, strung out along the rail line and quartered in the provincial capital, could count on heading home, they would have to wait relief by Nationalist units. Most intelligence sources indicated that the relief could well be a bloody one. Communist troop dispositions along the vital railroad promised a battle to CNA forces attempting to reach Tsinan.

Major General Eiji Nagano, the local Japanese commander in Tsingtao, was directed to surrender his troops to General Shepherd on 25 October. Admiral Barbey, General Rockey, and a gathering of distinguished official guests were invited to witness the ceremony; General Shepherd asked Lieutenant General Chen Pao-tsang, Deputy Commander of the Nationalist Eleventh War Area, to sign as Chiang Kai-shek's personal representative. The entire 6th Marine Division, less the 4th Marines still in Japan, was also a witness. On the morning of the 25th, more than 12,000 men marched on to the oval infield of the Tsingtao racecourse and formed in company and battalion mass columns. To their front, on a raised platform erected for the occasion, General Nagano and the Allied commanders signed the surrender documents. The Japanese general and his staff then laid down their swords, a gesture of defeat of tremendous significance to them. Division mili-

tary police escorted the former enemies from the field to close the proceedings.⁴⁸

CONSOLIDATION PHASE⁴⁹

The 6th Marine Division settled into a garrison routine with relative ease. The potential for trouble was strong in view of the impoverished thousands of jobless refugees who jammed the poorer sections of the city and overflowed into a miserable collection of shacks and cave hovels on its outskirts. A rash of thievery and mob action broke out from these slums. Directed against German and Japanese households, it occurred within a week of the Marine landing. The local police seemed powerless to prevent the outrages, but squad-sized patrols of the 22d and 29th Marines soon restored order. While the mob violence abruptly ceased with the advent of Marine street patrols, the threat of its renewal remained. General Shepherd's prompt action in bolstering civil authority had its desired effect, however. It dispelled any idea that may have existed in the minds of the people of Tsingtao, or of the watching Communists, that the 6th Marine Division was just a show force.

The division's rear echelon arrived from Guam on 28 October. On the same date naval units needed to operate Tsingtao's port as an advance fuel and supply base for the Seventh Fleet began

⁴⁸ Cass, *6th MarDiv Hist*, pp. 206-219.

⁴⁹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: ComSeventhFt WarD, Oct45; VIIIPhibFor WarDs, Aug-Oct45; IIIAC WarD, Oct45; 1st MarDiv WarD, Oct45; 6th MarDiv WarD, Oct45; 1st MAW WarD, Oct45; 7th ServRegt WarD, Oct45.

unloading. By the month's end, the ground portion of the city's American garrison was firmly established.

At Tsangkou, aerial activity was greatly increased over that originally planned by the decision to base MAG-25 as well as MAG-32 at the field. The deficiencies of Changkeichuang Field at Tientsin for extensive use by either fighter or transport aircraft persuaded General Larkin to switch the transport group's home station. The group service squadron was diverted to Tsingtao while it was still at sea en route from Bougainville, and the flight echelon began ferrying men and equipment to Tsangkou on the 22d. From the moment the group's two transport squadrons, VMR-152 and -153, arrived in China they were heavily committed to support the III Corps. Regular passenger and cargo runs to Shanghai, to Peiping, and to Tientsin were scheduled. In addition, special missions were flown as the situation required; in mid-October Marine transports were used to evacuate the Allied internees at Weihsien after Communist troops cut the railroad south to Tsingtao.

The two night fighter squadrons of MAG-24, VMF(N)-533 and -541, set up at Nan Yuan Field outside Peiping without incident. The group's ground echelon, which moved to the target in company with that of MAG-32, had been battered by the typhoon off Okinawa but came out of the storm with no crippling damage.⁵⁰ MAG-24's first regular flight operations began on 17 October as the ground echelon was unloading at Tangku.

⁵⁰ MAG-24 WarD, Oct45.

The rest of Peiping's complement of Marine planes, the Corsairs of MAG-12, staged through Tsangkou to Lantienchang Field on 25 October. Since the group's ground elements were still at sea at the end of the month, effective operations of its fighter squadrons, VMF-115, -211, and -218, waited upon their landing. For the most part, however, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was ashore and in service by 30 October. On that date, General Larkin, whose failing health would not allow him to remain in China, was detached to return to the States.

The new wing commander, Major General Louis E. Woods, who had led the 2d Wing at Okinawa, arrived at Tientsin on the 30th and assumed command the following day.⁵¹ By this time, his planes had relieved the carrier aircraft of TF 72 of all supporting missions flown for IIIAC. The reconnaissance and surveillance flights requested by ground commanders were now all the responsibility of 1st Wing squadrons. The Marine pilots also inherited the dubious privilege of being fired upon by Communist riflemen and machine gunners who took exception to their presence overhead. No return fire was authorized without permission of higher headquarters, and the sporadic shots went without the repayment that the flyers dearly wished to

⁵¹ General Woods, recalling his introduction to Changkeichuang Field, commented that it had good approaches and that any good pilot should be able to land there without too much trouble, but that he would have to use all the runway. The general remembered a sign had been erected reading: "This is a small field, use all of it." LtGen Louis E. Woods interview by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 22Jun59, hereafter *Woods interview*.

make.⁵² Instead, minimum altitudes at which scouting flights were made were steadily raised to lessen the risk to plane and crew.

The Communist troops who fired at Marine planes seemed equally attracted by Marine-guarded trains. Regularly throughout October, pot shots were taken at trains on the Peiping-Mukden line as they rattled by, and the Marines returned fire if any targets could be seen. On 18 October, six Communist soldiers were killed in the act of firing on a train running between Langfang and Peiping, but for the most part the shooting on both sides was without visible result. Jeep patrols in the vicinity of Marine positions were also fired upon by concealed riflemen and three men were wounded in such incidents through 30 October.

The Tientsin-Peiping road, site of the first clash in China between Communist troops and Marines, broke out in a fresh rash of roadblocks on 15 October and succeeding nights. This activity soon ended, however, when word was passed to farmers along the route that the next ditch dug across the road would be filled in from the nearest field.⁵³ Patrols of the 5th Marines roamed the road as far south as Ho-Hsi-Wu, the halfway town below which the 1st Marines zone of responsibility began. Along the rail line between the two cities, Langfang was the limiting point and a small detachment of the 5th occupied the station there.

⁵² At this time, or shortly thereafter, General Woods issued orders that "planes on reconnaissance would no longer be authorized to carry ammunition." *Woods ltr 1961*.

⁵³ *Peck interview*.

A subordinate command of the 1st Division, Peiping Group, under the ADC, General Jones, was established to control Marine activities in the capital. Only two battalions of the 5th Marines, the 2d and 3d, were part of the Peiping Group. The 1st Battalion was attached to the 11th Marines which had security responsibility for the stretch of road, rail, and river between Tientsin and Tangku. The infantry battalion was assigned to Tangku, guarding the enormous dumps of ammunition and supplies that were building in the area.

Although Tientsin was the supply center for IIIAC units in the northern sector, Tangku was developed as the major storage area to prevent unnecessary transshipment of materiel unloaded at the docks along the river. On 15 October, the Corps Shore Brigade was disbanded and the 7th Service Regiment took over its duties; GroPac-13 and the 1st Pioneer Battalion were placed under its operational control. At Tsingtao, a provisional detachment of 7th Service was activated with the landing of the 6th Division to support Marine activities in the south. The service regiment was officially designated the responsible and accountable supply agency for all organized and attached military and naval units of III Corps in North China on 21 October.

The dispositions of 1st Marine Division troops in the Tientsin area remained throughout October much as they were just after the landing. Most of the division's strength was concentrated in cities and major towns where their presence acted as a strong deterrent to mob action. When raging crowds of Chinese attacked Japanese civilians

in Tientsin on 13 October, riot squads of the 1st Marines waded into the fighting to rescue the Japanese and quickly quelled the disturbances before serious damage was done. Here, as in Tsingtao, the city's unruly element was given a sharp warning that the Marines would act strongly to prevent disorder whenever local authorities failed to do so.

General Peck was in no hurry to expose his men in small and vulnerable guard detachments along the Peiping-Mukden line.⁵⁴ As a consequence, the Japanese continued to outpost the bridges and isolated stretches of track between Chinwangtao and Peiping during October. Disarmament of Japanese troops within the garrison cities occupied by the Marines was effected smoothly with minimum supervision by American forces. The concentration point for the Japanese in the 1st Division zone was their North China Field Warehouse five miles southeast of Tientsin on the Tangku road; the details of feeding, housing, and processing thousands of soldier and civilian repatriates were all handled by Japanese officials acting under the direction of a handful of Marines. The extent of the repatriation problem facing the 6th Division at Tsingtao and the 1st at Tientsin was revealed by *North China Area Army* officers who estimated that there were 326,375 military and 312,774 civilians in North China who would have to be sent home. The first reduction from this vast total was made on 22 October, when 2,924 civilians and 436 military patients boarded a Japanese ship at Tangku and left for Japan.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

The use of Japanese troops to hold communication routes vital to the Nationalist scheme of control in North China was supposedly a temporary expedient. The airlift of the two Nationalist armies that China Theater Headquarters had scheduled to relieve the Marines and assume responsibility for Japanese repatriation was completed on 29 October. The 30,000-man 92d CNA remained in Peiping as the capital's main garrison, while the 94th CNA, with a strength of 26,000 men, set up its headquarters in Tientsin.⁵⁵ The 43d Division of the 94th was dispatched to Chinwangtao, and single regiments of the army were sent to Tangku and the mines near Tangshan for guard duty. The immediate goal of the Nationalist commanders seemed to be the recruitment and reorganization of 60,000 former puppet troops in the area; there was no visible disposition to relieve the Japanese of their rail security task. These Chinese officers were particularly interested in acquiring the Japanese weapons and equipment that had been turned in to the Marines.

Based on his belief that the Nationalist forces would relieve the Marines, and that no American troops should remain in an area of probable civil war,

⁵⁵ General Peck has noted: "On arrival of the 94th CNA, I received orders to cooperate with the Chinese in the defense [of Tientsin]. General Mou Ting Fang bore the titles of CG 94th Army and CG Tientsin Garrison Force. In conference between Mou and myself it was agreed that the Chinese would be responsible for the static defense of the city while the Marines would operate as a mobile reserve. This understanding seemed the best answer to the ticklish problems of command which could arise." *Peck ltr.*

General Stratemeyer recommended to Washington that the IIIAC begin pulling out of China on 15 November. Admiral Kinkaid agreed with this proposal in an information copy he sent to CinCPac on 27 October. Both American commanders said that their recommendation held true only if there were no change in the mission of the China Theater or of the Marines.⁵⁶ Although the IIIAC commander was not an addressee of Stratemeyer's message, routine monitoring of the communication traffic of higher headquarters soon made him aware of its content. Word of the possible 15 November departure date circulated rapidly through corps headquarters, and for a few days there was a noticeable letdown in the pace of planning for winter operations. Since General Rockey felt that no credence should be given to speculation about an early withdrawal, and in fact that such a move was very unlikely, he actively discouraged any tendency on the part of his staff or unit commanders to let things ride.⁵⁷

Evidence that supported General Rockey's estimate of a long China tour for IIIAC accumulated rapidly during the latter part of October. Soviet foot-dragging tactics in Manchuria made a farce of the Russian treaty promise to recognize Chungking's "full sovereignty" over the area and to give "moral support and aid in military supplies . . . entirely to the National Government as

the central government of China."⁵⁸ The vast store of captured Japanese munitions collected by the Soviet occupation troops found its way into the hands of the Communist forces that poured into Manchuria with the arrival of the Soviet armies. Hulutao, which the Nationalists planned as their principal port of entry to the Manchurian plain, was seized by the Communists. At Dairen, the local Soviet commander refused to let Nationalist troops land, thus closing the sea gate to the Liaotung Peninsula and eastern Manchuria. At Yingkow, another proposed landing site in Manchuria, the Soviet commander turned over the area to Chinese Communists after Admiral Barbey in the *Cactoctin* arrived to arrange for the landing of Nationalist troops.⁵⁹ In all instances where the Communists held sway, they threatened to fight to prevent the landing of CNA troops.

As soon as it became evident that the proposed landings might encounter resistance, Admiral Kinkaid and General Stratemeyer informed Chiang Kai-shek that American ships could not be used to transport Nationalist forces to any area where opposition was expected. Loading of the 52d CNA for Dairen was suspended on 27 October, and the 13th CNA, which was at sea en route to Hulutao, was diverted to Chinwangtao. This action was in keeping with the principles contained in a Seventh Fleet policy guide which Kinkaid published on 21 October. The guide called attention to the U. S. recognition of the Central Government and its strict

⁵⁶ CGUSForChina Thtr disp to WDCOS in CincPac WarD, Oct45, encl (B), pp. 19-22 (OAB, NHD).

⁵⁷ *Rockey interview*, 9Jul59; *Rockey comments*.

⁵⁸ Quoted in *U. S. and China*, p. 587.

⁵⁹ *Barbey ltr.*

neutrality in dealing with Communist forces and cautioned:

(B) All operations shall be carefully planned and executed so as to offer the minimum risk of clashes with Communists or entanglement in possible civil strife in China.

(C) In landing or supporting Central Government troops, areas are chosen where Communist resistance is unlikely. Should a clash or resistance occur between Communist and Central Government forces, fleet units will not take part.⁶⁰

The loss of direct American sealift radically changed Chiang's plans for occupying Manchuria. (See Map 33.) A time-consuming overland advance, probably against Communist opposition, was scheduled to free Hulutao. Hopeh Province was looked upon as a base for operations in Manchuria and the Peiping-Mukden Railroad as the main supply route. The area between Chinwangtao and Shanhaikuan was selected as the assembly and jump-off point.

Since Communist guerrilla forces abounded in the Chinwangtao area, the danger of Marines becoming involved in the fighting was acute. A sample of the trouble that could brew occurred on 30 October, when Communist troops near Peitaiho blew two bridges on the rail

line and sent word to the commander of 1/7 that no armed Americans would be allowed to pass through the area without permission. This bit of bravado was reported to the Nationalist Eleventh War Area commander, and on his orders the 43d Division of the 94th CNA conducted a sweep which drove off the Communists.

The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, was undoubtedly capable of tangling with these Communists and coming out on top, but it could not do so without contravening its orders not to take offensive action. General Rockey felt that it was "difficult but essential" to comply with the directive not to get involved in the Chinese civil strife and that it accurately reflected majority American opinion at the time.⁶¹ The Commandant of the Marine Corps in discussing the threatening situation facing the Marines, commended General Rockey for his "action at Chefoo and subsequent action at other places [which] has certainly given us every reason to believe that if we do get mixed up [in the fighting] it will have been forced upon us."⁶²

⁶¹ *Rockey interview*, 14-15Apr59.

⁶² Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift ltr to MajGen Keller E. Rockey, dtd 31Oct45. (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQMC).

⁶⁰ ComSeventhFlt msg to SeventhFlt, dtd 21Oct45 (Missionary Incoming Book No. 5, Wedemeyer File, TAGO, KCRC).

An Extended Stay

EXPANDED MISSION¹

When General Wedemeyer returned from Washington he quickly confirmed General Rockey's judgment that there would be no early withdrawal of the IIIAC. In a conference held on 7 November, Wedemeyer told the corps commander it was imperative that substantial numbers of Marines remain in North China, and that reductions in strength made necessary by the world-wide demobilization rush of American forces be phased over a period of months. Rockey immediately radioed this information to FMFPac in order to maintain the continuity of resupply shipping and to assist General Geiger's staff in the involved planning necessary to provide replacements for the veterans in IIIAC.

The continued requirement for Marines in North China stemmed from two complementary causes. One was the U. S. commitment to assist the National Government in eliminating all Japanese influence from China, and the other was the overriding determination of Chiang Kai-shek to recover control of Manchuria. As a direct result of the obstructionist tactics of Soviet occupation forces, the Nationalist Army was unable

to move into Manchuria with either the speed or the limited forces that had once been planned. Instead, the first-line troops which had been scheduled to relieve the Marines of repatriation and guard duties were committed to an overland advance through Shanhaikuan.

In his capacity of chief of staff to Generalissimo Chiang, a wartime role that was dropped before the year's end, General Wedemeyer was sharply aware of the low military potential of the Nationalists. He recommended against the move in strength into Manchuria after Communist opposition developed. Instead, the American commander told Chiang that he should first consolidate his political and military hold on North China as a base of operations. Although the Central Government's armies possessed a three to one superiority in manpower over the Communists, and a considerable edge in weapons and equipment as well, Wedemeyer believed that the Nationalist forces would become overextended and increasingly vulnerable if they attempted to occupy and hold Manchuria.

Despite General Wedemeyer's advice, the recovery of Manchuria became the focus of Chungking's military effort. The Japanese-created industrial complex and the rich agricultural resources of the area made its position seem essential to the economic well-being of post-war China. This argument lost much of its force, however, as a result of the action of the Soviet occupation army

¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: Eyes Alone Radios Folder (Wedemeyer File, TAGO, KCRC); *Rockey interviews*, 14-15 Apr 59 and 9 Jul 59; *Worton interview*; *U. S. Relations with China*; *Wedemeyer, Reports*.

during the fall and winter of 1945. Stripping the best of machinery and equipment from Manchurian factories and power plants under the guise of war reparations, and immobilizing the remainder by this selective robbery, the Soviets effectively converted Manchuria from an economic asset to a liability. Its gutted factory cities added nothing to Nationalist strength when they were taken over, and Communist military action made certain there was no opportunity to rebuild what had been lost.

As the pattern of events in Manchuria began to take shape, the United States anxiously strove to appraise its position in Chinese affairs. General Wedemeyer returned to Chungking from the States with instructions to survey the current situation regarding American forces and future prospects for his country's interests. After visiting Shanghai, Peiping, and Mukden and talking to top American, Chinese, and Soviet commanders, he submitted a detailed report on 20 November. In it he analyzed the relationship of the III Amphibious Corps to the Central Government and its plans, saying:

The Generalissimo is determined to retain in their present areas the Marines in North China. As a matter of fact he desires the Marines to expose long lines of communications in their occupational area. He visualizes utilizing the Marines as a base of maneuver. The Gimo [Generalissimo] would like to concentrate plans based on conducting a campaign against the Chinese Communists instead of repatriating the Japanese. Such a campaign may require several months or years . . . in the interim the Marines are subject to unavoidable incidents which may involve the United States in very serious commitments and difficulties. Careful consideration has been given to the implications

of suggesting that we withdraw all of our American forces including the Marines from China. It is impossible to avoid involvement in political strife or fratricidal warfare under present circumstances, yet I am admonished to do so by my directive. The presence of American troops in the Far East as I view it, is for the expressed purpose of insuring continued peace and accomplishing world order. Under the provisions of the lofty aims of the United Nations Charter, however, I doubt that the American people are prepared to accept the role inherent in world leadership. We can justifiably be accused, by removing our forces at this critical time, of deserting an Ally. It is readily discernible that China is incapable of solving her political and economic problems and also repatriating the millions of enemy troops and civilians within her borders.²

President Truman and the Joint Chiefs asked the theater commander to suggest several alternative lines of actions for consideration by policy makers in Washington. Accordingly, Wedemeyer recommended that either all U. S. forces be removed from China as soon as possible, or that American policies under which they were being employed be clarified to justify their use in a situation of imminent danger. He also suggested that American troops might be withdrawn and that economic aid to the Central Government be stepped up, or, in lieu of this course, that a straightforward policy declaration be made affirming U. S. support of the Central Government until it had solved its internal problems and repatriated the Japanese. In an attempt to discover a solution to the ominous Manchurian situation, the general proposed that a four-nation trusteeship (U.S., Great Britain,

² Quoted in Wedemeyer, *Reports*, p. 452.

U.S.S.R., and China) be established to control the territory until Chiang's government could demonstrate that it was able to take over. He further suggested that planning already underway for the creation of a Military Advisory Group to handle American aid to the Nationalist army be continued, but that consummation be withheld until military and political stabilization was accomplished to U. S. satisfaction.

Following his report directive, General Wedemeyer did not point out what he considered was the only workable solution to the China problem. In later years he wrote:

I could do no more than make my views of the situation clear, while refraining from stating definitely that only one course in China would preserve American interests and those of the free world; namely, unequivocal assistance to our ally, the Chinese Nationalist Government.³

The senior Marine officers most concerned shared Wedemeyer's belief that the directives under which they had to operate were ill-considered and ambiguous in meaning. The American forces in China, particularly the IIIAC, were placed in an untenable position by instructions that made them at once neutral and partisan in China's civil strife. Some officers felt, as did General Rockey, that U. S. Forces were committed to the extent that American public support would permit. Other officers on the scene, whose view was shared by General Worton, felt that more active backing of the Nationalists could be undertaken without undue risk. The split in opinion between the III Corps commander and his chief of staff was indicative of the

split existing throughout the directing bodies of the U. S. Government.⁴ Regardless of their personal feelings, however, the Marine generals conscientiously tried to comply with their instructions.

The dominant consideration in determining U. S. policy toward China was a sincere desire for the restoration of peace. Ambassador Hurley had directed a good part of his efforts in Chungking toward ending the civil war and achieving collaboration of both sides in a practical coalition government and army. When he left China in late September, Hurley was convinced that he had made substantial progress toward that goal; some agreements on general principles of settlement had been reached and the ambassador had engineered the convening of a Political Consultative Conference which would consider details of implementation. Then, on 26 November, Hurley announced his resignation as ambassador, on grounds of his lack of confidence in certain officials within the Department of State.

Immediately following Ambassador Hurley's unexpected resignation, the President asked General of the Army George C. Marshall to become his special representative in China. Marshall who had just stepped down as Army Chief of Staff, a position that he held with distinction throughout World War II, returned to duty at the request of his

³ *Ibid.*, p. 359.

⁴ In November seven different joint resolutions calling for the withdrawal of the Marines from China were introduced in Congress. 79th Congress, 2d Session, *Congressional Record* (Washington, 1945), v. 91, pt 8, pp. 11007, 11156.

commander in chief. The stage was set for a renewed effort on the part of the American Government to restore peace in China.

On 15 December, President Truman made a public statement of U. S. policy toward China which was substantially the same as that in his instructions to Marshall. The President believed it essential that a ceasefire be arranged between the Nationalist and Communist armies for the purpose of completing the return of all China to effective governmental control. He stated that a national conference of representatives of major political elements should be arranged to develop an early solution to the civil strife, one which would bring about a unified country and army. At the international level the U. S. would continue to support the Central Government, and within China would concentrate on assisting the Nationalists to disarm and repatriate Japanese forces.

The sense of the President's directive to General Marshall was that the American representative should act as mediator to bring the two sides together, using as his most powerful goad the dispensing or withholding of American economic and military aid. When Marshall arrived in China shortly after the President's statement was released, he immediately began a round of conferences with the Communist emissaries and Nationalist officials in Chungking. General Wedemeyer and Admiral Barbey, who had taken over Seventh Fleet from Admiral Kinkaid on 19 November, briefed Marshall on the American military situation.⁵ All were impressed with

his obvious determination to carry out his directive and see an end to the fighting.

While General Marshall was still in Washington preparing for his China assignment, he helped draft a set of instructions to General Wedemeyer which would cover American support of Nationalist forces. The theater commander was authorized to step up the program for the evacuation of Japanese repatriates, and to arrange for the transportation of CNA units to Manchurian ports uncovered by the Nationalist overland advance. He was informed that "further transportation of Chinese troops to north China, except as north China ports may be necessary for the movement of troops and supplies into Manchuria, will be held in abeyance."⁶ Provisional plans for Nationalist troop lifts to North China might be made but would not be put into effect unless General Marshall determined that carrying them out would be consistent with his negotiations.

The temporary halt to the movement of Nationalist soldiers into Hopeh and Shantung emphasized the fact that relief for the Marines was yet to come. In late October the 1st Marine Division had been forced to extend its hold on the Peiping-Mukden line because of the reluctance of Nationalist commanders to outpost the vital railroad in effective strength. A directive from China Theater to General Rockey, which ordered this further exposure of the American troops, declared:

It is a military necessity that at least 100,000 tons of coal reach Shanghai each

⁵ ComSeventhFlt WarDs, Nov-Dec45 (OAB, NHD).

⁶ Quoted in *U. S. Relations with China*, p. 607.

month. The mines in the Tangshan-Kuyeh area are the only immediately available sources of coal for Shanghai. Action has been initiated to dispatch to Chinwangtao sufficient shipping to move at least 100,000 tons of coal per month to Shanghai. It is understood that the Chinese railway company will endeavor to operate 4 daily coal trains to Chinwangtao by the end of the month provided the III Phib Corps will furnish train guards. It is desired that you take the necessary action to protect the port of Chinwangtao and the rail line and rail traffic to Chinwangtao to the extent necessary to permit the movement to and outloading from Chinwangtao of at least 100,000 tons of coal per month destined for Shanghai.⁷

In short order, Marine rail and bridge guard detachments, most of them taken from the 7th Marines, were spread out along the length of the Peiping-Mukden line from Tangku to Chinwangtao. In many instances the outpost units were little more than squad size and the duty they drew was lonely and dangerous. Their quarters, their clothing, and even their rations were often not suited, at first, for the North China winter. Those Marines whose spell of China duty consisted of rail, coal, and train guard during the winter of 1945-1946 have a far different story to tell than the fortunate majority who were stationed in the cities.⁸ The headquarters, support, and

combat units that remained in relative comfort in Tientsin, Peiping, and Tsingtao were a stand-by reserve that was never called upon although always ready.

TSINGTAO STAND-BY⁹

China duty for the ground elements of III Corps at Tsingtao often seemed to be divorced from the main current of Marine activities in North China. In contrast to the extended deployment of the 1st Division in Hopeh, the 6th Division had no security responsibility for communication routes in the interior of Shantung. With the exception of the rifle company regularly on guard at Tsangkou Field, no unit of General Shepherd's command held a position exposed to Communist harassing attacks. The Japanese disposition to cooperate in repatriation matters kept the requirement for Marine supervisory and guard personnel low. Once it was well established ashore, the 6th Division met demands that hardly taxed its strength and it could operate at little more than idling speed.

The 6th Marine Division was thus better able than the thinly spread 1st to meet a requirement for reinforcements along the Peiping-Mukden line. On 30 October, the corps ordered General Shepherd to ready a reinforced rifle battalion for transfer to Chinwangtao. The 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, was picked for the task and the division attached to

⁷ Corps SO No. 226-45, dtd 6Dec45, in IIIAC WarD, Dec45.

⁸ The 1st Division commander considered rotating troops in outlying positions with those in Tientsin and Peiping, but found the members of his own staff and the unit commanders "were almost all opposed to the rotation idea. Instead, we worked out a liberal recreation schedule which allowed troops on outlying duties to frequently visit Tientsin and Peiping." *Peck ltr.*

⁹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: IIIAC WarDs, Nov-Dec45; 6th MarDiv WarDs, Nov-Dec45; 1st MAW WarDs, Nov-Dec45; MAG-32 WarDs, Nov-Dec45; *Rockey interview*, 14-15Apr59; *Shepherd interview*; *Woods interview*.

it Battery E of 2/15, platoons from the tank and motor transport battalions, and detachments of engineers and ordnance men. The new rail guard unit left Tsingtao on 6 November and arrived at the coal port the following day, reporting to the 1st Division for orders. On the 9th, when all its supplies and equipment were unloaded, 1/29 moved to Peitaiho to set up its command post. Operationally attached to the 7th Marines, the battalion from Tsingtao was soon deeply involved in the mettlesome routine of guarding the Chinese railway.

General Shepherd realized that one of his major problems in Tsingtao was keeping his men usefully occupied. So long as the Communists posed no serious threat to the city and the repatriation process ran smoothly, there was a good chance that combat troops might lose efficiency. Idleness, even that of a relative nature, can be a curse to a military organization geared to operate at full capacity. In order to maintain unit standards of discipline, appearance, and performance, Shepherd instituted a six-week training program on 12 November which laid emphasis on a review of basic military subjects. The division commander also directed that each unit schedule at least ten classroom hours a week of studying academic and vocational subjects, to be held concurrently with the military training schedule.

Among the officers and men in the wing squadrons at Tsangkou Field there was equal emphasis and interest in an educational improvement program. Work schedules were arranged to encourage study, but heavy flight commitments of MAG-25 and MAG-32 ate into the time available for training not di-

rectly connected with operations. By the end of October, Tsangkou had developed into the wing's busiest and most important base in China. Command of the field and its complement rested with General Johnson, the assistant wing commander, who reported to General Woods at Tientsin for orders except where the defense of Tsingtao was concerned. General Rockey had altered the original command setup to give General Shepherd operational control of both ground and air units in a defensive situation.

As a result of the wide separation of major elements of III Corps in North China, Marine transports flew an extensive schedule of personnel and cargo flights connecting Tsingtao, Tientsin, Peiping, and Shanghai. In order to make maximum use of the planes available, MAG-25 operated VMR-152 and -153 as one squadron.¹⁰ The transport pilots and crewmen frequently returned to Pacific island bases, particularly Okinawa, to pick up cargo from the vast supply dumps assembled to support the invasion of Japan. The demand for cold weather gear was constant and pressing, and most of that which found its way to the men manning rail outposts and wind-swept flight lines arrived at Tsingtao and points north in the transports of Marine Aircraft Group 25.

While most transport flights kept well above the range of Communist small arms, the scout and torpedo bombers of MAG-32 frequently landed with bullet holes in their fuselages. Chance alone prevented some riflemen or machine gunner from bringing down one of the planes; the near misses were frequent.

¹⁰ VMR-152 WarD, Nov45.

The search and reconnaissance missions requested by Général Shepherd in October evolved into a daily patrol routine that gave the Marines at Tsingtao an excellent picture of Communist activity in eastern Shantung and kept them informed of the progress of Japanese units moving toward the repatriation port. One search pattern was flown over the mountains of Shantung Peninsula to Chefoo with a return leg that paralleled the northern coast and turned south at Yehhsien to follow the main cross-peninsula road into Tsingtao. (See Map 33.) A second route took the planes up the railroad as far as Changtien before turning south and west through mountain valleys to the road and rail junction at Taian; from Taian pilots followed the tracks through Tsinan and all the way home to Tsangkou. The third route covered by regular aerial patrol ran south to the mountain chain that bordered the coast before turning north through tortuous defiles to Weihsien and the favorite railroad return route.

The importance of the railroads indicated by the attention given them in the MAG-32 patrol schedule was emphasized on 2 November when a semi-weekly rail reconnaissance over the whole length of the Tsingtao-Tsinan-Tientsin rail net was directed. The two-seater bombers returned to Tsangkou Field across the Gulf of Chihli reporting on junk traffic that passed beneath them.

The hazardous nature of winter flying over mountainous terrain was vividly emphasized by an accident that occurred on 8 December. A major portion of each MAG-32 squadron flew to Tientsin that day to take part in an

aerial show of strength on the anniversary of Pearl Harbor. The show went off without a hitch, but on the return flight to Tsingtao the planes ran into one of the season's first snow storms over Shantung Peninsula. Each squadron was proceeding independently, and the planes of VMTB-134 and VMSB-244 climbed above the storm to come in. The scout-bombers of VMSB-343, attempting to go under the tempest, were caught up in its blinding snow swirls. Only six pilots managed to bring their planes home safely; six others crashed into the mountain slopes near Pingtu in the center of the peninsula.¹¹

As soon as it became evident that the VMSB-343 craft were down, intensive efforts were made to locate them. Virtually every plane in MAG-32 and VMO-6 had a turn at the search, but it was three days before Chinese civilians brought word of the location of the crash and pilots confirmed the fact. Communist villagers had rescued the only two survivors, one of whom was injured. The Communists of Shantung Peninsula also held two other Marine airmen at this time, the crew of a photo reconnaissance plane which crash-landed on 11 December on the shore near Penglai. Leaflets were dropped in both wreck areas offering rewards for the return of the living and the dead.

The photo plane at Penglai was part of a flight of three from VMD-254 on Okinawa which had tried to fly around a heavy weather front and reach Tsangkou Field. All three planes were forced down, one by propeller and engine trouble and the other two by empty fuel

¹¹ VMSB-343 WarD, Nov45.

tanks.¹² Both crew members of the second plane died in a water landing near Weihaiwei, but the crewmen of the third craft, which went down on the beach near Jungchen, escaped unscratched and were picked up by OYs of VMO-6 on 13 December. On the 15th, the VMD-254 plane crew from the Penglai crash and the uninjured survivor of the mass accident at Pingtu were released by the Communists. Recovery parties of the 6th Division picked up these men, and also drove north on 24 December to accept the remains of the VMSB-343 flyers killed on 8 December. The injured survivor of this crash was returned to Tsingtao on Christmas Day. Though all the negotiations attending the recovery of these Marines, the Communist villagers had been most cooperative, refusing the proffered rewards, and treating well the men they rescued.

By prior arrangement with the Communists, an attempt was made to recover the photo plane down near Jungchen. The 6th Division organized a task force built around Company F of the 29th Marines with appropriate air and ground attachments to handle the job of getting the plane airborne again. Travelling to Jungchen on the 17th on board an LST, the recovery force found the plane could not take off because of soft ground. The aircraft was stripped of usable parts and the carcass burned. The same fate met the wreck of the plane down at Penglai. In both instances, the cooperation of the local villagers was exemplary. For whatever

reason, the Communist harassment of the Marines in Shantung faded a bit after the crashes of December. The respite unfortunately proved to be temporary.

The sporadic ground fire that met American air patrols was a severe trial to pilots who had to stand the sniping. General Rockey attempted to establish a set of conditions under which this antiaircraft fire could be returned, and on 6 December he issued combat instructions. The flyers could shoot back if the source was unmistakable, if the fire from the ground was in some volume, if the target was in the open and easily defined, and if innocent people were not endangered. With permission to fire hedged by these qualifications, and the possibility of open warfare always resting on their decision, the Marine pilots remained discreet but frustrated. While in General Wood's opinion the individual pilot should have been given considerably more freedom of action, no Marine in China, regardless of his position, had anything resembling a free hand in conducting operations. The orders from General Rockey were an accurate reflection of the policy directives that reached him from higher headquarters.

Certainly, the directive most difficult to comply with was the admonition to avoid support of the Nationalist armies in the civil war. The very presence of the Marines in North China holding open the major ports of entry, the coal mines, and the railroads was an incalculably strong military asset to the Central Government. And the fact that the U. S. had provided a good part of the arms of the troops scheduled to take

¹² Aircraft Accident Cards of F7F-3Ps Nos. 80381, 80419, and 80423, dtd 11Dec45 (Unit HistReptFile, HistBr, HQMC).

over North China and Manchuria made the situation even more explosive. The supply of ammunition and replacement parts for these weapons, even though they were now used to fight the Communists rather than the Japanese, was a charge upon the American government. On at least one occasion, the Marines at Tsingtao wound up providing this ammunition directly to a Nationalist force hotly engaged with the Communists.

The 8th Chinese Nationalist Army began landing at Tsingtao on 14 November, its mission to accept the surrender of the Japanese *Forty-third Army* at Tsinan. The Nationalist commander moved his troops through the city and encamped between it and Tsangkou while he regrouped for the drive north. The Communist reaction to the landing was immediate and violent. On the night of the 14th, the railroad was effectively knocked out for a distance of 37 miles above Tsangkou by a spread of destructive raids. General Shepherd immediately moved 2/22 reinforced by tanks to the airfield to back up the rifle company already there, withdrawing the battalion as soon as the Nationalists began their advance.

The forward units of the 8th CNA tangled with the Communists soon after clearing Tsangkou's outskirts on 19 November. The prospect of a continuous series of fire fights was most disturbing to the Nationalist commander whose army was quite low on ammunition at the time it debarked from the American transports which carried it to Tsingtao. On 20 November, he made a formal request to General Shepherd for the am-

munition he needed. Shepherd forwarded the request to Rockey, who in a meeting with Wedemeyer at Peiping on the 23d received permission to make the transfer. The III Corps commander sent an order to Shepherd authorizing him to turn over to the 8th CNA one unit of fire¹³ for the infantry weapons of a Marine division. A hurry-up request to FMFPac asked for immediate replacement of this ammunition.

The majority of Japanese troops to be repatriated through Tsingtao were intended to be released from guard duties by the action of the 8th CNA. Once the Nationalist army had reached Tsinan and disarmed the Japanese there, it was to turn these arms over to puppet troops in the area which had declared for Chiang Kai-shek. The 8th was then to return along the railroad taking over the guard assignment from the Japanese who held it. This plan failed of accomplishment in many respects, but principally because the Nationalist unit, with a strength of less than 30,000 men, just could not handle the job assigned it. At the end of a month of fighting, the 8th CNA had reached a point just below Weih sien and could go no farther. Nationalist authorities changed its mission to one of rail security and pinned their hopes for relief of Tsinan on armies approaching overland from central China. The former puppet troops at Tsinan dug in for a protracted defense of the city,

¹³ The unit of fire was a measure of ammunition supply. It represented a specific number of rounds of ammunition per weapon which varied with its type and caliber. The IIIAC took three units of fire to China to cover the possible requirements for ammunition of its ground components.

while the Japanese *Forty-third Army* set its own schedule for troop movement to Tsingtao.

The actual mechanics of repatriation through Tsingtao were deceptively simple. They represented, however, a wealth of preliminary work at the theater level, principally logistical arrangements,¹⁴ and the ironing out of details at the port of embarkation among Nationalist representatives, Japanese military and civilian leaders, and operations and civil affairs officers of the 6th Marine Division. When the routine of repatriation was settled, only one company of the 29th Marines plus a relatively few liaison officers and interpreters from division headquarters were needed to supervise and control the program.

Basically, the repatriation system at Tsingtao worked in this way. All Japanese civilians and those military units which had not surrendered to the Marines came under control of Nationalist authorities. When the Nationalist 11th War Area representative released the military from guard duties or certified the civilians for return they assembled at a coke factory just north of Tsangkou which was designated as the processing and staging center. Within the center the Japanese handled all the administrative work necessary to set up embarkation rosters within priorities established by the Marines. The housekeeping details of the various billeting areas were also managed by the Japanese. Security details at the coke factory, along the train route to Great Harbor, and at the docks were

shared by the Nationalist police and the Marines. In like manner, the inspection of repatriates' baggage for contraband was a joint procedure; the Japanese were allowed to carry away little more than a handbag full of personal effects, a small amount of cash, and a five days' supply of food for the voyage.

Initially, 15 American LSTs were assigned to shuttle between Tsingtao and Japan carrying military repatriates, while the civilians had to wait on Japanese merchant vessels to carry them home. Seventh Fleet, in an effort to speed up the repatriation process, first authorized the use of LSTs by male civilians and later opened their decks and holds to family groups also. Regular repatriation runs from Tsingtao began on 19 November when three landing ships sailed with 2,873 naval base troops and nine civilians on board. Similar shipments of approximately 3,000 men were made on the 21st and 23d. On board each LST, in addition to the repatriates, were six Marine guards and a Japanese interpreter. The first substantial shipment of civilians departed on 5 December when 4,152 left on a Japanese vessel which had brought in 1,961 Chinese from Japan. On ships carrying civilian repatriates, Japanese guards and medical personnel were added to the operating complement.

By the year's end, 33,500 Japanese military and civilians had cleared Tsingtao. The figure could have been much larger but Nationalist reluctance to release rail guards or vital civilian technicians kept the total down. Communist destruction of the tracks, bridges, and roadbed slowed the movement of Japanese from Tsinan, and the

¹⁴ Wedemeyer, *Reports*, pp. 351-352.

43d Army advance units which alternately marched and rode down the railroad had to fight off harassing attacks. There were still 125,000 Japanese scheduled to move home through Tsingtao on 31 December, and most of these people had not as yet begun to move toward the port city.

The main interest of the Nationalist military authorities in the Japanese forces was their weapons, equipment, and ammunition. The considerable stores of munitions that III Corps units had collected in disarming the Japanese were a prize that the Nationalists wanted badly. During October and November, the Marine division commanders had a seldom-exercised authority to make emergency issues from these stocks to Nationalist units. The American feeling was that control of the surrendered military supplies should pass to the Central Government only when full responsibility for the Japanese and their repatriation was assumed. On 13 December, in a move calculated to prod Nationalist authorities, corps withdrew even the limited authorization that had existed to turn over Japanese weapons and ammunition.

In keeping with this decision, General Shepherd turned down a request made by the 8th CNA that it be given the materiel taken from the *5th Independent Mixed Brigade*. The Marine general in reply pointed out that these surrendered Japanese troops were the particular responsibility of the 6th Division. This fact was evident in the voluntary tribute that the *5th Brigade* commander, General Nagano, paid General Shepherd in presenting the Marine

with a priceless *Samurai* sword "on behalf of all Japanese soldiers under my command who are moved by your open and honorable conduct toward them." The Japanese officer continued:

Exemplary conduct and actions on the part of your soldiers inspired our minds with respect and wonder. Personally I like plain speaking. Indeed, it may sound strange for us Japanese soldiers to speak of American soldiers in this strain, but let the fact speak for itself. I feel it is my pleasant duty to report to you that every Japanese in Tsingtao City feels grateful to you for your fair and square dealings. This is the last thing that we expected of your Marines of the Okinawa Battle fame.¹⁵

The occasion for this presentation was General Shepherd's departure from China; at the same time an heirloom suit of *Samurai* armor was given him in behalf of the Japanese civilian repatriates who praised his Marines for their impartiality and "strict maintenance of military discipline."¹⁶ On 24 December, General Shepherd, who was returning to the States to organize the Troop Training Command, Amphibious Forces, Atlantic Fleet, relinquished command of the division which he had organized and led throughout the Okinawa fighting. In a formal ceremony before the division staff and the regimental and battalion commanders and executive officers, Shepherd turned over his command to Major General Archie F. Howard, who had been Inspector General, FMFPac.

¹⁵ MajGen Eiji Nagano, IJA, ltr to MajGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., dtd 15Dec45 filed with *Shepherd interview*.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

General Howard's assumption of command coincided with the arrival at Tsingtao of a merchant ship loaded with 9,500 tons of coal. Had the vessel come a few days later, only the Marines would have had fuel for heat and light since the stockpile for public purposes was exhausted. In peacetime, coal mines in the Poshan region of Shantung had supplied Tsingtao, but Communist activity had shut off this source. The city had to limp along on a dole reluctantly taken from the supplies intended for Shanghai.

Despite the fact that Tsingtao received only the fuel necessary to power essential public utilities, enough coal somehow found its way into private hands to keep a thriving souvenir industry heated during the winter of 1945-1946. The souvenir shops, like the inevitable honky-tonk district that sprang up almost in the footsteps of the first Marines to land, were attracted by the American dollar. The free-spending habits of the Marines, and of the sailors of Seventh Fleet who often came ashore with several months pay in their pockets, gave Tsingtao a superficial aspect of prosperity that extended only as far as the customary haunts of American servicemen.

Inflation of the local puppet currency was an ill common to all North China when the III Corps arrived. Since the Marines were not an occupying force in the sense that the Allies were in Japan, the steadying influence of a controlled economy in such unsettled conditions was absent. The Nationalists were not strong enough to impose their economic will, and the almost daily upward spiral of the exchange rate pre-

cluded payment of Americans in anything but American money. Even the many Chinese employees of the Marines had their wages set in terms of American money with payment at the going rate of exchange.

The fact that most Marine enlisted men could have afforded a personal servant in China, and in fact did share the services of one with his fellows in a ratio set by his commanders, was an attractive feature of China duty. In the city garrisons, each platoon had several houseboys who made up beds, shined shoes, cleaned the quarters, ran errands, and generally made themselves useful. Naturally, the fact that someone else was doing many of the necessary but irksome jobs which fall to the lot of lower ranks in any military organization was universally appreciated by the men who held those ranks.

While only a small portion of the Marines in North China were steadily engaged by occupation tasks, the presence of the remainder as a necessary reserve lent emphasis to the actions of the pilots, the rail guards, and the repatriation details. Unit commanders were particularly concerned that the off-duty hours of men used to having their time and abilities fully occupied be filled in a manner that would maintain morale and discipline. Since the majority of the veterans in III Corps had been in the Pacific islands for a year or more when the North China landings were made, the chance at liberty in Chinese cities was eagerly taken up. The novelty soon wore off, however, as few pocketbooks could stand the strain of constant spending at inflated prices. To meet the problem, General Rockey took steps to set up an

extensive recreational program which would offer the most service at the least cost to his men.

Rockey invited the Red Cross to extend its service club operations to the III Corps area and sent planes of MAG-25 to Shanghai and Kunming to pick up personnel and equipment. The facilities that these people opened in October in Tsingtao, Peiping, and Tientsin were elaborate and luxurious beyond any experience of Marines overseas.¹⁷ To supplement the Red Cross support, Rockey encouraged the formation of unit clubs, particularly at remote stations, to offer varied and inexpensive recreation.

The breakup of Army commands in southwestern China provided the Marines with a radio network. Three surplus 50-watt transmitters with enough broadcasting equipment to set up radio stations at each of the three major IIIAC bases were obtained. The Army-run newspaper at Shanghai, a theater edition of *The Stars and Stripes*, was distributed in North China, but it was overwhelmingly concerned with units and experience of little interest to the Marines. General Rockey felt strongly that the corps should have its own newspaper, and as a result, *The North China Marine* began weekly publication on 10 November. The paper, which took its title from a predecessor put out by the prewar embassy guard, was printed in Tientsin at a local press and distributed free by rail and air to all IIIAC installations.

¹⁷ General Rockey was very complimentary to the Red Cross for its services to IIIAC, citing in particular its club in Peiping, which had luxurious quarters in the rented Italian Embassy. *Rockey comments*.

The Central Government, through its War Area Service Corps (WASC), provided a wealth of educational and cultural opportunities to the Marines. Hostels run by WASC were the principal quarters for transient servicemen from the fleet and from outlying posts who visited the principal cities garrisoned by the corps. Peiping in particular was a mecca for tourists in uniform who flew in or came by rail from all over North China as part of a systematic effort to grant liberty in the ancient city to those not fortunate enough to be stationed there. By the end of December 1945, consistent command effort, ably seconded by the work of the Red Cross and WASC, brought into being a corps-wide recreational program that significantly eased the tension of waiting inherent in the Marines' situation.

LINE OF COMMUNICATION TROOPS¹⁸

In the northern sector of III Corps responsibility, the processing machinery at the focal point of repatriation ran as smoothly as it did in the south. (See Map 34.) Essentially the process was the same at the Tientsin-Tangku port of embarkation as it was at Tsingtao. The 1st Marine Division had full charge of the program, and the 1st Marines supplied the necessary guards, including 39 six-man details to ride the LSTs carry-

¹⁸ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: IIIAC WarDs, Nov-Dec45; 1st MarDiv WarDs, Nov-Dec45; 1st MAW WarDs, Nov-Dec45; LtCol James D. Hittle, "On the Peiping-Mukden Line," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 31, no. 6 (Jun47); *Rockey interviews*, 14-15Apr59, 29Apr59, and 9Jul59; *Peck interview*; *Woods interview*.

ing military repatriates. The Japanese through their military command and a civilian liaison committee handled most of the administrative and logistical requirements of selecting, feeding, housing, and moving the thousands who arrived at the assembly area near Changkeichuang Field. The Nationalists provided police protection along the line of march to the railroad station at Tientsin and inspectors for the search of baggage at the docks.

Three Japanese merchant ships were available for civilian repatriation during November, and the 1st Division was able to send home 8,651 people during the month. Five times that number left in December as more ships became available and LST transportation was authorized for nonmilitary repatriates.¹⁹ The feeling of the Japanese civilians toward the Marines of the 1st Division paralleled remarkably the sentiments expressed to General Shepherd regarding the men of the 6th Division. The spokesman for the civilian repatriates wrote to General Peck commending the attitude of the Marines and pointing out that the first repatriates had "kept requesting that the profound gratitude they felt for the kind and understanding treatment accorded them by your men be given expression."²⁰

After LSTs became available for military repatriation on 13 November, the 1st Division was able to process and ship out 33,583 men from Tangku by the 30th and an additional 20,450 the following month. The cumulative total for the

northern sailings stood at 112,022 on 31 December.

The major factor controlling repatriation totals was the relief of Japanese troops from rail security duties. In Shantung the Central Government forces assigned to this task were unequal to it; in Hopeh there was very little disposition on the part of the Nationalists to make the relief at all. Of necessity, the 1st Marine Division did the job for Chiang Kai-shek's forces by securing the lines of communication between cities where Marines were stationed. Repeated American policy statements pointing to repatriation assistance as the principal reason for the presence of Marines in China made the relief of the Japanese mandatory after the 1st Division extended its hold on the Peiping-Mukden Railroad.

The Nationalist headquarters which was assigned the job of taking over Manchuria, the Northeast China Command of Lieutenant General Tu Li Ming, did not start its troops in motion up the Shanhaikuan corridor until 17 November. In ten days the advance guard had reached Chinchow at the foot of the Manchurian plain without encountering much Communist opposition. Generalissimo Chiang then ordered the Nationalist force to hold up and not press on for Mukden and Changchun; by not proceeding farther, he intended to emphasize the lack of cooperation of the Soviets. The American decision to provide him with troop lift which would expedite his take-over program caused him to revise his strategy. At this point, the Soviet occupation command became much more amenable to Nationalist requests, but the damage both to Manchuria's industrial

¹⁹ IIIAC G-5 PeriodicRpt No. 2, Nov45, dtd 1Dec45 and No. 3, Dec45, dtd 1Jan46.

²⁰ Mr. H. Imura ltr to MajGen DeWitt Peck, dtd 12Nov45, filed with *Peck interview*.

capacity and to its chances for a peaceful future had already been done.²¹

The movement of Nationalist armies north into Manchuria interfered with the execution of the mission given III Corps to keep coal flowing from the KMA mines near Tangshan and Kuyeh for Shanghai, and, quite naturally, for Peiping and Tientsin, too. Before the advance began, Marine civil affairs officers got word that Northeast China Command intended to take a great deal of rolling stock beyond the Great Wall to support its operations. General Wedemeyer was asked to take steps to prevent this and he, in turn, passed the request on to Chiang Kai-shek. On 30 November, the III Corps was told that only 2 locomotives and 60 cars would be taken permanently. A board was set up with Marine representation to control the allocation of stock on each side of the wall. Before this agreement was made, however, Marine sources estimated that 25 locomotives and 500 coal cars disappeared into Manchuria in the initial stages of the Nationalist advance. In order to prevent this confiscation, Marine guards riding coal trains to Chinwangtao stayed on board during the turn-around period and kept the Nationalists from seizing the engines and cars.²²

One result of the severe loss to carrying capacity involved in the appropriation of coal cars for troop transports was a disappointingly low total of coal moved from the KMA mines during November. Only 22,000 tons reached Chinwangtao for transshipment, while

37,000 tons were sent to Tientsin. In December the situation improved tremendously, 94,000 tons were shipped to Chinwangtao and 98,000 to Tientsin. A good part of the increase could be traced to a definite slackening of Communist pressure against the rail line after the first part of the month. In Hopeh, as in Shantung where the same thing was happening, the widely publicized peace efforts of General Marshall were the most probable cause of the temporary lull.

The destruction wrought by Communist raiding parties in the first weeks of November was often enough to halt all traffic on the Peiping-Mukden line for a day or more. Chinese track repair gangs, however, profited from the wealth of experience provided them by these attacks and made continuous improvement on the time necessary to restore service. Damage to rolling stock was handled in the large railroad shops at Tangshan whose Japanese technicians were declared essential by the Nationalists and withheld from repatriation.

The OYs of VMO-3 frequently flew along the line to check for damage, since the railroad signal system was almost non-existent. Often the first news that engineers had of a break in the tracks would be their own sighting of twisted or broken rails. Under the circumstances a ride on a train which traveled the well-patched stretch of tracks between Tangku and Chinwangtao was a memorable experience.

Just before noon on 14 November, Communist troops firing from the protection of a village six miles north of Kuyeh stopped a train carrying the 1st Marine Division commander. General

²¹ Chiang, *Soviet Russia*, pp. 146-147.

²² IIIAC G-5 PeriodicRpt No. 2, *op. cit.*

Peck, who was inspecting 7th Marines positions along the railroad, ordered his escort platoon to return fire. Using a radio jeep mounted on a flatcar to contact the nearest Marine garrison at Linsi, he directed that reinforcement be dispatched immediately; at the same time, he radioed General Rockey requesting air support and permission to call down a strike on the village if it should prove necessary.²³ The Communists faded away as soon as Company L from Linsi arrived, set up a mortar, and dropped a few rounds in the area from which the firing had come.²⁴

General Peck returned to Tangshan for the night and on the next day started again for Chinwangtao. Just beyond the point at which he had been fired upon the previous day, Peck found the track torn up for several hundred yards. A track gang which was traveling on the train began making repairs while Marines beat down scattered sniper fire which was covering the break. The area proved to be mined and several of the Chinese repair gang were killed or injured when a mine exploded. The extent of the repairs necessary indicated that no trains could get through for two days,

²³ General Woods recalled that he received an order specifying that planes loaded with ammunition only be sent to the scene. He protested that bombs should also be carried, but directed that the planes be made ready. Shortly after this, "the original order was cancelled by telephone and no planes were sent." *Woods ltr.* General Peck noted, however, in his contemporary notebook, that some planes did eventually fly over at 1500, but that the pilots reported they did not sight any hostile force. *Peck ltr.*

²⁴ A Chronological Hist of 3/7, 1st MarDiv Activities in China, 30Sep-15Apr46, n.d., p. 3.

so General Peck returned to Tangshan and flew up to Chinwangtao.

In the exchange of messages between Generals Rockey and Wedemeyer which resulted from this incident, the IIIAC commander indicated that he was ready to authorize a strafing mission if fire continued from the offending village. The reply from Wedemeyer is interesting since it vividly demonstrates the difficulties attending Marine combat operations in China:

If American lives are endangered by small-arms fire received from village about 600 yards north of Loanshien as indicated in your radio CAC 0368, it is desired that you inform the military leader or responsible authority in that village in writing, that fire from that particular village is endangering American lives and that such firing must be stopped. After insuring that your warning to said military leader or responsible authority has been received and understood, should firing that jeopardizes American lives continue, you are authorized to take appropriate action for their protection. Your warning and action should include necessary measures to insure safety of innocent persons.²⁵

General Peck, on his arrival at Chinwangtao, was authorized to deal directly with General Tu Li Ming, in order to get the Nationalists to take offensive action against the Communists along the railroad. On the 16th, the generals agreed that if the Marines would mount guard on all railroad bridges over 100 meters in length between Tangku and Chinwangtao, the Nationalists, using the troops thus relieved, would conduct an offensive sweep driving away the Communists. Ten days later, after Marine detachments had taken control of the

²⁵ Quoted in IIIAC WarD, Nov45, pp. 4-5.



ARROW, made of blankets and clothing, directs Corsairs to village from which Chinese Communists fired upon a Marine patrol. (USMC 226788)



COMMUNIST MINE damages roadbed of Tientsin-Chinwangtao railroad. Standing figure at left is 1st Division commander, Major General DeWitt Peck. (USMC 226782)

bridges, Northeast China Command informed the 1st Division that it did not have enough troops available to meet its offensive commitment. Then in early December, as if to clinch the situation, the commanding officer of the 7th Marines was told by the Nationalist 43d Division commander that he had no instructions to relieve the Marines of bridge guard, nor did he have enough men to make the relief if it was ordered.

It is undoubtedly fortunate that the Communist forces harassing the Peiping-Mukden Railroad in Hopeh were unaware of the hedging restrictions on combat use of Marine air in North China. A steady procession of fighter planes was kept aloft over the railroad, seemingly ready at any time to support ground action. Beginning on 1 November, the squadrons of MAG-12 alternated the duty of flying two show-of-strength flights daily to Chinwangtao and return; in December the Corsair units were also assigned a 25-mile radius daily search of the Peiping area.²⁶ The night fighters of MAG-24 also made a daily flight to Chinwangtao, moving cross country to the coal port from Nan Yuan Field and returning over the railroad.²⁷ The group's two squadrons flew a daily search pattern in the Tientsin area in December with orders to report any unusual incidents to an air-ground liaison jeep.²⁸

On 10 November, a torpedo bomber of MAG-24's Headquarters Squadron was forced down by mechanical failure about

80 miles south of Peiping while on a routine flight to Tientsin. The pilot and five passengers were held by the local Communists, and the plane was camouflaged in an attempt to conceal it from aerial observation. On 15 November, however, a pilot of VMF(N)-541 spotted the aircraft,²⁹ and negotiations were immediately undertaken to have the men returned. Civilian emissaries who contacted the Communists reported that all the Marines were well and being fairly treated. On 17 December, 38 days after the plane had gone down, Communist troops brought the men to a Nationalist outpost near Tientsin and from there they proceeded to 1st Wing headquarters. The reason for the delay in releasing the men was not explained. The Marines reported that the Communists questioned them repeatedly about American aid to the Nationalists, a sore point that was obviously being emphasized by Yen-an's propagandists.

Not all the incidents involving attacks on Marines could be laid clearly at the door of the Communists. Intelligence officers were often forced to put an "unidentified Chinese" label on the assailants. One such case, involving the murder of one Marine and the severe wounding of another, achieved considerable publicity in the States as the result of an inaccurate report of its circumstances.

On 4 December two Marines of 1/29, hunting near their railroad outpost two miles west of Anshan, were shot without warning by two Chinese civilians who approached them. One Marine escaped by feigning death, although

²⁶ VMF-115 WarD, Nov45; VMF-211 WarDs, Nov-Dec45; VMF-218 WarD, Nov45.

²⁷ MAG-24 WarD, Nov45.

²⁸ VMF(N)-533 WarD, Dec45.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

each man was shot again after he had fallen. The survivor watched the Chinese disappear into a nearby village and then made his way back to his post. Near dusk, the executive officer of 1/29 led a small party to the area, set up a 60mm mortar close to the village, and then entered it with an American interpreter. The Marine told the village headman, who acknowledged the entrance of the gunmen, to surrender the murderers within a half hour. If he failed to do so, the officer promised to shell the village. When the time set elapsed without the terms being met, 24 rounds of high explosive and one of white phosphorus were fired toward the village. The impact area was deliberately kept outside the village walls, and there was little property damage and no injury to any of the inhabitants.³⁰ The murderers were never apprehended.

The story of the punitive action taken to force the disclosure of the guilty Chinese was garbled in its transmission to 1st Division headquarters. The report received stated that the mortars fired into the village. This was the initial report that General Rockey received from the division, and which he released in response to a directive from theater headquarters. The wire service reporters already had an incorrect version and were prepared to send it out whether or not it was officially released. One reporter in building his highly speculative narrative wrote that "combat men estimated that the village could have

been wiped out if all the 60-mm mortar shells scored direct hits."³¹

Building upon the incorrect report of firing into the village and imaginary casualties, some American newspapers blasted the Marines in China. One editorial writer compared the alleged firing on defenseless Chinese villagers to the atrocities committed by the Nazis in Europe and the Japanese in Asia.³² A board of inquiry which General Rockey immediately convened made a detailed investigation of the events at Anshan and recommended that no disciplinary action be taken against the officer involved, a finding which Rockey strongly approved.³³ As might be expected, the correct version of what happened never received the currency of the original sensational story.

The wide circulation given the false report of the Anshan incident emphasized the heavy responsibility which lay on the shoulders of the Marines who led the men keeping open the Peiping-Mukden line. Should even a bridge guard commander prove too aggressive and exceed his orders to maintain an essentially defensive attitude, the chain reaction to his rashness might well be all-out guerrilla warfare against Marines throughout North China. On the other hand, the same commander by being too circumspect might encourage Communist incursions. It was largely

³¹ *New York Times*, 9Dec45, p. 23.

³² "Semper Fidelis," *The Washington Post*, 12Dec45, p. 10, filed with Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift ltr to Mr. Eugene Meyer, dtd 13Dec45, published in *The Washington Post*, 15Dec45, p. 16 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQMC).

³³ Rockey ltr to Vandegrift, 29Dec45, *op. cit.*

³⁰ MajGen Keller E. Rockey ltr to Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift, dtd 29Dec45 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQMC).

due to the discretion required, expected, and obtained from the "junior officers and senior NCOs who commanded the track detachments along the Peiping-Mukden that the very delicate . . . internationally explosive phase of U. S. foreign policy requiring the protection of the Peiping-Mukden railroad from Tientsin to the Manchurian mountains was accomplished successfully." ³⁴

The KMA mines and the tracks from Tangshan to Chinwangtao were the focus of Communist harassment. Marine defensive arrangements in this area were kept fluid and changed as the situation required. The regimental headquarters of the 7th Marines moved to Peitaiho in November in order to facilitate control. Three of the four battalions assigned to the 7th's command at this time held the key area, while 3/7 secured the long stretch of track between Tangshan and Tangku. Even though many men were necessarily tied down at fixed posts, bridges and railroad stations, strong mobile reserves were maintained in each battalion sector of responsibility for emergency call.

Common sense on the part of the men concerned and the requirements of their mission helped develop a workable operating procedure for the track guard. A brief consideration of the defensive organization of the 30 miles of track assigned to the center battalion, 2/7, can serve as an example of the general deployment at the turn of the year. (See Map 34.)

The 2d Battalion's sector reached from the walled city of Changli to the

bridge across the Luan River at Luanhsien. Seven bridge guard detachments and four station details were mounted, each with a strength based upon the importance of the installation, the capacity of the quarters at hand, the proximity of adjacent detachments, and personnel available. The detachments ranged in size from 1 officer and 18 enlisted men, who held a small bridge only a half mile from the track command post, to a skeleton company of 4 officers and 85-100 men who guarded the bridge over the Luan River. The destruction of this half-mile-long bridge would have effectively cut the railroad to Manchuria for a lengthy period. To supplement individual weapons, the Marine guard at Luanhsien was equipped with two 81mm and two 60mm mortars plus four light and four heavy machine guns.

This concentration of supporting weapons was characteristic of the track outposts where firepower was called upon to make up for manpower shortages. As demobilization had its effect in early 1946, the battalion for a time had to concentrate its training on providing operators to replace fully qualified weapons men on these crew-served pieces. At least one mortar was made a part of detachment armament for night illumination and support. Frequently, unit commanders, who had orders not to "interfere in any engagement or conflict between Communists, Puppets, Nationalists, or any other troops, except as necessary to protect yourself, your own troops, and the installations with which you are charged," ³⁵ shot up flare shells

³⁴ Hittle, "On the Peiping-Mukden Line," *op. cit.*, p. 20.

³⁵ 1st MarDiv OPlan No. 5-45, dtd 22Oct45 in 1st MarDiv WarD, Oct45.

when close-lying CNA outposts were attacked. The incidental protection and assistance provided the Nationalists by this natural Marine precaution was undoubtedly interpreted as active support by the Communists.

When the men of the 7th Marines first moved out on bridge guard, they took over existing Japanese troop quarters. Few of these buildings, which were often peasant huts in poor repair, were acceptable billets. As fast as they could be shipped from Okinawa, quonset huts were set out along the railroad to provide suitable accommodations that could be adequately winterized.³⁶ Although each detachment had a considerable store of rations at its post in case it was cut off, daily hot meals were distributed by track galleys. In 2/7's sector, six of these galley cars were used to service the outposts. All other supplies reaching the men, including mail and special services kits of recreational and educational gear, came by rail also.

Both wire and radio contact with sector headquarters was maintained by each detachment, but the Communist proclivity for cutting the phone lines placed primary reliance on radio. Frequent inspection trips by battalion and company commanders were an established part of the routine of rail guard to ensure that standards of discipline and performance remained high. Marines on outpost were rotated frequently to compensate for the monotony and constant strain of

watchfulness of the duties they performed. Regular liberty parties were flown to Peiping from Tangshan with priority of place going to men who had stood the lonely vigil at the bridges of the Peiping-Mukden Railroad. Throughout a period of frequent disruptive personnel changes brought about by demobilization, the morale of the men charged with rail security was excellent. They had a tangible and important job to do, and they did it well.

DEMobilIZATION AND REPLACEMENT³⁷

The Marine Corps demobilization program for its reservists was based on a point discharge system developed by the Army for its non-regular veterans. Those few reservists who were over the upper draft age limit of 36 were also eligible for release regardless of the points they had accumulated.

Marine regulars who had completed their terms of enlistment and those who had served two years or more overseas were also scheduled for return home for discharge or reassignment. Naval personnel serving with the Marines were eligible for discharge under a different schedule of point accumulation which generally paralleled the Army-Marine system. The actual point total for discharge was determined by the service concerned, and most men in the States were separated as

³⁶ General Woods recalled that many of these quonset huts were Navy ones being sent to house aviation personnel; he gave orders to turn some over to IIIAC to provide suitable accommodations for Marines on bridge guard. *Woods ltr.*

³⁷ Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from: 6th MarDiv WarDs, Nov-Dec45; CMC ltr to Hon Francis Case, dtd 11Feb46 in 79th Congress, 2d Session, *Congressional Record* (Washington, 1946), v. 92, pt 9, p. A653.

soon as their personal score was reached. Similarly men serving overseas were returned home as their point total neared the discharge level and transportation was available.

Although the Marine Corps had a well organized schedule for demobilization before the end of the war, one which was realistic in terms of occupation commitments, the public pressure to have veterans released from service did not allow its efficient execution.³⁸ The point score for discharge dropped rapidly in the final months of 1945 with most 50-point men in the States separated by the end of the year; 48,000 more Marines were discharged by 11 January 1946 than had been originally planned. On that date, the occasion of a report by the Commandant to Congress, Marine Corps strength stood at 301,070. Of this total 45,981 Marines were serving in North China, a figure quite close to the original Marine Corps landing strength of III Corps.

Through December, no significant reduction in the size of IIIAC had been effected although changes were in the offing. High-point Marines in China had to be replaced rather than withdrawn as had once been the plan,³⁹ and low-point men from the States and from other units of the FMF were sent to North China to release those eligible for separation and rotation. More than 11,000 replacements arrived at Tsingtao and

Tangku in December and early January, enough Marines to enable all the 50-point men to be home and discharged by the end of February.

Within two months' time, the III Amphibious Corps lost one quarter of its veterans, and received in their place an equal number of Marines who were short on service and military experience. In the transportation pipeline from the U. S. were even more young Marines, many of them fresh from boot camp, who were scheduled to replace the men with point scores in the 40s and 30s. The problems which arose in assimilating these new men into units disrupted by the loss of key officers and NCOs were formidable. The most characteristic activity of Marine commands during the spring of 1946 was the implementation of a repeated cycle of basic training which enabled them to maintain a satisfactory level of performance.

In view of the rapidly shrinking size of the Marine Corps overall, a reduction in the strength of Marine forces in North China was inevitable. The change in official views regarding the early withdrawal of the IIIAC from China did not alter the plans for the peacetime strength of the FMF to be reached by the summer of 1946.⁴⁰ Four of the six Marine divisions activated during the war were scheduled for reduction and disbandment. Plans for the first major step in this program to concern III Corps were issued in December to take effect on order.

The 6th Marine Division was to be reduced to brigade strength with one

³⁸ CMC ltr to CNO, dtd 13Oct49, Subj: Demobilization Planning (2515-35 File, NavSec, FRC, Alex).

³⁹ Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift ltr to LtGen Holland M. Smith, dtd 30Nov45 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQ-MC).

⁴⁰ CominCh disp to CinCPac, dtd 30Sep45 in CinCPac WarD, Sep45, encl (B), p. 7 (OAB, NHD).

infantry regiment, the 4th Marines. At an appropriate time, after necessary reductions and detachments had been made in Japan, a skeleton headquarters group, incorporating the name, the colors, and the traditions of the regiment, would sail for Tsingtao. Once the Chinese base was reached, the regiment would be newly constituted from disbanded infantry units of the division. Supporting elements of the brigade would be activated from units performing similar functions within the division.

The news of the first major reduction of Marine strength in North China emphasized the many such changes pending in 1946. In the coming year, the principal task set IIIAC when it was dispatched to Hopeh and Shantung—the repatriation of the Japanese—was successfully accomplished. A new mission of support of General Marshall's attempt to bring about peace in China made the year chiefly memorable, however, for its wasted effort and endless frustrations.

Abortive Peace Mission

EXECUTIVE HEADQUARTERS¹

When General Marshall arrived in China on 20 December, he immediately began a series of informal conferences with Nationalist and Communist leaders. Both sides appeared anxious to bring an end to the fighting and to have Marshall act as the mediator in their discussions. Consequently, the American was asked to be the presiding member of a three-man committee whose task was the development of a workable truce plan. The Nationalist representative was General Chang Chun; speaking for the Communists was General Chou En-lai.

The Committee of Three, as it soon came to be known, first met on 7 January at the American Ambassador's residence in Chungking. The result of six long meetings spaced over the next three days was an agreement which ordered the cessation of all hostilities by 13 January, an end to destruction and interference with lines of communication, a partial suspension of troop movement,

and the formation of an Executive Headquarters to police the truce.

The agreement was issued on 10 January over the signatures of the two Chinese members of the Committee of Three and was addressed to "all units, regular, militia, irregular and guerilla, of the National Armies of the Republic of China and of Communist-led troops of the Republic of China."² In modification of the ban on troop movement, both forces were allowed to make essential administrative and logistical moves of a local nature. The Nationalists, in addition, won agreement for their continued advance within Manchuria to restore Chinese sovereignty, and acknowledgement of their right to continue troop shifts necessary to complete army reorganization in the area south of the Yangtze River.

The Executive Headquarters provided for in the truce agreement was to be established in Peiping with its actions governed by three commissioners, a Nationalist, a Communist, and an American, with the latter the chairman of the organization. General Marshall appointed U. S. Charge d'Affaires Walter S. Robertson as the American commissioner. His opposite numbers were Major General Cheng Kai Ming of the Nationalist Ministry of Operations and General Yeh-Chien-Ying, the Communist Chief of Staff. Three independent

¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: HistRec of the ExecHq, PeipingGruHq, Peiping, China, 10-Jan-31Mar46, n.d. (OCMH), hereafter *ExecHqHist* with the appropriate quarter; SCAP ltr AG 370.05, dtd 17Jan46, Subj: Conf on Repatriation, 15-17Jan46, Tokyo, Japan (Seventh Flt & ComNavWesPac File, FRC, Mech); IIIAC G-5 PeriodicRpts No. 4, Jan46, dtd 1Feb46, No. 5, Feb46, dtd 1Mar46, and No. 6, Mar46, dtd 1Apr46; *U. S. Relations with China*.

² Quoted in *U. S. Relations with China*, p. 609.

signal systems were authorized to enable the commissioners to keep in constant and secret contact with their superiors. The commissioners had the authority to vote and negotiate among themselves, but all orders issued had to have unanimous agreement. The agency through which these orders would reach the field was the Executive Headquarters Operations Section.

The Committee of Three determined that an American officer should be the Director of the Operations Section and that he should have equal numbers of Nationalist and Communist representatives on his staff, as well as enough Americans to carry out the tripartite concept in negotiations. The U. S. Military Attache at Chungking, Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade, was selected for the post of director. General Byroade's main concern with the immediate problems involved in maintaining the cease-fire. Field teams, each one a miniature Executive Headquarters in organization, were to be dispatched to areas where fighting continued or broke out anew. The teams were expected to supervise the carrying out of the terms of the truce and to fix responsibility for failure to comply with them.

The initial contingent of officers and enlisted men assigned to Executive Headquarters arrived by air at Peiping on 11 January. A steady procession of Army Air Forces transports, shuttling from fields at Shanghai and Chungking, brought in additional personnel and supplies. Priority in the airlift was given to communications equipment. On the 12th and those days immediately succeeding, radio operators repeatedly sent out the cease-fire order. Byroade's sec-

tion set up operations in the buildings of the Peiping Union Medical College on 14 January and immediately made preparations to send its first teams into the field to check reports of cease-fire violations.

Support of the Executive Headquarters made heavy demands upon the aircraft availability of the Army's Air Transport Command at Shanghai. On 15 January, a detachment of transports from MAG-25 was temporarily assigned to Peiping to increase the number of planes available to fly truce teams to trouble spots and keep them supplied on a regular schedule. The Marine planes were also used to drop leaflets incorporating the cease-fire message in areas where fighting continued. Fighters of MAG-12 and -24 flew special reconnaissance missions over Jehol Province in Manchuria to report on Communist troop movement for the Executive Headquarters.³

The fighting subsided in the first weeks after the publication of the truce agreement. The field teams sent out from Peiping were able to localize clashes between the two sides and to get a start on restoration of normal railroad communications. One result of the operations of Executive Headquarters was an immediate step up in the tempo of Japanese repatriation. The former enemy soldiers and civilians isolated by Communist action in the interior of North China were at last able to march and ride out to the embarkation ports. The continued presence of large numbers of Japanese in the disputed area was a

³ 1st MAW WarD, Jan46; MAG-25 WarD, Jan46; VMR-152 WarD, Jan46.

factor which seriously affected the chances for peace, and the truce teams were directed to take an active part in arranging their withdrawal. In coordination with the Central Government and China Theater, Executive Headquarters determined the priority and method of movement of repatriation groups and arranged to feed, house, and transport them.

With the advent of the truce, Generals Marshall and Wedemeyer were able to prod the Central Government into taking over complete responsibility for Japanese repatriation from China. This decision was in keeping with a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff which limited future participation in the program by China Theater forces to advisory and liaison duties. All Japanese personnel, supplies, and equipment were to be released to Nationalist control. Word of the impending change was circulated by IIIAC on 3 January, and the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions were directed to work out turnover procedures with officials of the Eleventh War Area. The switch began in Shantung on the 14th and in Hopeh on the 18th. Responsibility for the Japanese themselves was assumed immediately and the transfer of property was completed by 9 February.⁴

In the absence of Communist obstruction, an important factor influencing repatriation progress was the availability of shipping. In mid-January, a conference of the Pacific commands most concerned with the repatriation problem was held at Tokyo to determine

shipping allocations and scheduling for the overall program. The burden of the transportation task involved in returning the more than 3,000,000 Japanese still overseas had to fall on Japanese-manned ships operated by SCAJAP (Shipping Control Administration, Japan). The requirements of naval demobilization had already made serious inroads in the number of American-manned vessels available, and in immediate prospect was the end to the use of American crews. Several hundred Liberty ships and LSTs were to be turned over to SCAJAP and sailed by Japanese seamen to supplement the captured merchant vessels already in use.

The conference decided that China Theater should have the use of 30 percent of this merchant shipping, and that 100 SCAJAP Libertys and 85 LSTs would be made available in February and March for the China run. By utilizing the crew space in the LSTs for passengers, SCAJAP planned to carry 1,200 repatriates in each vessel rather than the 1,000 lifted in similar American-manned ships. The use of such measures, added to the fact that SCAJAP shipping could not be diverted to transporting Nationalist troops to Manchuria, enabled General Wedemeyer to predict that Japanese repatriation from China would be completed by the end of June.

The scheduling of Korean repatriation, a necessary consideration in those areas where the Japanese had held control, was also taken up at the Tokyo conference. The economic competition of the Koreans overseas, who were mainly laborers and artisans, made them unwelcome to native populations. Most

⁴ IIIAC WarDs, Jan-Feb46; 1st MarDiv WarD, Jan46; 6th MarDiv WarD, Jan46.

Koreans clamored to return home, and their agitation posed a particularly difficult problem in Japan proper where their number ran into the hundreds of thousands. Priority of shipping space was assigned to the movement of Koreans from Japan, but enough vessels were diverted to Shanghai, Tsingtao, and Tangku to allow 10,000 of the most destitute Koreans in China to leave during late January and early February.

In January, the last month in which any substantial lift by American vessels was available, 57,719 Japanese and 1,838 Koreans left North China. In the following month, 4,000 more Koreans and 43,635 Japanese were repatriated, most of the latter on SCAJAP LSTs. March saw a significant change, however, when the SCAJAP program got into full swing, and 142,235 Japanese repatriates cleared Tsingtao and Tangku. The encouraging progress confirmed General Wedemeyer's estimate for a June end to the entire program.

During most of the period of Nationalist responsibility for repatriation in North China, American participation in the process went beyond the advice and liaison stage contemplated by the JCS. As soon as the Marines turned over security and inspection duties to Chinese forces, a distinct slackening in the standards of treatment of the Japanese was apparent. China Theater headquarters was deeply concerned by a rash of incidents of unchecked mob violence against the repatriates moving to the coast and of the looting of their meager belongings during the processing at ports of embarkation. After an investigation of the circumstances of

these outrages, theater headquarters determined that American supervision of Chinese repatriation procedures was necessary. On 15 February, III Corps was directed to extend supervisory assistance to Nationalist repatriation agencies during staging, movement, and loading of the Japanese. The imposition of partial control by the Marines had the desired effect of stemming further disorder in IIIAC sectors of responsibility.⁵

REDUCTION OF FORCES⁶

Hard on the heels of the assumption of responsibility for repatriation by the Nationalists came a decision by General Marshall to authorize a 20 percent reduction in strength of all Marine units in China.⁷ The presidential representative's mission and authority were such that he effectively controlled American forces, although he ordinarily confined his directives to the policy level and did not interfere with operational routine.⁸ His decision was welcomed by Headquarters Marine Corps, since the task of maintaining a strength level of 45,000 officers and men in IIIAC seriously threatened the planned demobil-

⁵ *ExecHQHist*, 1May-30Jun46, sec VII, pp. 17-18; IIIAC WarD, Feb46.

⁶ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: Eyes Alone Inactivation Folder (Wedemeyer File, TAGO, KCRC); IIIAC WarDs, Jan-Mar46; IIIAC OPlan No. 1-46, dtd 14Feb46; 1st MarDiv WarDs, Jan-Apr46; 6th MarDiv WarDs, Jan-Mar46; 1st MAW WarDs, Jan-Mar46.

⁷ Marshall disp to CGChina, dtd 22Jan46 (Eyes Alone Personal Radio Folder, Wedemeyer File, TAGO, KCRC).

⁸ *Rockey interview*, 9Jul59.

ization schedule for the whole Marine Corps.⁹

The strength cut sanctioned by General Marshall gave the Marine Corps an opportunity to revamp its forces in North China in the planned postwar pattern of FMFPac. On 14 February, IIIAC issued its operation plan for the reduction, directing that its major components reorganize according to new peacetime (G-series) tables of organization. Missions were redefined and provision was made for the redeployment necessary to give effect to the plan. Subordinate units had prepared their own plans by the end of February to fit within the framework of action outlined by corps. March was slated to be the period of greatest activity since shipping to take home 12,000 Marines was due to arrive at Tangku and Tsingtao during the month.

Two of the supporting FMF battalions which landed with III Corps were dropped from the troop list under the reduction plan, with the companies of the 1st Military Police to be disbanded in Tientsin and those of the 11th Motor Transport to be returned to the States. The 1st Separate Engineer Battalion lost one of its three engineer companies but remained in China. Corps Troops was reorganized as a Headquarters and Service Battalion (Provisional) with companies replacing the former signal, medical, and headquarters battalions.

The widespread logistics activities of 7th Service Regiment did not permit

much paring of its personnel strength, but it was directed to reorganize along lines established by the Service Command, FMFPac. Support functions were consolidated in a smaller and less specialized number of service companies. In a move separate from but complementary to the corps reorganization plan, the regiment's detachment at Tsingtao was replaced on 19 April by the 12th Service Battalion. The battalion, which came north from Okinawa, reported to 7th Service Regiment for operational control for a short while and then became an integral part of the Marine command at the Shantung port. Stock control remained with the service regiment.¹⁰

The conversion of the 6th Marine Division to a brigade, anticipated well before the issuance of the corps operation plan, was directed to take effect by 1 April. The reduced regimental headquarters of the 4th Marines which arrived in Tsingtao from Japan on 17 January formed the core of the new unit. A new regimental Headquarters and Service Company was organized and the Weapons Company of the 22d Marines was redesignated the Weapons Company of the 4th. By the same order, 2/29 became 1/4, 2/22 changed to 2/4, and 3/22 was redesignated 3/4. The artillery battalion of the brigade was formed from the 4th Battalion, 15th Marines. The brigade's headquarters battalion was organized from signal, tank, assault signal, medical, and headquarters companies drawn from comparable division units. The service battalion drew its companies from the

⁹ CMC memo to CNO, dtd 10Jan46, Subj: Reduction of Marine Forces in China (HQMC S&C File, FRC, Alex).

¹⁰ 7th ServRegt WarDs, Apr-May46.

division engineer, pioneer, motor transport, and service battalions. The 32d and 96th Naval Construction Battalions which had been attached to the division now became a part of the brigade organization. On 26 March all remaining units of the 6th Marine Division were disbanded, and on 1 April the 3d Marine Brigade came officially into being.

The changes ordered for the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing were far less sweeping. Flight activities in the Peiping area were consolidated at South Field (Nan Yuan), leaving West Field (Lantienchang) to U. S. Army Air Forces transports supporting Executive Headquarters. The Headquarters and the Service Squadrons of MAG-12 were ordered to the States and with them went VMTB-134 and VMF(N)-541. The fighter squadrons of MAG-12 were transferred to MAG-24. Air unit withdrawals were completed by early April.¹¹

The reduction in strength of the 1st Marine Division was accomplished primarily by disbanding the third battalions of each of its infantry regiments and one firing battery from each of the four battalions of the 11th Marines. To facilitate its disbandment, the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, was formally transferred from the 6th to the 1st Division on 15 February and went out of existence at Peitaiho at midnight on 31 March. The other three infantry battalions scheduled for disbandment stayed in being until 15 April when the 1st Division had completed its redeployment.

The new dispositions of the Marine forces in Hopeh placed a reduced garrison in Peiping under General Jones. The 2d Battalions of the 1st and 11th Marines with supporting division medical and motor transport companies and a small headquarters comprised Peiping Group. A company from 2/1 provided security for MAG-24 installations at South Field, and a battery of 2/11 performed the same function for the Army's 13th Troop Carrier Group at West Field. A radio relay station at Langfang on the boundary of the Peiping Group's sector of responsibility was guarded by an artillery platoon from 2/11.

The 1st Marines was charged with the security of the area between Langfang and Tientsin's East Station which included most of the international concession where corps and division service and support troops were headquartered. The 11th Marines watched the stretch of road, rail, and river between Tientsin and Tangku with a battery of 1/11 furnishing a guard for the 1st Wing facilities at Changkeichuang Field. Tangku and the railroad north to Lei-chuang near the Luan River was the responsibility of the 5th Marines.

Regimental headquarters of the 5th was established at Tangshan with 1/5 in Tangku and 2/5 at Linsi. The 1st Battalion's sector extended north about two-thirds of the way to Tangshan; rifle sections guarded vital bridges and a radio relay at Lutai. A company of the 2/5 was stationed at each of the two major KMA mines in the Kuyeh vicinity with the remainder of the battalion

¹¹ 1st MAW WarD, Apr46.

mounting bridge guard and providing security for the mining area power plant at Linsi.

The dispositions of the 7th Marines remained much as they had been since November, with 2/7 units manning the important bridges and stations from Lei-chuang to Chang-li and 1/7 guarding the remainder of the railroad to and including Chinwangtao. Both the regiment and the 2d Battalion maintained their headquarters in Peitaiho, while the 1st Battalion, reinforced by Battery G of the 11th Marines, garrisoned Chinwangtao.

The effect of the reorganization and the resultant departure of officers and men eligible for discharge or rotation was apparent in the steady fall of III Corps troop strength. At the end of January 1946, the total number of Marines and Navy men in the corps stood at 46,553; three months later the figure was 30,379. The deactivation of the 6th Marine Division dropped the ground strength of the Tsingtao garrison by over 6,000, while the 1st Division lost nearly 4,000 men, and the 1st Wing dipped from 6,175 to 4,200.¹²

Several important command changes took place in this period of reorganization and reduction of Marine forces. On 17 February, Brigadier General Walter G. Farrell from the staff of AirFMFPac replaced General Johnson as Assistant Wing Commander at Tsangkou Field. Farrell, like Johnson, was a veteran of prewar China expeditionary duty. On 1 April, General Howard, who had re-

quested retirement after serving over 30 years as a Marine officer, relinquished command of the Marines in Tsingtao to General Clement.¹³ For three weeks during February and March, while General Rockey was on temporary duty in Pearl Harbor at FMFPac headquarters, General Peck commanded III Corps as senior Marine officer in China.

Despite the handicap of constant personnel changes and shifting of units in the first months of 1946, the missions assigned to the Marines were efficiently executed. The repatriation of the Japanese kept pace with the shipping assigned. The output of coal from the KMA mines in the Kuyeh area shipped from Chinwangtao climbed well above the 100,000-ton minimum set by China Theater and stayed there. And the lines of communication between Peiping and Chinwangtao were kept open.

An additional mission not formally laid down in operation orders was given IIIAC in January. General Marshall suggested that the Marines at Tsingtao take an active part in arranging the distribution of UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) supplies in Communist areas of Shantung. The general felt that such action might improve the relations between the Communists and the Marines. Since the United States was by far the heaviest contributor to UNRRA, any help to the United Nations agency's humanitarian and economic relief efforts could be considered

¹² IIIAC G-1 Monthly PeriodicRpts, Jan46, dtd 8Feb46 and Apr46, dtd 6May46.

¹³ *Muster Rolls*, 3d MarBrig, Apr46 (Diary Unit, Files Sec, RecBr, PersDept, HQMC).

a furtherance of U. S. policy aims.¹⁴ Using light planes of VMO-6, Marine officers and UNRRA officials flew to Chefoo and Lini in January to coordinate plans for the delivery of food, clothing, and agricultural supplies. Both Generals Howard and Clement made visits to the Communist-controlled cities to assist liaison efforts.

The incidence of firing on Marines, both those on outpost duty and on aerial patrol, fell off appreciably during the months immediately following the signing of the truce. Assistance provided UNRRA in carrying out its relief program in Communist territory seemed to have the good effect desired by General Marshall. The atmosphere was hopeful and the signs at this juncture of Marine activity in North China pointed toward an early withdrawal of American troops.

In Chungking, the Political Consultative Conference which met during January arrived at a basis for organization of a coalition government that seemed to satisfy both sides. The Committee of Three was then able to agree upon a plan for integrating the Communist and Nationalist armies into a single force. The success of this latter scheme, and of the political solution, depended entirely upon the ability of the Executive Headquarters to bring an absolute end to the fighting. The experience of the truce teams proved, however, that the end of the fighting was as far off as it had ever been. Compromise agreements achieved by prolonged negotiation were violated by either side whenever the situation shifted to favor one over the other.

MARINE TRUCE TEAMS¹⁵

General Marshall believed that Marine participation in the conflict control activities of Executive Headquarters should be restricted. He appeared anxious to avoid any possible misunderstanding arising from their ambiguous role in support of the Nationalist re-entry into North China.¹⁶ By early March, however, it became apparent that there were not enough qualified U. S. Army personnel available to form the American contingents of all the needed truce teams. Under the circumstances, General Marshall directed the assignment of a select group of Marines to temporary duty with the Executive Headquarters. The understanding was that they were to be relieved as soon as suitable Army replacements arrived from the States.

On 11 March, III Corps issued a special order directing the formation of six liaison teams for Executive Headquarters, each to be headed by a colonel or lieutenant colonel, with a lieutenant signal officer, a radio mechanic, two radio operators, and a mechanic-driver as team members. The six senior officers chosen were Colonels Theodore

¹⁵ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *ExecHqHist*, 10Jan-31Mar46, 1Apr-30Jun46, and 1Jul-30Sep46; IIIAC WarDs, Mar-Apr46; 1st MarDiv Intel-Memo No. 48, dtd 13Aug46, Subj: Evac of Communist Trps from Bias Bay, South China, in 1st MarDiv WarD, Aug46; Activities of Team 8 in South China in *North China Marine* (Tientsin), 27Jul46, pp. 1, 8.

¹⁶ MajGen Keller E. Rockey ltr to Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift, dtd 9Apr46 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, HQMC).

¹⁴ *U. S. Relations with China*, pp. 225-226.

A. Holdahl and Orin K. Pressley and Lieutenant Colonels Gavin C. Humphrey, Jack F. Warner, Maxwell H. Mizell, and LeRoy P. Hunt, Jr. The need for the Marines was pressing, and the team commanders reported to Peiping on 13 March for briefing from their former posts at Tangshan, Tientsin, and Tsingtao. On the 18th, after joining their Nationalist and Communist members and interpreters assigned by the headquarters, the first Marine-directed teams were sent into the field.

Two of the teams, those led by Mizell and Warner, acted as watchdogs on the railroad lines of communication. The other teams drew assignments in areas of actual or probable conflict where their duties required them to try to keep the peace through negotiation with the contending sides. The effort was taxing, and the round of conferences among the three principals members as well as the discussions with local military leaders were endless. One Marine observer who visited Pressley's team at Chihfeng in Jehol Province commented that this method of operation placed a tremendous burden on the American member:

Neither the Nationalist nor the Communist representative take the initiative in solving problems which come before the team. Indeed, long hours are spent in discussion of minor points while action on major points is delayed for weeks at a time. Even after action is taken and reports forwarded to Executive Headquarters one member or the other will attempt to void the decision by a new vote. The American representative has displayed more concern and taken more interest in

the operation of the team than either of the Chinese representatives.¹⁷

For more than three months, the Marines with the field teams and a few radio and supply men at Peiping, a group which never exceeded 60 officers and men, played an important part in the American attempt to make the truce work. Life in the field was not easy; the place of duty was usually deep in China's interior, and the only contact with home base was the radio and a weekly Army or Marine transport plane carrying supplies and mail. Being shot at was not at all an unusual experience for men who tried to step between two fighting forces. Still, the reaction of the responsible Americans on the teams to their problems was much the same as General Marshall's. When he visited North China and Manchuria in early March, the general pointed out that "it is not in human nature to expect individuals to forget the events of the past, but there isn't time to cogitate on that now. The rights and wrongs of the past 18 years will probably be debated for 18 years to come. But we have something now that demands that we look entirely in the future."¹⁸ He noted further an attitude toward his task that was shared by many American team members in saying, "I am deeply involved in this matter and I don't like to have anything to do with failure."¹⁹

¹⁷ 1stLt Robert E. McKay Rpt of trip to Chihfeng, Jehol Province, 2-8Apr46, in IIIAC IntelMemo No. 37, dtd 15Apr46, in IIIAC WarD, Apr46.

¹⁸ Quoted in *ExecHqHist*, 10Jan-31Mar46, p. 67.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

This determination to get the job done successfully was graphically demonstrated by the work of the few Marines who operated in South China as part of the truce team headquartered at Canton. In the mountains north and east of the city, some 3,000 Communist guerrillas posed a constant threat to lines of communication, and the Nationalists, after trying unsuccessfully to root them out, agreed to allow their evacuation by sea to Chefoo. Six Marines, two officers and three sergeants led by Captain Albin F. Nelson, were assigned by Executive Headquarters to shepherd the evacuation.

On 23 April, Nelson's group flew from Peiping to Canton and, after a month of preparation, went up into the mountains to contact the Communist forces. Three sub-teams, each composed of a Marine officer and an NCO, a Nationalist and a Communist officer, an interpreter, and a small police escort, arranged assembly points and safeguarded the Communists in their travels through Nationalist lines. The tension was high between the bitter enemies and an open fight was never more than a hair's breadth away. Team members handled all arrangements for feeding and housing the evacuees, inoculated them against communicable diseases, and even mustered out those Communists who did not want to make the move. The three columns collected by the sub-teams, which included women and children as well as soldiers, assembled on the beach of Bias Bay 40 miles northwest of Hongkong on 23 June. Typhoons delayed the arrival of LSTs which took the Communists north to Chefoo until

late afternoon of the 29th, the last day of the local truce.

The job done by Nelson's sub-teams was unique in concept and execution, but it shared the atmosphere of tension characteristic of most truce team efforts. Although for a time in the first half of 1946 it appeared that the truce might become more than a paper agreement, fighting continued. Because Communist and Nationalist commanders did not enjoy having publicity given to their cease-fire violations, the arena of battle often shifted to areas not policed by Executive Headquarters. The blame for eventual failure of the truce can not be laid solely at the door of either side in the civil war; but as events proved, the Communists benefited from truce negotiations and regarded them strictly as devices to gain time.²⁰

THE END OF THE IIIAC ²¹

In February, Generals Marshall and Wedemeyer recommended that China Theater be deactivated on 1 May. The move was made in an effort to strengthen Chiang Kai-shek's pressure on Soviet Russia for the removal of its

²⁰ LtCol Robert B. Rigg, USA, *Red China's Fighting Hordes* (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1951), p. 229, hereafter Rigg, *Red China's Hordes*.

²¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: Eyes Alone Inactivation and Withdrawal of Marines Folders (Wedemeyer File, TAGO, KCRC); IIIAC WarDs, May-Jun46; 1st MarDiv WarDs, May-Jul46; 1st MAW WarDs, May-Jul46; 3d MarBrig WarDs, Apr-May46; 4th Mar WarDs, Jun-Jul46; Rockey ltr to Vandegrift, dtd 9Apr46, *op. cit.*; Liu, *Military History of China; U. S. Relations with China*.

occupation troops from Manchuria. The residual functions of the theater command were to pass to U. S. Army Forces, China, an administrative and service command, and Seventh Fleet. Operational control of the III Amphibious Corps would be exercised by Commander, Seventh Fleet, Admiral Charles M. Cooke, who had replaced Admiral Barbey.

General Marshall was anxious to reduce Marine forces in China to air transport, housekeeping, and security details whose main purpose would be logistical support of Executive Headquarters. He stated frequently in conversations with General Wedemeyer that the continued presence of the Marines in Nationalist territory was a source of considerable embarrassment to him in his peace negotiations. The crux of the matter lay in Marshall's inability to persuade the Generalissimo to make the long-promised relief of the Marines and to obtain the agreement of the Committee of Three to the movement of Nationalist troops to North China for this purpose.

General Rockey, in conversations with General Wedemeyer on 18-19 March, recommended strongly that the Marines not be relieved until first-line CNA troops were firmly established in their place. The IIIAC commander believed that the Communists were strong enough to disrupt communications completely between Peiping and Chinwangtao, to stop production at the KMA mines, and even to capture Tsingtao in the absence of effective opposition. Wedemeyer agreed to the risk involved in making the relief, but pointed out that the relief must be made even if only Nationalist forces locally available were

used. He felt that truce teams judiciously placed in areas of potential trouble might prevent Communist depredations. It appears that both Wedemeyer and Marshall believed that the Nationalists would make no move to provide adequate security forces in North China until it was clear to them that the Marines were going to be pulled out. A tentative target date for the start of the withdrawal of the Marines was set for 15 April, but this, as well as everything else in the concept, depended upon the outcome of truce negotiations.

General Marshall returned to Washington on 12 March for a month of conferences bearing on the China situation. His absence coincided with the stepping-up of the Nationalist drive against the Communists in Manchuria, an operation which made Chungking even less willing than usual to divert good troops to rail and mine security. The Communists, naturally enough, were dead set against any movement of CNA troops into North China which might strengthen the Nationalists hand in Manchuria. Adding further complications to the issue was the belief of theater intelligence officers that the "Marines in China are the anchor on which the Generalissimo's whole Manchurian position is swinging."²² The effect of the altered situation was to slow the reduction of Marine forces considerably.

The pressure for the relief of the Marines was not all directed at the Nationalists or prompted by General Marshall's desire to get American com-

²² ComSeventhFlt disp to CNO, dtd 3May46 (Withdrawal of Marines Folder, Wedemeyer File, TAGO, KCRC).

bat troops out of China. In the postwar budget of the Navy Department expenditures for the Marine Corps were calculated on the basis of peacetime strength and organization, and the Commandant was vitally interested in withdrawing or deactivating any units in the field that were not necessary to the accomplishment of the missions assigned IIIAC. He was insistent that changes should be fitted into the organizational framework of the FMF and that the divisional structure be retained.²³

Before any firm commitment was made to reduce the ground element of IIIAC, a substantial cut in its air strength was ordered. Qualified flying personnel and plane mechanics were in short supply throughout the Marine Corps, and it was no longer possible to maintain all the squadrons in North China in efficient operating status with the replacements available. In early April, plans were laid for the return of MAG-32 to the States during the following month, and the Commanding General, AirFMFPac proposed that MAG-25 also be sent home. General Rockey recommended strongly that at least one transport squadron be retained to support Marine activities and to assist Executive Headquarters in maintaining its truce teams in the field. The recommendation was adopted quickly, and VMR-153 was selected as the unit to stay while its parent group and VMR-152 returned to the west coast of the United States.

²³ Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift ltr to Maj-Gen Keller E. Rockey, dtd 24Apr46 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQMC).

In order to determine how Marine ground forces in IIIAC could be reorganized, General Geiger and representatives of his FMFPac staff visited China between 12 and 22 May. Before leaving Pearl Harbor, the FMF staff officers drew up a plan which eliminated III Corps Headquarters and Corps Troops and 3d Brigade Headquarters and Brigade Troops, leaving only the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) in North China. Personnel equal to those eliminated, 391 officers and 5,700 enlisted men, were to be returned to the U. S. This plan formed a working basis for talks with Admiral Cooke and General Rockey. Once Geiger was on the scene in North China, the IIIAC and FMFPac staffs worked out changes that better fitted the situation.

Rockey had no substantial objection to the reductions outlined, but he believed that the 1st Division would need a headquarters augmentation in order to control its scattered components. Similarly, the reduction agreed upon for Tsingtao was much lighter than that originally proposed in view of the separate nature of the command there. At the end of several days of conferences, Geiger and Rockey approved a reorganization that eliminated a number of billets and reduced Marine strength by 125 officers and 1,417 enlisted men. Cooke concurred in this proposal and recommended its acceptance to Marshall, who gave his approval on 24 May.²⁴

²⁴ LtGen Roy S. Geiger ltr to Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift, ca. 25May46 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQMC); ComSeventhFlt disp to CinCPac and CGFMFPac, dtd 24May46, in CinCPac WarD, May 46, dtd 6Jun46, encl (B), (OAB, NHD).

When the reorganization order was published on 4 June, to take effect on the 10th, General Rockey was named Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) and Marine Forces, China, the latter a task force designation for the division. General Worton went from chief of staff of the corps to assistant commander of the division; in general, corps staff officers were assigned the senior positions on the augmented staff. Some 600 officers and men from IIIAC Headquarters and Service Battalion were added to division troops, and the battalion itself was transferred to the division for subsequent return to the U. S. The 1st MAW, consisting of MAG-24 and the squadrons, including VMR-153, assigned to wing headquarters, came under operational control of the division. The 7th Service Regiment and one company of the 1st Separate Engineer Battalion also became part of the reinforced division; the remainder of the engineer unit was returned to the States.

At Tsingtao, the 3d Marine Brigade ended its short existence with most of its units becoming part of the 4th Marines (Reinforced) or Marine Forces, Tsingtao. General Clement was given both commands in keeping with the wishes of General Marshall and Admiral Cooke that a general officer continue to represent the Marines in the port city. Aside from the regiment and its attached units, the task force included VMO-6, the 12th Service Battalion, and 96th Naval Construction Battalion. The total authorized strength of the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) was set at 25,252 officers and men with 2,517 of that number naval personnel assigned

to port operating, construction, and medical units.

As part of the reorganization of Marine forces, the number of general officer billets in China was cut. In view of the sharply reduced strength of the wing, the rank of the commander was set as brigadier general and the position of assistant wing commander was deleted from the T/O. General Woods was assigned new duties as Commanding General, Marine Air, West Coast and General Farrell returned to AirFMFPac. The new wing commander, Brigadier General Lawson H. M. Sanderson, reported from AirFMFPac and relieved Woods on 25 June. General Peck, who had requested retirement in April after completing more than 30 years of active duty, remained in command of the 1st Division at the Commandant's request²⁵ until the reorganization was completed. To round out the picture of major command changes, General Jones moved from his Peiping command to duties as President of the Marine Corps Equipment Board at Quantico.²⁶

During the many changes in composition of Marine forces in China that took place in the spring of 1946, there was little basic change in assigned missions. Whether the operation orders originated from China Theater or Seventh Fleet, the Marines still were charged with responsibility for seeing that the vital coal supplies from the KMA mines were shipped without interruption and that

²⁵ Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift ltr to Maj-Gen DeWitt Peck, dtd 8May46 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQMC).

²⁶ General Officer Biographies (SubjFile, HistBr, HQMC).

the line of communication between Tientsin and Chinwangtao was kept open. They were directed to provide logistical support to Executive Headquarters until the Army was able to relieve them. In furtherance of these tasks, principal garrisons were continued at Peiping, Tientsin, Tangku, Peitaiho, and Chinwangtao with orders to secure only the "actual ground occupied by U. S. installations, property, materiel, personnel, and intervening or surrounding ground necessary for wire and road traffic communications so that the elements of the command are not isolated."²⁷

In the south, the same garrison order applied to the Marine force at Tsingtao. The U. S. installations to be guarded were almost exclusively naval in character as the city had become Seventh Fleet headquarters and base of operations by June. A growing shore establishment provided administrative and logistic support to the ships of Admiral Cooke's command. In addition, an American naval training group had been operating at the port since December with a mission of teaching Nationalist crews how to sail and fight the U. S. ships that were transferred to the Central Government under military aid laws.²⁸

The most significant change in the tasks set the Marines was the ending of supervisory responsibility for Japanese

repatriation. In April, SCAJAP increased its allotment of LSTs to the North China run and 125,872 Japanese were sent home from Tsingtao and Tangku.²⁹ By the end of May, repatriation was completed except for those persons detained by the Chinese, serving on repatriation staffs, or too ill to be moved; only 15,855 people remained to be returned to Japan.³⁰ With the sailing of the last scheduled repatriation ship from Tangku on 15 July, even this rearguard was gone; more than 540,000 Japanese had been repatriated from North China under Marine supervision.³¹

When the last SCAJAP LST cleared Tangku, it also marked the end of the entire repatriation program from China proper which saw the return of over 2,200,000 Japanese to their home islands in nine months of dedicated effort. The significance of the American contribution to this remarkable undertaking was summed up well by General Nagano, the former Japanese commander at Tsingtao, on the occasion of his leaving China. The Japanese officer, who had been charged by General Shepherd with the responsibility for seeing the last of his countrymen home from Shantung, wrote in an unofficial report to the Marine general:

I cannot but be grateful to you and your country. This may sound rather strange from my lips. I like plain speaking. Please do not think that I am making

²⁷ IIIAC OPlan No. 2-46, dtd 1May46, in IIIAC WarD, Apr46.

²⁸ Com Tsingtao Unit Final Rpt to Chief, NavAdDiv, JUSMAG, China, dtd 23Jan49, p. 1 (ComNavWesPac A9 File, FRC, Mech), hereafter *Tsingtao NavAdDivRpt*.

²⁹ IIIAC G-5 PeriodicRpt No. 7, Apr46, dtd 1May46.

³⁰ IIIAC G-5 PeriodicRpt No. 8, May46, dtd 1Jun46, p. 1.

³¹ *Ibid.*; *ExecHqHist*, 1Jul-30Sep46, sec I, p. 50.

compliments. If anyone ever tells you that I [am] please tell him to go to Tsingtao and stand in front of the American L. S. T. and see the Japanese soldier as he passes on the ramp salute the Stars and Stripes; no Chinese flag, no Russian flag, no English flag, but the Stars and Stripes, under which they will be able to sail to Japan. Happy they! Just think of those Japanese soldiers and civilians in Manchuria and Siberia. We cannot be too grateful to you.³²

The early months of 1946, when the mass of Japanese soldiers and civilians moved from the interior of North China to the repatriation ports, was the period of greatest success of the truce. The Communists, by permitting the peaceful withdrawal of the troublesome Japanese, apparently were clearing the deck for action. The number of incidents in which Marine outposts were involved in clashes with Communist troops increased steadily as summer came on. Most of these sudden flare-ups were of a minor nature and American casualties were few. Only one man was killed in the first six months of 1946 in such an affair. He died on 21 May when a small reconnaissance patrol of the 1st Marines were fired upon by 50-75 armed Chinese near a village south of Tientsin. The attacking force slipped away unpunished.

The renewed Communist effort to retain control of North China was particularly marked in Shantung where the pressure on the CNA got so bad in early June that General Clement believed that Tsingtao might be attacked. Twelve Corsairs from VMF-115 at Peiping were stationed at Tsangkou Field from 12-15

June to back up the defenses of the 4th Marines, which held a main line of resistance well inside the positions of the Nationalist garrison. The Communist drive slackened after 15 June while negotiations were being made to bring to an end even more serious fighting in Manchuria.

In many respects, the organized harassment of lines of communication in Hopeh and the bitter struggle in Shantung seemed to have been initiated by the Communists to relieve pressure on their troops north of the Great Wall. The armies of the Central Government won a series of heady victories in Manchuria during an all-out spring offensive, but the defeated Communist forces avoided entrapment. The magnitude of the battles was so great that it threatened the end of all peace efforts. Since both sides claimed at times that the 10 January truce had no effect beyond China proper, General Marshall had to negotiate a separate truce for Manchuria. A temporary halt to the fighting was ordered by the Committee of Three on 6 June and a more permanent truce was signed on the 28th. In short order, this agreement too came to be more honored in the breach than the observance.

At the end of June, General Rockey was able to make a realistic appraisal of the Marine situation in the coming months. He reported to the Commandant that in his opinion:

... conditions will operate to keep Marines in North China for a considerable period, at least during the remainder of this calendar year. Our departure would very materially influence the whole situation in China and General Marshall has apparently reversed his former ideas

³² MajGen Eiji Nagano ltr to MajGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., dtd 18May46, filed with *Shepherd interview*.

about our early withdrawal. The CNA is spread thin in Manchuria. They do not appear to have the necessary troops to relieve us. If the Central Government loses the key cities in North China or if the coal fails to move from the KMA mines to Shanghai, Hongkong, Nanking, and elsewhere, the show is over as far as present plans for the unification of China are concerned.³³

CAPTURE AND AMBUSH³⁴

In July, the Communists reorganized their armies, naming the whole, "People's Liberation Army," which agreed with their title for the territory they held as the "liberated areas." In the Communist view, the "liberated area" in Hopeh extended right up to the perimeter defenses of the Marine and Nationalist outposts along the Peiping-Mukden Railroad. Despite its nominal coloring as Nationalist, the countryside over the entire range of land between Chinwangtao and Peiping was alive with Communist guerrilla forces. In their actions they took their cue from Mao Tse-tung, whose pamphlets incorporating hard-

earned lessons of guerrilla warfare were primers in Communist military schools. In regard to planning, he said:

Without planning it is impossible to win victory in a guerrilla war. The idea of fighting a guerrilla war at haphazard means nothing but making a game of it—the idea of an *ignoramus* in guerrilla warfare. The operations in a guerrilla area as a whole or the operations of a single guerrilla detachment or guerrilla corps must be preceded by the most comprehensive planning possible. . . .³⁵

This dictum provides a revealing background for two Communist actions against the Marines which took place in July. One was the first occasion on which Marines other than downed airmen were held prisoner, and the other was a deliberate and well planned ambush. Yen-an had evidently decided that the time had come for a major incident involving the Marines, one that could be worked for its full propaganda value. Such an incident would increase pressure in the U. S. for the withdrawal of the Marines because of the danger in which they stood.

On 13 July, the summer afternoon's heat prompted eight men from the bridge guard at Lin-Shou-Ying to head for a nearby village to get ice. This action violated a division directive that guard detachment members would stay within the barbed wire defenses of their posts. Communist soldiers, about 80 strong, surprised and surrounded the Marines at the icehouse. One man escaped unnoticed in the gathering dusk to alert the bridge outpost which radioed

³³ CG 1st MarDiv (Reinf) ltr to CMC, dtd 26Jun46 (HQMC S&C File, FRC, Alex).

³⁴ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: ComPhibGru 3 ltr to ComNavWesPac, dtd 30Apr48, Subj: Info and comment concerning incidents involving U. S. persons taken into custody by Chinese Communists (ComNavWesPac A-8 File, FRC, Mech), hereafter *Capture comments*; 1st MarDiv WarD, Jul46; CO 1/11 ltr to CMC, dtd 1Aug46, Subj: SAR of Incident Between CCF and a MarPat on 29Jul46, with five endorsements (HQMC S&C File, FRC, Alex); Col Wilburt S. Brown ltr to CMC, dtd 20Aug46 (HQMC S&C File, FRC, Alex); LtCol Henry Aplington, II, "North China Patrol," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 33, no. 6 (Jun49); *U. S. Relations with China*.

³⁵ Mao Tse-tung, *Strategic Problems of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War* (Peiping: Foreign Language Press, 1954), p. 21.


the news to 7th Marines headquarters at Peitaiho, 15 miles to the north. That evening all available men of the 1st Battalion boarded a special train at Chinwangtao and rode to the capture site to begin a dogged pursuit that continued all through a rainy night and on into the next day. No contact was made and it soon became apparent that a long search was in prospect. The Communist troops, armed with a sure knowledge of the countryside and protected by a friendly populace, was able to stay well away from the Marines.

The regimental commander decided to relieve the 1st with the 2d Battalion and withdraw 1/7 to prepare for extensive field operations. A 200-man combat patrol of 2/7 moved out from Changli to continue pursuit on the 16th. Fields of kaoliang higher than a man's head bordered the roads, blocking off all view. The villages along the route were deserted when the Marines first entered and then reoccupied only by women, oldsters, and children; no young men were ever seen. The patrol could easily have been ambushed despite its own precautions and the overhead cover of OYs, as virtually nothing could be seen through the dense cover of ripening crops. When a circuit of the 2/7 sector had been made without result, the patrol returned on 18 July to Changli, secured its base camp, and went back to Peitaiho.

Because none of the Marines taken near Lin-Shou-Ying or their captors could be located by patrols, Executive Headquarters was asked to take a hand in obtaining the release of the men. Before the Communists would permit a truce team to enter their territory to

begin negotiations, they required that all Marine units return to the positions held on the 13th. A series of discussions were held after this was done. The Communists demanded that the U. S. recognize the "unlawful" act of entering the "liberated area" and apologize; that there be no repetition of the incidents; and that the Marines captured each make a written statement of their good treatment. The upshot of this was that the seven men each wrote a letter attesting to their good treatment at the hands of the Communists, and U. S. negotiators assured the Communists that additional orders restricting the movement of Marines in the Chinwangtao area would be issued. The men were returned unharmed on 24 July.

No one but the Communists could be pleased by the distasteful but necessary solution to the problem posed by the captured Marines. During all the talks leading to the men's release, Communist officials hammered away at one theme—the Marines were actively aiding the Chinese Nationalist Army. This line of propaganda was to be sounded again and again as long as the Marines were in China, but nowhere in so outrageous and lying a fashion as in the Communist explanation of their ambush at Anping on 29 July. (See Map 35.) According to Yen-an, the positions of its Eighth Route Army near Anping on the Peiping-Tientsin road were suddenly attacked on the morning of the 29th and in the battle "more than sixty U. S. soldiers were discovered fighting shoulder to shoulder with eighty-odd Koumintang troops. . . . In the afternoon an American force came as reinforcements from Tientsin. With a view to make the American



MAP 35

T. L. RUSSELL

troops conscious of what they were doing, units of the Eighth Route Army left the battle at once.”³⁶

In truth, the Communists laid an ambush at Anping, knowing full well that their prize would be a routine Marine supply convoy. As a matter of policy, no CNA troops accompanied American trucks so there could be no claim of mutual interest or protection. On 29 July, the only Chinese vehicle in the convoy was a truck bearing UNRRA supplies. The presence of Communist troops in strength anywhere along the road to Peiping was completely unexpected, although sniping at individual trucks and jeeps had occurred several times in June. It was as a result of this occasional firing that there was a guard and convoy; the patrols which had searched the road regularly from October 1945 until March 1946 had been discontinued because there seemed to be no need for them.

On the morning of 29 July, the convoy assembled at the 1st Marines compound in Tientsin. The patrol escort, commanded by Second Lieutenant Douglas A. Corwin, consisted of 31 men from 1/11 and a 10-man 60mm mortar section of the 1st Marines. In addition to nine supply trucks for the Peiping Marine garrison and the UNRRA vehicle, there were two Army staff cars with American personnel from Executive Headquarters and three jeeps carrying Marines bound for Peiping. The patrol itself rode in four reconnaissance trucks and four jeeps, two of the latter carrying TCS radios. The TCSs lacked the range to

keep in contact all the way to Peiping, so there was a considerable gap between the time the patrol lost touch with 1/11 and the time it was picked up by 2/11's set at South Field. Within that stretch lay the village of Anping.

The convoy started out at 0915 with the patrol protection divided equally between forward and rear points; all vehicles proceeded at 50-yard intervals with 100 yards between elements. Radio contact with 1/11 faded by 1105 and the patrol proceeded normally until about noon when it had reached a point 44 miles from Tientsin. A line of rocks across the road slowed the lead jeeps and as they were threading their way through these obstacles, a new roadblock of ox carts was spotted just ahead. The point stopped and dismounted cautiously. At that moment, about a dozen grenades were thrown from a clump of trees 15 yards to the left of the road block. Lieutenant Corwin was killed immediately and most of the men with him were either killed or wounded in this initial attack. The survivors took cover and returned the Communist fire.

The body of the convoy halted quickly when it in turn came under steady and well-directed rifle fire which originated in a line of trees about 100 yards to the right of the road. Very few of those men riding the supply trucks and passenger vehicles were armed and they took cover as best they could in the ditch to the left of the road. The ambush was complete when the rear point, stalled by the convoy, was sprayed with fire from positions to the right and left rear. The second in command of the patrol, Platoon Sergeant Cecil J. Flanagan, then ranged up and

³⁶ Statement released by New China News Agency, Yenan, quoted in *The Peiping Chronicle*, 3Aug46, p. 1.

down the long column of vehicles directing return fire. The mortar and machine gun with the rear point were instrumental in stopping Communist attempts to rush. About 1315, during a lull in the attack, three Marines turned one of the jeeps around and made a successful break for help.

The Communists, responding to bugle signals, finally ceased fire about 1530 and began withdrawing. The attacking force, which had an estimated strength of 300 men well armed with rifles and automatic weapons, seemed content to call it a draw with the smaller and weaker defending force. On order of the senior officer in the convoy, an Army major in special services at Executive Headquarters, the American group then gathered up its wounded, and covered by a rear guard of Flanagan's men, continued on for Peiping. Only a few scattered shots greeted the lead vehicles as they left the ambush area; three damaged trucks were abandoned. The convoy and patrol reached the old capitol at about 1745. The Marine casualty list of the afternoon's action reported 3 killed and 1 died of wounds and 10 wounded, all of whom were from 1/11.

The first news of the ambush to reach Tientsin was brought by the Marines who had escaped from the trap early in the fire fight. Their wildly racing jeep overturned on the outskirts of the city, injuring two of the occupants, and delaying their report until a passing vehicle could be commandeered for the rest of the passage to the nearest Marine post. The 11th Marines got word of what had happened at 1630 and a heavily armed combat patrol was im-

mediately ordered to get ready. Air support was requested of the wing, while the regimental executive officer took off in an OY of VMO-3 to scout the scene of action. Flying low over Anping at 1730, he counted 15 bodies in Communist uniform, but saw no sign of the attackers. Five Corsairs of MAG-24 which reached the ambush site at 1917 also failed to spot the Communists,³⁷ nor was there any longer a sign of the bodies.

The 11th Marines relief force, 400-strong and backed by two 105mm howitzers, cleared the French Arsenal at 1830 driving "at reckless speed, and still only reached the scene of combat at 2045."³⁸ The Communist force had vanished, taking its dead and wounded with it, and the Marines could only tow in the shot-up trucks that marked the ambush site.

In the wake of the attack, orders were issued that substantially increased the strength of patrols on the Peiping-Tientsin road. Aerial surveillance of the road increased, and fighter aircraft alert time was cut from 2 hours to 15 minutes. More powerful field radios were used to bridge the communication gap between the two cities. No further attack of similar nature occurred during the remaining months the 1st Marine Division was in China.

General Rockey launched a careful investigation of the circumstances of the ambush and the nature of the attacking force. The findings were that a deliberate and unprovoked attack had been made by strong elements of one or more

³⁷ MAG-24 WarD, Jul46, n.d.

³⁸ Brown ltr to CMC, *op. cit.*

regular Communist regiments. A similar inquiry of the events at Anping conducted by a special team of Executive Headquarters foundered on Communist obstructions.³⁹ On General Marshall's order, the American members withdrew from the team and submitted their own report which agreed entirely with that of the 1st Marine Division.

To Marshall, the most disturbing aspect of what he called a deliberately planned and executed stroke at the Marines, was its indication of a harden-

ing in attitude on the part of the Communists. The American representative commented later that prior to 29 July 1946 "there had not been a deliberate break which struck at us specifically, which means that they were taking measures against the Nationalist Government and ourselves all included, which is a very definite departure from what had been the status before."⁴⁰ After the Anping incident, the element of risk involved in stationing the Marines on outpost guard increased substantially. As a result, the latter part of 1946 saw a considerable concentration of Marine positions and the foreshadowing of their complete withdrawal from Hopeh.

³⁹ The Seventh Fleet commander at the time, Admiral Cooke, in reviewing this portion of the manuscript, drew particular attention to the fact that "Communist authorities refused to allow any of their attack commanders to be brought before the investigating body." Adm Charles M. Cooke ltr to ACofS, G-3, dtd 31Oct61, hereafter *Cooke ltr*.

⁴⁰ Quoted in *Military Situation in the Far East*, p. 543.

Withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division

CONSOLIDATION OF MARINE POSITIONS¹

By the summer of 1946, the combat efficiency of the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had dropped far below wartime standards. Neither organization was considered in satisfactory shape to perform its normal function in an amphibious operation. The two units had become, in effect, garrison forces with capabilities geared to the missions which had been theirs since the war's end.

The wing's troubles stemmed from wholesale personnel turnover brought on by rapid demobilization. General Sanderson reported on 15 July: "Only 35% of the present enlisted strength of the entire Wing can be considered to have any qualifications other than basic. . . ." He pointed out further that MAG-24 had less than one experienced mechanic for every four planes, and that it was forced to operate at only 20 percent of aircraft availability. Progress in correcting training deficiencies was hampered by a lack of experienced instructors.²

The division shared with the wing the personnel problems brought on by de-

mobilization. An extensive schooling program begun by IIIAC to keep abreast of the loss of specialists was continued and expanded. Ranges were opened near Peiping, Tientsin, Chinwangtao, and Tsingtao to maintain weapons proficiency and to qualify those replacements who had missed range instruction in boot camp. Squads and platoons practiced tactics to the extent that maneuver room was available in the immediate vicinity of Marine posts, but field training by larger formations was not possible. By September, 1st Division units were reporting military efficiency levels of 25-35 percent,³ barely adequate to do the job at hand and certainly far below acceptable standards for amphibious troops.

Part of the solution to the combat readiness problems of the division and wing lay in a return to more normal rates of personnel attrition. At the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, a target date of 1 October was set for the discharge of all reserves and draftees in the naval establishment, a decision prompted by the limited post-war funds available to operating forces.⁴ From North China, all but a

¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: Aug-Oct46 WarDs of 1st MarDiv and 1st MAW.

² CG 1st MAW ltr serial 0052 to CG Air-FMFPac, dtd 15Jul46, Subj: Reduced status of 1st MAW AvnUnits (ComSeventhFlt S-A4-1 File, FRC, Mech).

³ CG, 1st MarDiv (Reinf) SpecRpt of Mil-Efficiency to CG, FMFPac, dtd 24Sep46 (Com-SeventhFlt A-9 File, FRC, Mech).

⁴ Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift ltr to Adm John H. Towers, dtd 9Aug46; Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift ltr to LtGen Roy S. Geiger, dtd 22Aug46 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQMC).

handful of these men were on their way home by mid-September. Replacements scheduled to arrive during the fall months, together with the regulars remaining, promised stability in unit rosters and therefore greater benefit from training programs.

Substantial cuts in the strength of Marine Forces, China, continued during the summer, easing the replacement problem appreciably. As a result of the Communist threat to Tsingtao in June, the Nationalist garrison had been strengthened, and there seemed little reason to station there any more Marines than were necessary for the immediate security and support of Seventh Fleet shore installations. On 1 August, the 1st Division issued an operation order directing the reduction of Marine Forces, Tsingtao, to the strength of a reinforced infantry battalion. The 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, augmented by detachments from the regiment's supporting units and with operational control of VMO-6, was selected to remain. Colonel Samuel B. Griffith, II, was assigned duty as its commander. The 12th Service Battalion was directed to continue supply functions for Navy and Marine units in the Tsingtao area under operational control of 7th Service Regiment. The air units at Tsangkou Field, except VMO-6, remained under the wing's command.

All regulars in Tsingtao over the number needed for the reinforced 3/4, the 12th Service Battalion, and 1st Wing detachments were transferred to 1st Division units in Hopeh. The reserves and draftees eligible for discharge, over 2,200 men, were transferred to units returning to the United

States. In August, 3/12, the 3d Medical Battalion, and headquarters, signal, and service companies of the regimental reinforcing elements sailed for the west coast to form part of a new 3d Marine Brigade organizing at Camp Pendleton. On 3 September, the 4th Marines, less 3/4, embarked and sailed for Norfolk to become a component of the 2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune. On the departure of the regiment, the command Marine Forces, Tsingtao, ceased to exist, and Colonel Griffith reported to the Commander, Naval Facilities, Tsingtao, for operational control. At the same time, the Marine air base at Tsangkou came under the naval commander. The division and wing retained administrative control of their respective units.

The narrowing of the 1st Division's operational responsibility to Hopeh was made even more significant by a long-sought change in Marine dispositions. Sometime near the beginning of July, General Marshall informed the Central Government that he was going to order the Marines off coal and rail guard duty and bring an end to their exposure to Communist attack. His decision forced the Nationalists to begin relieving the Marines without further delay.⁵ In July, eight Marine bridge detachments were replaced by troops of the 94th CNA, which included four first-line divisions equipped with American arms.

On 7 August, as the pace of reliefs was accelerated, General Rockey reported to Admiral Cooke the extent of the Marine commitment along the railroad. Over 4,700 officers and men, a

⁵ *Rockey interview*, 14-15 Apr 59.

third of the actual strength of the 1st Division,⁶ were stationed from Tangku to Chinwangtao. Of that number, 873 Marines were on outpost duty, an assignment that included the security of 20 bridges. Sixty men a day were detailed to bridge guard on the coal trains originating at Kuyeh; between 120 and 180 men were constantly employed in this task. The close-in protection of the KMA mines near Linsi was the responsibility of three companies of the 5th Marines. Intelligence indicated that 25,000 Communist troops, both regulars and militia, were located within 15 miles of either side of the railroad in the 1st Division zone of responsibility. Nationalist forces in the same area, all under the 94th CNA with headquarters in Tientsin, totaled 35,898, but many of these soldiers were former puppet troops of dubious military worth.⁷

The Communists did not relax their program of harassment while the Marines were withdrawing from the railroad. On 4 August, a coal train headed for Tientsin was ambushed and derailed near Lutai. The four Marine guards riding the caboose and Chinese railroad police fought off the 50-man ambush party; a relief train from Tangku rescued the men. Sentries on bridge and station outposts were often sniped at, and occasionally a night-long exchange of fire would occupy the Marines and their elusive attackers. Through August and September the

number of such incidents declined steadily as the division's units became less vulnerable. The Communists showed no disposition toward attacks on the main Marine positions, but such costly attacks were unnecessary. The same purpose of speeding the decision to withdraw the Marines was accomplished by harrassing actions, and without the risk of all-out retaliation.

In effecting a reorganization of its positions, the division returned the battalions of the 1st and 11th Marines in Peiping to their parent units in Tientsin. The 5th Marines (less 1/5) was reassigned to Peiping and the command, Peiping Marine Group, was dissolved. The 1st Battalion, 5th, continued its year-long association with Tangku and remained responsible for the security of the port and its warehouses and supply dumps. In like manner, after pulling in its outposts, the 7th Marines continued to hold the American installations in Peitaiho and Chinwangtao, a job that had occupied the regiment since the initial landings in China.

The last relief of Marine rail guards by Nationalist troops took place on 30 September. The event also marked the completion of moves which saw the concentration of division units in three main areas—Peiping, Tientsin-Tangku, and Peitaiho-Chinwangtao. With the ending of its responsibility for ensuring coal delivery to Chinwangtao for shipment, Marine Forces, China, had only four residual missions: (1) to protect U. S. property, installations, and personnel; (2) to maintain such detachments in port areas as were necessary for its own support; (3) to guard only those routes and means of communica-

⁶ 1st MarDiv G-1 Rpt, Jul46, dtd 5Aug46 in 1st MarDiv WarD, Jul46.

⁷ CG, 1st MarDiv ltr to ComSeventhFlt, dtd 7Aug46, Subj: Defense of the RR Line from Tientsin to Chinwangtao (HQMC S&C Files, FRC, Alex).

tion necessary for its own support; and (4) to assist and provide logistical support for U. S. Army activities of Executive Headquarters.

While the ground elements of the division were regrouping, the wing made two changes that reflected the altered nature of Marine operations in China. On 22 September, the wing service squadron, which had acted as a personnel clearing center at Tsangkou Field for almost a year, moved to Changkeichuang Field outside Tientsin to relieve headquarters squadron of maintenance, housekeeping, and transportation details. On 15 October, VMO-6 was detached from 3/4's command and moved to Tientsin to provide additional reconnaissance aircraft to cover supply trains bridging the gaps between Marine garrisons and to scout the immediate vicinity of American defensive positions. Both transfers were made entirely by air.

During this period of change, the last two general officers who had made the original landing completed their China duty. On 26 August, General Worton was relieved as ADC by Brigadier General Alfred H. Noble, and on 18 September, Major General Samuel L. Howard relieved General Rockey in command of the division. Rockey's new post was Commanding General, Department of the Pacific, and Worton took command of Marine Garrison Forces, Pacific, in succession to Noble.⁸ Howard, a China-duty veteran who had commanded the 4th Marines in Shanghai in 1941, acted quickly to forestall any thought by the

Chinese that a change of command meant a change in Marine purpose. In a public statement addressed to the people of North China, he stated:

The U. S. Government's announced policy is the promotion of peace and harmony in China. General George C. Marshall and the members of his Executive Headquarters are working toward that end.

The U. S. Marines have no part in the establishment of our nation's policy. We are an organization whose traditional duty is to support and uphold that policy and to protect American lives and property in any part of the globe. We are in China to carry out the directives of our State Department or those of General Marshall. This we propose to do.⁹

The Communist attitude toward the Marines did not soften in any way with the withdrawal of the Americans from railroad and mine outposts. General Howard's assumption of command was greeted with an incident as serious as that at Anping in what it portended—a well planned raid on the Division Ammunition Supply Point at Hsin Ho six miles northwest of Tangku. The supply point was laid out along the edge of a large oval almost two miles across on its long axis and just over a mile wide on the short; the area enclosed was marshy ground. A barbed wire fence, a motor road, and eight sentry towers ringed the oval; the ammunition was disposed in tented piles between the towers. During the summer of 1946, this ammunition supply seemed an irresistible lure to many individuals and small groups which attempted to steal from it. Sentries were frequently fired

⁸ General Officer Biographies (SubjFile, HistBr, HQMC).

⁹ *North China Marine* (Tientsin), 28Sep46, p. 1.

upon and their return fire drove off several raiding parties bent on getting at the contents of the tents inside the barbed wire. The last such incident happened on 4 September and then a lull occurred which set the stage for a determined effort by the Communists to make a sizeable haul.

At about 2200 on 3 October, a sentry at the ammunition point's Post 3, which was nearly a quarter of a mile from the guard house, discovered a large group of Chinese just outside the perimeter wire. When he approached to investigate, he was fired upon and, after an exchange of shots, ran to the sentry tower to call in an alarm. While he was phoning, a raiding group cut through the wire, entered one of the tents, and began carrying off ammunition boxes. The sentry's rifle fire failed to stop the thieves.

A strong covering party of the raiders, from positions in the fields adjoining the ammunition point, opened a heavy fire on a truck carrying men of the guard to the aid of the sentry. Before the Marines could reach Post 3, they were forced to dismount, take cover, and build up a firing line, while the remainder of the guard, 52 men in all, came up and joined the fight. Gradually the firing from the fields died away and when a reinforcement of 100 men of 1/5 from Tangku arrived at 2300 the Chinese had disappeared. Machine guns and mortars were set up and searching fire by flare light was delivered for several hours to discourage any repetition of the raid. At dawn the nearby fields were thoroughly searched; one dead and one wounded Communist soldier were found and 11

cases of rifle ammunition and grenades were recovered. An inventory showed 32 cases of pistol, carbine, and rifle ammunition were missing. Papers on the dead man and interrogation of the prisoner identified the raiding group as a 200-man company from the Road Protecting Battalion of the 53d Communist Regiment; the unit had come from an area about 35 miles north of Tangku in a day's hard marching.

The Communists withdrew as rapidly and as secretly as they had come. Aerial reconnaissance did not spot them or the donkey carts they had brought with them to carry away the ammunition. The raid was well planned, well executed, and but for the prompt reaction of the Marine guards might have been even more successful. The strengthened security precautions taken at Hsin Ho as a natural result of the raid did not discourage the Communists from attempting further attacks, but they helped delay a return engagement until spring.

WITHDRAWAL FROM HOPEH¹⁰

Almost as the last shots were dying away at Hsin Ho, General Marshall was reporting to President Truman that he felt he could no longer be useful in China as a mediator. Neither side was willing

¹⁰ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from 1st MarDiv WarDs, Oct46-Jun47; 1st MAW WarDs, Oct46-Jun47; Raid on DivAmmoPt at Hsin Ho, 5Apr47, encl A to 1st MarDiv G-2 PeriodicRpt No. 52, dtd 8Apr47; *U. S. Relations with China; Military Situation in the Far East*; Harry S. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope—Memoirs*, v. II (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956).

to honor its truce agreement nor to make any concessions which would materially weaken its position. The fires of hatred fanned by years of bitter civil strife could not be quenched by negotiations. An American reporter categorizing the attitude of the Communists and the Nationalists at this time aptly summed up the situation: "Each side is convinced of the insincerity of the other. Each side is convinced that the enemy aims only at its destruction. And each side is right."¹¹

Unwilling to admit failure whenever the barest glimmer of hope for peace remained, Marshall continued to try to bring the two sides together during the remainder of the year. His efforts were fruitless. Finally, on 3 January 1947, President Truman directed Marshall's recall for consultation and on the 7th, as the general was preparing to leave China, announced Marshall's nomination as the next Secretary of State. In evaluating the Marshall mission, the President commented:

... it is important to bear in mind that even before he left for China there already existed a formal agreement in writing between the Central Government and the Communists to work toward national unity. This is the agreement that was brought about previously with the assistance of Ambassador Hurley when he headed our diplomatic mission to China, and had this not already been in existence I would not have sent Marshall to China.¹²

General Marshall issued a strongly worded personal statement as he left

China which outlined his views on the reason for failure of the negotiations leading toward peace and coalition government. On the Nationalist side he laid most of the blame on a "dominant group of reactionaries" in the Kuomintang who believed "that cooperation by the Chinese Communist Party in the government was inconceivable and that only a policy of force could definitely settle the issue."¹³ While he recognized the existence of an even more powerful and doctrinaire group among the Communist leaders who would not compromise their views, Marshall stated that he considered that there was "a definite liberal group among the Communists, especially of young men who have turned to the Communists in disgust at the corruption evident in the local governments—men who could put the interests of the Chinese people above ruthless measures to establish a Communist ideology in the immediate future."¹⁴

The American representative recognized, however, that many knowledgeable people disagreed entirely with his thesis, holding that Communist party discipline was so rigid that it could not condone the existence of divergent viewpoints. Marshall advocated as a solution to the China crisis the assumption of leadership by liberals in the Central Government and in independent minority parties. In the context of his remarks, it is apparent that he had few illusions that what he recommended would occur.

¹¹ Harold J. Noble, "Should We Pull Out of China," *The Saturday Evening Post*, v. 205, no. 13 (28Sep46), p. 19.

¹² Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

¹³ Quoted in *U. S. Relations with China*, p. 687.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

While American efforts to bring about peace in China were reaching a final peak of frustration and disappointment, the role of the Marines was undergoing a sharp reappraisal. The mission of assistance and support to American-sponsored activities of Executive Headquarters was the prime reason for the continued presence of the 1st Marine Division in North China. As it became increasingly apparent that a complete collapse of truce negotiations was in the offing, plans were laid for the withdrawal of all Marine units from Hopeh. Guam, which was being developed as the principal forward base of FMFPac, was originally designated the redeployment point for the entire division, but later plans provided for gradual reduction of forces with some outfits slated for Guam, others for the west coast, and a few aviation units headed for Hawaii. The first major move was ordered from Washington and called for the return of the 7th Marines (Reinforced) directly to the States.¹⁵

A division operation plan incorporating this decision was issued on 2 December. All troops were scheduled to ship out from Chinwangtao. Before the month's end, the 7th Marines was directed to disband the reinforcing companies of the division service and support battalions which had been attached to it during most of the China tour of duty. Those men eligible for return on the basis of their time overseas were incorporated in the regiment's ranks; recent replacements were transferred

to units remaining in China. Two artillery battalions, 3/11 and 4/11, and VMO-6 were attached to the regiment for the return voyage. A small rear echelon was charged with the responsibility for disposing of all U. S. property in the Chinwangtao-Peitaiho area. To provide security while American troops and supplies were being shipped from Chinwangtao, a guard detachment of two companies from 1/1 was sent to the KMA port town on 28 December. The 7th Marines embarked and sailed on 5 January, reporting to FMFPac for operational and administrative control.

Sailing with the regiment but bound for Ewa on Oahu was the ground echelon of VMF(N)-533. In December, the flight echelon of the squadron had flown its night fighters to Guam via Shanghai, Okinawa, and Iwo Jima; from Guam the planes were shipped the rest of the way to Ewa. Eleven days after the VMF(N)-533 aircraft staged through Okinawa, the Corsairs of VMF-115 were flown to the island to pick up the carrier *Tarawa* as a transport to Ewa. This cut in MAG-24 strength was ordered on 23 December as a part of a further reduction of Marine Forces, China, which saw the departure of the remaining units of the 11th Marines for Guam.

Heavy icing conditions at Taku Bar and in the Hai River made it necessary to use Chinwangtao as the shipping point for troops ordered out on 23 December also. The 1st Tank Battalion, less Company B which remained attached to the 1st Marines and Company C which had been disbanded by the 7th Marines, left for Guam with the division artillery regiment on 18 January. The

¹⁵ Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift ltr to Maj-Gen Samuel L. Howard, dtd 29Nov46 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQMC).

ground echelon of VMF-115 sailed at the same time for Ewa.

For a short while in December, Marine combat units were leaving China as Army dependents arrived. General Marshall had approved the sending out of the wives and children of personnel attached to Executive Headquarters before the truce reached its final stages of disintegration. As a result, dependents began arriving at Tangku in August and were escorted to Peiping by Marine train guards and covering flights of OYs. A sizeable shipload arrived on 14 November, but the situation was such that many of these people were sent home on 23 December when another dependent ship arrived. Thereafter the civilian traffic was all one way—homebound. Many dependents bound for Peiping never got off the ships they arrived in.

Some Marine officers and senior NCOs who were normally entitled to have their dependents with them at peacetime overseas stations were quite anxious to have their families join them in China. When the matter was first seriously considered in the summer of 1946 after the Navy had approved the idea in principle,¹⁶ General Rockey recommended strongly against its adoption for forces in Hopeh. Aside from the obvious danger from Communist action, he felt that the personnel and military situation was too fluid, that suitable housing was not available, and that there was a significant danger to the health of women and children exposed to a wealth of strange

diseases.¹⁷ Before he left China, however, Rockey endorsed the idea of sending Marine dependents to Tsingtao since its geographic situation permitted quick evacuation and close-in naval support, while the health and housing picture was considerably better than it was in Tientsin and Peiping.¹⁸ On 29 November, the Commandant wrote to General Howard that he was ready to recommend to the Secretary of the Navy that dependents be sent out to China as soon as the troop list was firm.¹⁹ Marine families actually began arriving at Tsingtao in late fall, following by several months the arrival of the first dependents of Navy men stationed at the port.

The Department of State made its formal announcement of the end of American participation in the activities of Executive Headquarters on 29 January. The stay of the 1st Division units in Hopeh was tied to the evacuation of American personnel and property from Peiping. In a new operation order issued on 3 February, the division was directed to provide tactical and logistical support to the Army's Peiping-based forces until their withdrawal was completed and at the same time to finish preparations for its own departure from China. The 1st Marines in Tientsin and the 5th in Peiping and Tangku were ordered to provide train guards, rescue parties, and motor convoys as needed in addition to routine security detachments. One battalion of the 1st Marines was to be ready to fly to Shanghai on six hour's notice, a requirement which reflected the fact

¹⁷ *Rockey comments.*

¹⁸ *Rockey interview*, 14-15 Apr 59.

¹⁹ Vandegrift ltr to Howard, dtd 29 Nov 46, *op. cit.*

¹⁶ CNO disp to CinCPac, dtd 1 Jun 45 in CinCPac WarD, Jun 46, encl (B) (OAB, NHD).

that the few Army and Navy units left in the central Chinese city were not organized or equipped to protect American lives and property.

Training was the keynote of China duty for the ground elements of General Howard's command during the waning months of the Marines' stay in Hopeh. Between the fall of 1946 and the spring of 1947, there was a steady but slow rise in the reported combat efficiency of the various elements of the division, but the lack of opportunity for large unit maneuvers and amphibious practice put an effective ceiling on efficiency ratings. By April only the medical and motor transport battalions, whose duties were roughly the same in war and in peace, reported percentages of combat efficiency as high as 75 percent; the remainder of the division hovered around the 50 percent mark and the infantry regiments hung at 40 percent.²⁰

The situation in the 1st Wing was somewhat better since the pilots were able to maintain flying proficiency. The requirements for patrol flights were sharply curtailed, however, by the fold-up of Executive Headquarters and the consolidation of Marine positions. In December, VMF-211 got in three weeks of gunnery practice over the sea off Tsingtao while it was temporarily based at Tsangkou Field, but in general fighter pilots had little opportunity for combat training. As far as the crews of VMR-153 were concerned, there was no discernible letup in the heavy schedule of

operations that they had met since the transport planes first reached North China. In late February, at Seventh Fleet order, the squadron began dropping UNRRA supplies, mainly clothing and medical items, in Communist territory in western Hopeh.²¹ By 27 March when this mission ended, three-quarters of a million pounds of relief supplies had been air dropped.

Marine transports were sent to Tsinan on 3 March to evacuate 17 American and foreign civilians threatened by fighting between CNA and Communist troops. This particular type of rescue mission was to become more and more a part of the VMR-153 routine as its stay in China continued and the civil war situation grew less and less favorable to the Nationalists. The decision as to what aviation units were to remain in China after the withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) had been made in Washington by March and the ubiquitous transport squadron headed the slim list of units scheduled to base at Tsangkou where a new command, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific (AirFMFWesPac), was to be organized.

Colonel John N. Hart, the chief of staff of the wing, was assigned duties as commanding officer of the new organization which was to be a part of

²⁰ CG, 1st MarDiv serial O1A12647 to CG, FMFPac, dtd 5May47, Subj: ReadinessRpt of FMF, (Ground) Units (Unit HistRpt File, HistBr, HQMC).

²¹ The Seventh Fleet commander noted that these supplies were arranged for by negotiations at Nanking between Communist, Nationalist, and U. S. representatives. They were intended for "relieving nonmilitary inhabitants, non-Communist inhabitants in dire straits." Admiral Cooke stated that "it was later found that the Chinese Communist Army appropriated and put to its own use all the medical supplies. . . ." *Cooke ltr.*

the over-all Marine command to be activated at Tsingtao—FMFWesPac. The wing issued the operation order for the withdrawal of its units on 25 March as a preliminary part of the 1st Division's similar inclusive plan which was published on 1 April. In addition to VMR-153, one fighter squadron (VMF-211), a headquarters squadron (formed from the wing service squadron), and the air base detachment already at Tsangkou were included in Hart's command. The pilots of VMF-218 began flying their ships to Shanghai via Tsingtao on 26 March and completed a further move to Okinawa by the 30th. From Okinawa the Corsairs picked up a carrier for transport to Guam.

Guam was to be the next base for the wing and for MAG-24, and the planes and men of the headquarters and service squadrons moved to the Marianas in April. The advance CPs of the wing and group opened on Guam on the 24th. The rear echelon of MAG-24 closed out all Marine facilities at South Field by 9 May and headed for Guam; with its departure all scheduled flights to Peiping ceased. While the 1st Marine Division remained in China, a few transports of VMR-153 and six fighters of VMF-211 remained at Changkeichuang Field, which was serviced by an air base detachment. Regular flight operations from the field did not end until 19 June.

The final plan for the withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division ground elements was preceded by several minor moves which anticipated the deployment ordered on 1 April as had the 1st MAW plan. On 10 March, Company B of the 1st Pioneer Battalion was sent to Guam to assist in camp construction activities

for the 1st Brigade which was slated to be based on the island. Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, who had relieved General Noble as ADC at the turn of the year, was the commander designate of the new unit.²² On the 17th, Company E of 2/1 was ordered to Tsingtao to augment 3/4 so that the reinforced battalion could relieve all seamen guards at naval installations. At the same time the 1st Reconnaissance Company was sent to Chinwangtao to relieve the one 1st Marines company still on duty with the guard detachment at the port.

Essentially, the division's withdrawal plan, which was to take effect on the departure of the last elements of the Army's headquarters group from Peiping, divided the division into four detachments. The Marine ground units detailed to FMFWesPac included the 1st Marines, less its Weapons Company and 1/1, and company-sized attachments from the division's headquarters, service, engineer, medical, and motor transport battalions. Similar attachments of division supporting troops were added to the 5th Marines which was scheduled for Guam as the infantry component of the 1st Brigade. The headquarters companies of FMFWesPac and of the 1st Brigade were to be formed by redesignating the Headquarters and Service Companies of the 1st and 5th Marines. A rear echelon consisting of the 7th Service Regiment and 1/1 was directed to dispose of all U. S. property in the area occupied by Marines before withdrawing. All remaining elements of the divi-

²² Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift ltr to LtGen Allen H. Turnage, dtd 12Feb47 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQMC).

sion were ordered to Camp Pendleton to join units then stationed there and to rebuild others to form a new 1st Marine Division.

During this period when the division withdrawal plan was just getting underway, the Communists made their most punishing attack against the Marines. Again the ammunition point at Hsin Ho was the target, and by all indications the raiding force was the same one that had hit the point in October. (See Map 36.) Ironically, the Marine guards were close to the end of their task when the Communists struck. The 7th Service Regiment had nearly finished the process of separating the serviceable ammunition from the stocks and shipping it out of China. Much of what remained was useable but unstable or in poor condition. Although no decision had been made as yet to turn over this ammunition residue to the Nationalists,²³ the prospect that this might be done was obvious and may have triggered the attack.


Following the October raid, the layout of the supply point had been altered from an oval to a more regular triangular shape, with the long axis toward the north. The ammunition was grouped in eight dump areas along the triangle's legs, a pair two miles in length and a shorter side a little over a mile long. At the northern apex, the point most distant from the guardhouse, was a two-man sentry post. Several other fixed posts were placed at strategic points along the perimeter and jeep patrols checked the open stretches between. The

security system was adequate to discourage thievery and to hold off the attacks of small raiding groups until reinforcements could arrive from Tangku, but it was not designed to cope with an attack by a force estimated at 350 well-armed men.

At about 0115 on 5 April, a bugle call sounded from the fields adjacent to the northernmost sentry post and a fusillade of rifle and machine gun fire burst out of the night directed at the Marines. The two sentries returned the Communist fire for about 10 minutes before they were killed. Two separate bodies of raiders then penetrated the northern dump, their action evidently a diversion for a stronger and heavier attack which took place farther down the eastern side of the ammunition point. The target of this attack was a dump area containing artillery and mortar ammunition and fuzes. The Communist fire emptied a patrol jeep, killing all three occupants, and drove back the other sentries as well as the men from the main guard coming to their rescue. Eight more Marines were wounded in the exchange of shots.

As soon as word was received in Tangku that the Hsin Ho point was under attack Company C of 1/5 was dispatched to the scene. The Communists were ready for them. At 0200, as the self-propelled 105mm howitzer leading the relief column reached a narrow point in the road near Hsin Ho, it was disabled by a land mine and blocked the way. Immediately, the Marine vehicles following, a jeep and two trucks crowded with men, were subjected to an intense fire coming from an irrigation ditch only 40 yards east of the road. Under cover of

²³ MajGen Samuel L. Howard statement of 30Apr47, in *North China Marine* (Tientsin), 3May47, p. 1.



MAP 36

T. L. RUSSELL

this fire, two waves of Communist soldiers rushed forward and threw grenades at the Marines who had taken cover behind the trucks and were firing back. The Communists, a group of 35-40 men, then pulled back to the ditch and kept up a brisk exchange for another 15 minutes before they were driven off. Eight more Marines were wounded in this well-planned ambush.

By this time the main body of the raiders was withdrawing, leaving behind six dead and taking an estimated 20-30 wounded with them. Tracks showed that six to eight carts and a number of pack animals carried full loads of ammunition out of the dump but no accurate count of what was lost could be taken since the Communists blew up the remnants of the piles they had stolen from. A rear guard composed of the raiders who had hit the northern dump area furnished covering fire until 0300 when the last of the Communists drew off. Again, as in the first Hsin Ho attack, the Communists got away undetected.

Heavy punitive columns from 1/5 and planes from VMO-3 and VMF-211 were on the trail at dawn but the only Communists sighted were those who had died in the attack. The raiders and their booty, ammunition and fuzes which could be made into mines, were able to reach a ferry across the Chin Chung River eight miles north of Hsin Ho and disappear on the other side into a maze of farming villages and fields.

The unsatisfactory ending of the second Hsin Ho attack was a grim reminder of the handicaps under which the Marines operated in North China. The initiative rested with the Communists, who

attacked when and where they pleased, secure in the knowledge that once they struck and ran they were safe from effective reprisal hidden among the thousands of villagers within a short distance of any Marine post.

As a matter of expediency, before the month of April was out the ammunition point was being guarded by Nationalist troops. The transfer had little element of formality; "it was more a walking away from the ammunition than a turnover."²⁴ Only a small detachment from 7th Service Regiment which was cleaning up the last stocks of serviceable ammunition remained at Hsin Ho and these men were withdrawn to Tientsin on 15 May.²⁵ At virtually the same time in Tsingtao, the Nationalists began acquiring similar stocks of American ammunition declared unserviceable by boards of survey. The ammunition was dumped in small quantities in revetments near Tsangkou Field after the local CNA commander was informed of the intention to do so. Naturally enough, the ammunition quickly disappeared.²⁶

Marine activities in Hopeh gradually shut down and centered in Tientsin as the division withdrew on schedule. The last motor convoy carrying 5th Marines gear cleared Peiping on 12 May, and on

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ 7th ServRgt WarD, May47.

²⁶ ComNavWesPac ltr serial 0002640-07 to CNO, dtd 16Sep47, Subj: Rpt of Ammo dumped by FMFWesPac at Tsingtao, China 19May-13Sep47 (ComNavWesPac File, FRC, Mech). The decision to dump the ammunition in this fashion was recommended by Admiral Cooke, and approved in Washington during a conference in early February 1947, which was attended by Admiral Cooke and Secretary of State Marshall. *Cooke ltr.*

the same date the regiment (less 1/5) sailed for Guam. On the 20th, the 1st Marines departed for Tsingtao, leaving 1/1 as the guard force for the rear echelon. The port of Tangku's garrison was secured when 7th Service Regiment withdrew its naval detachment, the successor to GroPac-13, to Tientsin, and 1/5 followed the rest of its regiment to Guam on the 24th. For a few days, the only Marines in Hopeh stationed outside of Tientsin were at Chinwangtao, but Communist attacks on the railroad at that port soon prompted their withdrawal.

The Communist drive on Chinwangtao was in sufficient strength to threaten the CNA perimeter positions, and Nationalist gunboats fired over the Marine camp on one occasion to beat back attacks on the railroad.²⁷ Between 22-24 May, 79 U. S. and European civilians were evacuated from Peitaiho by Marine OYs and Navy landing craft. On the 26th, the Marine guard detachment, the 1st Pioneer Battalion which had taken post in late April to relieve the reconnaissance company, boarded LSMs and left for Tientsin. The Communist attack proved to be only the most serious of a long series of attempts to disrupt rail traffic in the vital corridor to Manchuria, and the Nationalists were able to retain their hold on Chinwangtao.

The remainder of the division shipped out for the States and Guam during the first weeks of June. The only threat to the orderly withdrawal procedure was a report received on the 18th that the Communists intended to attack Tangku. To counter this action, a rifle company at Tsingtao was alerted for airlift to

Tientsin to reinforce 1/1. The threat failed to materialize and the division headquarters battalion and attached units sailed for San Diego on 20 June. At midnight on the 19th, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick L. Wieseman, commanding the division rear echelon, reported by dispatch to the Commanding General, FMFWesPac, for operational control.

*FLEET SUPPORT*²⁸

The troop strength of Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific, was settled early in 1947 at an interdepartmental conference in Washington in line with the State Department view "that the number of United States armed forces ashore in China should be maintained at the minimum compatible with United States interests."²⁹ The command drew its name from the altered title of Seventh Fleet which had been redesignated Naval Forces, Western Pacific in January. Named to head FMFWesPac, which was activated on 1 May, was Brigadier General Omar T. Pfeiffer, who had served under Admiral Cooke as Fleet Marine and Planning Officer since January 1946.³⁰

The basic organization of General Pfeiffer's command included a force headquarters and service battalion, two infantry battalions, the 12th Service

²⁸ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: FMFWesPac WarDs, May-Aug47; AirFMFWesPac WarDs, May-Aug47; 7th ServRgt WarDs, May-Sep47; 12th ServBn WarDs, May-Aug47.

²⁹ SecState ltr to SecNav, dtd 23Jul47 (ComNavWesPac S-A-14 File, FRC, Mech).

³⁰ MajGen Omar T. Pfeiffer ltr to CMC, dtd 19Oct61.

²⁷ 1st MarDiv G-2 PeriodicRpt No. 59, dtd 27May47.

Battalion, and AirFMFWesPac. Its strength at the end of May after all its elements had joined was 279 officers and 3,747 enlisted men. Administratively, the air elements remained a part of 1st MAW with operational control resting with General Pfeiffer. In the case of the service battalion, the same situation applied although the phrasing vested "military command and coordination control" in FMFWesPac and retained "management and technical control" in Service Command, FMFPac.³¹

In the absence of a regular artillery unit, FMFWesPac was reinforced by enough officers and men to form the nucleus of a provisional artillery organization with two six-gun 105mm howitzer batteries. Five officers and 16 men were added to the force as a tactical headquarters, and one rifle company in each infantry battalion was augmented by 3 officers and 22 artillerymen. These reinforced companies were commanded by artillery majors with infantry captains as executive officers. The battalions were commanded by colonels with lieutenant colonels as executives.³²

FMFWesPac was ordered to continue the principal mission executed by 3/4 and its predecessors of furnishing security for American naval installations. In alternate months, each of the two infantry battalions was to furnish all the guard details needed for wharfs and warehouses, barracks and headquarters, and ammunition dumps and motor pools. One company, initially E of 2/1, was assigned to the air base guard for sev-

eral months at a time. The force's lone tank platoon was permanently stationed at the field as part of its defenses.

In addition to its guard duties, FMFWesPac had a mission of providing emergency protection for American lives and property in Tientsin, Nanking, and Shanghai. The three cities contained the majority of Americans in China on government business, aside from the sizeable contingent at Tsingtao. The protective requirement was temporary in nature as far as the 1,900-man division rear echelon at Tientsin was concerned; its planned departure date was set for the end of August. At the Chinese capitol of Nanking, there were 1,240 military and diplomatic personnel and their dependents and at Shanghai were another 1,700. Besides these official representatives, more than 4,500 American nationals were in China on private business and the number was steadily increasing.

Airlift was the means of accomplishing the quick reinforcement intended by FMFWesPac orders. The infantry company at Tsangkou had to have a rifle platoon ready at all times for lift on an hour's notice. One of VMR-153's R5C transports stood by on the same alert. On six hour's warning, all of 2/1 had to be prepared to lift from Tsangkou in the squadron's transports. In surprise practice alerts undertaken during the summer, the ready platoon was aloft in half an hour and seven plane loads of infantrymen were airborne in less than an hour. On the departure of 2/1, 3/4 was to undertake all security commitments, including those at the airfield, assisted by bluejackets trained in interior guard duty by the Marines.

³¹ 12th ServBn WarD, May47.

³² Encl (A) to CMC serial 03A5947, ca. 15Apr47 (ComNavWesPac A-1 File, FRC, Mech).

The addition of a second infantry battalion to the units at Tsingtao was made in part so that a realistic program of amphibious training could be scheduled. By alternating months of guard and training, both battalions were able to increase combat efficiency appreciably. All summer long, small unit practice for amphibious exercises planned for the fall was the daily routine of the battalion in training. An important adjunct of this improved program was the instruction given ships' landing forces in the tactics and techniques of land combat. One or two ships of Admiral Cooke's forces were detailed each month for this training which was conducted as a regular activity of FMFWesPac.

No amount of planning or training, however, could overcome Tsingtao's most serious deficiency as a site for amphibious exercises. There was no safe impact area for live firing in support and execution of a landing, and no room for maneuver ashore in the heavily cultivated countryside. Fields used by the Marines in cold weather for extended order training were denied them as soon as the spring thaws allowed crops to be planted. The city's food supply was too critical as a result of the Communist economic blockade to permit the leasing of arable land for troop use.

The problem of a suitable area for training did not plague the fighter squadron at Tsangkou as much as it did the ground units it was to support. In June, 17 pilots of VMF-211 went to Guam for ten days training in naval gunfire spotting techniques. While these men were gone, a like number of VMF-218 pilots from Guam took their place to maintain the state of readiness. The

sea off the port of Tsingtao was available as a firing range, and in mid-August VMF-211 was able to practice strafing and dive and glide bombing in attacks on a Japanese destroyer sailed to the area as a target. Later in the month, the squadron flew combat air patrol for fleet units maneuvering off Tsingtao.

Heavy weather dogging these exercises was responsible for the loss of three Corsairs. The pilots of two were recovered quickly, one from the sea and another from a friendly sector of the Tsingtao countryside; the third pilot was taken by the Communists when he landed out of gas on the south shore of Shantung Peninsula. His plane was sighted on 28 August, and a landing party sent ashore to destroy it and find the flyer exchanged fire with local Communists as it withdrew. Fifteen days later the pilot was returned unharmed, but only after lengthy negotiations, the submission of a letter explaining the incident from Admiral Cooke, and the payment of \$1,000 plus medical supplies as compensation for damages supposedly sustained by the Communists.³³

The status of VMR-153 as the odd-job and workhorse squadron of Marine air in China was not in any way changed by its assignment to AirFMFWesPac. Courier flights to Tientsin were made twice weekly after 20 June to expedite the withdrawal of the division rear echelon; Changkeichuang Field was manned by a liaison detail from 7th Service Regiment during landing and takeoff. Nanking and Shanghai were

³³ *Capture comments*, p. 6. Admiral Cooke commented that he directed that "there would be no ransom and no apologies" in the negotiations for the release of the flyer. *Cooke ltr.*

stopping points in a regular schedule of transport and cargo flights which maintained physical contact between the major American bases in China. The squadron continued to perform chores outside the common military pattern, and on 28–29 August it flew 218 Germans from Tsingtao, Canton, and Tientsin to Shanghai where they boarded a repatriation ship. The former enemy nationals were not wanted in China by the Central Government, and the U. S. State Department cooperated in arranging their transport.

August was the time of departure. General Pfeiffer completed his tour of overseas duty, having established FMFWesPac as a flourishing command. Brigadier General Gerald C. Thomas, the former Director of Plans and Policies, Headquarters Marine Corps, relieved him.³⁴ At the same time, Colonel Hart relinquished command of AirFMFWesPac to Colonel Frank H. Lamson-Scribner. The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, at Tientsin mounted out for the States on 27 August, its destination Camp Pendleton and the 1st Marine Division. The remainder of the rear echelon, its task completed, boarded ship by 30 August and sailed for Guam. On 12 September, Lieutenant Colonel Wieseman reported with 7th Service Regiment to the 1st Brigade and at the end of the month the regiment was officially disbanded.

The withdrawal of these Marine units from Hopeh marked the end of 25 months of difficult, sometimes hectic service. Tsingtao now became the focus of attention, but duty in the Shantung

port continued to have a different aspect than that which prevailed in the north. In many senses, during the remainder of its existence FMFWesPac repeated Marine history. Its actions paralleled those performed by the expeditionary and garrison forces in the China of the prewar era. As an arm of the fleet ashore, it provided security for American nationals in danger when the civil war's tide turned overwhelmingly against the Nationalists.

A LOSING CAUSE³⁵

By the summer of 1947, the Communists had their Nationalist opponents dead in their sights. A mounting series of offensives in Manchuria cut off and annihilated or captured CNA outpost garrisons. Lines of communication between major cities were severed and permanently blocked. In less than six months the Nationalists were effectively isolated in several large garrison areas. In order to shake loose from Communist nooses which were slowly tightening, the Nationalists had either to reinforce their armies strongly and take the offensive or to consolidate positions quickly to conserve men. They did neither.

The weak reinforcements sent were dissipated ineffectually, and hundreds of thousands of men were tied to the defenses of cities whose retention added little or nothing to Nationalist military or economic strength. It was evident that few leaders in Nanking appreci-

³⁴ General Officer Biographies (SubjFile, HistBr, HQMC).

³⁵ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *U. S. Relations with China*; Liu, *Military History of China*; Wedemeyer, *Reports*; Rigg, *Red China's Hordes*.

ated the truth of the Communist battle philosophy espoused by one of Mao Tse-tung's commanders: "When you keep men and lose land, the land can be re-taken; If you keep land and lose soldiers, you lose both."³⁶

Vividly illustrative of the Communist viewpoint was their reaction to a CNA drive to capture the Red capital at Yen-an. Rather than tie themselves to position defenses, Mao Tse-tung's forces faded before the advance and let the Nationalists take the remote Shensi city. The victors then were exposed at the end of a long and vulnerable supply line and became besieged instead of besiegers. Similarly, Nationalist advances in Hopeh and Shantung, which included the capture of Chefoo in October, were hollow successes. The attack objectives were cities, not soldiers, and the attacking forces soon settled into a sit-tight defensive pattern to protect their prizes and withered as fighting units.

The deterioration of Nationalist morale was compounded of many factors. American military observers noted a significant loss of popular support for the Nationalists among the war-wearied people, and Chiang's soldiers in return evidenced little regard for the natives of Manchuria and North China. Many of the men in the CNA ranks were from southern and central provinces and had not seen their homes or families for years; there was no rotation plan for veterans. Inflation robbed the soldier's meager pay of any value, and

an incredibly inept supply system often left him on short rations, with ailing equipment, and too little ammunition. To top the dismal picture, the military hierarchy in Nanking kept changing senior field commanders; the rate of turnover was high early in 1947 and soared higher as reverses mounted. In all save a few cases, proven combat leadership was subordinated to political considerations in making appointments.

The situation was so black that American leaders were in a quandary as to just what their future policy toward China should be. In May 1946, General Marshall had determined that the Communists and Nationalists were not co-operating to establish peace and a coalition government as they had promised, and he had been instrumental in imposing an embargo on U. S. arms shipments to the Central Government. This cut-off of munitions supply to the Nationalists lasted a year and the results were felt sharply in the fighting in the latter part of 1947. The 6,500 tons of ammunition turned over to the CNA by the Marines at Hsin Ho and Tsingtao between April and September was a helpful measure, but little more than a stopgap. The Communists, aided by the huge quantities of Japanese munitions handed over to them by the Soviets and by their own increasing captures of Nationalist weapons and ammunition, fared better on the arms supply front than their adversaries.

In July, at the request of President Truman and Secretary Marshall, General Wedemeyer headed a special mission to China to investigate and report

³⁶ Gen Liu Po-cheng, CG, Second Communist FldA, quoted in Rigg, *Red China's Hordes*, p. 31.

on the situation as he found it.³⁷ He was asked to advise on what aid measures might be taken to bolster the Central Government and what would be the consequences if no assistance was given. For a month members of the mission visited China's major cities and talked with many prominent persons both in and out of Government. The report of the detailed survey and its conclusions were presented to the President on 19 September.

In his report, General Wedemeyer severely criticized the Central Government and its conduct of political, economic, and military affairs. He pointed out, however, that the U. S. had little choice but to support the Nationalists, since the Chinese Communists were furthering the aims of the Soviet Union in the Far East, and these aims were diametrically opposed to those of the United States and jeopardized its strategic security. Although Wedemeyer made a number of specific recommendations designed to remedy the situation, including increased American economic assistance and the institution of a United Nations-sponsored trusteeship of Manchuria, the crux of his feelings was summed up in an extract from the report's conclusions:

The only working basis on which national Chinese resistance to Soviet aims

³⁷ When he was in Washington in February 1947, Admiral Cooke, in a meeting with President Truman, had proposed that "a commission composed of eminent members of high prestige, in the political field, the economic field, and the military field, be sent to China in the immediate future, and thoroughly explore the situation and make recommendation to the U. S. Government of what should be done." *Cooke ltr.*

can be revitalized is through the presently corrupt, reactionary and inefficient Chinese National Government.

The National Government is incapable of supporting an army of the size it now has in the field.

In order to preclude defeat by Communist forces, it is necessary to give the National Government sufficient and prompt military assistance under the supervision of American advisors in specified military fields.

American military aid to China should be moral, material, and advisory. It should be an integrated part of our world wide policy of military assistance to certain nations.³⁸

The Wedemeyer report was not made public after its presentation and the tone of urgency its recommendations contained was not translated into immediate action. Although Congress subsequently increased American economic and military aid and the military advisory groups in China were strengthened, the pace of this support did not match that at which the Nationalist fortunes declined.

The confused military picture at this critical point in the civil war was best explained by the man most responsible for its being—Mao Tse-tung. In a speech to his principal subordinates on 25 December 1947, the Communist leader laid out a ten-point path of conquest, a primer for the warfare that had gone before and the battles to come:

(1). First strike scattered and isolated groups of the enemy, and later strike concentrated, powerful groups.

(2). First take the small and middle-sized towns and cities and the broad countryside, and later take big cities.

³⁸ Quoted in *U. S. Relations with China*, pp. 813-814.

(3). The major objective is the annihilation of the enemy fighting strength, and not the holding or taking of cities and places. The holding or taking of cities and places is the result of the annihilation of the enemies fighting strength, which often has to be repeated many times before they can be finally held or taken.

(4). In every battle, concentrate absolutely superior forces—double, triple, quadruple, and sometimes even five and six times those of the enemy—to encircle the enemy on all sides, and strive for his annihilation, with none escaping from the net. Under specific conditions, adopt the method of dealing the enemy smashing blows, that is, the concentration of all forces to strike the enemy's center and one or both of the enemy's flanks, aiming at the destruction of a part of the enemy and the routing of another part so that our troops can swiftly transfer forces to smash another enemy group. Avoid battle of attrition in which gains are not sufficient to make up for the losses, or in which the gains merely balance the losses. Thus we are inferior taken as a whole—numerically speaking—but our absolute superiority in every section and in every specific campaign guarantees the victory of each campaign. As time goes by we will become superior, taken as a whole, until the enemy is totally destroyed.

(5). Fight no unprepared engagements; fight no engagements in which there is no assurance of victory. Strive for victory in every engagement; be sure of the relative conditions of our forces and those of the enemy.

(6). Promote and exemplify valor in combat; fear no sacrifice or fatigue or continuous action—that is, fighting several engagements in succession within a short period without respite.

(7). Strive to destroy the enemy while in movement. At the same time emphasize

the tactics of attacking positions, wrestling strong points and bases from the enemy.

(8). With regard to assaults on cities, resolutely wrest from the enemy all strong points and cities which are weakly defended. At favorable opportunities, wrest all enemy strong points and cities which are defended to a medium degree and where the circumstances permit. Wait until the conditions mature, and then wrest all enemy strong points and cities that are powerfully defended.

(9). Replenish ourselves by the capture of all enemy arms and most of his personnel. The sources of men and material for our army is mainly at the front.

(10). Skillfully utilize the intervals between two campaigns for resting, regrouping and training troops. The period of rest and regrouping should be in general not too long. As far as possible do not let the enemy have breathing space.³⁹

The complete Nationalist defeat pre-
saged by Mao's pronouncement was
more than a year and a half in the mak-
ing. During that time, the American
private and public stake in mainland
China was wiped out, and the principal
concern of U. S. officials became the
safety of American nationals. The
primary mission of Naval Forces,
Western Pacific in support of national
policy eventually became the evacuation
and protection during evacuation of
Americans ordered from China.

³⁹ Mao Tse-tung, *Turning Point in China* (New York: New Century, 1948), p. 3, quoted in Liu, *Military History of China*; Quoted from the original press release of 1Jan48 in Rigg, *Red China's Hordes*, pp. 180-181. The two translations vary but not significantly; that in Liu has been used.

Withdrawal

STATE OF READINESS¹

For FMFWesPac, autumn of 1947 brought the harvest of a summer's hard training. On 30 September, BLT 2/1 made a full-scale landing near Tsingtao with simulated naval gunfire support and the overhead cover and dry-run bombing and strafing of VMF-211. In October, a battalion landing team built around 3/4 (newly redesignated the 3d Marines) completed a month-long course of ashore and afloat amphibious exercises with a similar landing. After this final phase of training for 1947 was completed, the Marine garrison settled down to a winter routine of guard duty and a renewal of the familiar pattern of training by progressive stages to maintain the amphibious competence of veterans and replacements.

The new 3d Marines, and its companion, the 1st Marines formed from 2/1, reflected the reorganization of FMFWesPac under new Marine Corps-wide ground tables of organization which eliminated the infantry regimental level in brigade and division

and assigned the regimental titles to battalion-sized units. At the same time, the battalion level was done away with in division artillery regiments and batteries were grouped under regiment. The intent of the new setup was to provide the larger FMF commands with a flexible number of hard-hitting units patterned on the battalion landing teams of World War II. The new organizational theory found its principal impetus in the attempts of the Marine Corps to field the most fighting men it could garner despite severe budgetary pruning of its strength.²

Within FMFWesPac the number of changes made were relatively few. The artillery augmentation of both the 1st and 3d Marines was withdrawn to pare those organizations to the T/Os common to all FMF infantry battalions. A skeleton artillery headquarters was retained within the force headquarters and service battalion primarily for training purposes. In emergencies, the gunners needed to man the 105mm howitzers which were kept in Tsingtao would have to be flown or shipped in. Most reinforcing units of General Thomas' command were redesignated as elements of parent organizations in the 1st Marine Division, although administrative and operational control remained with FMFWesPac. The 12th Service Battalion was reorganized ac-

¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: ComNavWesPac Semi-annual Summary of NavForWesPac, 1Apr-30Sep48, dtd 22Oct48 (ComNavWesPac A-9 File, FRC, Mech); FMFWesPac WarDs, Sep47-Feb48; FMFWesPac G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, and Air S-3 Rpts, Mar48 (S&C Files, HQMC), hereafter *FMFWesPac StfRpts*; and following appropriate months, Apr-Jun48; *Capture comments*.

² "The New FMF," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 31, no. 5 (May47), pp. 10-15.

cording to a new logistical concept that gave units of Service Command, FMF-Pac, with headquarters in Hawaii, the direct support role once assigned organic service battalions which were dropped from division and brigade organizations.³

Emplaced behind a cordon of Nationalist defenses, the Marines in Tsingtao had few contacts with the Communists who held the Shantung countryside. Those that did occur were uniformly unpleasant. Continuing the practice begun in 1945 of holding the men who unwittingly fell into the their hands, the Communists seized five Marines of a hunting party which had blundered through Nationalist lines on Christmas Day in 1947. One Marine died of wounds received in the unprovoked outburst of fire which preceded the capture. For three months the Communists kept moving and interrogating the men, feeding them English language propaganda, and trying unsuccessfully to convince them of American responsibility for the civil war. The Communists finally released the Marines on 1 April, having failed also in their purpose of getting the men to mouth the lie that "high ranking officers sent them into 'liberated areas' to make an incident."⁴

Only four days after these Marines were returned, the four-man crew of an R5D of VMR-153 was taken. The plane's engines failed as it was circling to land at Tsangkou, and it crashed on the mud flats lining the western shore

of Kiaochow Bay. Communist troops immediately hustled the crew out of sight, and the first Marine search plane which scouted the wreck was fired upon. For a month the Communists denied knowledge of the whereabouts of the Marines while planes of AirFMFWes-Pac dropped clothing, food, and medical supplies in Communist territory intended for the captives. When the Communists finally admitted that they held the flyers, they stalled negotiations for their release interminably, and the men were not returned to Tsingtao until 1 July.

The seizure of the hunting party resulted in a firm check on Marine excursions beyond the limits of Tsingtao and the American installations at Tsangkou Field. There was no way, however, of lessening the exposure of Marine flyers to capture so long as there were missions to be flown over Communist territory with the chance of operational failures. The need for such missions continued in 1948, and the land over which the Marine pilots flew increasingly showed the red banners of Mao Tse-tung's armies. In early February, as a result of the imminent capture of Changchun in Manchuria by Communist forces, VMR-153 transports evacuated American and British consular officials, missionaries, and foreign nationals from the city. Later in the month, the Marine planes flew in supplies for the U. S. Consulate in besieged Mukden. This supply lift was repeated in April as a skeleton U. S. consular staff kept a death watch within the Nationalist stronghold.

In view of the worsening civil war situation, the new Commander, Naval

³ *Ibid.*; 12th ServBn WarD, Oct47.

⁴ Interrogation of four Marines, dtd 1Apr48, encl A to CG, FMFWesPac ltr to CNO, dtd 28May48 (S&C Files, HQMC, FRC, Alex).

Forces, Western Pacific, Vice Admiral Oscar C. Badger (who had relieved Admiral Cooke in February) ordered General Thomas to have his command ready to mount out on 30 days' notice. Initially, in a plan published on 3 April, FMFWesPac contemplated leaving a small service contingent to secure and maintain the supplies not loaded in the allotted time. By June, an Inspector General's review of this decision noted that the economic situation of Tsingtao's beleaguered populace was so desperate that "hungry Chinese hordes would sweep over any such remaining force as this. Supplies and installations would melt away instantly."⁵ FMFPac added a comment that if redeployment orders were given, the evacuation of men and materiel would be complete, and General Thomas noted that with 30 days' warning, adequate shipping, and Chinese labor, he could clear all Marine supplies and equipment from Tsingtao.⁶

While the alert for possible evacuation existed and plans were made for that eventuality, the Marine garrison life in Tsingtao went on much as usual. To complete the winter's training, all companies of the 1st and 3d Marines were air lifted in practice deployment problems, and in June the battalions each made two landings in conjunction with Admiral Badger's amphibious forces. As Communist troops moved in strength into northern and central provinces in the summer of 1948 the danger to Americans in China increased gravely. The Marines embarked on a

new cycle of combat training in July and stood by ready to move as the situation required.

STATE DEPARTMENT WARNINGS⁷

Admiral Badger assigned General Thomas the responsibility for evacuation of Americans from North China. The FMFWesPac staff prepared plans to cover the withdrawal of their fellow countrymen from Tientsin and Peiping as well as Tsingtao. In the latter city, Thomas was given military command and coordination control of all Navy and Marine shore activities. When the expected official warning to American civilians to get out was issued, the Marines, working closely with local U. S. consulates, were prepared to move swiftly to facilitate the withdrawal. The amount of water lift and naval support necessary to accomplish the evacuation was determined by FMFWesPac and the plans were kept current to match the shifting political and military situation.⁸

In the Yangtze Valley, the only other area of China where large numbers of Americans were present, the overall responsibility for evacuation rested with Rear Admiral Frederick I.

⁷ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: U. S. Dept of State record groups on China, Lot F79-830 U. S. Marines 1948 and Lot 55F174, Box 2-300 Evacuation, General (Dept of State RecCen); FMFWesPac StaffRpts, Jul-Dec48; U. S. Department of State Bulletin No. 496, v. 20, no. 1 (2Jan49), pp. 28-29, hereafter *State Bul* 496.

⁸ IG memo to CMC, dtd 13Jul48, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.

⁵ IG memo to CMC, dtd 13Jul48, Subj: Ability of FMFWesPac to carry out assigned mission (S&C Files, HQMC, FRC, Alex), p. 4.

⁶ *Ibid.*

Entwistle, Commander, Amphibious Forces, Western Pacific. Under Entwistle, the Director, Ground Division, Army Advisory Group, Nanking, and the Commander, Naval Port Facilities, Shanghai, were charged with planning and directing evacuation procedures in their respective regions. Missionaries, teachers, and businessmen in outlying sectors who wished to leave would be collected by air or whatever means possible and funnelled through the two cities toward ships bound for safe ports. Principal reliance for security forces under this plan was placed on Marine combat units detailed from Tsingtao or Guam with reinforcements provided by ships' landing parties, many of them trained by FMFWesPac.⁹

Naval authorities realized that the ground forces available to them were not strong enough to protect the widespread properties of Americans during the rioting and disorder that might accompany Communist attacks on major cities. The decision was made early in the summer, and was implicit in all plans prepared after July, that security forces would concentrate on safeguarding the lives of U. S. nationals during evacuation. The possible demands on FMFWesPac to provide troops to assist simultaneous operations in North China and the Yangtze Valley made the reinforcement of General Thomas' command a wise and necessary move.

⁹ ComWesPacPhibFor OPlan No. 783, dtd 6Aug48 (OAB, NHD), Anxs A and B. Prior to the commencement of the evacuation, Admiral Entwistle was relieved on 1 December 1948 by Rear Admiral George C. Crawford. Gen Gerald C. Thomas ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 23Aug61.

In order to meet FMFWesPac's most pressing need for combat support, the personnel to man an artillery battery were requested from the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade on Guam. Initially, the artillerymen were held ready for airlift,¹⁰ but in October, Battery D of the 11th Marines shipped out from the island, landed at Tsingtao on the 17th, and moved directly to positions at Tsangkou Field to bolster Marine defenses. The arrival of the battery marked the first increase in the strength of FMFWesPac above the ceiling imposed at its formation by the State Department. Further minor increases in troop strength were authorized but never effected, for the swift march of events caught up with and passed this decision.¹¹

Preparations were made to dispatch a battalion landing team to Tsingtao from Guam in mid-October, either by air if an emergency warranted such a move, or by sea if it did not. Actually, the time in transit of the BLT would be less by sea than by air, since with the land transport planes then available the total airlift time would be 15½ days to move the 1,350 Marines and their half million pounds of equipment.¹² A simi-

¹⁰ PlansOff, NavForWesPac ltr to G-3, 1st ProvMarBrig, dtd 5Jul48, Subj: FMFWesPac OPlans (ComNavWesPac S-A16 File, FRC, Mech).

¹¹ CG, FMFPac speedltr to CG, FMFWesPac, dtd 22Oct48 (S&C Files, HQMC, FRC, Alex).

¹² Encls (A) and (B) to CinCPac serial 000138 to CNO and ComNavForWesPac, dtd 21Oct48, Subj: Reinforcement of FMFWesPac, Tsingtao with forces presently available to 1st ProvMarBrig, FMF (ComNavForWesPac TS File, FRC, Mech).

lar estimate of lift time made by Fleet Air Wing One on 15 November indicated that use of 24 large seaplanes stationed in the Marianas would only cut the span of time needed by two days.¹³ Unless the need for men was imperative enough to warrant piecemeal reinforcement, the best method of moving the BLT to China would be by ship.

The reason for the rush of preparations to bolster FMFWesPac was found in the successes of the Chinese Communists. On 24 September Mao's forces captured Tsinan, Shantung's capitol, and on 15 October the Red armies took Chinchow, the supply center for all CNA forces in Manchuria. In both instances, Nationalist relief columns made feeble attempts to rescue the besieged garrisons and were easily turned back by the triumphant Communists. Under the circumstances, the chance of the Nationalists holding their positions in Manchuria or in North China seemed slim, and Americans in China were advised to "consider the desirability of evacuation while normal transportation facilities were available."¹⁴

Between the 1st and 15th of November, the American Consulates and the Embassy issued this precautionary warning in all areas of China, and on the 11th, the Consul Generals at Peiping and Tientsin followed up with a statement:

In as much as later evacuation on an emergency basis may be impossible, American citizens who do not desire to remain in North China should plan to leave at

once by United States Naval vessel from Tientsin.¹⁵

By this time, all Marines had been transferred from Tientsin and Peiping, but a few returned to help process evacuees. A Marine officer with a rifle squad and five communications men flew to Tientsin from Tsingtao on the 14th; another officer and a communication detail reported to Peiping. These Marines assisted consulate personnel in loading out a landing ship and stayed until the 18th when the ship sailed. A similar detachment was sent to Tientsin for two days on the 25th to help evacuate other Americans who availed themselves of the naval lift.

The emergency condition activating plans to evacuate all U. S. nationals who wanted to leave China was set by Admiral Badger on 16 November as Ambassador John Leighton Stuart warned them to "plan at once to move to places of safety."¹⁶ Concurrently, the 1st Brigade on Guam ordered the 9th Marines, suitably reinforced as a BLT, to embark on the APA *Bayfield* for movement to Tsingtao and temporary duty with FMFWesPac. The battalion was directed to be prepared to remain on board ship for an indefinite period in readiness for combat operations ashore.¹⁷ On 28 November, BLT-9 sailed from Guam and reported by dispatch to Admiral Badger and General Thomas for orders.

While the Guam reinforcements were en route, the Marines at Tsingtao

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³ ComFAirWing One OPlan No. 4-48, dtd 15Nov48 (OAB, NHD).

¹⁴ *State Bul 496*, p. 28.

¹⁷ 1st ProvMarBrig (Reinf), FMF OpO No. 8-48, dtd 16Nov 48 (ComNavWesPac TS File, FRC, Mech).

moved swiftly to prepare for their own eventual withdrawal. The 2d Provisional Combat Service Group (Light), as 12th Service Battalion had been redesignated in July, began loading out supplies to reduce all force stocks to a 90-day level. Large working parties from the infantry battalion not on guard duty were furnished to expedite this process. Most Navy and Marine dependents left Tsingtao in November in advance of their bulky household effects which were crated for shipment on following cargo vessels. The remaining dependents left in the first days of December. While other American civilians in China could choose to remain or go despite their government's warning, military families had no option; they were ordered to places of safety. In like manner, American women employees of the Embassy and the dependents of diplomatic personnel were directed to leave.

The evacuation plans long in preparation worked smoothly. Some few foreign nationals, mainly dependents of diplomatic officials, were evacuated along with the Americans who were leaving. Between 1 November and 5 December, 1,316 persons left China, 751 by plane, mainly from Shanghai, and 560 by Navy and Army transports. By 20 December the figure had risen to 3,944, of which more than 1,500 were military dependents. In the process, North China had been virtually cleared of American civilians, with only a few businessmen and missionaries remaining as the responsibility of skeleton consulate staffs. Nanking was emptied of its many American military and economic advisory groups by early December, and

Shanghai, where approximately 2,500 American civilians remained, became the focal point of evacuation efforts.

Once the exodus from Nanking got underway, with most people leaving by air while a shuttle of Navy landing craft carried away military supplies and household goods, the city was nearly clear of potential evacuees by 17 November.¹⁸ On that date, at the request of Ambassador Stuart, a rifle platoon of the 3d Marines was sent from Tsingtao to the Nationalist capital to provide security for the American Embassy. The platoon travelled by APD, and the high-speed transport stayed at anchor in the Yangtze off Nanking as added insurance for the possible emergency evacuation of the Embassy staff. Stuart believed that the presence of the Marines would prevent lawless mobs from attempting to pillage the Embassy in the interim between Nationalist collapse and Communist takeover. The latter act seemed inevitable by November's end, and the ambassador felt that Chinese police could not be relied upon for adequate protection.

On the arrival of the 9th Marines at Tsingtao, one rifle company (A) and some of the landing team's reinforcing elements went ashore as a reserve while the remainder of the unit stayed on board the *Bayfield* ready for immediate use. On 5 December, Admiral Badger reported to the Chief of Naval Operations that the 9th was ready to move to Shanghai on order. After a discussion

¹⁸ CTF 78 ltr to ComNavWesPac, dtd 6Dec-48, Subj: Movement of Evacuees in Yangtze by U. S. Forces (ComNavWesPac A16-3 File, FRC, Mech).

of the situation with the American Consul General, and with Ambassador Stuart's approval, Badger reported:

Considerable conjecture and talk has already taken place regarding Marines in Shanghai. Their appearance now would cause little additional excitement inasmuch as they are needed to augment naval forces already there. Am ordering *Bayfield* with BLT-9 embarked, minus reserve units, proceed Shanghai ETA 16 Dec. . . .¹⁹

SHANGHAI STAND BY ²⁰

The last few weeks of 1948 witnessed the end of effective Nationalist resistance in Hopeh, and in January both Tientsin and Peiping fell easily into Communist hands. The precipitating factor in this defeat was attributed in later years to the arrival of a badly needed but defective shipment of weapons and equipment at Tangku on 29 November. The military gear, American surplus from depots in Japan, had been shipped in unopened crates just as it had been packed at the war's end; at its destination much of the materiel was found to be in poor condition or useless for lack of vital parts. Although immediate steps to correct de-

¹⁹ ComNavWesPac disp to CNO, dtd 20Dec-48 (S&C Files, HQMC, FRC, Alex).

²⁰ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: U. S. Dept of State record group Tsingtao ConGenIntelRpts 1949 (Dept of State RecCen); ComNavWesPac OpO No. 1-49, dtd 24Jan49 (OAB, NHD); *FMFWesPac StaffRpts* Dec48-Jan49; 3d Mar S-1 and S-3 PeriodicRpts, Feb49, dtd 1Mar49 (S&C Files, HQMC), hereafter *3d Mar StfRpts* with appropriate following months; Muster Rolls of the units concerned (Unit Diary Sec, PersDept, HQMC); *U. S. Relations with China*.

ficiencies were taken, some American officials felt that the event did lethal damage to the fighting spirit of the already reeling CNA troops.²¹

Regardless of the truth of this supposition, the end result of the civil war was already evident when the shipment arrived. On 15 December, the Director of the Joint U. S. Military Advisory Group, Major General David Barr, USA, reported to Washington:

Only a policy of unlimited United States aid including the immediate employment of United States armed forces to block the southern advance of the Communists, which I emphatically do not recommend, would enable the Nationalist Government to maintain a foothold in southern China against a determined Communist advance. . . . The complete defeat of the Nationalist Army . . . is inevitable.²²

With a puzzling disregard for the facts of past performance, the officials of a number of major U. S. firms in Shanghai felt that they could do business with the Communists. They feared a probable period of lawlessness at the time of changeover of governments, however, and wanted the Marines to guard their properties, such as the city's power company, from mob damage.²³ The official American policy of using Marines to protect lives only was reiterated, but a consulate spokesman pointed out that the concept was broad enough "so that emergency or tem-

²¹ Testimony of VAdm Oscar C. Badger and MajGen David Barr in *Military Situation in the Far East*, pp. 2694, 2745-2749.

²² Quoted in *U. S. Relations with China*, p. 336.

²³ "American Business Request for Marines," *The North China News* (Shanghai), 8Dec48, p. 1.

porary protection might be given to property if necessary to guard Americans living here.”²⁴

On the arrival of the *Bayfield* in the Whangpoo River off Shanghai, the announcement was made that the 9th Marines would land only if American lives and property were threatened. If the need for emergency evacuation procedures arose, the evacuees would assemble at four major collecting points convenient to the American community where the Marines would furnish necessary protection and cover withdrawal to the U. S. Navy's dock and warehouse area. From the docks, Navy amphibious craft would transfer the evacuees to ships located downriver in the Whangpoo anchorage.²⁵

The departure of the 9th Marines for Shanghai lent impetus to the withdrawal preparations at Tsingtao. Communist successes had the effect of completely isolating the city, making it the only Nationalist stronghold left north of the Yangtze. The Central Government, with a target date of 1 February, began withdrawing the men and materiel that made up the thriving naval training center which had grown up at the port following the arrival of the Americans. The fold-up of U. S. naval shore-based facilities kept pace. On 21 January, the Chief of Naval Operations directed Admiral Badger to embark all shore-based units, except for a minimum staff needed to operate recre-

ational facilities for fleet liberty parties and a Marine shore patrol detachment. The ground elements of FMF-WesPac, less a reduced 3d Marines BLT and the 9th Marines on stand-by at Shanghai, were to load out for Camp Pendleton and the 1st Marine Division. AirFMFWesPac, less MGCIS-7 which would report to MAG-24 on Guam to continue air control duties, was ordered to move to Cherry Point. The escort carrier *Rendova* would join VMF-211,²⁶ whose pilots had qualified to operate from its decks in August practice flights.²⁷

Part of the movements and transfers directed from Washington were already underway or accomplished by the time the formal directive arrived. The platoon of the 3d Marines on duty at Nanking was relieved in late December by a similar unit of the 9th. On 6 January, Admiral Badger returned the reserve units of the 9th Marines to Guam, and on the 10th, Battery D of the 11th Marines also left Tsingtao for the 1st Brigade. Loading operations to complete the withdrawal of all U.S. supplies and equipment were continued by 2d Combat Service Group and the units concerned.

By 21 January, all VMF-211 pilots had requalified as carrier pilots and the squadron moved on board its new home. The R5Ds of VMR-153 flew out in several echelons before the 29th when the ground personnel and heavy equipment left for the States. Two days later,

²⁴ United Press disp of 9Dec48 in *North China Marine* (Tsingtao), 11Dec48, p. 1.

²⁵ AmerConGen Shanghai disp No. 55 to Dept, dtd 3Feb49, Subj: Protection and Evacuation of American Nationals (Lot F79, Box 45, File 300—Evacuation—Emergency Plan, Dept of State RecCen).

²⁶ CNO disp to ComNavWesPac, dtd 21Jan49 (S&C Files, HQMC).

²⁷ AirFMFWesPac S-3 PeriodicRpt No. 16, Aug48, dtd 7Sep48 (S&C Files, HQMC, FRC, Alex).

Tsangkou Field was closed to all American planes and flight operations ceased as AirFMFWesPac Headquarters Squadron secured and mounted out. On the departure of the last shore-based Marine planes, air transport and liaison for ComNavWesPac was furnished by a seaplane detachment of Fleet Air Wing 1 based on a tender anchored in Tsingtao's harbor. Combat air support, if needed, would be the responsibility of the *Rendova's* air group.

By 3 February, all elements of FMF-WesPac were on board ship except Company C, 3d Marines, which was assigned duties as shore patrol to police the limited liberty area kept open for fleet recreation. Another 3d Marines company (B) was transferred to the 1st Marines in keeping with Badger's orders to reduce the strength of the battalion remaining at Tsingtao. The sole reinforcing elements added to the 3d Marines were an engineer platoon and a small detachment, mostly motor transport of 2d Combat Service Group, left to support the final wind up of logistic activities.

On 8 February, when General Thomas and the major portion of his command sailed from Tsingtao, the end of FMF-WesPac waited only the disbandment of its Headquarters and Service Battalion in Camp Pendleton and the rejoining of its task force elements to the 1st Marine Division during the following month. For Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Colley and the officers and men of the 3d Marines that he commanded, the remainder of their time at Tsingtao was to be a period of watchful waiting, comparatively uneventful and yet potentially trouble-filled. A trickle of evacuees

continued to flow through the beleaguered port, but most Americans who wanted to leave North China had gotten out by February and those few people who left later were generally foreigners or stateless persons certified for evacuation by the consulate.

Tsingtao was kept alive mainly by infusions of American economic aid which provided raw cotton for the city's textile mills and coal, flour, and rice for the refugee population. The role was hardly enough to keep Tsingtao in robust or even passable health, and the days of the port under Nationalist control were obviously numbered. Its capture was easily within the capabilities of Mao Tse-tung's armies, but the drive to cross the Yangtze and destroy the main Nationalist forces had priority in Communist military efforts. The people of Tsingtao no longer considered U. S. naval forces to be an effective shield against the Communists and, according to the American Consul General, were convinced that the Marines and Navy combat ships would take no steps to prevent a Communist entry into the city.

WINDUP ACTIVITIES ²⁸

By March the Communist armies had reached the Yangtze River on a broad

²⁸ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: Tsingtao ComGen IntelRpts, *op. cit.*; 3d Mar StfRpts, Feb-Apr-49; 3d Mar S-2 PeriodicRpt, Apr49, dtd 1May-49 (ComNavWesPac A-9 File, FRC, Mech); Muster Rolls of the units concerned (Unit Diary Sec, PersDept, HQMC); *Military Situation in the Far East*; C. E. Lucas Philips, *Escape of the Amethyst* (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1957).

front and were poised to invade South China. While his forces regrouped for the attack, Mao Tse-tung put pressure on the Nationalist government to cease fighting or else be annihilated. Several weeks of negotiations proved futile for there was no ground for compromise; both sides knew that despite the surface appearance of an agreement, its practical effect was absolute Communist victory.

Under the circumstances, Tsingtao was more than ever a doomed city and held its status as an American naval base on a day-to-day basis. By mid-March, Admiral Badger had decided to move his flagship from the port and to cut further the number of service ships remaining. What was left of the one-time thriving base was either operating from shipboard or was ready to mount out on short notice. There was no longer any need for the 3d Marines to stay at Tsingtao, and Badger ordered the battalion south to relieve the 9th Marines. On 17 March, BLT-3 (less its shore patrol company) sailed for Shanghai in its transport, the APA *Chilton*, and dropped anchor in the Whangpoo the following day.

After a period of familiarization with the evacuation plan and with the city itself, the 3d Marines was ready to take over the watch. In order to reach the strength required for the evacuation procedures which had been worked out, the battalion needed to gain back the rifle company it had lost when FMF-WesPac left Tsingtao. Before its departure on 30 March, the 9th Marines transferred its Company C to the 3d which redesignated the unit Company B. The selection was a natural one since

most of the new Company B was already ashore in Shanghai guarding American naval facilities in the dock area and the remaining platoon furnished the embassy guard at Nanking. In addition to these units, the 3d Marines set up a small shore patrol detachment which was quartered on the Shanghai Bund and provided a ship's guard to Admiral Badger's flagship, the AGC *Eldorado*.

The stay of the 3d Marines at Shanghai was a short one. Less than a month after the battalion arrived at the city, an outrageous Communist attack on British naval forces gravely increased the risk of the deep involvement of American ships and men in a similar incident. Admiral Badger made the decision to withdraw on strong evidence that the Communists would no longer recognize the neutrality of American ships in Chinese waters.

So confident were the Communists of their success that they openly announced the date when their ultimatum to the Nationalists would expire and the advance across the Yangtze would begin. In an effort to beat this deadline, the British attempted to relieve the station ship which had been maintained at Nanking for emergency evacuation of Commonwealth nationals. On 20 April, in the narrow reaches of the Yangtze below the capital city, the relief ship, HMS *Amethyst*, was shelled by Communist artillery, forced aground on an island, and raked unmercifully by rifle and machine gun fire.

The Communists' immediate and demonstrably false claim was that the British frigate was operating in conjunction with Nationalist warships.

The Red artillerymen also delivered their fire against HMS *Consort*, the erstwhile station ship which attempted unsuccessfully to rescue the *Amethyst* and she was barely able to limp downriver with heavy structural damage and a long casualty list. A relief force headed by the cruiser *London*, steaming up from Shanghai, was unable to break through the deadly barrier of artillery fire and sustained in its turn considerable casualties and materiel damage. The Communist gunners firing at point-blank range at large targets in restricted waters could hardly miss in this unequal engagement and were able to keep up their attack despite murderous return fire by the British. After these rescue attempts were beaten off, the *Amethyst* stayed stranded in the river for more than three months while the Communists tried to gain maximum propaganda value for their "capture." Finally, in an incredible feat of seamanship and courage, the frigate's crew brought their ship out to safety in a night-long dash through the gantlet of artillery.

Admiral Badger was quick to offer assistance to the British ships damaged in the first few days of the *Amethyst* incident and to provide the means for more effective care of their casualties. The grim lesson of the destructive effect of field artillery fire on naval vessels unable to maneuver freely or reply effectively was a costly one. More than 40 men were killed and 78 wounded aboard three ships. With the help of 3d Marines' corpsmen and stretcher bearers, the wounded men were transferred to the American hospital ship

Repose which sailed for Hong Kong on 25 April.


The Communist action against the British was followed by threats that similar punitive measures would be taken against any foreign warship which attempted to sail on the river. Since all plans for the evacuation of American civilians had been predicated on free use of the Whangpoo River, Shanghai's access route to the broad mouth of the Yangtze, the altered situation called for a reappraisal of American objectives. If Badger ordered his ships to remain where they could be attacked, he would undoubtedly be forced to use all means at his command, including carrier air and naval gunfire, to retaliate. The Admiral considered that such action would have an adverse effect on the safety of the Americans who desired to stay in China and would certainly involve the U. S. more deeply in the morass of civil war. Consequently, he recommended and had approved a decision to make one last call for Americans to leave and then to withdraw his forces.²⁹

The State Department was convinced that most Americans who still remained in China were prepared to stay regardless of the risk. Under the circumstances, the platoon of Marines at Nanking was no longer needed to assist in evacuation, and on 21 April the men flew back to Shanghai leaving behind five NCOs who were transferred to State Department guard duty as a regular detachment. The arrival of the Nanking Marines was followed very

²⁹ ComNavWesPac disp to CNO and ConGen Shanghai, dtd 22Apr49 (S&C Files, HQMC, FRC, Alex).



CHINESE NATIONALIST SENTRIES *relieve Marine bridge guards at Chinwangtao in October 1946. (USMC 228263)*



A PORTION of the Marines remaining in Tsingtao debark from USS Chilton, on which they are billeted, to relieve guard posts throughout the city in March 1949. (USN 80-G-706944)

shortly by the assembly on board the *Chilton* of the whole BLT-3. Company A remained temporarily on Shanghai's docks to shepherd out the last 119 American civilians who heeded the consul general's final warning to leave. On 28 April, their task finished, the rear echelon of the battalion rode an LSM downstream to their transport, and on the 29th the 3d Marines sailed for Tsingtao.

The purpose of the trip north to the Shantung port was to readjust some of the cargo hastily loaded out at Shanghai and to redistribute naval personnel evacuated from the port facilities there to various fleet units.³⁰ The *Chilton* sailed for the States on 6 May, leaving behind Company C of the 3d as the sole remnant of an FMF task force that had once topped 50,000 men. The company, which had long had most of its gear loaded on board a cruiser for ready employment as an emergency landing force, shifted its station to shipboard on 3 May, but continued to furnish shore patrol detachments.

Relief for Company C was enroute to Tsingtao when the rest of the 3d Marines sailed for home. Early in April, the 7th Marines at Camp Pendleton had been alerted for movement to join Admiral Badger's command and replace the 3d, and on the 21st the battalion embarked on two cruisers at San Pedro. By the time the ships arrived at Pearl Harbor, the swift march of events in China had caught up with original replacement plans and Badger no longer wanted a battalion. Instead he asked for a rifle platoon to reinforce the regu-

lar Marine ships' detachment on two cruisers, plus a headquarters and a third platoon to be stationed on the *Eldorado*.³¹ Company C of the 7th Marines was detached for this task at Pearl Harbor on 1 May, and the remainder of the battalion returned to California within a week, completing what was certainly the shortest tour of overseas duty in its history.

The replacement Company C on board the *Manchester* and *St. Paul* arrived at Tsingtao on 14 May; two days later the cruisers which had been relieved on station departed with Company C of the 3d Marines. The stay of new arrivals at Tsingtao was fleeting; almost as soon as the Marines he had asked for had transshipped to the *Eldorado*, Admiral Badger left for Hong Kong and the two cruisers followed in a few days time. The *St. Paul* visited Shanghai just ahead of the Communist forces which captured the city on 25 May, and the *Manchester* left Tsingtao on the 26th when it was clear that the Communists were at last ready to take the city. These two events, the fall of Shanghai and the imminent loss of Tsingtao, had the effect of cancelling the requirement for Marine ship-based reinforcements. There was no longer any opportunity to land in the portions of China held by the Communists without incurring casualties, and the Americans who had unwisely remained to do business as usual could expect no succor from the Navy.

³⁰ ComNavWesPac disp to CNO, dtd 30Apr49 (S&C Files, HQMC, FRC, Alex).

³¹ CG, FMFPac msg to CG, 1st MarDiv, dtd 10Apr49; ComNavWesPac disp to CNO, dtd 29Apr49; CNO disp to ComNavWesPac, dtd 29Apr49 (S&C Files, HQMC, FRC, Alex).

The cruisers with the platoons of Company C on board rendezvoused at Okinawa with the *Eldorado* after leaving China. There the company reassembled on the command ship and left with it for the U. S., arriving and disembarking at San Diego on 16 May. The return home of the last element of the FMF to be assigned to Naval Forces, Western Pacific, brought an end to a long and colorful era of Marine History. The swarming Red tide which engulfed mainland China wrought a change that erased forever the way of life which had once made China duty a coveted goal and the China Marine an envied person in the Corps.

CONCLUSION

In the considerable volume of literature that has been written in castigation, explanation, or defense of United States policy in China during the postwar years, there is only passing mention of the part played by the Marines in carrying out this policy. Virtually all memoirs and records concede the enormous difficulty of being at one time an active ally of Nationalist China and at the same time neutral in the civil war it was fighting. Too little recognition is given to the controlled reaction of Americans who were exposed to Communist harassment and attack and who meted out a frustrated limited punishment in return, a retaliatory attitude at odds with all Marine training and conditioning.

The men of III Amphibious Corps and its successor commands had it in their power as individuals and small groups to go beyond the restriction of their orders—to lash back with full fury

against their attackers, to hunt them down relentlessly, to shell and strafe the villages and farms that hid them—but instead they gave the disciplined response expected of Marines. The greatest tribute that can be paid these men is that they maintained whatever position their government assigned them and did so in the spirit as well as the letter of the orders under which they served.

The wisdom inspired by hindsight can provide many solutions to the problems that faced the U. S. in China. Interesting though these theories may be, they are academic arguments now. One practical lesson learned, and a costly one, was never to underestimate the strength of Communism or the determination of its adherents. Promises, agreements, and negotiations were all regarded as means to an end by the Chinese Communists, and the Marines ambushed at Anping and those who fought at Hsin Ho received the brunt of this practical education for their fellow Americans.

It was not the Communists but the Japanese who were the expected source of trouble when IIIAC first landed in North China, and one of the marvels of the postwar period is the open cooperation that was received from former bitter enemies. The Marines stepped into a complicated repatriation setup and with the help of the Japanese made its solution seem easy. Where opposition might have been expected, none was received, and a few hundred Marine administrators and guards were able to do a job that could have required thousands of men. Techniques of repatriation worked out at theater level were translated into practice virtually without a

hitch. The impartial justice exercised by the Marines in North China and by all the services throughout the Pacific in seeing defeated soldiers and uprooted civilians home was an incalculable but evident asset in the later relations of the U. S. with Japan.

The mutual trust of the Japanese and the Marines extended to the point where they mounted guard over the railroads of Hopeh together. And the Marines relieved the Japanese when the Nationalists were unable to do so in order that the American pledge to facilitate repatriation could be honored. The mission of keeping open the lines of communication between Peiping and Chinwangtao and the responsibility for seeing that KMA coal reached its destination gave the IIIAC tasks that savored much of the duties which fell to the Marine expeditionary forces in the Caribbean islands in the '20s and '30s. The economic well-being of a large and important part of Nationalist China depended during the winter of 1945-46 on the security measures taken by General Rockey's command.

Important though the humanitarian aspects of Marine missions were, their political repercussions were far greater and longer lasting. The support of the Central Government involved in the act of securing ports of entry into Red-dominated territory ensured the enduring enmity of the Communists. The decision not to follow up this initial support by using all the force necessary to restore order in North China gave immeasurable but certain strength to the Communists, but it was a decision in keeping with the temper of the American people at the time. The Marines

by their very presence were a force for stability in China, not because of their own strength, for that was soon whittled away, but because they stood for the power of their country. In effect, American action secured for the Nationalists a base of operations from which they launched their drive to recover Manchuria and North China. Thereafter, the American position was entangled irretrievably with the fortunes of the Central Government's armies.

During the year and a half that a large portion of the FMF was stationed in North China, the Marine Corps underwent a drastic reduction in strength. The men who served so well along the rail lines, at the coal mines, and in the headquarters cities were often fresh from boot camp. There was constant drain of experienced men from corps, division, and wing units that matched or exceeded the ravages of combat, but withal the job set out was done. A determined and continuous effort was made to maintain high standards of discipline and to continue training by whatever means possible. Again, as has been the case many times in the Marine Corps past, commanders were able to count on the fact that their veterans and inexperienced men would coalesce as units because of the tangible pride they had in themselves as Marines. To those who have not experienced this feeling or seen its results, it may seem questionable, but it exists and was in large part responsible for the cohesiveness of Marine units in China at a time when demobilization and demanding commitments might have caused a different result.

Not until the 1st Marine Division pulled out of China and the mission of the remaining units was narrowed to security of American installations at a naval advanced base was there time or opportunity to turn to amphibious training. At Tsingtao in 1947-48, the battalion landing teams of FMFWesPac were able to renew their skills in the complicated business which is the Marine Corps primary mission. When the State Department was convinced that Americans should leave China, these ready battalions were a logical on-the-scene choice to handle the job of emergency evacuation and to provide protection if need be. As it happened, emergency employment of the ship-based Marines was unnecessary, but this fact was in keeping with their selection for the task.

Their readiness to land and ability to handle a difficult assignment with dispatch was sufficient insurance that more normal measures could be used.

When the whole of Marine activities in North China in the postwar years is considered, the variety of missions accomplished is considerable and the common factor that threads them all is the adaptability of Marines to the job at hand. Perhaps the most valuable legacy of this tour of China duty is one often taken for granted—the fund of command experience in a variety of situations which was garnered by young officers and NCOs. This reservoir of responsibility well earned has been drawn on repeatedly since in peace and war.

PART VI

Conclusion

Amphibious Doctrine in World War II¹

THE GENESIS

One would not exaggerate by saying that amphibious warfare was the primary offensive tactic in the American conduct of the Pacific War. Simply defined, an amphibious assault is "an operation involving the coordinated employment of military and naval forces dispatched by sea for an assault on a hostile shore."² In his final report of the war to the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral King stated:

The outstanding development of this war, in the field of joint undertakings, was the perfection of amphibious operations, the most difficult of all operations in modern warfare. Our success in all such operations, from Normandy to Okinawa, involved huge quantities of specialized equipment, exhaustive study and planning, and thorough training as well as complete integration of all forces, under unified command.³

¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal*; Isely and Crowl, *Marines and Amphibious War*; LtGen Holland M. Smith, "The Development of Amphibious Tactics in the U. S. Navy," in 10 parts, *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 30, no. 6 (Jun46) through v. 31, no. 3 (Mar47), hereafter Smith, "Amphibious Tactics," *Marine Corps Gazette*, with issue and page numbers; Maj Robert D. Heinl, Jr., "The U. S. Marine Corps: Author of Modern Amphibious War," *USNI Proceedings*, v. 73, no. 11 (Nov47), hereafter Heinl, *The USMC*.

² Smith, "Amphibious Tactics," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 30, no. 6 (Jun46), p.14.

³ *War Reports*, p. 658.

Marine Corps interest in what is termed amphibious warfare may be said to have begun as early as 1898, when, in the Spanish-American War, Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Huntington's battalion of Marines landed at Guantanamo, Cuba, to seize a major naval base for fleet operations in the blockade of Santiago.⁴ In the years following this landing, the advanced base concept envisioned the establishment on a permanent basis of a force capable of seizing and defending advanced bases which a fleet could employ to support its prosecution of naval war in distant waters. According to the theory of how advanced base operations were to be conducted, primary emphasis was on the defense of the base. There was apparently no consideration in the pre-World War I period of the feasibility of large scale landings against heavily defended islands, which, of course, was the nature of much of the amphibious warfare in the Pacific in World War II.

As the international commitments and influence of the United States increased during the early years of the 20th century, the requirements for military and strategic planning grew apace. American interest in Latin America and U. S. participation in World War I accelerated

⁴ For a thorough treatment of Marine participation in the evolution of amphibious warfare, see Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal*, pt I, and Isely and Crowl, *Marines and Amphibious War*, chaps 1-2.

the need for the preparation of long-range programs, and the Marine Corps was not exempted from having to look to the future. Although expeditionary service in revolt-torn Latin America constituted a heavy and continuing drain on the services of the Marine Corps and forced it to focus attention on that area, a few farsighted military strategists, such as the brilliant Major Earl H. Ellis, directed their thoughts to the Pacific and to the prospect of war between the United States and Japan.

In the general distribution of the spoils following World War I, Japan was given the mandate over former German possessions in the Central Pacific. Thus, the strategic balance in that area was changed drastically in favor of Japan, which now had authority over a deep zone of island outposts guarding its Empire. Once they were fortified and supported by the Japanese fleet, they would provide a formidable threat to the advance of the United States fleet across the Pacific if a war broke out.

Ellis was one of the first to recognize the danger posed by the strategic shift in the Pacific. This awareness influenced him to modify his earlier ideas about the nature of a war with Japan and in 1921 he submitted his new thoughts in the form of Operation Plan 712, "Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia." He foresaw operations for the seizure of specific islands in the Marshall, Caroline, and Palau groups, some of which Marines actually assaulted in World War II. His views were generally shared by the Commandant, Major General John A. Lejeune, and other high ranking Marine officers.

The Marine Corps did little in the area of amphibious planning and training during the late 1920s and early 1930s because in those years it was busily engaged in the pacification of Nicaragua, Haiti, and Santo Domingo, and in protecting American lives and interests in the midst of the unrest in China. It was thus precluded from engaging in large-scale amphibious exercises during these years. None could be held in any case because military appropriations were slim. Additionally, the Navy was more interested in preparing for traditional fleet surface actions. Nevertheless, much thought and study was given to amphibious logistic supply in the Navy-Marine Corps maneuvers at Culebra in 1924 and during the joint Army-Navy-Marine Corps maneuvers at Hawaii in 1925. Out of these meager efforts, the genesis of present amphibious doctrine appeared early in the academic year 1930-1931, when the Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools directed a committee of four officers—Majors Charles D. Barrett, Pedro A. del Valle, and Lyle H. Miller, and Lieutenant Walter C. Ansel, USN—to prepare a manual embodying existing knowledge concerning landing operations. Although never published, *Marine Corps Landing Operations*, as it was entitled, comprised the first formal effort to assimilate current amphibious doctrine. As General del Valle recalled:

. . . the boss man in that show was Charlie Barrett, who was a brilliant officer, and the rest of us were 'makee-learner' and all that we did was study the meager historic records . . . and semi-historic records that existed. I remember that I had read about the Mesopotamian

campaign of Sir Charles Townshend, and he gave me some of the principles of a landing attack that we incorporated into this original study. . . .⁵

After Major Barrett, as general chairman of the committee, had blocked out the general form the manual was to take, he was transferred to Headquarters Marine Corps and his place was taken by Major DeWitt Peck, who, in addition, was head of the Tactical Section of the Marine Corps Schools. Major Peck:

. . . wrote the basic chapter . . . and parcelled out the other chapters to the appropriate school instructors, artillery to the art[illery] instructor, etc. As the chapters were finished [Peck] as editor, coordinated the whole. . . .

Upon approval of the CO of the Schools, the manual was sent to HQMC where it was reviewed, I believe, by Barrett and [Major Alfred H.] Noble. The only important change they made was in the handling of beach and shore parties, reversing the school concept.⁶

The groundwork prepared by these officers at the Marine Corps Schools resulted in further study of the subject at Quantico and elsewhere. Meanwhile, the Fleet Marine Force was established in September 1933, and became increasingly important in Marine Corps training, planning, and thinking.⁷ Immedi-

ately following the activation of the FMF, it became necessary to prepare a textbook which would incorporate the theory and practice of landing operations for the use of the infant tactical organization. Work on this text began at the Marine Corps Schools in November 1933, when all classes were suspended and both faculty and students were assigned the duty of writing a manual that would present in published form a detailed account of the doctrine and techniques to be employed in training for and conducting amphibious assault operations.

The final result of this crash program appeared in January 1934 under the title *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*. The contents and title of the manual were revised several times in the following years, and the Navy accepted it as official doctrine in 1938, when, entitled *Tentative Landing Operations Manual*, the book was reprinted and distributed as *Fleet Training Publication 167 (FTP-167)*. Three years later, the War Department recognized the worth and potential of amphibious tactics and published the substance of the work as *Field Manual 31-5*.

Army interest in amphibious assault tactics had resulted earlier in the participation of the 2d Provisional Army Brigade (18th Infantry and two battalions of the 7th Field Artillery) in Fleet Landing Exercise Number (FLEX) 4 in 1938. Not until 1941 did the Army again take part in a FLEX or evince any overt

⁵ LtGen Pedro A. del Valle interview by HistBr, dtd 17Nov66 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC).

⁶ MajGen DeWitt Peck ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 9May66, hereafter *Peck ltr 1966*.

⁷ An example of Marine Corps attitudes concerning the establishment of the Fleet Marine Force may be found in the following comment of the Commandant, Major General Thomas Holcomb, regarding Major General Louis McC.

Little: "I have selected General Little for the most important command in the Marine Corps—the FMF." Officer's Personnel Jacket, Louis McC. Little (0562) (GSA, MilPersRecCenter, St. Louis, Mo.).

interest in amphibious warfare. It was in this year that joint amphibious training of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps organizations was first conducted on the east coast. Under the experienced guidance of Major General Holland M. Smith, commander of the Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet, and his staff composed of officers from the three services, the 1st Joint Training Force (1st Marine Division and 1st Infantry Division) conducted maneuvers at Culebra and later at Onslow Beach, North Carolina. Following in 1942, the 9th Infantry Division joined the 1st Marine Division in landing exercises on the east coast. Meanwhile, other Army divisions were similarly involved in the west coast training together with FMF units and learning the fundamentals of amphibious warfare. The results of this training were thoroughly demonstrated throughout the war wherever Army divisions made amphibious assaults.

Lessons learned and gradual advances made in the period 1934–1940, and the refinements that appeared in the fleet landing exercises conducted during the prewar years, placed at the disposal of United States forces at the beginning of World War II a body of tactical principles forming a basic amphibious doctrine. At Guadalcanal, Marines were the first to put to the test of war this doctrine, and found it practicable. General Vandegrift, who commanded the Guadalcanal assault troops, later wrote:

We were as well trained and as well armed as time and our peacetime experience allowed us to be. We needed combat to tell us how effective our training, our doctrine, and our weapons had been. We

tested them against the enemy and found that they worked.⁸

The two key words in General Holland Smith's definition of amphibious tactics noted above are "coordinated" and "assault." In the formal body of amphibious doctrine presented in early 1934, the Marine authors had recognized that an amphibious operation was a joint undertaking of great complexity and that the landing of troops on a hostile shore had to be accomplished as a tactical movement. The steps leading to a successful landing operation included an approach, deployment, and assault by the landing force following an adequate preparatory bombardment and accompanied by the effective supporting fires of surface and air forces. Basically, this is how Allied amphibious operations were conducted in World War II and since.

Also basic to the conduct of an amphibious assault was the organization, founded on well-established concepts, of the amphibious task force and its major elements. Generally, such a force was comprised of the following: a transport group, a fire support group, an air group, a mine group, a salvage group, and a screening group, all naval units; and a landing force, composed of Marine units for the most part. The latter was conceived as a mobile striking force containing self-sufficient combat elements that could be employed with a maximum degree of flexibility.

The nucleus of the landing force was usually the Marine division, which was

⁸ Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift ltr, dtd 5 Dec-47, in Maj John L. Zimmerman, *The Guadalcanal Campaign* (Washington: HistDiv, HQ-MC, 1949), p. v.

often reinforced by corps troops, and sometimes Army units. In the division were three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and division, special, and service troops, the composition, organization, and strength of which underwent several changes in the course of the war. According to established doctrine, the assignment to the Marine landing force of troops and equipment for an amphibious operation was based on the impending mission and the lift capability of the assault transports carrying the troops to the target.

Not all phases of amphibious operations were emphasized during the fleet landing exercises before 1940. Basic logistic planning was relatively simple in this period because there was little equipment to embark and hardly any assault shipping worthy of the name to embark it in, especially when compared to conditions in the war years. One logistics shortcoming which was brought to light following the early assault operations in the Pacific concerned the over-the-beach handling of supplies. While not completely resolved, this problem was considerably eased with each succeeding operation as the planners attempted to correct the mistakes of previous landings.

In reviewing the development of amphibious tactics, General Holland M. Smith, who has been called the "Father of Amphibious Warfare," stated:

Amphibious preparedness in the two years prior to Guadalcanal consisted on the one hand of full-scale production of the materials which had been found suitable for landing operations in the experimental period before 1940 and on the other of training military and naval personnel to use that materiel in accordance with the

tactics and techniques, which had also been developed, in war.⁹

Faced with the imminence of war, Congress made adequate funds available for a speedup of defense preparations. Some of this money was allotted to the Navy and Marine Corps, which then began to eliminate personnel and materiel shortages as rapidly as possible. The most important task facing the Marine Corps as it prepared for the world conflict certain to erupt was to train troops in amphibious tactics utilizing the doctrine, equipment, and materiel then available.

As General Vandegrift commented, Guadalcanal proved Marine tactics were sound. The subsequent development of amphibious tactics following later landings and combat ashore in the Pacific did little to change basic doctrine, but did serve to teach Americans how to land more troops and materiel on the beach in a shorter period of time and at less cost. In the course of the war, existing techniques were perfected and refined at the same time that new solutions (JASCO, air support control, and underwater demolition teams) and the employment of new equipment (radar, landing ships and craft, amphibious command ships, and escort carriers) were developed and integrated with the basic amphibious warfare doctrine to eliminate old problems.¹⁰ It was readily apparent that, no matter how sound Marine tactics were, they were ineffective unless dynamic, intelligent, and well-in-

⁹ Smith, "Amphibious Tactics," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 30, no. 10 (Oct46), p. 45.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, v. 30, no. 11 (Nov46), p. 47.

formed commanders and highly trained and disciplined troops employed them aggressively, vigorously, and resourcefully. The Navy and Marine Corps learned lessons in every assault operation that they conducted during the war; in the final analysis, the experiences gained in one landing helped to achieve the successes in each following one.

The Pacific War may be roughly divided into three periods,¹¹ during which amphibious tactics were developed and gained optimum results. The first or defensive period began with the attack on Pearl Harbor and lasted until the landings on Guadalcanal and Tulagi. The second, a period of limited offensives, began with the Guadalcanal operation; the third was an offensive period heralded by the Tarawa invasion in November 1943. In the opening year of American offensive operations, United States commanders learned that close cooperation between landing force and naval staffs through the planning and training phases for a landing and during its execution was vital to its success.

COMMAND RELATIONS

In World War II "joint forces fought in assault on a scale never before dreamed of. So much combined effort called for the highest possible degree

of coordination."¹² For the Marine Corps, the delineation of command responsibilities between the amphibious force commander and the landing force commander was an important factor in the success of the advance across the Pacific.

The chain of command in a force established to conduct an amphibious assault was relatively simple, at least in theory, and Guadalcanal was the testing ground for this facet of amphibious doctrine. According to *FTP-167*:

d. The attack force commander will usually be the senior naval commander of the units of the fleet comprising the attack force. . . . Provision must be made in advance for continuity of command within the landing area during the course of the operation.¹³

And this was all that *FTP-167* said about command relations. Essentially, the naval amphibious force commander would have the primary authority for decisions affecting either the landing force or the various support groups, each of which would have co-equal command status and parallel command functions under his direction. The pattern was thus set in the Guadalcanal landing for the concept of command relations—worked out in peacetime—to be employed in a combat situation for the first time.

At Guadalcanal, Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, Commanding Gen-

¹¹ Admiral Spruance set up this arbitrary but practical division in a lecture presented to the Royal United Service Institution in London on 30 October 1946. Adm Raymond A. Spruance, "The Victory in the Pacific," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, v. XCI, no. 564 (Nov46), p. 540, hereafter Spruance, "Lecture."

¹² Adm William H. P. Blandy, "Command Relationships in Amphibious Warfare," *USNI Proceedings*, v. 77, no. 66 (Jun51), p. 572, hereafter Blandy, "Command Relationships."

¹³ CNO, ND, *Landing Operations Doctrine*, U. S. Navy, 1938 (*FTP-167*) (Washington, 1938), p. 29.

eral, 1st Marine Division, and the landing force commander for the operation, was subordinate to Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, Commander, Amphibious Force, South Pacific (Phib-ForSoPac), and amphibious force commander for the same operation. A major source of disagreement which rose between Turner and Vandegrift was based on their differing concepts of Vandegrift's command functions and responsibilities once the general had landed and assumed responsibility for the conduct of operations ashore.

Even before the order for the Guadalcanal operation had been distributed, the command relationship between these two leaders derived from the following paragraph of the order which established Turner's command in April 1942:

IX. Coordination of Command

- (a) Under the Commander, South Pacific Force, Commander of the South Pacific Amphibious Force will be in command of the naval, ground and air units assigned to the amphibious forces in the South Pacific area.¹⁴

Further augmenting this relationship was a clause in the JCS Directive of 2 July 1942, setting forth the military aims of the moment for the war against

Japan in the South Pacific and Southwest Pacific areas, and which stated:

Direct command of the tactical operations of the amphibious forces will remain with the Naval Task Force Commander throughout the conduct of all three tasks.¹⁵

In the planning for and actual conduct of operations at Guadalcanal, Turner's forceful personality and character had an effect on each decision made. General Vandegrift maintained that the commander trained for ground operations should not be subordinate to the local naval amphibious force commander with respect to the conduct of the land battle and the disposition of the main force and reserves given the responsibility to fight it.¹⁶

Concerning these differences of opinion, Major General DeWitt Peck, who was War Plans Officer for the Commander, South Pacific Force (ComSoPac), wrote: "It might be noted that in questions of command relationship, General Vandegrift's position was supported by ComSoPac. I believe, however, that a definite directive should have been issued when the question first

¹⁴ CominCh ltr to DistrList, Subj: Basic Plan for the establishment of the South Pacific Amphibious Force (Short title-LONE WOLF), FFL/A3-1/A16-3(5), Ser 00322, dtd 29Apr42 (OAB, NHD), quoted in VAdm George C. Dyer, "The Amphibians Came to Conquer," MS, p. 6-27, hereafter Dyer, "The Amphibians." Currently in preparation, this book is a biography of Admiral Turner.

¹⁵ JCS 00581, dtd 2Jul42, cited in Samuel Eliot Morison, *Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions May 1942-August 1942—History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, v. IV (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1949), p. 261. The three tasks referred to concerned the seizure of: (1) Santa Cruz Islands, Tulagi, and adjacent enemy positions; (2) The remainder of the Solomon Islands and the northeast coast of New Guinea; and (3) Rabaul, and enemy-held New Guinea and New Ireland.

¹⁶ Vandegrift and Asprey, *Once A Marine*, p. 119.

arose."¹⁷ Continuing, General Peck recalled:

. . . two points of difference between Vandegrift and Turner in particular. After the successful landing at Guadalcanal and the consolidation, Turner wanted Vandegrift to station marine detachments at several points along the NE and NW shores of the island which were likely landing places for Japanese reinforcements. Vandegrift refused to make this dispersion of his force. At another time Turner wanted Vandegrift to form another Raider Battalion, composed of selected personnel from the Division. Vandegrift refused. It would weaken the Division both in personnel and morale to form an 'elite' organization. In fact there was considerable question in SoPac as to the efficacy and wisdom of having raider battalions.¹⁸

When the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb visited Guadalcanal in late

¹⁷ Peck ltr 1966.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* Commenting on this situation, Major General Omar T. Pfeiffer, Fleet Marine Officer and Assistant War Plans Officer at CinCPac during this period, stated: "I had personal knowledge of the differences between Gen Vandegrift and Adm Turner, as told to me by Gen Vandegrift in Oct '42, when I was at Guadalcanal with Adm Nimitz. I advised Adm Nimitz of these differences." MajGen Omar T. Pfeiffer ltr to CMC, dtd 19Apr66, hereafter *Pfeiffer ltr*. Attempting to put the Vandegrift-Turner command relationship in perspective, General Pfeiffer continued: "It was my privilege to serve intimately with Admirals Nimitz and King and to have almost daily personal contact with Commandants Holcomb and Vandegrift. My experiences, therefore, were with the high command and I have restricted my comments to what I learned on that level. . . . Although command relations with Admiral Turner were not satisfactory, I consider him the exception rather than an example of normal relations." *Ibid.*

October 1942 and questioned Vandegrift about the local situation, the 1st Marine Division commander related his problems and said "the quicker we get the Navy and particularly Kelly Turner back to the basic principles of FTP-167 . . . the better off we are going to be."¹⁹

At the request of Admiral Halsey (ComSoPac) on 23 October, Vandegrift accompanied the Commandant and his party in a flight to Noumea, New Caledonia, for a conference with Halsey and his major commanders concerning Guadalcanal. During this conference Holcomb raised the question of command relationships in the amphibious force and made certain recommendations concerning organizational and command relationship changes in Turner's force. After his retirement, Admiral Turner later told his biographer that he had not been adverse to these changes.²⁰

After approval had been given by Halsey, Nimitz, and King, the command structure in Amphibious Force, South Pacific, was changed as follows on 16 November 1942:

a. All Marine units were detached from PhibForSoPac.

b. All Marine Corps organizations in the South Pacific Area, except Marine Corps aviation, regular ships' detachments, and units in the Ellice Islands and the Samoan Defense Group, were assigned to I Marine Amphibious Corps.

c. For coordination of operations, joint planning would be conducted by

¹⁹ Vandegrift and Asprey, *Once A Marine*, p. 183.

²⁰ Dyer, "The Amphibians," p. 6-30.

CG, IMAC, and ComPhibForSoPac under the control of ComSoPac.²¹

In addition, it was determined that in the future, after the landing force commander had landed, control of the troops ashore would revert to him in his capacity as commander of a task force established in the operation order to conduct the shore phase of the operation. An alternative to this was that Marine Corps units would revert to Marine Corps command when and as directed by ComSoPac or, as the Allies tightened the ring around Japan, by the area commander.

Although the pattern embodied in this directive was the one followed throughout the war in the Pacific with but few modifications, it took a little while before the concept of separate functions prevailed. As Admiral Spruance's former chief of staff recalled:

The problem of the transfer of responsibility from the Commander Joint Expeditionary Force to the Commander Expeditionary Troops continued to plague Admiral Turner and General [Holland] Smith until an agreement was reached during the planning for 'Galvanic.' [The invasion of Tarawa in November 1943].

I was not a witness to any arguments the two commanders may have had, but each came to me privately and complained about the other. . . . My job was to reassure them, quiet them down, and try to solve their differences. I could get no help from Admiral Spruance. His attitude was 'They both know what I want and they will do it. There is no need of prescribing definitely a solution.' I insisted that it was essential

to include in our order a definite statement of the transfer of responsibility, not only to satisfy the two commanders but so that the entire force would understand.

I continued to draft proposed paragraph 5s [pertaining to command] of our operations plan until I finally reached a wording that was satisfactory to both Turner and Smith.

I have not got the plan before me but my notes indicate that para. 5 read in part like this:

'The Commander Joint Expeditionary Force commands all task organizations employed in the amphibious operations at all objectives through inter-related attack force commanders. The Commanding General Expeditionary Troops will be embarked in the flagship of the Commander Joint Expeditionary Force or stationed ashore when the situation requires, and will command all landing and garrison forces that are ashore.

Landing Forces, after their respective commanders have assumed command on shore, will be under the overall command of the Commanding General Expeditionary Troops.

Commander Joint Expeditionary Force is designated as second in command of this operation.'

There seemed to be no difficulty in accepting the provision that the landing force commanders would inform their respective task group commanders when they assumed command on shore.

Although Turner and Smith disagreed with much ill humor during the planning stages of Galvanic, Flintlock [the Marshalls landings], and Forager [the Marianas campaign], the minute they were embarked together in the flagship of the Comdr. Joint Expeditionary Force, friction disappeared and cooperation and collaboration was excellent.

The command arrangements established for Galvanic set the pattern for Flintlock

²¹ ComSoPac msg to TF Commanders SoPac, dtd 16Nov42 (OAB, NHD).

and Forager, and no further problems arose.²²

LOGISTICS

Another important lesson learned during the first year of the American offensive in the Pacific was that the logistical aspect of an amphibious operation was as vital to the success of a landing as were the assault tactics employed to reach and stay on the shore. Like the negative influence of the Gallipoli debacle on the evolution of so many other facets of amphibious doctrine, the failure of basic logistics planning during this World War I campaign spurred Marine planners on to develop sound logistical theory and techniques. Despite all efforts to the contrary, however, most if not all logistical problems that conceivably could occur during an amphibious operation cropped up in the preparations for and later at Guadalcanal.

The key to amphibious logistics planning developed by the Marine Corps in the prewar period was the "combat unit loading" of transports. This practical process involved the sequential loading of supplies and equipment in order to support the anticipated tactical scheme ashore. Combat loading was finally refined to the point where, if possible, all material belonging to a single organization was stowed in the same part of a ship. Because the tactical requirements for each amphibious assault were different, however, combat loading could not be standardized, and each load had to be planned by someone knowledgeable

in logistics and familiar with the scheme of maneuver for the assault phase of the operation.

Trained to cope with the specialized nature of amphibious logistics and versed in all of its myriad details was the Transport Quartermaster (TQM), a Marine officer assigned to duty aboard each amphibious assault ship. He was required to be familiar with not only the weight and dimension of each item of Marine issue that might conceivably be taken into combat, but also every characteristic of the particular ship to which he was assigned. The TQM therefore had to become familiar with the exact location of all holds and storage spaces and their dimensions in cubic and square feet. Because modifications, not shown in ships' plans, had often been made in troop cargo space of the vessel, the TQM was required to obtain an accurate remeasurement of holds, their hatches, and loading spaces.

The Marine Corps had acquired some, but not enough, practical experience in combat loading during fleet landing exercises held between 1935 and 1941. The lack of suitable transports and the uncertainty at times as to ports of embarkation and dates of availability of ships limited the full application of these doctrines in practice and prevented the Marines from gaining a real appreciation of what combat loading would be like under wartime conditions.

This lack was evident during the preparations for Guadalcanal. When the 1st Marine Division left the United States, it was headed for New Zealand, the staging area rather than the target, and most of the ships transporting division units were loaded organization-

²² RAdm Charles J. Moore ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 2May66.

ally.²³ The reason for this was because General Vandegrift and his planners had been told that the division was to "be the nucleus for the buildup of a force which would be trained for operations which might come late in 1942."²⁴ When 7 August was announced as the date for the invasion of Guadalcanal, a D-Day that was much earlier than had been expected, the division had to unload its ships at Wellington and immediately reload them for combat. Reloading was expedited and went relatively well for all groups except one, which found the 11-day period required to accomplish this task something akin to a nightmare.²⁵

At the objective, the inability of the landing force to relieve the congestion on the beaches, as men and supplies poured ashore, was as great and insoluble a problem during the war as it had been in the prewar landing exercises. Before World War II, no separate shore party organization had been established within the T/O for a Marine infantry division, with the result that labor

forces had to be drawn from the tactical units for this purpose. The mission of the latter was thus affected adversely.

In the prewar years, when a simulated enemy was introduced to add realism to a fleet landing exercise, it proved difficult to achieve the requisite order and control of the beaches. In recognition of this problem, early amphibious warfare doctrine provided for the establishment of a beach party, commanded by a naval officer entitled a Beachmaster, and a shore party—a special task organization—commanded by an officer from the landing force. Such primarily naval functions as reconnaissance and marking of beaches, marking hazards to navigation, control of boats, evacuation of casualties from the beach, and the unloading of landing force materiel from the boats were assigned to the beach party. The duties of the shore party encompassed such functions as control of stragglers and prisoners, selection and marking of routes inland, movement of supplies and equipment off the beaches, and assignment of storage and bivouac areas in the vicinity of the beach. The *Tentative Landing Operations Manual* did not stipulate the strength and composition of the shore party, but only stated that it would contain detachments from some or all of the following landing force units: medical, supply, engineer, military police, working details,²⁶ communications, and chemical warfare. Although the beach and shore parties operated independently, the manual called for their

²³ "I think that this tends to paint a better picture than actually existed. It is my recollection as the logistic staff Marine on Halsey's staff group (Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, ComSoPac at the outset), that we had until about November 1942 for build-up and training in New Zealand and therefore there was no combat loading for the 1st Division. All cargo was unloaded at Wellington and reloaded (combat load). The material for which there was no space remained in Wellington for subsequent displacement forward." BGen Joseph H. Fellows ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 25Apr66.

²⁴ Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal*, p. 249.

²⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 249–250, for the trials and tribulations of this unit.

²⁶ It is interesting to note that, although incongruous, "working details" is the exact term appearing in the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*.

commanders and personnel to observe the fullest degree of cooperation.

The solution to these deficiencies was found in 1941, when, based on the recommendations of Major General Holland M. Smith, a joint board consisting of Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard officers recommended to Rear Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, that: (1) as a component of the landing force the beach and shore parties be joined together under the title Shore Party; (2) the beach party commander be designated both as the assistant to the shore party commander and as his advisor on naval matters; and (3) the responsibility for unloading boats at the beach be transferred from the naval element to the landing force element of the shore party.²⁷

These changes were officially adopted on 1 August 1942 as *Change 2 to Fleet Training Publication 167*. Earlier that year, the size of the Marine division had been increased by adding a pioneer (shore party) battalion of 34 officers and 669 enlisted Marines. The T/O change was made on 10 January 1942, a date too late for the personnel concerned to acquire practical experience in large-scale exercises, where the techniques of handling vast quantities of supplies and the adequacy and strength of the new organization could have been tested.

At Guadalcanal, where logistical doctrine was put into practice, some glaring deficiencies were uncovered. To begin with, at that critical point in the

war, the number of ships available for the operation was limited, necessitating a careful screening of the landing force equipment that was to be carried to the target. No gear that was in excess of tactical requirements could be loaded in assault shipping, nor was there enough hold space for all of the division organic motor transport. Most of the quarter- and one-ton trucks were loaded aboard ships, but 75 percent of the heavier rolling stock was left behind with the rear echelon. When finally embarked, the Marines carried supplies for 60 days, 10 units of fire for all weapons, only enough individual gear to live and fight, and less than half of the vehicles of the division.

The Guadalcanal operation also demonstrated that an increased number of TQMs was needed to supervise all phases of loading and embarkation. In addition, events showed that boat crews well trained in seamanship and small-craft handling were required for the rapid unloading of ships, movement to the beach, and the return to the ships for other loads of cargo. Although this phase of assault landings was improved somewhat during the course of the war, comments concerning the operations of boat crews at Okinawa give rise to the observation that even at the end of the Pacific fighting there was still considerable room for improvement.²⁸

A primary source of concern at Guadalcanal on D-Day and after was the slowness with which supplies were moved from the landing craft to the beaches and then to supply dumps inland. Quite simply, General Vandegrift

²⁷ CG, LantPhibFor PrelimRpt to CinCLant on New River Exercise 4-12Aug41, dtd 27-Aug41.

²⁸ See pt II, chap 5, p. 159, *supra*.

was faced at this critical point of the operation with a manpower shortage that had been predicted during the planning phases. In view of the uncertainty of the situation on a hostile beach, he believed that he could not spare men from combat units to augment the 500 Marines in the 1st Pioneer Battalion. The mounting stack of supplies on the beaches offered a lucrative target to Rabaul-based Japanese aircraft, but fortunately for the American forces ashore, the enemy concentrated on shipping in the transport area rather than materiel on the beaches. "‘Had the Japanese set fire to the supplies towering high on the Guadalcanal beachhead,’ to quote Vandegrift, ‘the consequences might well have been incalculable and ruinous.’" ²⁹

Although enemy threats to the beachhead became negligible as the war progressed—that is, with the exception of the period of the *Kamikazes*—the logistical problems inherent in an amphibious assault landing never completely disappeared. Even under optimum conditions, such as those that existed on L-Day at Okinawa where there was no opposition to the landing, logistics problems continued to crop up from the very inception of an operation and were among the most difficult that the invasion force commanders had to solve. Quick and easy solutions were seldom if ever within grasp, for amphibious logistics has always been an immense and complex factor.

The Guadalcanal landings began the second or limited offensive period of the

war in the Pacific. "So limited was it at first, that all of our efforts for several months were exerted primarily to hold what we had taken at Guadalcanal." ³⁰ Operations in this second period were conducted chiefly in the Solomons-New Britain—Eastern New Guinea area and may be said to have lasted until November 1943. As one student of military history has written, the primary lesson of Guadalcanal "was that without the FMF, the operation could never have happened." ³¹

The United States entered the offensive period in November 1943 when the Central Pacific campaign opened with the Gilberts operation. This phase of the war was marked by growing American strength as new ships joined the fleet and additional troops became available. In November 1942, there were 69,320 Marine ground troops in the Pacific; this number increased to 100,845 a year later. ³² Marine aviation strength increased proportionately. In this third war period, vast forward area bases were constructed from which these growing forces could mount and stage for future operations.

Although the war in the South Pacific was primarily a holding action, which in the end became fully offensive in character, the Central Pacific campaign was a true offensive from the outset. The terrain of the targets here was entirely different from that experienced in the South Pacific, and the targets themselves were not only a series of "a

³⁰ Spruance, "Lecture," p. 541.

³¹ Heintz, "The USMC," p. 1320.

³² FMF Grd Status Rpts, Nov42, Nov43.

²⁹ Quoted in Isely and Crowl, *Marines and Amphibious War*, p. 132.

tiny, isolated, completely and densely fortified atolls or small islands”³³ but also larger islands such as those found in the Marianas. In the conduct of the fighting in the Central Pacific and in the selection of targets, many of Ellis’ prophecies of the 1920s became reality.

It has been accurately stated that:

If the battles of the South Pacific proved that the Fleet Marine Force was ready for war, those of the Central Pacific demonstrated its grasp and virtuosity in amphibious assault. Except for Okinawa—which was really not a part of either South or Central Pacific campaigns—the entire roll of Central Pacific battles, from Tarawa to Iwo Jima, was by necessity a series of sea-borne assaults against positions fortified and organized with every refinement that Japanese laboriousness and ingenuity could provide. To reduce such strongholds was truly amphibious warfare *a l’outrance* [to the utmost]—the assaults which the Marine Corps had foreseen and planned for during the decades of peace.³⁴

Between the invasions of Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942 and of Tarawa on 20 November 1943, Marine forces had been involved in assault operations in the Central and Northern Solomons. During the first year of offensive operations, and indeed until the end of the Pacific War, amphibious warfare doctrine was modified without seriously affecting basic principles. Two primary factors generated these modifications—increased American production and refinement of existing techniques in amphibious operations. Each of these factors had far-reaching influence on

the reassessment and transformation of the following essentials of an amphibious operation:

1. Preliminary preparation of the target [by air and naval gunfire].
2. [Air bombardment and naval gunfire] in close support of the landing.
3. Logistic support of the landing.
4. Landing craft.
5. Landing force communications.
6. Assault techniques and tactics.³⁵

Amphibious assaults were uniformly successful throughout the course of operations in the Pacific because two of the principles of war—surprise and concentration of forces—were generally followed. In the final period of the war, it became not only practicable but possible to subordinate the former to the latter because American naval and air forces had gained control of a vast area above and surrounding the targets. Consequently, objectives were sealed off and the enemy could not reinforce a garrison in the face of an impending American amphibious assault. Therefore, U. S. forces could and did sacrifice surprise without endangering any landings.

LANDING CRAFT

Increased production at home and the resultant flow of new types of weapons and equipment overseas did not materially affect the basic pattern of amphibious operations. The debarkation of Marines into landing craft from amphibious transports, the formation of as-

³³ Heinl, “The USMC,” p. 1319.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1320.

³⁵ These six arbitrary categories are those noted in *ibid.*, p. 1322.

sault waves, and the trip to the beach itself all remained essentially unchanged. New and improved amphibious vessels and vehicles, however, permitted American forces to conduct landings in a more expeditious manner.

The Fleet Marine Force pioneered in the 1930s the development and testing of landing craft, most notably the shallow-draft *Eureka*, designed by Andrew J. Higgins, a shipbuilder in New Orleans. Despite the fact that the Navy had developed an experimental type of its own, the Higgins boat "gave the greatest promise, for it could push itself aground on the beach and then retract. In fact this boat was the ancestor of the LCVP (Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel) that played an important part in the amphibious operations of World War II."³⁶ Because of its rather fragile hull, however, the Higgins boat could not negotiate the reefs offshore of many of the island targets in the Pacific, whereupon another Marine Corps-sponsored and -developed item, the amphibian tractor, originally conceived for employment in logistical support, was fully utilized as a tactical weapon.

The importance and capabilities of the versatile amtrac as a landing vehicle as well as an assault weapon were fully demonstrated at Tarawa, although they had been employed earlier in the war in the Solomons. On Guadalcanal, the amphibian tractors were used to carry cargo from ship to shore, and once on the island, the artillery employed them

in the role of prime movers. "Once in position, however, the gunners found the amphibian was a creature of mixed virtues; tracked vehicles tore up comm wire, creating early the pattern of combat events that became too familiar to plagued wiremen."³⁷ The amtrac began its career on Guadalcanal in a modest manner, and its "usefulness exceeded all expectations";³⁸ nobody, however, envisioned using the weird vehicle in much more than a cargo-carrying capacity.

After Tarawa, however, "Never again in the Pacific War were assault troops to be handicapped by serious shortages of this vital piece of equipment."³⁹ Amphibian tractors were later armored and armed with guns, howitzers, and flame-throwers, and utilized to carry the assault wave into the beachhead.

Also making its first appearance in a Central Pacific campaign was the DUKW. Developed for the Army to serve as ship-to-shore cargo and troop transfer vehicles where harbor facilities were inadequate, the value of this amphibian truck was initially exhibited at Kwajalein, where it transported supplies and equipment—mainly artillery and ammunition—to the beaches. When ashore, the DUKWs also supplemented the organic motor transport of the land-

³⁷ Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal*, p. 256.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 256n. Not everybody was enthused about the amtrac, for, according to General Pfeiffer, Admiral Turner "... recommended no further amtracs because they rusted on the beach at Guadalcanal. . . ." Pfeiffer *ltr.*

³⁹ Isely and Crowl, *Marines and Amphibious War*, p. 583.

³⁶ King and Whitehill, *King's Naval Record*, p. 320.

ing force in support of the operation.⁴⁰ In all Marine operations in the Pacific after Kwajalein, Army DUKW companies, and Marine DUKW companies in the later stages, were attached to the divisions involved.

British developmental experiments with seagoing landing ships furnished the United States with an insight to solving the problem of getting amphibious forces and all of their combat gear ashore in as complete a package as possible. The most important of the larger landing vessels developed in the war was the LST, which quickly attained a reputation for being "the workhorse of the amphibious fleet."⁴¹

Although hydrographic conditions in the Central Pacific often prevented LSTs from reaching the shore to load or unload their cargoes, these vessels were ideally suited as sea-going transports for DUKWs and amtracs, which could easily offload into the water from the huge LST bow ramp. At the staging area for the Marianas invasions, assault troops and amphibian vehicles were carried to the target on LSTs for the first time in the Central Pacific. This proce-

dure became commonplace in later World War II amphibious assaults in this area.

Depending on how and for what purpose they had been modified, LSTs were employed as offshore radar stations, repair ships, and hospital ships. They were also used as floating platforms from which small spotter planes were launched and recovered by Brodie Gear, which may very roughly be compared to a giant slingshot.

American adoption and further modification of yet another type of landing craft, the LCI, also resulted from earlier British experimentation. Initially employed with ramps on either side of the bow for the rapid offloading of infantry troops at or close to the beach, coral outcroppings fringing the island objectives in the Central Pacific prohibited their employment as originally conceived. The LCIs were then converted to gunboats and rocket and mortar boats, and were assigned to the gunfire support group of the amphibious landing force for the purpose of providing close-in fire support of the landing. They first appeared in this role during the invasion of the Treasury Islands.

Both tactical and logistical requirements gave impetus to the development of a family of various types of landing craft and to the modification and improvement of those already in production and service. The considerations of basic amphibious doctrine were constant factors when the configuration and future uses of new types of landing craft were being determined. Fundamentally, these craft had to give the ship-to-shore movement greater power and flexibility and expedite the landing of the supplies

⁴⁰ The DUKW "was valuable only to the extent that nothing else was available to the artillery. It was rated at 5,000 pounds capacity in moderate surf. The 105mm howitzer weighed 5,000 pounds all by itself. Consequently, we had to overload to get a skeleton crew, a limited amount of ammunition, howitzer, and section gear in one DUKW. Until DUKWs were modified to transport the 105, we had to beat out the sides to get the piece aboard. The only reason that artillery used this vehicle was because the amphibian tractors were always assigned to the infantry." LtCol Robert C. Hilliard comments on draft ms, dtd 9Dec65.

⁴¹ Isely and Crowl, *op. cit.*, p. 583.

and equipment belonging to and in support of the landing force.

COMMUNICATIONS

Other technical innovations, which modified but left unchanged amphibious doctrine and helped to improve the control of ship-to-shore movement and operations ashore, appeared in the field of communications. Improved communications procedure and the development of highly sophisticated radio equipment, which was better suited for employment in amphibious operations than that which had been available at the beginning of the war, soon emerged as a result of the lessons learned in battle.

The most critical period of all in an amphibious assault is immediately before and during the ship-to-shore movement. It is at this time that effective command control over scattered subordinate units is difficult to maintain, especially without an optimum communications performance. Many factors led to a communications breakdown at various times at Tarawa. The interrupted contact between the attack force commander's flagship and the forces ashore was one that was fraught with the most dangerous consequences. After Tarawa, few such breakdowns recurred because of the introduction into the Pacific of the amphibious force flagship (AGC, which stands for Auxiliary General Communications).

That new type of naval auxiliary . . . had been improvised for Admiral Hewitt in the Salerno operation because the network of communications in modern amphibious warfare had become so vast and complicated, and the officers and men

necessary to staff amphibious force headquarters so numerous, that no ordinary combatant or auxiliary ship could hold them.⁴²

Along with the improved control of operations overall provided by the equipment and facilities of the AGC was an attempt to ensure that no communications gap would again occur in amphibious assault. To gain this assurance control craft bristling with the most modern communications equipment available were stationed at the line of departure. Not only did these craft organize, control, and shepherd to the beachhead the vessels and amphibious vehicles comprising the initial assault wave, but they also coordinated the landing of subsequent waves.

Technical refinements and modern, up-to-date equipment served together to make an amphibious assault a smoothly functioning and relatively simple type of operation. At the end of the war most if not all kinks had been ironed out. By 1945, testing and practice under combat conditions had given American commanders improved and coordinated supporting arms, close air support, and naval gunfire support systems.

SUPPORTING ARMS

Because coordination and control figure so importantly in the conduct of an amphibious operation, every effort was

⁴² Samuel Eliot Morison, *Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1942–April 1944—History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, v. VII (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), p. 207, hereafter Morison, *Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls*.

bent in developing all of the tools and techniques that would make each venture a complete success. Coordination of all three elements of the amphibious force and especially the three supporting arms—air, artillery, and naval gunfire—was vital. The communications failure at Tarawa provided the medium in which the Joint Assault Signal Company was nurtured. The nucleus of Army, Marine, and Navy communications personnel around which the JASCO was formed came from fire support ships, air liaison parties, and shore fire control parties. The JASCO, employed only in the course of amphibious operations, served as a single administrative and housekeeping unit for the naval gunfire teams, air liaison parties, and shore party communication teams required by a division during an assault landing. Just prior to and in the course of operations, all of these teams were parcelled out by attachment to the rifle regiments and battalions of the division. The establishment of the JASCOs resulted in a reduction in personnel and operational requirements of their former parent organizations, because the JASCO required fewer skilled communicators who, by employing uniform techniques and radio procedures, reduced the amount of unnecessary traffic and thus unclogged previously overworked radio circuits.

Complementing the JASCOs and also providing an additional measure of coordination and control to the conduct of the amphibious operation were land-based fire support coordination centers (FSCCs), which appeared for the first

time in the war at Iwo Jima.⁴³ The establishment of the coordination centers ashore simply was an extension to a point closer to the scene of action of the control exercised aboard the AGC by the task force commander, and permitted a more rapid response to the requests of the infantry unit commanders, although it did not always work out that way. At Okinawa, final authority for the allocation and selection of supporting fires was vested in the artillery representative in the Target Information Center, who generally made his decision in accordance with the advice and recommendations of the representatives of air and naval gunfire.

From the Marine Corps point of view, air support of ground troops by Marine pilots flying Marine aircraft never reached a satisfactory level during the Pacific War. In fact, many World War II Marine aviation commanders considered that their squadrons, groups, and wings were never employed to maximum capability with respect to their tactical functions from a time immediately after Guadalcanal until the Philippines and Okinawa campaigns. In late 1943 and the early months of 1944, tedium and boredom were the order for Marine pilots who, day after day, flew the so-called "Bougainville Milk Run," or bombed and rebombed oft-attacked

⁴³ According to Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., former 3d Marine Division Naval Gunfire Officer, "What we had on Iwo was just a single small-size blackout tent where we kept a modest situation map, a few radio remotes, and our whiskey. The 3d Division was the only unit that did this; neither of the other divisions was that institutionalized." Col Robert D. Heinl, Jr., ltr to CMC, dtd 27May66.

atolls and islets that were in the backwash of the war. It may have been good experience for young Marine aviators, but it wasn't the type of combat for which they had been trained.

The situation improved with the assignment of Marine squadrons to the Philippines and Okinawa operations. Attached to MacArthur's forces, the Marines amassed an outstanding record of successful and fruitful close air support missions, and proselytized a number of Army commanders who had not previously been aware of the capabilities of this supporting arm. During Okinawa, close air support was flown for the most part by carrier-based Navy flyers, while Marine pilots of TAF flew combat air patrols and provided the air defense of the island. Although these TAF aviators did the most to blunt the *Kamikaze* threat and downed a creditable if not entirely confirmed number of enemy planes, they still did not fulfill what has come to be recognized as the primary mission of Marine aviation, close air support of Marine ground troops.

The request that Marines support Marines was not based on pride of service alone, as some have suggested—Marine ground commanders were happy to receive air support from any source, provided it came in immediate response to the initial request and did the job for which it had been requested. A less-than-completely satisfactory performance in these two aspects of air support served as the crux of Marine dissatisfaction with the type of support they received until late in the war. This discontent was very strongly voiced in the operations and action reports following the Marianas campaign, where Marine com-

manders noted that Navy control procedure was relatively inflexible and caused long, needless delays between the request for a mission and its final execution. Another cause for aggravation was that these missions were controlled by naval officers on board ship and out of realistic touch with the situation ashore.

In the Guam campaign, the most critical area of air support operations was communications. Requests for air strikes originated with air liaison parties assigned to each infantry battalion and regiment, and had to be approved up the chain of command and by both division headquarters and the Commander, Support Aircraft, Attack Force. Only one radio circuit, the Support Air Direction net, was made available for these requests, and it was crowded at all times. Additionally, "very few close support strikes were carried out on time or within limits set by requesting agencies" for "the time consumed in request, processing, approval, and final execution was generally 45 minutes to an hour or more."⁴⁴ Despite the belief of the Commander, Support Aircraft at Guam that "the time spent [was] justified by the success of the missions, ground units generally asked for more immediate control of planes by air liaison officers and for a method of operations and system of communications that would ensure a faster response to the needs of assault troops."⁴⁵

Concluding that air liaison parties should have more direct contact with supporting planes, the Commander, Support Aircraft, Pacific Fleet, backed

⁴⁴ Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, *Central Pacific Drive*, p. 574.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

the Marines in his comments on air operations in the Marianas.⁴⁶ He also called attention to the need for greater understanding "on the one hand by the Ground Forces of the capabilities and limitations of aircraft, and on the other hand by the pilots of what they are supposed to accomplish."⁴⁷ The problem of control was eased somewhat at Iwo and Okinawa, where Marine LFASCUs and the ALPs were given greater authority and provided a quicker response to the requests of infantry commanders, but full control remained with the command ship-based Navy CASCUs for the greater portion of these two operations.

One Marine demand that was never completely answered was to have Marine squadrons in support of the infantry from the outset of an amphibious assault. At the end of the war, and then too late for their full employment, some Marine escort carriers appeared in the Pacific. Marine close air support techniques and operations never reached full fruition during the war. Not until Korea, where the experience gained in World War II and in postwar landing exercises was tested in the crucible of combat, did Marines fly close support missions for other Marines for any considerable period.

The operations leading to the capture of Tarawa provided the source of many lessons learned, not the least of which was the importance of the role of naval gunfire in an assault on a strongly de-

fended island. Although this should have been apparent, American commanders learned that in order to soften up the target for a landing, the preliminary bombardment had to be heavier and sustained for a longer period than had been the case in previous operations. More importantly, task force commanders learned that:

. . . the Japanese shore battery could be attacked at short range with reasonable impunity; ships could 'fight forts,' at least Japanese forts; and no longer would the concept of gunfire support in the Central Pacific require that ships maneuver at high speeds while firing at long range; indeed the opposite was recommended by Admiral Hill when he suggested that destroyers operate close enough to the beach to use their 40mm.⁴⁸

What this meant was that in order to reduce casualties—especially during the assault phase—enemy emplacements would have to be destroyed rather than just neutralized. This concept was a complete reversal of naval gunfire doctrine to that time. Another significant lesson learned about naval gunfire support at Tarawa was "the vital necessity of reducing the time lag between the lifting of fires and the touchdown of the leading wave in order to reduce the opportunity of the defender to recover from the shock of the bombardment. . . ." ⁴⁹ All in all, "the lessons of Tarawa showed the 'doubting Thomas' that effective gunfire support required a thorough knowledge of the gunnery problem. . . ." ⁵⁰ Essentially, in view of the nature

⁴⁶ ComSptAirPacRpt of Ops in Spt of the Capture of the Marianas, dtd 11Sep44, p. 30 (OAB, NHD).

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁴⁸ Col Donald M. Weller, "Salvo—Splash!" *USNI Proceedings*, v. 80, no. 8 (Aug54), p. 839.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 849.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

of Japanese island redoubts in the Central Pacific scheduled for future attack, the performance of naval gunfire support had to improve greatly.

One step taken along these lines was the establishment of a shore bombardment training program at Pearl Harbor in September–October 1943. Kahoolawe Island in the Hawaiian group was utilized as a bombardment range at which both fire support ships and their crews and shore fire control parties practiced naval gunfire support techniques that were to prove successful in subsequent operations. According to one observer, the Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Forces, Pacific Fleet:

... took quite a hard-boiled attitude toward an unsatisfactory performance over this course—and no destroyer went into the forward area without demonstrating proficiency at Kahoolawe.⁵¹

Marine commanders never disputed the importance of naval gunfire in support of a landing, and acknowledged its dominant position in comparison with the other supporting arms available to ground forces. "This dominance can be measured by various yardsticks such as weight of fire, rapidity of response, all-weather capability, economy, uninterrupted availability, and peak power during the beach assault itself."⁵² Once artillery is ashore, however, it becomes the dominant arm. In general, landing force commanders wanted all of the naval gunfire support they could get; three notable occasions when ground

commanders were amply supported were the Marshalls, Guam, and Okinawa.

The amount of naval gunfire available for other operations was limited, however, by certain considerations. For example, during the early stages of the war at Guadalcanal, the threat to the landing by the Japanese fleet forced the U. S. task force commander to reduce the strength of the support force by diverting some ships to stem that threat. At Iwo, a portion of the fleet was assigned to cover the carrier strikes on Tokyo in order to reduce the *Kamikaze* menace. These, among others, were the reasons given for the fact that the landing forces could not get all of the NGF support that they wanted and needed.

Finally, naval gunfire preparation of an objective prior to a designated D-Day was necessarily limited early in the war in order to maintain the principle of surprise. American naval superiority in the latter stages of the fighting permitted the sacrifice of surprise without endangering an assault landing. It was not only superior strength that allowed tactical and even strategic surprise to be subordinated to ensure the capture of the beachhead. Improvement in the techniques of employment and delivery of naval gunfire did much to guarantee the success of an operation.

Following Tarawa, naval gunfire doctrine was thoroughly reappraised. As pointed out earlier, one conclusion reached was that while area fire could be employed for neutralization in the pre-landing period on the morning of a D-Day, it could not effectively destroy enemy gun positions and well-constructed defenses. In order for NGF to

⁵¹ Weller, *op. cit.*, *USNI Proceedings*, v. 80, no. 9 (Sep54), p. 1017.

⁵² Col Robert D. Heinl, Jr., "The Gun Gap and How to Close It," *USNI Proceedings*, v. 91, no. 9 (Sep65), p. 28.

perform its primary task, it was vital that support ships "deliver prolonged deliberate destructive pinpoint fire against known or suspected difficult targets."⁵³ Accordingly, gunfire support vessels, including battleships, would have to move in close to the beaches. At Kwajalein, NGF was delivered at constantly closing ranges, down to 1,800 yards. Samuel Eliot Morison quotes a conversation that allegedly occurred on the task force flagship bridge after Admiral Turner had given orders for the fire support ships to close the range:

"C.O. of a battleship: 'I can't take my ship in that close.'

Turner: 'What's your armor for? Get in there!'"⁵⁴

A direct result of the lessons learned at Tarawa was the successful and rapid capture of Kwajalein with significantly smaller losses. Subsequent amphibious operations in the Pacific benefitted similarly. The conduct of amphibious assaults in the period following the Gilberts campaign was so vastly improved and the techniques of amphibious warfare refined to such a degree that, in less than a year after Tarawa was secured, Marines landed on Tinian on 24 July 1944 in what Admiral Spruance considered "was, perhaps, the most brilliantly conceived and executed amphibious operation of the War."⁵⁵ General Holland M. Smith, commander of the Expeditionary Troops for both Saipan and Tinian, called the latter one of those

"enterprises . . . that . . . become models of their kind. . . . If such a tactical superlative can be used to describe a military maneuver, where the result brilliantly consummated the planning and performance, Tinian was the perfect amphibious operation in the Pacific war."⁵⁶

Close on the heels of the end of the Marianas campaign came the bitterly fought battles in the Philippines and on Iwo Jima and Okinawa. The successful amphibious assault at each of these targets was a logical culmination of all lessons learned since Guadalcanal and demonstrated a determination not to repeat earlier mistakes and shortcomings.

Viewing the Pacific War,⁵⁷ Admiral Spruance speculated on three factors that stand out in the development of naval warfare. These were the great growth of carrier strength, the improved ability to make amphibious landings against heavy resistance, and the increased capacity for logistical support of the fleet at ever-increasing distances from Pearl Harbor. One can charge the Marines' success in the conduct of amphibious warfare to the same three factors. Vital to all this, however, was the development of new techniques and refinement of the old which neither blindly adhered to basic amphibious warfare doctrine nor completely disregarded it either. This thesis best describes the foundations of the strategy leading to victory.

⁵³ Isely and Crowl, *Marines and Amphibious War*, p. 587.

⁵⁴ Morison, *Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls*, p. 260n.

⁵⁵ Spruance, "Lecture," p. 550.

⁵⁶ Gen Holland M. Smith and Percy Finch, *Coral and Brass* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), p. 181, hereafter Smith and Finch, *Coral and Brass*.

⁵⁷ Spruance, "Lecture," pp. 554-555.

THE JAPANESE

But what of the enemy? In the Pacific, the Allies faced a fantastically implacable, determined, and aggressive foe, who had a strong capability for organizing the ground and constructing defensive works of great strength.

As individual soldiers and small unit fighters, the Japanese were probably unsurpassed in courage and tenacity, but these attributes were not complemented by effective tactical direction. Although the Japanese Army had good field artillery, the support of a flexible artillery organization was lacking. After the loss of Guadalcanal, the Japanese ground troops were denied anything that even resembled effective air support and for all practical purposes, the Japanese were unable to maintain an air offensive that was even worthy of the name. By the end of the Gilberts operation, and certainly by the time that Saipan was invaded, the island outposts defending the Empire had been completely isolated and beyond any hope of reinforcement.

American amphibious assaults in the Central Pacific rapidly took on a pattern which seldom varied throughout the rest of the war. This program was set by the generally small size of the objective combined with the high density and great strength of the defense, particularly at the beachhead. The classic example of this, perhaps, is Peleliu. Once American and Japanese forces were in contact, the determination of the enemy to fight until death and the impregnability of his defenses tended to neutralize the overwhelming fire superiority of the Americans. "This forced our riflemen, with some assistance from

combat engineers and tanks to assume the cruelly expensive task of literal extermination of all resistance, long after any hope of vital victory remained to the Japanese."⁵⁸ This conclusion is particularly valid in relation to Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, and certainly the latter, where General Ushijima's *Thirty-second Army* "extracted the maximum cost for our victory."⁵⁹ In an attempt to salvage something in the face of impending defeat, the Japanese finally resorted to the program of *Kamikaze* attacks in the hope that resulting American losses would force the United States to tire of the war and end it. Although U. S. casualties mounted as a direct result of these attacks, the war effort was not deterred.

The myth of enemy invincibility, and his reputation for cunning and ruthlessness emerged from the record of the Japanese Army in China in the 1930s, the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, and the relative ease of initial Japanese conquests in Southeast Asia. Marine Corps attitudes towards the enemy were first formed in Shanghai and later tempered in combat at Guadalcanal. The Marine estimate of the opponent basically took two forms. The first was that the Japanese could be defeated by employing their own tactics against them, and by becoming as adept as the enemy in jungle warfare. The Marines were not novices in fighting in the tropics, for many of the regulars had received their baptism of fire in the Banana Wars. The second attitude, one of deep mistrust, was

⁵⁸ Col Donald M. Weller, "Firepower and the Amphibious Assault," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 36, no. 3 (Mar52), p. 56.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

based on a number of incidents which had occurred in the early days of the war in the Philippines and at Guadalcanal.

One specific episode at the root of this mistrust which strongly affected the Marine temper when it became known was the unfortunate Goettge Patrol on Guadalcanal.⁶⁰ As soon as the particulars of what had happened to the patrol reached the rest of the division:

. . . hatred for the Japanese seared the heart of the Marine Corps. This episode . . . followed by devious trickery, such as playing dead before tossing a grenade, made it difficult to indoctrinate Marines on Guadalcanal and later with the necessity of taking prisoners of war for the purpose of gaining information. Such an attitude, combined with the adamant refusal of most Japanese to surrender under any circumstances, hobbled intelligence work in the field.⁶¹

Repercussions stemming from the knowledge of this event continued as long as the Pacific War lasted.

With each succeeding Pacific amphibious assault, more chinks and defects in

the Japanese military system were exposed and exploited. The step-by-step process by which the enemy was defeated cost the Americans dearly, but in the end, Japanese attrition was the heavier. Perhaps no fighting men in the war suffered so much as those who comprised the pitiful remnants of the once-proud Japanese units that retreated from Guadalcanal, those that withdrew from Cape Gloucester to Rabaul, and others that withered on the vine on the bypassed islands of the Pacific. Once Japanese fortunes waned and the American offensive began to roll, these forces were neither reinforced, replenished, nor succored. Collectively, they were indeed a forlorn hope in the most descriptive sense of this term.

Other factors in addition to the effective application of the doctrine of amphibious warfare and subsequent refinements strongly influenced the Marine Corps role in the Pacific War. Such considerations as the strength and organization of Marine divisions and aircraft wings, combat developments and tactical innovations, and improved and new weaponry together provided the bases leading to a successful conclusion of each campaign to which Marine Corps units were committed.

⁶⁰ See Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal*, p. 281, for the story of this patrol.

⁶¹ Isely and Crowl, *Marines and Amphibious War*, p. 138.

A Final Accounting¹

The intent of the five-volume *History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II*—of which this is the final volume in the series—is the comprehensive presentation of Marine Corps participation in the Pacific War. Because of the emphasis on operations, the administrative aspect of the wartime growth and development of the FMF has received less than full treatment heretofore. It would be difficult and inappropriate to attempt in this one chapter either to depict the many changes in the nature, composition, and mission of Marine Corps units in the war, to describe fully unit activations, deactivations, and consolidations, or to evaluate the causes and effects of changes in amphibious doctrine mentioned briefly in the previous chapter.

These five volumes would be less than complete, however, without some accounting of the role of the Commandant and Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) in the war effort. Under the provisions of General Order 241—the charter for the Fleet Marine Force—the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) was to maintain the Marine expeditionary force in readiness for oper-

ations with the fleet, as the force was to be part of the fleet for “tactical employment.” The Commandant also was to designate the units comprising the FMF and which were to be under his command except when embarked with the fleet or when engaged in fleet exercises. At the onset of World War II, therefore, the Commandant did control the FMF, or parts of it. The outbreak of the war changed this command relationship for all practical purposes, primarily because most of the FMF was operating essentially under the tactical direction of fleet commanders. Thereafter, the CMC was responsible only for Marine Corps administration and planning, and had no operational control over FMF units. But the manner in which he provided the FMF with fully trained and equipped Marines and the most modern tools available cannot be overemphasized.

It is possible that many Marines in the islands thought that HQMC operated in a vacuum because Washington was so far away from the combat zone. This view was sometimes believed justified because it seemed to take so long for HQMC to respond to a request or inquiry from the field. The truth is, however, that both Generals Holcomb and Vandegrift kept fully abreast of all developments that concerned their Marines and, depending upon what was required by field units, they responded to those requirements with appropriate

¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: *CMC Rpts*, 1940–1945; *USMC Admin Hist*; Condit, Diamond, and Turnbladh, *Marine Corps Training*; Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal*; Isely and Crowl, *Marines and Amphibious War*; Shaw and Kane, *Isolation of Rabaul*.

and decisive action. CMC decisions could and did involve such varied yet allied matters as personnel, training, and logistics.

Assisting the Commandant was a Headquarters staff, which, like the rest of the Corps, expanded throughout the war. Headquarters Marine Corps had been located in the "New Navy Building," on Constitution Avenue, Washington, D. C., until November 1941, when it moved to the Navy Department Annex in Arlington, Virginia. Built before World War II as an archives storage building and later taken over by the Navy, the Navy Annex overlooks Arlington National Cemetery and commands a fine panoramic view of the skyline of the nation's capital.

At the beginning of the war, the Commandant had a planning staff in the Division of Plans and Policies (irreverently known as "Pots and Pans") and its subordinate sections, and an administrative, technical, supply, and operating staff in the following HQMC staff agencies: Adjutant and Inspector's Department, Quartermaster Department, Paymaster Department, Division of Reserve, Division of Public Relations, Division of Personnel, and Division of Aviation.

Following the outbreak of World War II, the overall growth of Headquarters Marine Corps, together with the initiation of the Women's Reserve program and general wartime requirements, made it necessary to revamp the headquarters structure and bring the Marine personnel under some sort of centralized administrative control. To this end, a Headquarters Battalion, Headquarters Marine Corps, was

formed on 1 April 1943. In July, it was redesignated as the 1st Headquarters Battalion, and a 2d Headquarters Battalion was activated. These two units functioned to administer the great number of additional military personnel who had been assigned to HQMC staffs.

Perhaps the most important staff section at HQMC throughout the war was the Division of Plans and Policies, which came into being as a result of the redesignation of the Division of Operations and Training on 21 April 1939. This move was made in preparation for a possible war in view of the deterioration of international relations at this time. To dwell on the importance of this division is not to derogate the equally important role played by other headquarters staff agencies. A brief narration will show how its functions vitally affected almost every facet of other HQMC staff activities and responsibilities.

The Division of Plans and Policies formulated Marine Corps policy and developed plans for personnel, intelligence, operations, supply, equipment, and training, and maintained liaison regarding these and other Marine Corps matters with various government agencies. To facilitate the operations of the division, it had four staff sections of its own: M-1, personnel; M-2, intelligence; M-3, operations; and M-4, supply.² A fifth section, M-5, was established on 27 March 1944 to provide more active supervision and coordination of all phases of basic and advanced Marine

² On 24 February 1945, the designations M-1, M-2, *etc.*, were changed to the more common G-1, G-2, *etc.*

Corps training, except that conducted by aviation organizations—which came under the Division of Aviation—and that conducted by combat organizations—which remained the exclusive purview of the M-3 Section. Until its disbandment on 6 May 1945, the M-5 Section continued to supervise all Marine Corps training activity within the United States.

Understandably the most important section in "Pots and Pans" was the M-3 Section, which had cognizance over the following matters: war plans, tactical doctrine, FMF organization, aviation planning (with the Division of Aviation), equipment (with M-4 and M-5), FMF personnel allowances and priorities, troop movements, maneuvers (with M-5), chemical warfare doctrine, statistical reporting on location and strength of units, security and passive defense, signal security, assignment of radio frequencies and call signs, codes and ciphers, training of combat organizations, and maintenance of liaison with major agencies of Headquarters Marine Corps and the other Services.

As the war progressed, the ranks of this and other HQMC staffs expanded in pace with the expansion in the number and diversity of FMF units in the field. Many if not most of the staff billets were filled with combat veterans who provided the Commandant and his assistants with valuable knowledge based on their actual experiences in the Pacific. Following each amphibious assault landing in which Marine Corps units participated, a raft of special action reports flowed in to Headquarters Marine Corps to be reviewed, analyzed, and their most important and

salient points published and sent to field units for their information and use. In these and other ways, Headquarters Marine Corps played a most vital role in supporting the FMF.

PERSONNEL AND TRAINING

Even before it appeared that a war was imminent, the Marine Corps was fulfilling its mission in national defense. The 1930s saw the development of the doctrine of amphibious warfare and of the tools and techniques to be employed in amphibious assaults. The outbreak of war created an undeniable demand for troops in ever-increasing numbers, an expansion of existing organizations and facilities and the activation of a variety of new ones, and the development of modern weaponry to be employed by Marines in combat. The Marine Corps was as sensitive and responsive as the other Services to these demands, and it was incumbent upon the Commandant to meet them as far as the Corps was concerned.

With the publication of the Presidential declaration of a limited national emergency on 8 September 1939, and of an unlimited national emergency nearly two years later on 27 May 1941, Marine Corps strength was expanded dramatically. The July 1941 strength of the Corps was 53,886; a year later, after the Pearl Harbor attack impelled a flock of volunteers to rush to recruiting stations to enlist, Marine Corps strength had increased to 143,388.

In the months prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, the Marine Corps processed approximately 2,000 recruits a month; following that date, 20,000 men

were joined each month. By 1 March 1942, recruit depot housing as well as facilities at other major Marine bases were filled to overflowing. At this time, the Marine Corps was forced to reduce its manpower input to approximately 8,000 men monthly until additional land could be acquired and housing built.³

To meet training requirements and house the burgeoning ranks of the Marine Corps, the Commandant took steps to purchase additional land on both the east and west coasts of the United States. A divisional training site of 113,000 acres, later to be called Camp Pendleton, was purchased at Oceanside, California. The Marine Corps bought 150,000 acres in the same state at Niland for an artillery firing range, and land for a parachute training site at Santee, near San Diego.

In addition, in mid-1940, Camp Elliott—near San Diego—was activated, “. . . and in operation for a considerable time prior to the acquisition of Camp Pendleton.”⁴ The following year, this new base housed west coast FMF elements and also serviced as an advanced training base. Until that time, the recruit depot at San Diego had provided room for all of these services besides fulfilling its basic mission of training Marine recruits. Because of the accelerated Marine Corps expansion, San Diego became too crowded and the opening of Elliott fortunately relieved the pressure. Initially, this camp was able to handle the vastly increased advanced training load on the west coast;

later, as this load was increased further, the camp was expanded and developed to many times its original size to meet ballooning needs. From the time the 2d Marine Division was activated to the date of its departure to the Pacific, it called Elliott's 29,000 acres home. It also became the base for the first Marine Corps tank training center and the infantry training center for numerous Pacific-bound replacement drafts.

On the east coast, Quantico had assumed an important position in the development of Marine amphibious doctrine and techniques, and in the training of Marine officers and technicians during the period between wars. The advent of the national emergency soon made it apparent that Quantico could not expand physically to continue these activities, all of which were rapidly growing and intensifying in scope, and at the same time serve as home base for east coast FMF activities. This was especially true in view of the fact that operational forces were to reach division size. Parris Island was hard put to maintain its own recruit training program and could do little to relieve the pressure. The only answer to this problem was to construct an entirely new and extensive base for FMF activities on the eastern seaboard. Congressional approval on 15 February 1941 led to the selection of a site in the New River-Neuse River area of North Carolina.

Shortly after its maneuvers in the Caribbean in the summer of 1941, the understrength 1st Marine Division moved into Tent Camp #1, Marine Barracks, New River, N.C. From this base, which was redesignated Camp

³ *CMC Rpts*, 1941, 1942.

⁴ Gen O. P. Smith ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 3 May 66.

Lejeune on 20 December 1942,⁵ the division participated in a series of amphibious exercises, one with the Army 1st Infantry Division, the first of four Army divisions to receive such training jointly with Marine units or under the direction of Marine officers.

Like the division, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing soon outgrew its quarters at Quantico, even before it gained full strength. At the same time that the base at New River was being developed, the Marine Corps obtained authorization to construct a new air base nearby. Cunningham Field, Cherry Point, North Carolina, was designated a Marine Corps Air Station for development purposes on 1 December 1941. When it was commissioned on 20 May 1942, it had become a vast new base that was capable of handling the greatest part of a completely built-up Marine aircraft wing.

Similarly on the west coast, burgeoning Marine Corps aviation strength required the facilities to handle the new squadrons and training organizations. Accordingly, the following Marine Corps Air Stations—all in California—were commissioned: Santa Barbara, 4 December 1942; Mojave, 1 January 1943; El Toro, 17 March 1943; and El Centro, 23 July 1943. In addition, a number of satellite air facilities were built on both coasts to handle the overflow as well as to conduct specialized training of squadrons permanently or temporarily based on the larger stations.

Paralleling the acquisition of new training sites and the construction of

facilities thereon was the attempt to meet the demand for trained commissioned and enlisted personnel for both general and specialist duties. With the expansion of Marine Corps strength, there was a comparable development in the training program.

By the time that the United States had entered the war, the main patterns of Marine Corps recruit training to be employed for the duration had evolved. The basic principles underlying recruit training in 1939 changed little in the war years, except for the amount of time allotted to the training cycle. Before the national emergency was declared in September 1939, boot camp lasted eight weeks. Following that time, and until the authorized strength figure of 25,000 enlisted Marines had been reached at the end of January 1940, the training period was accelerated and new Marines entering service from September 1939–January 1940 received only four weeks of recruit training.

Beginning in February 1940, with the attainment of the manning level, it was possible to lengthen the training cycle first to six and then to seven weeks. In 1944, the Marine Corps reverted to an eight-week schedule. The program promulgated by Headquarters Marine Corps provided that each recruit spend his first three weeks in the Corps training at the main station of either Parris Island or San Diego, the fourth to sixth weeks on the rifle range, and the last two weeks of boot camp back at the main station. This schedule represented 421 hours of training, broken down as follows: 195 devoted to weapons instruction, 39 to physical training, 89 to garrison subjects, and 98 to field subjects.

⁵ *G-3 OpD*, Dec42, p. 36.

In July 1944, the final wartime change was made in training recruits; 36 additional hours of weapons training were included in the eight-week cycle without lengthening it.

From Pearl Harbor to V-J Day, the Marine Corps Recruit Depots at Parris Island and San Diego trained approximately 450,000 new Marines. This is only an approximation because, while there is no actual recruit depot output figure available, all recruits had to go through boot camp before they could be sent to the FMF or other Marine Corps activities, and this number is close to the enlisted strength of the Corps near the end of the war. At the recruit depots, training in the nomenclature, functioning, and handling of weapons, physical conditioning, and instruction in combat field subjects were emphasized. The primary effort of the recruit depots was to transform raw civilians into basically trained Marines, and pass them on to the FMF or to replacement training centers for intensive combat training, or send them to schools for specialized training.

TRAINING REPLACEMENTS

Marine Corps policy in World War II was to replace combat losses on an individual basis. That is, rather than allow committed units to become reduced in size and combat effectiveness because of casualties, it was determined to send replacement battalions of trained Marines to the combat area. Once there, these battalions would be disbanded and individual Marines fed into the units that had been hit hard in the fighting. It was believed that this system would

obviate the necessity of withdrawing from combat a unit that had suffered heavy losses. Replacement battalions were also the source of men to fill gaps in deployed units caused by rotation of veterans to the States.

On 22 May 1942, after the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions had been trained and prepared for movement overseas, the Commandant directed that training centers be activated at New River and San Diego. Infantry training of replacements began first on the west coast at Camp Elliott, where the 2d Replacement Battalion was formed on 1 September 1942. This battalion's training was limited to two weeks of physical conditioning only. It should be noted that, from the very beginning of the replacement battalion program to the end of the war, replacement battalions were purely administrative organizations formed to train and expedite the movement of replacements overseas.

Basically, the function of the training centers was to prepare both specialist and infantry replacements to take their places in combat organizations. Accordingly, the training programs at these centers stressed conditioning marches and field exercises, and such subjects as techniques of individual combat, cover and concealment, field fortification, sniper and infiltration tactics and countermeasures, individual and crew-served infantry weapons, jungle warfare, small unit tactics, and amphibious training. In short, the training centers taught FMF-bound Marines all that they should know to enable them to take their places in tactical units in the field.

Although the syllabi of the infantry training centers were designed to reflect the needs of the FMF, and while the programs should have provided the FMF with well-trained infantry replacements, this often was not the case. As late in the war as the Iwo Jima operation, reports from the field indicated that in too many instances, replacements failed to measure up to expected standards in combat. Commenting on the inadequacies of replacements during the battle for Iwo Jima, the commander of the 27th Marines pointed out that "replacements were certainly unsatisfactory. . . . Having had little or no previous combat training, they were more or less bewildered and in many cases were slow in leaving their foxholes." ⁶

Replacements failed to meet combat requirements for several reasons. In one instance, the replacement training program was not originally designed to train a man so thoroughly that he could join a strange FMF unit while it was *in combat*. It had been anticipated that replacements would join combat units in rest and rehabilitation areas during the interval between operations. Then they could be integrated under optimum conditions, a prerequisite for reasons of training, morale building, and to imbue them with unit spirit. It was important that replacements and combat veterans alike became acquainted and learned what to expect of each other.

Anticipated heavy losses during the Marianas operations raised the need to replace casualties while units were still

fighting. Specifically, after the plans for the invasion of Saipan had been completed and the invasion was underway, the G-1 annex was reconsidered and provisions for the immediate acquisition of replacements inserted.⁷

The heavy losses sustained by the 1st Marines during the first week of the assault on Peleliu served to confirm the necessity for planning for the replacement of casualty losses during a combat situation. Beginning with the Iwo Jima operation, each division was provided initially with two replacement drafts, the personnel of which were to be used first to augment the shore party and then to be released as individual combat replacements when needed. These same provisions were made for the Marine divisions assigned to the invasion of Okinawa.

Had replacements in the States completed the full cycle of the revised training program set forth in a July 1944 directive, it is possible that they might have performed more satisfactorily in combat. So great was the demand from the field for replacements that, by mid-1944, only a few drafts had been able to complete the 12-week cycle.

Other factors diminished the impact of whatever training the replacements did receive. During the early years, the long periods between the departure of replacements from training centers and their assignment to combat units often caused them to forget much of what they had learned in training. Intensive schooling in numerous unfamiliar subjects compressed into a short time was

⁶ 5th MarDiv SAR, Iwo Jima Operation, 19Feb-26Mar45, dtd 28Apr45, Anx R (27th Mar).

⁷ CTF 56 Rpt on FORAGER, dtd 2Oct44, encl F (G-1).

quickly forgotten during the long voyage on transports and longer periods during which these Marines were performing non-tactical duties in various camps overseas. No adequate training program was provided to keep up their knowledge during this period.⁸

Through no fault of either the personnel or the programs of the training centers, the infantry replacement program overall was less than satisfactory. Replacement training was probably as good as it could have been considering the time limitations. Pressing personnel requirements in the combat zone caused trainees to be shipped out before completion of the training cycle. The training centers were responsible neither for this nor for the training and integration programs established by the receiving organizations. The inherent shortcomings of the replacement system could be cured only by adopting a different method for replacing combat losses, and none had appeared, even by the end of the war.

SPECIALIST TRAINING

Because amphibious warfare became so exactly complex, to make a successful assault on a heavily defended shore and to support the operations of the attack force demanded a high order of technical skill in a variety of specialties. By 1945, Marine Corps personnel classification employed no fewer than 21 different occupational fields, each field containing a number of individual specialties.

⁸ MajGen Oscar R. Cauldwell ltr to CMC, dtd 27Feb56.

Formal schooling was required for some of the specialties, while on-the-job training sufficed for others. Courses in certain basic occupational fields, such as administration, band, and tank and LVT had been underway before December 1941. By the following April, formal Marine Corps schooling had been expanded to include courses in the following fields: barrage balloon, parachute, chemical warfare, landing boats, and the Japanese language. Some Marines were assigned to courses conducted by the Marine Corps; others attended schools established by the other Services; and still others were trained by civilian facilities, either industrial or academic.

Specialist training at all times reflected the current needs of the Marine Corps. New courses were adopted, others changed, and still others dropped whenever it was required that such action be taken. Parachute and barrage balloon training, for example, was dropped when those units were deactivated.

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

In an authoritative summary of American participation in the Pacific War, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey stated:

At the start . . . our strategic intelligence was highly inadequate, and our overall war plans, insofar as they were based on faulty information and faulty interpretation of accurate information, were unrealistic. . . .

In the field of operational intelligence considerable forward strides were made during the Pacific War. . . .⁹

⁹ USSBS, *Summary Report (Pacific War)* (GPO, 1946), p. 31.

This is true when comparing the status of American intelligence operations at the beginning of the war with those at the end. But judging by the numerous gaps in our knowledge of the enemy existing as late as the time of the planning periods for ICEBERG and OLYMPIC, a great deal had yet to be accomplished in the intelligence program before it could be considered to be operating at an optimum level.

Much has been written in the earlier volumes of this series about poor aerial photographic coverage and subsequent mapping of targets from Guadalcanal on. During the discussion in this work of the planning for Okinawa, it was observed that the same problems existed. Also, American knowledge of Japanese strength and defenses on Okinawa "... was minimal, and ... as late as L minus 1," the G-3 of the 6th Marine Division "was told that the Hagushi beaches were held in great strength."¹⁰ This was, of course, proved incorrect by the uncontested landing on 1 April 1945.

Intelligence problems existed on the division level and below, or perhaps this should be reversed since intelligence production by the G-2 depended upon the timeliness and wealth or paucity of information provided by lower echelons. Throughout the 1930s and well into World War II, American commanders of all Services generally did not understand or appreciate how important it was to staff their intelligence sections properly. Because of this attitude, the people most experienced or knowledgeable in intelligence matters were not

very often assigned to work in the G-2 or S-2 sections, and those who were, produced intelligence which commanders usually disregarded.¹¹ An additional liability accruing from all of this was that intelligence training and an awareness of its importance suffered throughout most commands. In this respect, the Marine Corps was as guilty as the other Services.

At Guadalcanal, the division intelligence section was the weakest component of the 1st Division staff throughout the planning period and into the first weeks of combat. Compounding this weakness, regimental and battalion intelligence teams were not well integrated with either one another or with division. As the campaign progressed, signs appeared that both commanders and subordinates were becoming conscious of the importance of complete, up-to-date information of the enemy and how to acquire it. It was a slow and tedious process, however, to indoctrinate all hands with the importance of saving and

¹¹ General Omar Bradley spoke of this in *A Soldier's Story* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951), p. 33, when he related the intelligence gap to his experiences as an Army officer and said "The American army's long neglect of intelligence training was soon reflected by the ineptness of our initial undertakings . . . Misfits frequently found themselves assigned to intelligence duties. And in some stations G-2 became a dumping ground for officers ill suited to line command . . . Had it not been for the uniquely qualified reservists who so capably filled so many of our intelligence jobs throughout the war, the army would have found itself badly pressed for competent intelligence personnel." In this context, it should be noted that Lieutenant Colonel Edmond J. Buckley, mentioned on page 686, was a Marine Corps reserve officer.

¹⁰ LtGen Victor H. Krulak ltr to ACofS, G-3, HQMC, dtd 4Dec65.

turning in every scrap of material pertaining to the enemy.

On 8 September, the 1st Raider Battalion landed east of Tasimboko on Guadalcanal, the site of a suspected enemy base. Following this raid, Lieutenant Colonel Edmond J. Buckley, division intelligence officer who had replaced Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Goettge after the latter's death, remarked:

It did not occur to any of the intelligence personnel present to collect any of the large amount of documentary material that was lying among the rest of the [enemy] supplies . . . a newspaper correspondent on his own initiative, collected a poncho full of maps, diaries, and orders and brought them to me personally.¹²

The intelligence gap existing at the 1st Division level was not solely a result of its own deficiencies, but occurred also because higher headquarters did not supply General Vandegrift with important information made available to other commanders. Until mid-October, the division was not on the distribution list for the daily intelligence report published by Commander, South Pacific, headquarters in Noumea. Vandegrift's G-2 learned of the existence of this report only after the 164th Infantry had landed on Guadalcanal and the regimental intelligence officer informed him of this particular publication.¹³

¹² Col Edmond J. Buckley interview by Hist-Div, HQMC, dtd 3Jul47. (Guadalcanal Comment File).

¹³ *Ibid.* According to Lieutenant General Louis E. Woods, Cactus Air Force commander after 7 November 1942, Marine aviation on Guadalcanal also suffered an intelligence gap, for "I received very little pertinent intelligence information from the 1st Division Headquarters. However, I did receive the information

For the invasion of Cape Gloucester, 1st Division intelligence officers worked hard to assemble information on the objective and the enemy in order to brief assault troops. In addition, they devoted as much attention to the very real problem of acquiring information after the landing. Part of the preinvasion training deliberately and repeatedly stressed the importance of immediately passing along to intelligence agencies any enemy papers or material that were found. Members of the 1st Marine Division were shown through repeated demonstrations and a review of combat experience that a seemingly insignificant enemy document or item of equipment might provide the key that would shorten the battle and save lives. In order to overcome the indifference that most Marines showed toward the taking of prisoners, intelligence staff personnel reminded the New Britain-bound Marines that the ordinary Japanese soldier was willing to cooperate with his captors and provide military information once he had surrendered.

Following these two operations, the attitude of Marines respecting battlefield intelligence and how to acquire it generally improved. This was apparent not only in the 1st Marine Division but also in the Marine divisions which subsequently arrived in the Pacific. Intelligence training paid off at Bougainville, for instance, when a patrol from the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, turned in a sketch

about the big Japanese invasion force directly from General Vandegrift in time to have some fighter planes flown in prior to the [enemy] November 13-15th landing." LtGen Louis E. Woods ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 18May66, hereafter *Woods ltr 1966*.

of enemy positions found in the map case of a dead Japanese officer. Based on this intelligence, the battalion was able to attack the next day to keep the enemy off balance. This incident of intelligence awareness was not an isolated one, for similar instances appeared in succeeding operations.

Because of Stateside training based on lessons learned in combat, most Marines sent to the Pacific after the campaign for Guadalcanal received a fairly thorough indoctrination in the importance of battlefield intelligence. Other aspects of intelligence besides basic combat intelligence interested the Marine Corps. These ancillary fields encompassed Chinese and Japanese language study and the training of aerial photography interpreters.

By the end of 1944, the Marine Corps had 242 trained Japanese language personnel and 63 enrolled in a study program. At the same time, some 38 Chinese interpreters were available to the Corps.¹⁴ To provide the FMF with officers trained in Order of Battle techniques, commissioned personnel were sent to a course in that subject conducted by the War Department at the Pentagon.¹⁵ Other Marines received specialized training at the Combat Intelligence School, Camp Lejeune, and the Army Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland. This training, in addition to that conducted in the field, pointed up the increased importance

given to intelligence matters in the Marine Corps.

UNIT FORMATIONS: CHANGES AND DEVELOPMENTS

With the creation of the FMF, the Marine Corps acquired the tactical structure necessary to carry out its primary wartime mission; namely, to serve the fleet by seizing advance bases for naval operations, and, once captured, to occupy and defend these bases. Accordingly, a tactical organization had to be developed to perform these functions. Although authorization had been granted to form a brigade for the FMF, other Marine Corps commitments prevented the Commandant from assigning the personnel and equipment initially required to bring the FMF up to strength.

In pace with the ever-changing development of amphibious warfare doctrine and techniques were changes in the tactical formations of the units slated to employ these techniques. Additional men and material were needed to beef up the FMF, but the isolationist attitude of the American people was well reflected in congressional reluctance to appropriate any money to any of the Services for any purpose which seemed offensive in character. To obtain the approval of Congress for an increase in Marine Corps strength, following a discussion with Admiral Leahy, the CNO, General Holcomb hit upon the stratagem of making it appear that an increase in Marine Corps manpower would actually constitute an increase in the *defensive* poten-

¹⁴ G-2 Sec, Div P&P, OpD, 7Dec41-31Dec44, p. 3.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

tial of the United States.¹⁶ In keeping with the defensive aspects of the advance base force, Headquarters Marine Corps planners developed a new unit admirably suited and entitled for this purpose—the defense battalion. Credit for the creation and development of the defense battalion has been attributed to Colonel Charles D. Barrett, the head of the War Plans Section, Division of Plans and Policy, and his artillery assistant, Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Pepper.

As it transpired, the defense battalion program, commencing with the activation of the 3d Defense Battalion on 10 October 1939, was one of the major activities of the Marine Corps in the first two years of the war. In that time, the Corps activated a total of 18 defense battalions—numbered in sequence—and two composite defense battalions, the 51st and 52d. These last two units were comprised almost entirely of Negro Marines.

Concerning defense battalions, in his annual report for 1940 to the Secretary of the Navy, General Holcomb said:

(1) During the fiscal year ending 30 June 1940, the Marine Corps organized and trained four defense battalions for the

¹⁶ Concerning this particular matter, General Thomas recalled that in 1941 General Holcomb told him: "If you said, 'I want an offensive outfit,' the politicians would say, 'No sir, you want to fight a war.' But if you said, 'I want a defensive outfit and I want to defend this country,' you could get men and we got men for defense battalions and we got them just that way because they were going to a defensive outfit and we were going to defend this area." Gen Gerald C. Thomas interview by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 26Sep66 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC).

purpose of providing efficient and readily available organizations for the defense of bases. These battalions are heavily armed and are relatively immobile. The overhead, administration, supply, etc., has been reduced to the minimum. A battle station has been assigned to every man. The defensive fire power of these battalions is very large.

(2) The organization of two additional defense battalions has recently been authorized. The use of all six of these defense battalions can be foreseen in existing plans. In addition, inquiries, preliminary to requesting the service of defense battalions in areas not contemplated in present plans, have recently been made.

(3) These defense battalions and those to be organized will be under the command of the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, and therefore at the disposal of the Commander in Chief of the U. S. Fleet.¹⁷

The complete development of the defense battalion provided the Marine Corps with a balanced force designed to accomplish the seizure and securing of bases for the Fleet. The advent of the defense battalion liberated infantry and artillery units of the FMF from any inherent responsibility for the protection of bases. As originally conceived and organized, defense battalions consisted of seacoast and antiaircraft artillery batteries, searchlight and sound locator units, and antiaircraft and beach defense machine gun units.

On 2 October 1941, the Commandant approved Defense Battalion Tables of Organization D-155a through D-155d, each T/O representing a defense battalion that was organized differently from the other three. Common to each defense battalion under this T/O were a Headquarters and Service Battery and

¹⁷ *CMC Rpt*, 1940.

a 90mm or 3-inch AA Group. The addition of two of the following other components would then complete the organization of the battalion: 155mm Artillery Group; Special Weapons Group; 5-inch Artillery Group; Machine Gun Group; or a 7-inch Artillery Group. At this time it was stated that "The particular table which will govern the organization of a defense battalion will depend upon the type of equipment furnished and will be prescribed by the Commandant from time to time."¹⁸

Approximately seven months later, the defense battalions were reorganized, this time with an increase of strength and the addition of a fifth type of battalion formation, but all still using the components mentioned above. Under this T/O, dated 25 May 1942, the D-155a formation, for instance, consisted of a Headquarters and Service Battery, a 155mm Artillery Group, a 90mm or 3-inch Antiaircraft Group, and a Special Weapons Group. The total strength of this groupment was 1,146 Marines; the D-155d unit was even larger—1,196 Marines. The naval medical component of 25 doctors, dentists, and corpsmen was the same for each groupment. As a matter of comparison, it is interesting to note that the strength of the D-Series T/O infantry battalion was 933, and never during World War II did the strength of the various T/O infantry battalions exceed 996 men.

On 13 May 1942, the CMC approved a recommendation to organize, equip, and train a "colored composite Defense Battalion, the 51st, at Montford Point,"

¹⁸ *G-3 OpD*, Dec41.

in North Carolina.¹⁹ The strength of this unit was 1,085 Marines, and it consisted of a Headquarters and Service Battery (Reinforced), a Machine Gun Group, a 90mm or 3-inch Antiaircraft Group, a 155-mm Artillery Battery, a 75mm Pack Howitzer Battery, and a reinforced Rifle Company.

Officers assigned to defense battalions usually were graduates of the Base Defense Weapons Course, a component of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico. This course was designed to train company grade officers in the techniques and employment of light field artillery and weapons utilized in the defense of advanced bases. Prior to the outbreak of World War II, the 10-month course was fairly evenly balanced between instruction in field artillery and base defense.²⁰ Mobilization of Marine reservists and general expansion of the Corps necessitated in turn an expansion of the training program and general reduction in the length of most courses. In 1940 the Base Defense Weapons Course was reduced to a period of 16 weeks.

Under the pressures of the short-of-war period, the Base Defense Weapons Class, as it had been retitled, was split into Field Artillery and Base Defense Sections (antiaircraft and coast artillery). Further reductions in the length of the course ensued under the pressure of wartime needs. In January 1943, the Base Defense Section was transferred to Camp Lejeune and redesignated the Officers Base Defense School, which became a part of the Base Artillery Bat-

¹⁹ *G-3 OpD*, May42.

²⁰ Condit, Diamond, and Turnbladh, *Marine Corps Training*, p. 88.

talion, which, in turn, was an element of the Training Center, Camp Lejeune. Beginning in March 1944, two separate courses were set up—one designated the Antiaircraft Course dealing with 90mm guns, and the other, which actually began in May, titled the Special Weapons Course to instruct in the employment of 20mm and 40mm guns and .50 caliber machine guns. Beginning in June that year, the emphasis in training began to shift towards instruction in field artillery at the Camp Lejeune school. This change reflected the progress of the Pacific War, for as the offensives in the South and Central Pacific went into high gear, the need for base defense artillery began to pale and the attacks on the strongly fortified Japanese-held islands in the Gilberts, Marshalls, Marianas, and Palaus demonstrated the requirement for more and heavier field artillery.

It was intended that defense battalions would land on an objective after the assault troops had landed, and then assist in the defense of that objective either while the fighting was still going on or after the target had been secured. In practice it did not work out that way, for in many instances, defense battalions landed immediately after the initial assault and began operations soon after. In the case of the defense battalions—or detachments thereof—on Wake, Midway, and certain other Pacific islands, the enemy came to them. At any rate, once the Central Pacific campaign began, the defense battalions in the South Pacific area found themselves in the backwash of the war and, like the aviation activities based in these islands, became beset by doldrums with only the

appearance of intermittent enemy air raids to relieve their boredom.

This was the case in late summer 1943, when General Vandegrift—who had recently been appointed as the commander of I Marine Amphibious Corps when General Barrett died suddenly—made an inspection trip in the Solomons in company with his chief of staff, Colonel Gerald C. Thomas. “What interested Vandegrift most were these defense battalions . . . in the Guadalcanal area. . . . The war had gone on beyond them.”²¹ It was found that each battalion had an excess of five or six majors, “and here these kids were pleading just to get into the war.”²² IMAC then made arrangements with Headquarters Marine Corps to send approximately 35 of these officers back to the States assigned to the Command and Staff Course at Quantico, and then back to the Pacific, “because our crying need at the division and corps level [was] for junior staff officers.”²³

The problem concerning the future of the defense battalions, however, was not solved until 1944, when all of them, with the exception of the 6th Defense Battalion and the two composite units, were first redesignated antiaircraft battalions, and shortly thereafter designated antiaircraft artillery battalions. On 1 November 1944, for the Okinawa operation, four of these AAA battalions—the 2d, 5th, 8th, and 16th—were formed into the 1st Provisional Antiaircraft Artillery Group, which was later placed under the operational control of

²¹ Gen Gerald C. Thomas interview by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 26Sep66 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC).

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

the Army 53d AAA Brigade of the Tenth Army.

Although the defense battalions loomed large in the Marine Corps overall, it appears that "almost until the disaster at Pearl Harbor, there existed in the G-3 [Division of Plans and Policies at HQMC] a divided opinion as to the relative value of 'Defense Battalions' and 'Divisions.'" ²⁴

According to General del Valle, in 1939 Executive Officer of the Division of Plans and Policies:

A study of the problem we might encounter in the Pacific, especially the Ellis estimate, inspired me to work with the then Lt. Col. H. D. Harris, our G-2, to make available rough T.O.s of various types of divisions. This was done on our own. . . .²⁵

Both del Valle and Harris:

. . . made a study of all the divisions in the civilized world, the composition of the divisions we went into war with, the first World War. . . . And we decided that some time that the Marines may get a division. . . . So, I did it all with Harris. He did the research and I did the pictures, and we made up a division, in fact we made up three type divisions for the Marine Corps. One of them had a battalion of tanks.²⁶

One of the protagonists for the defense battalions then told del Valle: "That's all the Marine Corps is going to need, defense battalions."²⁷ Soon after this,

²⁴ LtGen Pedro A. del Valle ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 13Apr66, hereafter *del Valle ltr 1966*.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ LtGen Pedro A. del Valle interview by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 17Nov66 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC).

²⁷ *Ibid.*

the Head of the Division of Plans and Policies came to the then Colonel del Valle and asked to see the prototype divisions that Harris and del Valle had drawn up; ". . . we produced our crude products, one of which was selected as the basis for the division which we took to Guadalcanal."²⁸

THE MARINE DIVISION

During the course of World War II, the organization of the Marine division underwent numerous changes to reflect revisions and new developments in the conduct of amphibious assaults. Although the unit designation was the same, there was considerable difference in the strength and organization of the 1st Marine Division which landed on Guadalcanal in 1942 and the 1st Division which landed on Okinawa three years later. All other Marine divisions activated during the war years were similarly affected by various organizational changes.

General Vandegrift's Guadalcanal division was organized in accordance with Marine Corps T/O D-100, which had been approved on 1 July 1942. The total strength of the D-Series Marine division was 19,514, which was broken down into 865 commissioned and 16,987 enlisted Marines, and 115 commissioned and 1,547 enlisted Navy personnel, who were members of the Medical, Dental, Chaplain, and Civil Engineer Corps.

The organization of this division was as follows:

Special Troops	3,031
Headquarters Battalion	
Headquarters Company	

²⁸ *del Valle ltr 1966*.

Signal Company	
Military Police Company	
Special Weapons Battalion	
Headquarters and Service Battery	
40mm Antiaircraft Battery	
90mm Antiaircraft Battery	
3 Antitank Batteries	
Parachute Battalion	
Headquarters Company	
3 Parachute Companies	
Tank Battalion (Light)	
Headquarters and Service Company	
Scout Company	
3 Tank Companies	
Service Troops	1,946
Service Battalion	
Headquarters Company	
Service and Supply Company ²⁹	
Ordnance Company	
Division Transport Company	
3 Regimental Transport Companies	
Medical Battalion	
Headquarters and Service Company	
5 Medical Companies	
Amphibian Tractor Battalion	
Headquarters and Service Company	
3 Amphibian Tractor Companies	
Engineer Regiment	2,452
Headquarters and Service Company	
Engineer Battalion	
Headquarters and Service Company	
3 Engineer Companies ³⁰	
Pioneer Battalion	
Headquarters Company	
3 Pioneer Companies ³¹	

²⁹ The Service and Supply Company consisted of a company headquarters and a service platoon. The latter was comprised of a platoon headquarters and service and supply, bakery, commissary, post exchange, chemical services, salvage, and bath sections.

³⁰ Each company consisted of a company headquarters and an assault and an engineer platoon.

³¹ There were a company headquarters and three pioneer platoons in each company.

Naval Construction Battalion	
Headquarters Company	
3 Construction Companies ³²	
Artillery Regiment	2,581
Headquarters and Service Battery	
105mm Howitzer Battalion	
Headquarters and Service Battery	
3 105mm Howitzer Batteries	
3 75mm Pack Howitzer Battalions	
Headquarters and Service Battery	
3 75mm Pack Howitzer Batteries	
3 Infantry Regiments	9,504
Headquarters and Service Company	
Weapons Company ³³	
3 Infantry Battalions	
Headquarters Company	
Weapons Company ³⁴	
3 Rifle Companies ³⁵	

Throughout the series of wartime T/Os, the Marine division was organized on a triangular basis. This triangular formation was reflected pri-

³² The versatility of the Seabees is reflected by the composition of each construction company, which had: a maintenance and operations platoon, two construction platoons, a road blasting and excavation platoon, a waterfront platoon, and a tanks, steel, and pipe platoon.

³³ The regimental weapons company consisted of a company headquarters, a 75mm gun platoon, and an antiaircraft and antitank platoon.

³⁴ The battalion weapons company consisted of a company headquarters, a 20mm antiaircraft and antitank platoon, an 81mm mortar platoon, and three machine gun platoons. The D-Series Tables of Equipment (T/E) specified that when the 20mm dual-purpose gun was not available, the 37mm gun was to be substituted, which was fortunate, for the Marines employed this weapon with good effect throughout the war.

³⁵ Each rifle company had a company headquarters, a weapons platoon (consisting of a 60mm mortar section and a light machine gun section), and three rifle platoons. The rifle platoon was broken down into a platoon headquarters, a BAR squad, and three rifle squads.

marily in the organization of the three infantry regiments in each division. Within the infantry regiment, groups of three formed the whole: three squads (under the F- and G-Series T/Os, the lowest component was the fire team) comprised a rifle platoon, three platoons a rifle company, three companies an infantry battalion, and three battalions an infantry regiment. Some of the support units organic to the division were likewise triangularly organized in order to give maximum assistance to the infantry elements.

Slightly less than a year after the D-Series T/O for a Marine division had been approved and published, on 15 April 1943 the E-Series T/O appeared.³⁶ There were certain marked changes in the composition and strength of the new T/O division. Some units were taken away from the division, some were added, and others completely or slightly revamped. The aim of the reorganization was to make the Marine division a more effective and flexible fighting machine.

The E-Series Marine division was stronger than the D-Series by 451 sailors and Marines. Although under the new T/O, the strength of special troops was decreased by 714 men, primarily because of the transfer of the parachute battalion to corps troops, and a reduction in the size of the special weapons, light tank, and service battalions, these losses were overbalanced by the strengthening of certain other division organizations. Among these

were: service troops, which was enlarged slightly when the division transport company and the three regimental transport companies were taken from the service battalion and formed into a division motor transport battalion; the engineer and infantry regiments, which were given nearly 100 more men; and the artillery regiment, which was expanded with the addition of a second 105mm howitzer battalion. Along with the formation of the motor transport battalion, which gave the division an increase of 84 personnel in this field, 130 more vehicles were assigned to the division.³⁷

The F-Series tables for a Marine division, approved on 5 May 1944, had 2,500 less men than its predecessor. In the 1944 organization, special troops—in essence a command headquarters groupment—was abolished and in its stead a division headquarters battalion, which became a separate battalion within the division, took control of the units formerly under special troops cognizance. The headquarters battalion troop listing was changed somewhat at this time, for the special weapons battalion was disbanded, and the light tank battalion became an independent battalion. It was given a numerical designation which reflected the number of the division to which it belonged, *e.g.*, the 1st Tank Battalion was organic to the 1st Marine Division, *etc.* Division service troops was reduced in strength at this time with the transfer of the amphibian tractor battalion to corps troops.

³⁶ See App I, "Comparison of Organization, Marine Division," for a tabular representation of the composition of the four World War II T/Os for a Marine infantry division.

³⁷ See App J, "Comparison of Equipment, Marine Division."

Along with its redesignation, the composition of the tank battalion was also changed. The reduction in battalion strength to 594 men was primarily caused by the loss of the scout company, which was redesignated as the division reconnaissance company (1st Reconnaissance Company, 1st Marine Division, *etc.*) and placed in the division headquarters battalion. Here, the company became the instrument of the division commander. The duties of this company more nearly reflected the amphibious mission of the division, for reconnaissance personnel more often travelled by jeep or on foot on land and in rubber boats over water whenever they were on a reconnaissance mission. The ancestry of the reconnaissance company can be traced to the concept and the needs underlying the formation of Colonel William J. Whaling's scout-sniper group on Guadalcanal.³⁸ Quite a few Marines who were assigned to the new unit came from the parachute and raider battalions, which were disbanded in 1944.

The engineer regiment, as such, was disbanded when the F-Series T/O was published, and like the headquarters and tank battalions, the engineer and pioneer battalions became separate entities in the division. They, too, were given the numerical designation of their division. The engineer battalion was enlarged somewhat, while the pioneer battalion remained relatively unchanged in size. The naval construction battalions (Seabees) were detached at this time because they were continuously

needed elsewhere in the Pacific for airfield construction and it would have been uneconomic to have them remain inactive with their Marine divisions between operations. Despite this T/O change, the Seabees were attached to Marine divisions as a component of the landing force in assault landings.

The only specific change in the artillery regiment in the F-Series tables was that the number of 75mm pack howitzer battalions was reduced from three to two. The Marine artillery regiment now had two 75mm pack howitzer battalions and two 105mm howitzer battalions. In deference to the amphibious character of the Marine division, it contained lighter organic artillery than its Army counterpart, which had three 105mm howitzer battalions and a battalion of 155mm howitzers. During combat operations, however, Marine divisional artillery was usually supported by the 105mm and 155mm howitzers and 155mm guns of corps artillery.

Although the G-Series T/O was not published until 4 September 1945, after the Pacific War had ended, the tables of some division units had been published earlier. For example, the T/O for an infantry regiment is dated 1 May 1945, but this is misleading because many of the changes inherent in the G-Series had been made before this time. A case in point is the fact that the Marine infantry regiments which landed on Okinawa just a month before the T/O publication date were organized in accordance with these tables. Each division of IIIAC was up to or close to T/O strength, 19,176 men—a considerable increase over the previous T/O—plus

³⁸ See Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal*, p. 319n.

an overage which reflected the normal reinforcement given a combat-bound division.

In the 1945 version of the tables of organization, the division had been given an assault signal company, a rocket platoon, and a war dog platoon. Other division units that had been augmented were the service troops, whose motor transport battalion was enlarged from 539 to 906 men (overall transportation in the division was increased from a previous total of 1,548 pieces of rolling stock to 1,918), and a slight expansion of the artillery and infantry regiments. Further indicating that the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions were organized on Okinawa in accordance with the G-Series tables is the fact that the 75mm self-propelled gun platoon had been replaced by the 105mm self-propelled howitzer platoon in the infantry regimental weapons company prior to the landing.

*THE MARINE INFANTRY
REGIMENT*

At first glance, it would appear as though the various wartime T/O regiments differed only slightly in size from one another, and that there had been but few changes in their compositions.³⁹ Appearances are deceiving, however, for the Marine infantry regiment and its components experienced perhaps the most dramatic revolution of all of the types of Marine Corps units each time new tables of organizations were published. Not only was the composition of the infantry regiment affected by these

T/O changes, the types and numbers of the different weapons with which it fought similarly underwent change. Conversely, the development and assignment of new weapons and the augmentation of existing tables of equipment strongly influenced each succeeding infantry regiment T/O change.

The most outstanding changes in the infantry regiment took place on battalion and company levels. Within the regimental headquarters complex, the only element significantly modified during the war was the regimental weapons company, which lost its three anti-aircraft/antitank platoons in the E-Series T/O and instead picked up three 37mm gun platoons. These were reduced by one in the G-Series tables. At the same time, the 75mm gun platoon was replaced by a platoon of 105mm self-propelled howitzers. This larger-caliber weapon proved to be of inestimable value in the cave warfare of Okinawa.

With the inception of the F-Series T/O, the battalion weapons company was abolished. Its 81mm mortar platoon was placed in the battalion headquarters company, where it became the infantry battalion commander's artillery, and its three machine gun platoons were parcelled out on the basis of one to each rifle company. The weapons platoon of the rifle company was also disbanded at this time. The 60mm mortar platoon was incorporated with the company headquarters and the light machine gun section became part of the newly established company machine gun platoon.

The size of the rifle company grew with the appearance of each succeeding table of organization. In the D-Series

³⁹ See App K, pt 1, "World War II Development of the Marine Infantry Regiment."

tables of 1942 company strength was 183; 196 in the E-Series; 235 in the F-Series; and 242 in the G-Series. This growth rate was caused in part by the fact that the machine gun platoon (44 men in 1944, 56 in 1945) was added to the rifle company and offset the loss of the weapons platoon, which was only a paper loss. Actually, when the 60mm mortar section was transferred to the company headquarters, it gained four men, and despite the fact that the light machine gun section was abolished, the loss of its 19 Marines was more than made up for by the addition to the rifle company of the 44-man machine gun platoon.

Another element of the rifle company increased during the war was the rifle platoon, or more importantly, the squads of that platoon. The D-Series rifle platoon had 42 Marines in a platoon headquarters of 7 men, an 8-man automatic rifle (BAR) squad, and three 9-man rifle squads. The BAR squad consisted of a squad leader armed with a submachine gun, two BAR-men, and five riflemen. Although assistant BAR-men were designated as such in subsequent T/Os, they did not appear in the D-Series tables. The rifle squad in this T/O consisted of a squad leader, a BAR-man, six riflemen, and a rifle grenadier, who was armed with the trusty Springfield M1903 .30 caliber rifle and a grenade launcher.

At this juncture, it must be pointed out that, although the D-Series table of equipment for a Marine division⁴⁰ listed 5,285 carbines, 7,406 M-1s, and

only 456 '03s,⁴¹ this was not, in fact, the case for the 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal was not so armed. The M-1 rifle was issued to the 1st Division in April 1943, after it had left Guadalcanal, and was in Australia training for the impending New Britain operation. "Nostalgia for the reliable '03 was widespread, but the increased firepower of the M-1 would not be denied."⁴² This is not to say that no Marines had M-1s on the 'canal, for some acquired them through a "moonlight requisition" after Army units arrived on the island. Others obtained the new rifle by picking up the dropped weapons of soldiers who had been wounded and evacuated. This last occurred in October 1942, during the time that the 164th Infantry fought alongside of the 7th Marines in stemming Japanese attacks on the perimeter.⁴³

Returning to the D-Series rifle squad, it was not particularly suited for operating other than as a whole and, unlike the rifle squads of later T/Os, it was the lowest component of the triangular organization and could not be broken down into a smaller tactical unit. At this point in the development of Marine assault tactics, the chain of command extended down only as far as the squad

⁴¹ Apparently only the rifle grenadiers were to be armed with the '03 since the division was equipped with an equal number of grenade launchers in this T/E.

⁴² Shaw and Kane, *Isolation of Rabaul*, p. 307.

⁴³ Mr. George C. MacGillivray comments to HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 7Feb66, hereafter *MacGillivray Comments*. Mr. MacGillivray was a crewman of a 37mm gun team with Weapons Company, 7th Marines, in the operations on Guadalcanal and Cape Gloucester.

⁴⁰ See App J.

level. This was the lowest echelon on which control was maintained and fire supervised. The problem of control in combat has always plagued commanders; and the more difficult the terrain over which a battle was being fought, the more difficult it was to maintain control.

Marine Corps units committed to the jungle war and antibandit activities in Central America during the early 1900s found it necessary to devise methods for achieving better infantry control and accuracy under fire. In face of the hit-and-run tactics and ambushes of such bandit leaders as Augusto Sandino in Nicaragua, and in areas where mobility was curtailed by the jungle, firepower became the key to success. Additional firepower came from reliance on the assignment of an additional number of automatic weapons to each squad.

The practical experience gained from using automatic weapons in Nicaragua influenced greatly the development of the fire team. The ratio of automatic weapons in the squad was increased by most leaders from one for every eight men to one for every three or four. Most important was the growth of the automatic rifle as a base of fire and as the nucleus of a small fire group.⁴⁴

A further development leading to a more responsive infantry unit occurred in China in 1938, with the development of a rifle company specially organized to quell street riots. At the heart of this organization were three platoons

composed of six fighting teams of four men each.

Each team was led by a senior private or junior NCO, and could be employed flexibly in independent action as well as in performing its primary mission as an integral part of the riot company as a whole.

The equipment of each man in the 1st and 3d Platoons was a rifle, bayonet, cartridge belt with 100 rounds of ammunition, gas mask, and steel helmet. Two men of the 1st and 6th Teams in the 2d Platoon carried BARs; the other two men in each of these teams were armed with Thompson sub-machine guns.

Marines in the 2d and 5th Teams carried rifles with bayonets fixed, and they too had 100 rounds of ammunition in their cartridge belts. Rifle grenadiers comprised the strength of the 3d and 4th Teams, and they each wore a grenade carrier holding eight tear gas grenades.⁴⁵

The four-man fighting team was the solid foundation on which the riot company was based, for although:

... the company commander and the platoon leaders would retain control for as long as the situation warranted, the fighting team could have been quickly detached on independent assignments such as search missions or the establishment of a strong point at a street intersection. In any case, the team could be detached without destroying the basic riot formation or the unit integrity of the company. The success of the riot company would result from its simple line formations and signals, and more importantly, from the emphasis on the decentralized control of the four-man fighting team.

... The decentralization of command and independent coordinated action by small units were as necessary in the

⁴⁴ 2dLt Lee M. Holmes, "The Birth of the Fire Team," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 36, no. 11 (Nov52), p. 21, hereafter Holmes, "The Fire Team."

⁴⁵ Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., "Shanghai 1937," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 49, no. 11 (Nov65), p. 63.

crowded streets of the International Settlement [of Shanghai] as they were in the jungles of Nicaragua and the Pacific islands. . . .⁴⁶

An answer to some of the problems of rifle squad control appeared in the E-Series T/O. The BAR squad was dropped and replaced by a third rifle squad. The rifle squad was increased in size to 12 men: a squad leader, an assistant squad leader, six riflemen, and two assistant BAR-men, all armed with M-1s, and two BAR-men. Now the squad could be broken down into two six-man units, each containing a total of one automatic and five semiautomatic rifles. While meeting some of the requirements for better control and heavier firepower in jungle fighting, this formation provided only a partial solution. Prior to the adoption of the E-Series T/O, some Marine units, especially the 1st Parachute Battalion—then in training at Camp Lejeune—experimented on their own. Based on the recommendations of the battalion operations officer and because some extra BARs were available to the battalion at the time (1941), the parachutists trained with their rifle squads organized into three three-man teams in which one man was armed with the BAR. Soon other Marine Corps organizations were adopting this formation, if the extra weapons were at hand.

Liaison between the Parachute and Raider units was very close and ideas on tactics, technique, organization, and equipment were freely exchanged. Both Raider and Parachute units operated with the 3d Marine Division during the Bougainville campaign and the advantages of the

fire team organization over the squad were soon noted.⁴⁷

The mission of the Marine raider battalion and the organization of a squad of raiders was described by the commander of the 2d Raider Battalion, Major Evans F. Carlson, in a letter to President Roosevelt, who was told that:

I designed the organization and equipment with a view to providing a battalion capable of high mobility and possessing the maximum fire power compatible with such mobility. . . . The emphasis is on speed of movement on foot, endurance, self-sufficiency and great fire power. . . . The squad, consisting of a corporal and nine others, is armed with five Thompson submachine guns, four Garand rifles and one Browning automatic rifle. These nine men operate in three fire groups of three men each. Each group, led by a scout armed with a Garand, is supported by two automatic riflemen. . . . The three fire groups, of course, are mutually supporting. A group so armed and so trained can cover a front of from 100 to 300 yards, as against the 50 yard front covered by the orthodox infantry squad of eight men, armed with the 1903 rifle and one BAR.⁴⁸

At Camp Pendleton in July 1943, Company L, 24th Marines, conducted experiments in the problems of controlling infantry units in combat. The basis for this training were the lessons learned by veteran FMF units in the Pacific. The company was organized according to the E-Series tables with

⁴⁷ Col Robert T. Vance ltr to 2dLt Lee M. Holmes, n.d., cited in Holmes, "The Fire Team," p. 22. It should be noted that the term "fire team" did not officially appear until the F-Series T/O was published in 1944.

⁴⁸ Maj Evans F. Carlson ltr to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, dtd 2Mar42 (NARS, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.), hereafter *Carlson ltr*.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

12-man rifle squads. Heralding the future, an additional man and an extra BAR were added to each squad, which then conducted training with this formation. The results of field tests proved the practicality and ease of control of such an organization, and the officers observing the tests recommended "that the rifle companies of the 24th Marines be organized on the group basis for exhaustive tests of this method with a view to its possible adoption by the Marine Corps."⁴⁹ Major General Harry Schmidt, commander of the 4th Marine Division, forwarded this report to the Commandant by way of Major General Clayton B. Vogel, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, San Diego Area, who further recommended that "experiments be carried out with a company and a battalion organized along these lines, possibly in the school organization at Quantico. . . ." ⁵⁰

On 14 October 1943, the Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, was asked to conduct experiments along the lines indicated in the reports which General Holcomb had received from California. A board was convened on 15 December at Quantico; the senior member was Lieutenant Colonel Samuel B. Griffith, II, a former Marine Raider, and Majors Thomas J. Meyers and Lyman D. Spurlock.⁵¹

⁴⁹ LtCols John J. Cosgrove, Aquilla J. Dyess, and Homer L. Litzenberg, Jr., ltr to CO, 24th Mar, dtd 2Aug43.

⁵⁰ CG, 4th MarDiv ltr to CMC, dtd 23Sep43, and CG, FMF, San Diego Area, 1st End to same, dtd 30Sep43.

⁵¹ CMC ltr to CMCS, dtd 14Oct43, Subj: Employment of the Rifle Squad; CMCS ltr to LtCol Samuel B. Griffith, II, dtd 15Dec43, Subj: Board of Officers.

The troops provided the board for these experiments consisted of a rifle platoon furnished by the Training Battalion, Marine Corps Schools. Each squad was organized into four groups of three men each. The platoon was oriented on the purpose of the experiments at a two-hour lecture and blackboard talk conducted by Colonel Griffith's board, and on the following day a number of formations and "plays" were described to the members of the platoon, who then practiced them in the field under the board's observation.

Although the board generally concurred in the findings following the experiment conducted by the 24th Marines, it believed that instead of the four three-man teams recommended by that regiment's board for the rifle squad, the new formation should consist of three groups of four men each. Griffith's board reasoned that in a three-group squad, battle casualties could be absorbed more easily, control would be easier, and the principle of the Marine infantry triangular formation would be preserved. One further point that the board made was that "From the psychological point of view the use of the word 'team' infers a unit of effort and a spiritual cohesiveness that the term 'group' does not."⁵² Reinforcing the recommendations of the board, Colonel Griffith included as an enclosure extracts of a letter he had written in September 1943, as 1st Raider Battalion commander, relating the organization of the raider companies to the experi-

⁵² LtCol Samuel B. Griffith, II, ltr to CMCS, dtd 7Jan44, Subj: Report of Board of officers relative to experiments conducted with a rifle squad organized into groups.

ences of his battalion in the New Georgia operation.

In preparation for this campaign, in March 1943, the 10-man rifle squads of the 1st Raider Battalion were reorganized into "three groups of three men each, with a corporal squad leader. Each group was designated as a 'fire team' and the senior man was appointed leader of the fire team. Each fire team was equipped with one BAR, one carbine, and one M1."⁵³ Colonel Griffith continued, "As a result of this combat training experience, the officers and enlisted men of this battalion were of the opinion that the fire team organization was superior to normal organization," and "Our experience in the New Georgia operation confirmed" this opinion.⁵⁴

The findings of the Griffith Board were then sent to Headquarters Marine Corps, where the Division of Plans and Policies noted that a similar plan for the reorganization of the rifle squad had been submitted to FMF field units for comment.⁵⁵ Upon receipt of the Griffith Board report at Headquarters, it was routed through the various sections of "Pots and Pans" for comment. Based on his experiences as the commanding officer of the 2d Parachute Battalion, which had conducted the diversionary raid on Choiseul nearly three months earlier,

⁵³ Extracts of CO, 1st Raider Bn ltr to CO, 1st Mar, dtd 17Sep43, Subj: Organization of Marine Raider Companies, encl (A) to *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ CMCS ltr to CMC, dtd 10Jan44, Subj: Employment of the Rifle Squad; CMC ltr to CMCS, dtd 17Jan44, Subj: Employment of the Rifle Squad.

Lieutenant Colonel Victor H. Krulak—now head of the G-4 Section—noted:

The squad organization recommended by the Marine Corps Schools is believed to be fundamentally sound. All squads in the Battalion which I commanded were organized on a three group system—each group being built around an automatic weapon (in this case the Johnson light machine gun). The organization stood up well in combat.⁵⁶

The reports from the FMF field units indicated that the new formation was satisfactory, and it was adopted and appeared in the new rifle squad T/O published in March 1944.

The F-Series rifle squad was a great improvement over its predecessors and its organization seemed to give the commander the requisite control and additional firepower found to be so necessary in both jungle and island fighting. The 1944 squad was improved in several ways—it had 13 instead of 12 men, it was armed with a third BAR, and was susceptible to greater control over its Marines. Whereas in previous T/Os, the responsibility and authority of command was vested in only one man—the squad leader—four men were given command authority in the F-Series squad. These were the squad leader and his subordinates, three fire team leaders. The new squad consisted of a squad leader armed with a carbine, three fire team leaders and three riflemen armed with M-1s and M-7 grenade launchers, three assistant BAR-men armed with carbines and M-8 grenade launchers, and three BAR-men.⁵⁷ The

⁵⁶ LtCol Victor H. Krulak memo AO-644-gg for M-3, dtd 13Jan44.

⁵⁷ MCTrngBul No. 101, dtd 29Mar44, Subj: Rifle Squad, T/O F-1, approved 27Mar44.

composition, concept of employment, and combat principles underlying the organization of the fire team were a culmination of Marine Corps tactical experience to that time. By the delegation of command authority to the squad and fire team leaders, it was believed that the principle of military leadership would be more widely disseminated and that the rifle squad would become more aggressive and efficient.

Under the fire team concept, the squad leader was responsible for the training, control, and general conduct of his squad. He was to coordinate the employment of his fire teams in a manner that would accomplish the mission assigned by his platoon commander. He was also responsible for the fire control, fire discipline, and maneuver of his fire teams as units. The fire team leaders were similarly responsible for their fire teams.

As it evolved, the fire team was organized primarily around the base of fire provided by the automatic rifle. Reflecting the uniform organization and balanced equipment of the team, it was capable of operating independently as a reconnaissance, observation, security, or outpost group. Maintenance of the principle of triangular organization in the Marine division beginning at the rifle squad level was apparent with the advent of the fire team. In addition, the establishment of this unit meant that control and coordination of effort under battle conditions in general and in amphibious operations in particular could be sustained. Other benefits accruing from the employment of the fire team were: maintenance of mutual support in the defense; decentralization of fire

control; decentralization of command; mobility; flexibility; rapid absorption of replacements during reorganization under combat conditions; and adaptability to special training and the accomplishment of missions involving the employment of special equipment.⁵⁸

Regarding this last factor, the F-Series T/E gave the Marine division a sufficient number of flamethrowers and demolition kits to permit the distribution of one of each per squad when the employment of this equipment was required. The flamethrowers and demolitions were kept in the infantry battalion supply section, and were available when the battalion commander called for them.

In 1st Marine Division preparations for the Peleliu operation, however, there was a shortage of flamethrowers and replacements were late in arriving. Nineteen of these, together with three bazookas and some demolitions, were placed directly under battalion control. To employ these special assault weapons, a battalion weapons platoon composed of 60 men drawn from the rifle companies was, in some cases, organized. These Marines were evidently drawn from the company headquarters, for the

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* Apparently the matter of control of troops in a combat situation was uppermost in the minds of Marine planners when they adopted the fire team concept. Regarding this, General Gerald C. Thomas, Director of Plans and Policies at that time, has written: "The fire team leader should not take his place in the firing line, but stay in [the] rear to control his fire team. We went to this squad because a leader could not control seven men in combat, so, we certainly would not expect him to control twelve." Gen Gerald C. Thomas memo to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 26Apr66.

rifle platoons generally were maintained at full strength.⁵⁹

To forestall the necessity of denuding the rifle companies of men in order to form special assault units, the G-Series T/O provided the infantry battalion with a 55-man assault platoon. This organization was composed of a platoon headquarters and three assault sections of two seven-man squads each. Comprising the squad was a squad leader, a flamethrower operator and his assistant, a bazooka operator and his assistant, and two demolitions men. In 1942, the Marine division had 24 not-too-satisfactory flamethrowers, which were carried and employed by the combat engineers. Each infantry battalion supply section in the F-Series T/O had 27 flamethrowers to be put into action on the battalion commander's order. In the G-Series tables, there were only 12 flamethrowers per battalion, but the one advantage in this case was that a trained unit had been established to make optimum use of the weapon.

From 1942 on, many changes were made in the composition of the division—some transitory, some long-lasting, and all reflecting combat lessons learned as well as immediate or future refinements. Many T/O changes resulted from the experimentation of individual units; a new tactical formation or an improved combat tactic often proved successful and was adopted throughout the Marine Corps after official approval had been given. In retrospect, each successive T/O change served to make the World War II Marine division the most effective

and deadliest amphibious assault unit in history to that time.

WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

Some note has been made in preceding paragraphs of the weapons and equipment organic to the Marine division. The point has been emphasized that a division did not always possess the types and amount of equipment specified in a particular T/E. The comments regarding the number of M-1 rifles in the hands of Guadalcanal Marines bear this out. Although the D-Series T/O called for the antiaircraft and antitank platoon of the regimental weapons company to be armed with 20mm guns, they were not in fact so equipped. Organized at Parris Island, the Weapons Company, 7th Marines trained at New River with the old wooden-wheeled, 88-pound, 37mm gun before the division left for the Pacific. The company later received a wholly different 37mm gun, which proved most effective in combat.⁶⁰

Another notable difference between what the D-Series T/E indicated the Marine division should have and what it actually possessed relates to the 75mm self-propelled gun platoon of the regimental weapons company. Officially, each platoon was equipped with two half-track 75s, but in reality, until near the end of the Guadalcanal campaign, the platoon fired 75mm guns which had a modified recoil system on a wholly new carriage with a new sighting, elevating, and training system. The special weapons battalion also had some half-tracks, which were employed in defense of the

⁵⁹ Garand and Strobridge, "Western Pacific Operations," MS, pt III, chap 8, p. 61.

⁶⁰ MacGillivray comments.

1st Division perimeter on the beaches of Guadalcanal.⁶¹

Marine equipment was continuously repaired (until no longer serviceable), replaced, and replenished throughout the war. Some gear could be refurbished by service units in the division, but more often, combat organizations would have to send damaged items to maintenance and repair facilities in rear areas. Normally, the replacement and replenishment system functioned as well as could be expected under conditions of war, with combat units receiving the supplies they had requisitioned or those which were automatically replenished. As soon as modified or new weapons and vehicles were received, they were sent to the units which would use them.

In May 1943, for instance, the light tanks (M3A1, mounting 37mm guns) of Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, were replaced by 33-ton General Sherman medium tanks (M4A1, mounting 75mm guns). This event is noteworthy because the first 24 mediums to arrive in the SWPA were received by the Army and turned over to the Marine company.⁶² When subsequent models of the Sherman (M4A2, M4A3), which were heavier and more fully armored, were shipped to the Pacific, other Marine division tank battalions began using them also. The two later versions of the

medium tank were employed on Iwo Jima and Okinawa.⁶³

Soon after improved tank models began appearing in the Pacific, armored flamethrowers became available. Much of the successful introduction and employment of this infantry weapon in combat depended upon the rapid development of the portable flamethrower earlier. At the beginning of the war, American troops had only the M1 flamethrower, which had a range of a mere 10-15 yards and frequently misfired. Despite the knowledge that the enemy had no better weapon, it "did not overcome the dislike and distrust the American troops felt for the M1."⁶⁴

Although this model was gradually improved, the basic problem remained, the too-rapid burning of the flamethrower fuel, which in the beginning was gasoline alone. The development of napalm (a three to eight percent mixture of aluminum soap with gasoline) came later after much experimentation. When the correct formula for napalm was achieved, its use as a fuel almost

⁶¹ LtCol George Janiszewski comments to HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 8Feb66. LtCol Janiszewski served as an enlisted Marine in the 75mm Gun Platoon, Weapons Company, 7th Marines, on Guadalcanal.

⁶² LtCol Frank O. Hough and Maj John A. Crown, *The Campaign on New Britain* (Washington: HistBr, HQMC, 1952), p. 22.

⁶³ The 1st Marine Division's tank battalion on Okinawa, however, retained its M4A2 tanks, which had welded hulls and were equipped with diesel motors. "LtCol [Arthur J.] 'Jeb' Stuart's fight to keep these instead of accepting the gasoline driven ones was carried by me all the way back to Pearl Harbor before the Okinawa landing. In my opinion, considering all factors, this feature helped keep casualties [among tank battalion personnel] to a minimum. The [tanks] were not so easily set on fire and blown up under enemy fire. We salvaged many using a 4.2 mortar smoke barrage and a tow tank under fire." *del Valle ltr 1966*.

⁶⁴ 1stLt Lewis Meyers, "Tactical Use of Flame," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 29, no. 11 (Nov45), p. 20, hereafter Meyers, "Tactical Use of Flame."

doubled the range of the flamethrower and gave greater adhesion of the liquid on the target, it burned for a longer period than earlier fuels, and was much safer for the flamethrower operator to handle. The M1 was modified for use with napalm, and when fully loaded, it weighed 68 pounds—a heavy burden for an infantryman to carry, especially in combat when he was being shot at.⁶⁵

The M2-2 flamethrower was introduced into combat in late 1943 (the E-Series division had 24, the F-Series had 243, and the G-Series had 108), and although it had an improved ignition system and could be maintained better in combat, it had the same 4-gallon capacity and 40-yard range of the earlier model.

By the end of the war, the portable flamethrower had become an important addition to the arsenal of Marine infantry weapons. But in face of the Japanese defenses encountered in the Central Pacific operations, it was found that it could not provide flame in sufficient quantity and that flamethrower operators could not advance through coordinated enemy fires to apply it without tremendous loss of American lives. The two solutions most likely to succeed were to drop some sort of fire bomb on a target and to develop an armored vehicle capable of delivering large amounts of flame for greater periods than heretofore.

The napalm bomb was first employed

in support of a combat operation at Tinian, where Army pilots used it on an experimental basis. Various gasoline/napalm mixtures, types of fuses and fuse settings, and methods of delivery were attempted to ascertain what the potentials and limitations of the napalm bomb were. On the basis of reports received from his Navy and Marine Corps observers, the commander of Amphibious Group 2, Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill, concluded that "the bomb gave great promise of success as an amphibious weapon in future assaults against densely covered islands."⁶⁶ This conclusion was verified in later operations as air delivery of napalm was perfected as an offensive weapon.

Fitting LVTs and tanks with flamethrowers gave the infantry a better weapon for the destruction of enemy-held caves, cliffs, and canefields. Appearing in the Pacific in early 1944 was the "Ronson," a Canadian Army-developed, heavy-duty, long-range flamethrower which had a 150-gallon tank. It was initially mounted on an LVT and experimented with in the Hawaiian Islands and later used at Peleliu. In the spring of 1944, the Marines in the Pacific created "Satan," an M3 light tank which had been converted to carry the Ronson and 170 gallons of fuel, and had a range of 60–80 yards. VAC took 24 Satans into the Marianas campaign, where they

⁶⁵ Casualties among flamethrower operators were especially high in proportion to their numbers because of the nature of the tactics in which they and their weapons were employed in the assault of fortified positions. Also, the weight of the loaded flamethrower, and its high silhouette combined to make the operator particularly vulnerable to enemy fire.

⁶⁶ VAdm Harry W. Hill ltr to Dr. Jeter A. Isely, dtd 15Jun49, cited in Isely and Crowl, *Marines and Amphibious War*, p. 364. Commenting on this matter, General Woods has written: "Marine aviation did much experimenting with napalm, mixes, etc., in the Marshall Islands prior to Tinian, and much of it was dropped on Japs in bypassed islands." *Woods ltr 1966*.

were employed with spectacular results.⁶⁷ The Satan was improved upon with the appearance of the Army H1 Flamethrowing Tank, which mounted a newer model Ronson on the M4 Sherman. It carried 290 gallons of fuel, had the same range as the Satan, and a firing time of 2½ minutes. This was the weapon employed by Tenth Army troops on Okinawa.

A new type of tracked vehicle making its Marine Corps appearance in combat on Iwo Jima was the "Weasel," a light cargo carrier (M29C) that was capable of hauling a half-ton load. VAC, which received these vehicles in November 1944, distributed them to the 3d, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions the same month. While not seaworthy, the Weasel proved of inestimable value on land, where it was fast, maneuverable, and could pull trailers and light artillery pieces over terrain untrafficable for wheeled vehicles.⁶⁸

A recital of the numerous items of new and modified equipment—aviation, ordnance, communications, transportation, armor, *etc.*—assigned to Marine Corps organizations would require more space than is available here. An accounting of their employment is found in the five volumes of this series.

SPECIAL UNITS

Whenever there is a discussion of what special units the Marine Corps had in World War II, the two organizations most readily thought of are the para-

chute and the raider battalions. There were, however, other specialist-type groups of brief life and briefer memory, and still others which were developed and activated late in the war. Although some of the units to be mentioned in this section were short-lived, the lessons learned from their training and combat experience in many cases proved valuable to other FMF organizations.

Marine parachutists, or Paramarines as they were often called, appeared on the scene in the fall of 1940, when the Commandant solicited requests from Marine volunteers to undergo parachute training. The first group began training at the Naval Air Station, Lakehurst, New Jersey, on 26 October of that year. As this and succeeding classes became qualified parachutists, they formed the nucleus of the first parachute battalion organized. Company A, 1st Parachute Battalion, was activated at Quantico on 28 May 1941, and the battalion itself some two months later on 15 August. At the same time that this battalion was organizing on the east coast, the 2d Parachute Battalion was being formed at Camp Elliott on the west coast. On 3 September, the 2d Battalion was at full strength.

From Quantico, the 1st Battalion moved to New River for further training. Many World War II Marines will recall seeing the parachute towers at Hadnot Point when they reported to Camp Lejeune for duty. In order to apply Marine Corps concepts of parachute training, parachute training schools were established at Camp Gillespie, San Diego, on 6 May, and at New River on 15 June 1942. In July 1943, the New River complex was closed, and Camp

⁶⁷ Meyers, "Tactical Use of Flame," p. 21.

⁶⁸ VAC G-4 SAR, Iwo Jima, dtd 30Apr45, p. 45.

Gillespie became the center of Marine Corps parachute training activities.

The 1st Parachute Battalion departed the United States for New Zealand in June 1942. It landed on Gavutu, British Solomon Islands, on the same day that other elements of the 1st Marine Division landed on Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Following its commitment in the heavy fighting on Tulagi and later on Guadalcanal, the battalion was withdrawn from action and sent to Noumea, New Caledonia, where it was joined by the 2d and 3d Parachute Battalions in 1943. On 1 April 1943, the 1st Parachute Regiment was formed of these three battalions. A fourth battalion was activated the next day at San Diego, but never was sent overseas and was disbanded the following January.

Meanwhile, after a lengthy training period, the regiment left Noumea to return to Guadalcanal, arriving there in September 1943. At the end of the month, the entire regiment was transferred to Vella Lavella, New Georgia Group, where it participated in operations against the Japanese. The 2d Parachute Battalion, Reinforced, landed on Choiseul on 27 October in a raid intended to divert Japanese forces from the area of the 1 November target of the 3d Marine Division, Bougainville. The diversionary group withdrew on the 3d.

Before the Bougainville operation was over, most of the 1st Regiment had been committed to action. In December 1943, however, a decision was reached in Washington to disband Marine parachute units. The 1st Regiment, less its air delivery section, was ordered to San Diego, where the Paramarines were used

to cadre the newly forming 5th Marine Division. The air delivery section was divided equally, and its elements were redesignated as corps air delivery sections for I Marine Amphibious Corps and V Amphibious Corps. The 1st Parachute Regiment was formally disbanded on 29 February 1944.

In retrospect, the Marine parachute program proved of little value to the Corps in the sense that no Marine combat paradrops were made during the war, although some had been considered. Militating against such action were several cogent factors. First, the Marine Corps did not have an adequate lift capability. At no one time could existing Marine aviation organizations muster more than six transport squadrons for a single operation, which meant that only one reinforced battalion could be lifted to an objective. Moreover, there were no shore-based staging areas within a reasonable distance of proposed targets. Further, the long distances between objectives were prohibitive. Finally, the objectives assigned to the FMF were generally small, densely defended areas, and therefore unsuitable for mass parachute landings. For these reasons, the Marine parachute program passed into history.

Although the Paramarines never made a combat jump, they did fight as ground troops in several actions and fought exceptionally well before the parachute battalions were disbanded. Marine parachute troops had outstanding spirit and, because of the emphasis on physical conditioning and small-unit tactics in their training program, they excelled in these areas. Their combat knowhow and aggressiveness were fully

demonstrated at Iwo Jima, where a large proportion of 5th Division personnel who were awarded Medals of Honor and Navy Crosses had been Paramarines.⁶⁹

Another group of Marines whose members, like the Paramarines, considered theirs an elite organization, were the Raiders. One reason for the formation of several Marine raider battalions was the apparent need for specially trained hit-and-run troops who could harass the enemy based on the long chain of Japanese-captured islands in the Pacific. Presumably, Marine raider battalions were formed because of the notable success of British commando-type organizations at a time when everything else was going badly for the Allies. Although unsubstantiated and undocumented, it has been rumored that not all Marine Corps officers were particularly enthusiastic about the raider concept.⁷⁰ In writing to President Roosevelt about his 2d Raider Battalion, Major Carlson said:

The whole thing is unorthodox, in the military sense, but it will do the job . . . Of course, we are meeting with opposition from the orthodox brass hats. However, General Vogel, the Force commander, and [Major] Generals [Charles F. B.] Price

⁶⁹ Col Frank C. Caldwell comments to Hist-Br, dtd 15Feb66. Colonel Caldwell, a former Paramarine, was the commander of Company F, 26th Marines, on Iwo Jima.

⁷⁰ "Any such organization, as was the British Commandos, is suitable only for minimal counter-offensive [action] pending the time when the offensive is resumed. Their operational use was limited by their organization and equipment." *del Valle ltr 1966*.

and [Joseph C.] Fegan are sold on the idea and are giving their full support.⁷¹

One recent critic of special units, who believes that any good organization can be trained for special operations, has written that "Most of the pressure for this organization came from the Navy."⁷² This might be rebutted by a comment Admiral Nimitz made in 1957 concerning the assignment of Carlson's 2d Raider Battalion to CinCPac in 1942: "Here I was presented with a unit which I had not requested and which I had not prepared for."⁷³ A partial explanation for the high level of interest evinced in the Marine raider battalions can possibly be inferred from the following excerpt of President Roosevelt's reply to Carlson's letter:

I am delighted to have your letter and to know that all goes so well with you.

What you tell me about the new outfit is most interesting and surely there will be a chance to use it.⁷⁴

Regardless of the quarter from which the impetus to organize Marine raider battalions came and despite Marine Corps attitudes pro and con regarding their formation, a program of special raider training began on 6 January

⁷¹ *Carlson ltr*.

⁷² LtCol Don P. Wyckoff, "Super Soldiers," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 47, no. 11 (Nov63), p. 24.

⁷³ FAdm Chester W. Nimitz ltr to ACofS, G-3, dtd 10Mar57. On 28 May 1942, however, Admiral Nimitz proposed to General MacArthur that the 1st Raider Battalion, then at Tutuila, be employed to raid Tulagi, which the Japanese had captured on 3 May.

⁷⁴ President Franklin D. Roosevelt ltr to Maj Evans F. Carlson, dtd 12Mar42 (NARS, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.).

1942. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, was redesignated the 1st Separate Battalion and transferred from the 1st Marine Division to Amphibious Forces, Atlantic Fleet. Shortly thereafter, Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson and Major Evans F. Carlson were directed to organize, train, and command the first two Marine raider battalions activated. Both officers had the requisite experience necessary to guide the formation and training for this type of specialized organization. Edson had been a company commander with experience in fighting bandits in Nicaragua, and Carlson had been a military observer with General Chu Teh's Eighth Route Army in North China during the Sino-Japanese War. Carlson's raider concept was based, at least in part, on his analysis and admiration of Mao Tse-tung's guerrilla tactics and operations, about which he wrote in two books published in 1940.⁷⁵

A reason for President Roosevelt's interest in the raiders and Carlson may stem from the fact that before the Marine officer had begun a tour as observer in China (1937-1938), he was the commander of the guard at the "Little White House," Warm Springs, Georgia. Also, while still a company grade officer, Carlson had a number of personal appointments with the President, and "during his tour . . . , he sent the President, at his request, a number of reports dealing with politics, political, diplomatic and military figures,

American business policy, and the role of the British and French in China."⁷⁶

Edson's 1st Separate Battalion was redesignated the 1st Raider Battalion on 16 February 1942. The battalion executive officer, Major Samuel B. Griffith, II, joined it after observing commando training in England. On 29 March, the 1st Raiders and 3/7 were sent to the west coast for transfer overseas to Samoa. Arriving at Tutuila on 28 April, Edson's outfit moved once again, this time in July, to Noumea, New Caledonia, where it prepared for the Guadalcanal operation.

The 1st Battalion landed on Tulagi on 7 August together with the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines as part of the 1st Marine Division invasion force, whose other elements landed on Guadalcanal, Gavutu, Tanambogo, and Florida Islands. Although the initial operations on Tulagi were unopposed by the enemy, during the night 7-8 August the raiders repulsed four separately launched Japanese attacks. Organized enemy resistance was eliminated by nightfall of the 8th, and the battalion remained on Tulagi until the end of August.⁷⁷

At this stage in the Guadalcanal campaign, a growing need for more troops led to the move of the battalion across to the bigger island on 31 August to strengthen the 1st Division perimeter. Two raider companies patrolled Savo Island, on 2 September, but found no enemy. Following this, the 1st Raider and 1st Parachute Battalions were consolidated into a provisional battalion and

⁷⁵ Evans F. Carlson, *The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940); same author, *Twin Stars of China* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1940).

⁷⁶ Dr. Elizabeth B. Drewry, Dir, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y., ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 8Mar66.

⁷⁷ 2/5 moved to Guadalcanal on 21 August.

moved into defensive positions on the southern rim of the division perimeter, inland from the airfield.

Here, Edson and his staff planned for an amphibious raid around to the east in the Tasimboko area, where an enemy buildup was reported. The raid was launched on 8 September with a landing just before dawn. Although light at first, enemy resistance became heavier. Upon the arrival of the Paramarines, Edson pushed the attack into the village, where he found that the Japanese had withdrawn, leaving some guns, ammunition, and food.

Despite the disappearance of the enemy forces, intelligence sources indicated that the Japanese were massing for another attack on the Marine defenders. To forestall enemy incursions and to protect the airstrip, General Vandegrift ordered the raiders and parachutists to prepare positions on a long, low ridge extending south of Henderson Field and paralleling the Lunga River. Following sporadic probing attempts on the night 12–13 September, the Japanese launched a full-scale attack the following night and lasting until early the next day. The defenders of Bloody Ridge, or Edson's Ridge as it also became known, turned back a serious threat to their precarious foothold on Guadalcanal in a violent and bloody fight that was crucial to the defense of the perimeter. Edson took over the command of the 5th Marines on 21 September, at which time Griffith, now a lieutenant colonel, relieved him as commander of the raider battalion.

The next action in which the 1st Raider Battalion took part occurred on 26 September, when it was to establish a

permanent patrol base on the coast of Guadalcanal at Kokumbona. Meanwhile, at the mouth of the Matanikau River, 1/7 and 2/5 had become involved in a heavy fire fight with a strongly entrenched enemy force and had become pinned down. Griffith's raiders were ordered to join the two battalions and to prepare for a renewal of the attack the next day. It began early on the 27th and the raiders were stopped short when they ran into a Japanese force which had crossed the river during the night to set up strong positions on high ground some 1,500 yards south of the beach. The raiders as well as the other two Marine battalions were hit hard and finally were forced to evacuate from Point Cruz.

The final action on Guadalcanal in which the understrength 1st Raider Battalion participated was the Matanikau offensive on 7–9 October. Because of losses suffered in this fighting, the battalion was no longer an effective unit, and it was withdrawn soon after from Guadalcanal. It was detached from the 1st Marine Division and attached to Corps Troops, I Marine Amphibious Corps. The battalion embarked for Noumea, arriving there on 17 October.

At San Diego, on 19 February the 2d Separate Battalion (formed on the 5th) under the command of Major Carlson was redesignated the 2d Raider Battalion. Carlson's executive officer was Major James Roosevelt. The 2d Battalion (less Companies D and E, which were sent to reinforce the Marine detachment on Midway) departed the west coast for the Hawaiian Islands for training in landing from submarines and rubber boat handling. On the day

after the Guadalcanal landings, Carlson and the remainder of his battalion boarded submarines and sailed from Pearl Harbor for a raid on Makin in the Gilbert Islands, landing there on 17 August.

The purposes of this raid were to destroy enemy installations, gather intelligence data, test raiding tactics, boost morale in America, and perhaps divert some Japanese attention from Guadalcanal. Although the greatest asset of this operation was in relation to its effect on home-front morale, it also gained a modicum of success in its other objectives. The raiders lost 30 of their force in the course of which the battalion destroyed the 85-man Japanese garrison, and the accompanying radio stations, fuel and supply dumps, and other installations before reboarding the submarines for the return to Pearl.⁷⁸

Carlson's battalion next moved to Espiritu Santo, arriving there on 20 September. On 4 November, the 2d Raider Battalion landed at Aola Bay, about 40 miles east of the Lunga River. From this point, Carlson marched his command through the jungle west to Lunga Point to clear the region of the enemy. For 30 days, until 4 December, the 2d Raider Battalion conducted a 150-mile combat and reconnaissance patrol through some of the most difficult terrain on Guadalcanal. In the course of this patrol, the raiders fought more than a dozen actions and killed nearly 500 of

the enemy at a loss to themselves of 16 killed and 18 wounded. The battalion left Guadalcanal for Espiritu Santo on 17 December 1942, and moved from there to Wellington, New Zealand the following 4 February for a brief rest period, and then back to Espiritu Santo, where it remained awaiting orders for commitment to further action.

A third raider battalion was formed in the Samoan area on 20 September 1942 of volunteers from various 3d Marine Brigade infantry and defense battalion units. The commanding officer was Lieutenant Colonel Harry B. Liversedge. The 3d Raider Battalion departed Samoa on 15 January 1943 and joined the 2d Battalion at Espiritu Santo. Liversedge's battalion spearheaded the unopposed Army landing in the Russell Islands on 20-21 February 1943, and remained there until it was committed to combat later in the year.

Major James Roosevelt organized the 4th Raider Battalion on the west coast on 23 October 1942. It left the United States in February 1943 and went into camp at Espiritu Santo. On 15 March, the 1st Marine Raider Regiment was activated here and consisted of the four raider battalions organized to date. Liversedge, promoted to colonel earlier, was the first regimental commander. At this time, the raiders were scattered throughout the South Pacific with the regimental headquarters and the 2d and 4th Battalions at Espiritu Santo, the 1st at Noumea, and the 3d in the Russells.

Upon its assignment to the New Georgia operation, the regiment, less the 2d and 3d Battalions, moved to Guadalcanal, arriving there the first

⁷⁸ Nine of the Marine casualties were raiders who had been tragically left behind and later captured when the rest of the Carlson force withdrew under most difficult circumstances. See Appendix A, "Marine POWs," *infra.*, for an account of the fate of these men.

week in June, when it became part of the New Georgia Occupation Force. The first element of the regiment committed in this operation was the 4th Raider Battalion (-), now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Michael S. Currin, which landed at Segi Point on New Georgia Island, on 21 June 1943. Before the New Georgia campaign ended four months later, the regimental headquarters, the 1st Battalion, and the remainder of the 4th Battalion, together with Army units, took part in the hard-fought operations leading to the conquest of the New Georgia group. On 29 August, the regiment left Enogai for Guadalcanal, and on 4 September left the Solomons for Noumea.

Here, on 12 September, the 2d Raider Regiment (Provisional), was activated. Consisting of a regimental headquarters and service company, and the 2d and 3d Raider Battalions, Lieutenant Colonel Alan Shapley's new organization was slated as a reinforcing element of the 3d Marine Division for the Bougainville operation. Prior to the assault landing, the division attached the regimental headquarters and the 2d Battalion to the 3d Marines and the 3d Battalion to the 9th Marines for the campaign.

Both the 1st Raider Regiment on New Georgia and the 2d Regiment on Bougainville fought well during their relatively short spans of life. The same may be said about their battalions which fought as independent units before the regiments were formed. But, by the summer of 1943, the siphoning off of trained men both individually and in battalion-sized organizations, as raider and paramarine battalions were activated, proved to be a severe drain on

the Marine Corps as a whole and a luxury which it could not afford. Four Marine divisions (three overseas and one Stateside) were then in existence and the activation of a fifth one was in the offing. The American war effort was in full gear at this time and additional manpower was needed for regular Marine Corps ground formations. The center of the argument here is that the weapons and tactics with which they fought were no different from those employed by regular Marine ground troops. As a matter of fact, a certain cycle is apparent when applied to the history of the formation and disbandment of the raider and parachute battalions: special unit, to groups of special units, and a return to regular infantry formations.

The raiders were too small in organization, too lightly armed (initially, their heaviest weapon was the 60mm mortar), and too specialized in T/O and T/E. Unlike the Paramarines, the raiders did conduct at least one operation of a type for which they had been trained—the raid on Makin. But there was insufficient justification by 1944 for the Marine Corps to maintain special units organized solely to conduct hit-and-run raids. On 26 January, the 2d Raider Regiment (Provisional) was disbanded at Guadalcanal, and the 2d and 3d Raider Battalions were assigned to the 1st Raider Regiment. This unit, in turn, was disbanded on 1 February, when the Headquarters and Service Company and the 1st, 3d, and 4th Battalions were designated the regimental headquarters company and the 1st, 2d, and 3d Battalions of the 4th Marines. The 2d Raider Battalion became the regimental weapons

company. The new regiment was organized to bear the name and honors of the "old 4th," which fought so gallantly in the Philippines in 1942, and was employed first in the Emirau landing and subsequently as a component of the 1st Marine Brigade in the invasion of Guam. Later, at Okinawa, as an element of the 6th Marine Division, the regiment was in the foremost of the fighting.

Two other World War II Marine Corps organizations of passing interest which were abandoned because of general unsuitability were the barrage balloon and glider squadrons. Late in 1941, the Navy had undertaken a barrage balloon program, which was turned over to the Marine Corps for development because those naval bases not defended by the Army came under the cognizance of the FMF. One of the final steps leading to implementation of the Marine program was the recall to active duty of Major Bernard L. Smith as officer-in-charge of barrage balloon development. Major Smith, a reservist, was a pioneer Marine aviator who had served in World War I. On 18 October 1918, he had made the first successful long-distance dirigible flight in the United States, from Akron, Ohio, to Rockaway, New York.

A barrage balloon school was organized at Quantico in April 1941, and later transferred to Parris Island. The long-range goal envisioned a total of 20 balloon squadrons, but in fact by 1943, only five had been organized and sent into the field. The 1st, 3d, 5th, and 6th Barrage Balloon Squadrons were employed at Noumea under the operational control of the Army; the 2d Squadron was at Samoa.

Unfortunately for the time, expense, and effort put into the program, barrage balloons proved to be of little value and hindered rather than supported friendly air operations. In addition, 90mm antiaircraft artillery fire was far more effective in the defense of American installations. On 15 June 1943, in a memorandum to General Marshall, Admiral King stated that a separate Marine Corps barrage balloon program was "an uneconomical use of men and materiel,"⁷⁹ and recommended that the Army take over the program in order that existing Marine Corps squadrons could be disbanded. General Marshall concurred with the CominCh recommendation, whereupon Admiral King advised the Commandant on 1 July of the decision and directed that all balloon materiel and equipment was to be turned over to the Army.⁸⁰

By the end of 1943, all of the Marine squadrons had been disbanded, their materiel transferred to the Army, and their personnel absorbed by Marine defense battalions. An interesting sidelight to the story of the barrage balloon program is the fact that one of the three original officers in the program at Quantico was Captain Aquilla J. Dyess, who was later posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for heroism while

⁷⁹ CominCh memo for CofS, USA, dtd 15Jun-43, FF/1A16-3, Ser: 001187, Subj: Assignment of Barrage Balloon Defense Activities in the Pacific Areas to War Department and Liquidation of the Marine Corps Barrage Balloon Program (OAB, NHD).

⁸⁰ Gen George C. Marshall memo for Adm King, dtd 26Jun43, encl A to CominCh ltr to CMC, dtd 1Jul43, FF1/A16-3, Ser: 001318, Subj: Barrage Balloons (OAB, NHD).

leading his infantry battalion at Roi-Namur.

Close upon the heels of the beginning of the balloon program came the inception of the naval aviation troop-carrying glider program, which similarly was to be executed by the Marine Corps. In 1941, President Roosevelt initiated a revision of existing war plans and goals, which, in essence, increased the size of Marine Corps aviation, among other things, and envisioned four glider groups with a lift capacity of 10,000 Marines.⁸¹

The responsibility for developing the glider program was given to the Division of Aviation, Headquarters Marine Corps, and called for extensive planning in the development of gliders, personnel, and training. On 9 July 1942, CominCh approved a CMC letter which recommended that certain Marine battalions, designated as air infantry, be transported by gliders. The establishment of three glider bases was authorized: Eagle Mountain Lake, Texas; Edenton, North Carolina; and Shawnee, Oklahoma. Personnel to man these bases came from Marine Glider Group 71, consisting of Headquarters Squadron 71, Service Squadron 71, and Marine Glider Squadron 711, which was stationed at Parris Island until 15 November 1942. At that time, the group moved to its permanent station, MCAS, Eagle Mountain Lake; the other two bases were never utilized for glider operations. Glider program training ended in March 1943 and the group was disbanded the following June.⁸²

Shortly after the program had begun, the impracticality of Marine Corps employment of gliders was realized. Quite simply, transport-type aircraft were required to haul gliders and the glider-transport combination could not fly in bad weather over long distances, both of which were common in the Pacific. Additionally, as in the case of the Paramarine program, the Marine Corps did not have enough transport planes to support the glider program. These reasons, combined with the island-hopping mission of the Marine Corps in the vast expanses of the Pacific, caused the termination of the glider program after it had reached a strength of 282 Marines and 21 gliders.⁸³

Another Marine Corps program, begun in response to a real wartime need, was the training of dogs for use in combat. On 26 November 1942, the Commandant directed the establishment of "a training program for dogs for military employment when personnel and materiel become available."⁸⁴ At that time, 20 Marines were being trained by the Army at Fort Robinson, Nebraska, and 4 other Marines were training at Fort Washington, Maryland.

Soon after the War Dog Training Company was organized at New River, the Marine Corps determined that there was little use in tying up the manpower and effort necessary to support the pro-

⁸³ Maj John H. Johnstone, *United States Marine Corps Parachute Units*—Marine Corps Historical Reference Series No. 32 (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1962), p. 8.

⁸⁴ CMC ltr to CG, TC, FMF, MarBks, New River, N. C., dtd 26Nov42, cited in "War Dogs in the U. S. Marine Corps," n.d., p. 2 (War Dog Subject File, HistBr, HQMC).

⁸¹ *DivAvn OpD*, Supplement dtd 1Jun45, p. 4.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

gram unless the use of the dogs contributed directly to killing the enemy and keeping down casualties in units for which the dogs were helping to supply security. Therefore, although at the beginning of the program a certain number of the dogs were trained for guard or sentry duty, as soon as the program was in full operation, the Marine Corps trained only scout and messenger dogs. A 14-week training period was established at Camp Lejeune for both dogs and handlers. Following the completion of each training period, a platoon of 1 officer, 64 Marines, and 36 dogs (18 scout and 18 messenger) was formed. One man was assigned to handle each of the 18 scout dogs, and two handlers were assigned to each of the messenger dogs. Although it was anticipated that a war dog platoon was to be attached to each infantry regiment, in the G-Series T/O the platoon was organic to the division headquarters battalion, from which the dogs and their handlers were to be assigned to front-line units.

The first of its kind to see action in the Marine Corps was the 1st War Dog Platoon, which departed San Diego on 23 June 1943, and landed with the 2d Marine Raider Regiment (Provisional) on Bougainville. War dogs participated in the Guam, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa assaults, and they were employed in mopping up operations on Saipan and in the occupation of Japan. Until 11 August 1945, the Marine Corps procured dogs or accepted offers of donations of dogs for combat training. Approximately six days later, the program ended.

The last special unit which deserves a brief mention here is a rocket platoon, which became organic to the Marine division in the G-Series T/O and was placed in headquarters battalion. Early in the war, purely because the United States was late in beginning the development of the weapon, employment of rocket organizations was strictly on a hit-and-miss basis. An IMAC experimental rocket detachment participated in the Bougainville operation, but its projectiles were highly inaccurate against small area targets and when fired, the rocket launchers revealed Marine positions.

Four provisional rocket platoons were organized by FMFPac during the war. Each detachment had 12 one-ton trucks mounting M7 rocket launchers which fired the Navy 4.5-inch finned barrage rocket. Lighter installations sometimes supplemented this basic armament. The detachments' capabilities were admirably suited for situations where conventional supporting arms could not do the job, and Marine rocket personnel, dubbed "Buck Rogers Men,"⁸⁵ were often called upon. The sudden and intense concentration of fire from this weapon was ideal for last-minute preparation of an objective, also, and was often used as a signal for the attack to jump off.⁸⁶ Ground-fire barrage rockets were effectively employed in this fashion from the invasion of Guam on. Their fires wrought havoc among the enemy both as a destructive and a morale-breaking agent. The appearance

⁸⁵ Sgt George Doying, "The Buck Rogers Men," *Leatherneck*, v. 23, no. 4 (Apr45), p. 27.

⁸⁶ Bartley, *Iwo Jima*, p. 141n.

of rocket launchers at the frontlines generally evoked a hail of Japanese fire, but Marines quickly learned to dig in when the rockets were called up, and by the end of the war, the employment of this weapon in difficult situations was commonplace.

In connection with this discussion of rocketry, their use by Marine aircraft is of interest here. A Marine squadron, VMTB-134, flying TBFs claimed the distinction of having fired the first Navy aircraft rocket at the Japanese:

That this squadron carried off the pioneering honors was due to their own enterprise and the ingenuity of a service squadron in locating and installing launchers and securing rockets. The rockets reached the squadron on 8 February 1944. On 15 February, with only 3 days training, the squadron took part in a strike on Rabaul. Despite their lack of experience, they used their rockets with considerable success.⁸⁷

One of the rockets developed for air delivery and used extensively by Marine aviation was the 5-inch HVAR (High Velocity Aircraft Rocket), which was 6 feet long, weighed 140 pounds, and had a velocity of 1,375 feet per second. This

missile first went into use in July 1944.⁸⁸ Marine pilots also employed the "Tiny Tim," the 11.75-inch rocket that was 12 feet long, weighed approximately 1,200 pounds, and carried a punch that equalled the projectile of a 12-inch naval rifle. These were employed with some success by planes from the carrier *Intrepid* at Okinawa, but the results could not be completely assessed because "so many things were being thrown at the Japs on Okinawa that it was impossible to distinguish the wreckage caused by 'Tiny Tim' from the general destruction."⁸⁹

MARINE CORPS AVIATION

Perhaps no other arm of the Services was so profoundly affected by technological advances during the war as aviation, and the air organization of the Marine Corps was no exception. Merely viewing a procession of the types of planes employed by Marine pilots from 7 December to V-E Day supports this statement. The staff agency at Headquarters Marine Corps responsible for supervising the expansion of and supporting the Marine air program throughout World War II was the Division of Aviation.

Previous volumes in this series, especially Volumes II and IV have dealt extensively with Marine Corps air operations in the Pacific fighting. The sections of combat narrative in each of the other three volumes describe in detail the tremendous strides Marine Corps aviation made during the war,

⁸⁷ Joint Board on Scientific Information Policy, *U. S. Rocket Ordnance, Development and Use in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1946), p. 29. The VMTB-134 Hist, dtd Feb44 (OAB, NHD), states that the date of the attack was 17 February 1944. The fact that claims of "firsts" are tenuous is proved by USS *Manila Bay* (CVE-61) AR, ser 014, dtd 18Feb44 (OAB, NHD), which indicates that TBFs of VC-7 employed "air-to-ground rockets in attacking Japanese shore and ship targets in the Kwajalein Atoll area on 31 January and 1 February 1944." Dir, NHD, ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 3Jun66.

⁸⁸ Joint Board on Scientific Information Policy, *op. cit.*

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

and the valuable support it provided in most of the operations in the Pacific.

Although the 1st and 2d Marine Aircraft Wings had been established nearly six months before the outbreak of the war, only one group in each wing—MAG-11 at Quantico and MAG-21 at Ewa—were operational. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor destroyed all but one of the planes at Ewa. Just prior to 7 December, half of the combat strength of MAG-21 had been sent westward. Eighteen dive bombers of VMSB-231 being ferried on the carrier *Lexington* to garrison Midway were re-routed to Pearl Harbor, arriving there on 10 December after having been launched from the flattop on the same day. A week later, 17 of the planes made a long over-water flight to their original destination. On Christmas Day, the aircraft complement on Midway was augmented when VMF-221 pilots flew in 14 fighter planes. Throughout the following months, and until the 1st Marine Division landed on Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942, a greater number of Marine pilots and planes entered the Pacific. But at first, the numbers were all too few.

The importance of the relation of aviation to Marine ground tactics was graphically demonstrated at Guadalcanal, where, despite a severe shortage of planes, fuel, and spare parts, the Cactus Air Force—as the first squadrons to be based on Henderson Field were collectively called—devastated the myth of Japanese superiority in the air. Guadalcanal-based pilots flew cover for Allied shipping coming into and anchored off of the island, and they also went up to intercept Japanese raids com-

ing from the north. A post-Guadalcanal analysis of its operations states, "The Cactus Air Force performed beyond all proportion to its facilities and equipment. . . ." ⁹⁰

By 8 February 1943, when Guadalcanal was secured, Marine aviation strength on the island had been built up dramatically. No longer were Allied planes content to play a strictly defensive role; they were carrying the battle to enemy air bases elsewhere in the Solomons, and indeed to the heart of Japanese air operations at Rabaul on New Britain. The plane which was to become the basic weapon of Marine fighter pilots in the war appeared over Guadalcanal on 12 February, when VMF-124 flew its gull-winged F4U-1 Vought-Sikorsky "Corsairs" up from Espiritu Santo. This plane not only could fly faster than any aircraft the Japanese possessed, but it could also climb nearly 3,000 feet a minute and had twice the range of the Grumman Wildcats, the Marine fighter planes flown heretofore. With these and other modern aircraft, Marine squadrons claimed a total of more than 2,344 Japanese planes downed in air combat.

There were 120 Marine aces in the war—that is, pilots who had shot down five or more enemy aircraft. Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Boyington, a Medal of Honor winner, was the leading Marine ace with 28 planes to his credit; six of these were downed while he was with the Flying Tigers in China before the United States entered the war. Not available for the record is the amount

⁹⁰ Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal*, p. 294. CACTUS was the code name for Guadalcanal.

of damage accomplished by Flying Leathernecks during their support of ground operations.

It was in this area, Marine air support of Marine ground troops, that close coordination between the Marine air and ground components worked so well and laid the basis for the postwar development of the balanced air-ground task force. Close air support techniques were pioneered during World War II as a result of the close working relationship and cooperation between Marine aviation and ground commanders, and a knowledge of what the requirements of each were. Beginning in the Bougainville campaign, and improved upon constantly in each succeeding operation, close air support of ground forces came to be as important as artillery and naval gunfire support, and in many cases was more effective.

The strength and numbers of Marine air organizations, like the ground forces, grew apace with the expanding American war effort. With the capture and occupation of Pacific islands formerly held by the Japanese, Marine squadrons were based on newly built or previously established fields on these islands and became available for a vast number of missions against the enemy. By the war's end, the Marine Corps had activated four aircraft wings in the Pacific, one in the States, a number of training commands, 128 tactical squadrons, and had an aviation strength of 116,628 Marines—of whom 10,049 were pilots.

Because of the nature of Marine Corps aviation activities in the course of the war, it is not possible to trace the development of wing and group T/Os in the same manner that the organization

of the Marine division and regiment was traced earlier in this chapter. For one reason, throughout the Pacific War period there was constant development in and manufacture of different types of tactical aircraft, which formed the basis of new tactical squadrons. Therefore, the character and makeup of the wings and groups changed constantly from 1941–1945. The wartime wings were in reality task organizations whose composition depended primarily upon the mission which they had been assigned.

In early 1942, the D-Series T/O for a Marine aircraft wing consisted of a headquarters squadron, an air regulating squadron, an observation-utility group (headquarters squadron, observation squadron, and two utility squadrons), two scout bombing groups (headquarters squadron, service squadron, and four scout bombing squadrons), and two fighter groups (headquarters squadron, service squadron, and four fighter squadrons). A year later, the 1st MAW—with squadrons based on Espiritu Santo, New Caledonia, Guadalcanal, and Efate—consisted of a headquarters squadron, an air depot squadron, an air repair and salvage squadron, an air base squadron, an observation squadron, and four composite aircraft groups in which were fighter, scout bombing, and transport squadrons, as well as the usual headquarters and service squadrons for each of the groups. The makeup of each group was different. And so, throughout the war, the composition and, in fact, the strength of the wings changed in keeping primarily with assigned tactical missions.

Marine air operations in the Pacific War can be divided roughly into sev-

eral phases. Encompassed in the first are the operations following Pearl Harbor and leading to Guadalcanal. Included in the second phase is the advance up the Solomons chain and the complete reduction of enemy air power centered in Rabaul, the story of which is found in Volume II, Part V, "Marine Air Against Rabaul." In a third phase, the role played by Marine pilots during the Central Pacific drive and in the Philippines campaign forms Parts IV and V, "Marines in the Philippines" and "Marine Aviation in the Central Pacific," of Volume IV. Finally, "Marine Carrier Air," leads off Part III of this volume. In these many pages are found the outstanding record of achievement of Marine Corps aviation in World War II.

TACTICAL INNOVATIONS

Paralleling the changes in the composition of the Marine rifle squad was the development of Marine infantry tactics. Some of the senior officers and noncoms landing in the Solomons with the 1st Marine Division had been schooled in jungle fighting during tours of duty in the Caribbean in the 1920s and early 1930s. Most of the rest of the division had participated in one or more of the numerous fleet landing exercises of the prewar era. Prewar concepts and tactics had to be changed, however, when subjected to test in combat.

The combined training and experience of division personnel was sound and proved successful in the initial phases of the Guadalcanal campaign, but more was required of Marines than to defend the division perimeter or to

beat off enemy attacks. It would not be enough to patrol the island aggressively in search-and-kill missions. In the final analysis, these were the tactics employed to seize and hold Guadalcanal, but there were other islands to be taken, other Japanese positions to be overcome, and other tactics to be developed.

Japanese bunker defenses encountered on Munda during the New Georgia campaign gave impetus to the development of a new set of ground tactics which emphasized close tank-infantry coordination. In this operation, the Marines provided the tanks, the Army supplied the infantry. At the conclusion of the fighting, Marine and Army commanders submitted a number of recommendations which were aimed at improving tactics, communications, and fire coordination. The experience of New Georgia pointed up the need for the infantry to be supported by heavier tanks and tank-mounted flamethrowers. The light tanks used at that time were not capable of destroying the well-constructed Japanese bunkers.

Training in small-unit tactics against a fortified position paid dividends to the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, on D-Day at Bougainville. The assault wave of the battalion was hit hard by effective fire from an undamaged Japanese 75mm artillery piece, and Marine elements which landed were thoroughly dispersed. Only one infantry company landed on its assigned beach. Rifle groups soon began forming under ranking men, however, and as the fight to extend the beachhead ensued, the Marines became oriented to their location and tactical integrity was restored. The pace of the assault then intensified.

While in New Zealand preparing for Bougainville, 3d Division training had consisted first of small-unit tactics, and then progressed to battalion and regimental combat team rehearsals. On the lower level, all Marines had been thoroughly briefed on the mission of each assaulting element, and each squad, platoon, and company was made familiar with the mission of adjacent organizations. Additionally, each Marine was given a sketch map of the Cape Torokina shoreline. Because of this sound preinvasion indoctrination, and despite the confused situation on the beach on D-Day, control was regained and "bunker after bunker began to fall to the coordinated and well-executed attacks" of the reformed infantry groups.⁹¹

As the Bougainville campaign progressed and after three major engagements with the enemy, 3d Division Marines became as adept at jungle fighting as the veterans of Guadalcanal. The Marines on the Northern Solomons island learned to take cover quickly and quietly when attacked and learned to employ their supporting arms effectively.

The 3d Division developed a formation it called "contact imminent," which was employed for an approach march through the jungle to enemy positions. This formation, ensuring a steady and controlled advance, had several variations. Basically, it consisted of a march column of units which had flank guards deployed to cover the widest possible front under existing conditions

of visual or physical contact. The formation was spearheaded by a security patrol and avoided all trails. Control was maintained by means of telephone wire which was unrolled at the head of the column and reeled in again at the tail. Upon stopping or at the time of contact with the enemy, unit and supporting arms commanders clipped their hand-carried sound-powered telephones into the lines and were in instant communication with the formation commander. The officer at the head of the main body controlled the speed and direction of the column.

Experience at Bougainville demonstrated that a command employing the "contact imminent" formation could expect to move at a rate of 500 yards per hour through swamps—and Bougainville had swamps aplenty inland of the beachhead. It was also discovered that a unit in this formation could fend off small enemy attacks without a delay in forward movement. At the same time, the formation was flexible enough to permit the commander to deploy his troops for immediate combat on the flanks, in the front, or at the rear.

By the end of the Bougainville campaign, 3d Division Marines had amassed a bookful of lessons learned in combat which, together with the experiences gained by others in previous operations, would profit Marines assigned to the Pacific area when they entered combat. Bougainville proved, as did Guadalcanal and New Georgia earlier, that with few exceptions, jungle tactics were based simply on common sense applied to standard tactical principles and methods generally employed in tropical terrain and vegetation. Although it was diffi-

⁹¹ Shaw and Kane, *Isolation of Rabaul*, p. 213.

cult to maintain troop control in the jungle, the "contact imminent" formation proved eminently sound. Another lesson of Bougainville was that, like in the "Banana Wars" of Central America, rapid-fire weapons were most suitable for jungle fighting; the light machine gun was particularly favored because of its rapid rate of fire, mobility, and low silhouette.

Less than two months after the Bougainville D-Day, Major General William H. Rupertus' 1st Marine Division landed on New Britain at Cape Gloucester, which was the last major Marine ground operation in the Southwest Pacific area. The terrain on New Britain for the most part was very similar to that found on Bougainville. Jungle, swamps, and unknown and unforeseen heights abounded. The tactics the Marines employed here, therefore, were the "book" tactics for jungle warfare, with basic techniques refined by these now combat-wise veterans. General Rupertus' men maintained excellent night fire discipline and patrolled aggressively throughout the campaign. In essence, they successfully employed tactics which had once been the exclusive province of the enemy in the Pacific; the tables had been turned. Marines captured enemy weapons and used them expertly against their former owners. Again, as before, small-unit leaders were capable of independent action in "brush-choked terrain, where the bitterest fighting was often done at close range with an unseen enemy."⁹²

While fighting on Bougainville was underway and before it had started in

New Britain, Marines opened the Central Pacific campaign with the invasion of Tarawa, where Marines met a determined enemy well ensconced in heavily fortified defenses. An overall evaluation of the Tarawa operation called this "a battle where perseverance dominated over adversity, where individual courage and collective knowhow defeated a strong Japanese garrison on its own ground and in its own positions."⁹³

A post-operation analysis determined what factors militated for success on Tarawa. In this context, both 2d Division engineers and tankmen praised the preinvasion training they had received in coordinating their employment of demolitions, flamethrowers, and firepower in knocking out the coconut palm log, coral, and concrete bunkers and pillboxes.

Tarawa served as a bloody testing ground where valuable lessons were learned for storming a heavily defended beach. It was found that in their training for future combat commitments, the Marine divisions had to emphasize more thorough coordination of tanks, artillery, flamethrowers, demolitions, and riflemen in isolating and overrunning strong Japanese defenses. A further conclusion based on the Tarawa experience was that all Marines, regardless of their specialties, had to be taught something about the use of demolitions. Up to that point, explosives had been employed almost exclusively by combat engineers.

⁹² Capt James R. Stockman, *The Battle For Tarawa* (Washington: HistSec, DivPubInfo, HQMC, 1947), p. 65.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 438.

The lessons of Tarawa were absorbed at Camp Pendleton by the 4th Marine Division, which was forming and training for its impending assault of the islands of Kwajalein Atoll. Great stress in the training phase was placed on the destruction of pillboxes. To achieve this, the infantry regiments organized two types of assault demolition teams—each numbering about 20 men—for use against these and other fortified positions. Both teams contained demolitions, bazooka, and BAR groups, but the nucleus of the first was a flamethrower, and the second was built around a light machine gun. The 4th Division selected infantrymen from all of the assault units for special demolitions training and to act as demolition men in the above-mentioned teams. They were, in fact, to take the place of combat engineers in this formation and elsewhere, whenever necessary.

The success of this training was emphasized at Roi-Namur and the other islets of Kwajalein. At the end of this operation, the VAC commander, General Holland Smith, made the following comments, which could have applied equally to subsequent campaigns:

The technique of the infantry-tank teams pushing rapidly forward, closely followed by demolition and flame thrower teams is concurred in by this Headquarters as sound. However, emphasis is placed on the fact that it must be a continuous movement in which light enemy resistance is neutralized and bypassed by the forward elements of the infantry-tank teams, then the supporting elements of the infantry equipped with demolitions and flame throwers reduced these isolated enemy positions before they can recover and fire on the rear of our troops moving forward.

This technique is particularly effective

in searching out the real strongpoints and thereby avoiding holding up the attack by weak and scattered resistance. When a strongpoint is encountered, the infantry-tank team and demolition-flame thrower team become integrated and operate together until the strong point is reduced.

In reducing a strong point, emphasis must be also placed upon the value of supporting fires from air, naval gunfire and artillery. Field artillery continues to be the most reliable and effective weapon for neutralization purposes in close support of infantry. Proper use of supporting fires in reducing strong points calls for the artillery-infantry-tank team to be closely coordinated. The greatest neutralization value is gained by the infantry and tanks moving quickly into the neutralized area as artillery fires lift. The closer the advance behind our own neutralization fires the more the benefit derived from the neutralization. Team work, involving firing, must be practiced in training periods to develop thoroughly the use of combined arms.⁹⁴

In a personal letter to the Commandant, General Smith more vividly described the Kwajalein battle:

The fighting on Namur was fierce. Heavy underbrush filled with Japs throughout the entire back area. The [enemy] had concrete tunnels connecting their pill boxes, and in addition trenches dug at the base of trees running zigzag across the entire island. The 24th [Marines] had to dig them out with hand grenades, flame throwers, and bayonets.⁹⁵

The refinement of existing tactics rather than the development of new ones marked the Saipan operation,

⁹⁴ CG, VAC, comments, n.d., in CominCh, Amphibious Operations, The Marshall Islands, Jan-Feb44, dtd 20May44.

⁹⁵ MajGen Holland M. Smith ltr to CMC, dtd 4Feb44 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File HistBr, HQMC).

where the technique of tank-infantry coordination was improved. Although artillery served admirably as a supporting arm, the fighting in the Pacific demonstrated the "need for a weapon which could operate closer to the infantry, a weapon which the infantry could direct and control, and from this came the tank-infantry team."⁹⁶

Standard infantry arm and hand signals and radio communication were employed whenever infantry and armor worked together. Neither was a satisfactory link, however, and at Arawe, 1st Tank Battalion personnel installed field telephones at the rear of their light tanks through which the riflemen could contact the tank commanders. "The improvement in tank-infantry cooperation was immediate, and the innovation proved to be sound enough to have a permanent part in armored support tactics."⁹⁷

Tank-infantry cooperation was based on a mutuality of needs. The tanks had the crushing ability and firepower which, under optimum conditions, provided excellent support to the infantry. On the other hand, in the midst of battle, the tank, a large lumbering vehicle, was a target which the enemy could hardly expect to miss, and, in fact, often hit. Under most combat conditions, the tanks were tightly buttoned up and vulnerable because the vision of the tankers inside was restricted to a very great degree. The infantry, therefore, was responsible for protecting the

tank from suicide-inclined Japanese who threatened to blow up both tanks and themselves. As the eyes and ears of the tank, the infantry was also responsible for designating suitable targets for the guns of the armored vehicle and directing its fire.

The tank-infantry concept reached full maturity at Saipan. Not only because of earlier experiments but because the terrain here was more suited for armored operations. Infantry-tank coordination was excellent at Tinian. "Indeed, much of the operation took on the properties of a tank-infantry sweep."⁹⁸ There were few tank losses here primarily because enemy antitank fire was ineffective, and also because the most dangerous antitank weapon, the magnetic mine, was offset by a Marine technique used first at Roi-Namur, later employed in the Marianas, and nearly perfected at Iwo and Okinawa. This simple field expedient merely consisted of covering the flat areas of the most vulnerable surfaces of the tank with oak planking.⁹⁹

Each infantry regiment on Tinian was assigned one reinforced company of 18 medium tanks plus a platoon of four flamethrower tanks and two light tanks. Throughout this operation, these tank companies supported the same infantry units to which they had originally been assigned. This led to constantly improving tank-infantry tactics.

As at Tarawa, the only infantry tactics feasible at Peleliu were those

⁹⁶ Capt Leonard G. Lawton, "Tank-Infantry Team," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 29, no. 11 (Nov45), p. 30.

⁹⁷ Shaw and Kane, *Isolation of Rabaul*, p. 394.

⁹⁸ Maj Carl W. Hoffman, *The Seizure of Tinian* (Washington: HistDiv, HQMC, 1951), p. 131.

⁹⁹ LtCol Richard K. Schmidt ltr to CMC, dtd 5Dec49, cited in *Ibid.*

employed by determined flamethrower, demolition, and infantry assault teams. The Japanese had fully utilized the terrain on the island to their advantage. It has been said of enemy defenses on Peleliu that "never before in the Pacific War had the Japanese displayed greater resourcefulness or exploited their capabilities more successfully."¹⁰⁰

To overcome these nearly impregnable defenses, 1st Marine Division troops employed their bazookas, portable flamethrowers, and demolitions with savage expertise. When afforded profitable targets, artillery supported the infantry. Tank-infantry tactics proved satisfactory, but only on level ground where the tanks could maneuver.

General Rupertus, the commander of the 1st Marine Division, noted after Peleliu that portable flamethrowers were not at first employed satisfactorily because the infantry did not receive them until immediately before embarking for the target area. The 1st Division commander commented favorably on the results achieved by the Ronson flamethrower, but added that he believed it should not be mounted on the LVT. Instead Rupertus thought that the General Grant tank would prove a more suitable platform. The Grant mounted a 75mm gun on its right side and in a power turret on top, a 37mm gun and a .30 caliber machine gun. General Rupertus recommended that:

The 37mm gun . . . could be removed and the Navy flame-thrower installed therein; you would still have the 75mm gun available. . . . If in addition to such installation a bulldozer blade were made

a part of the tank, you would have one of the finest weapons possible for this mopping up of caves, pillboxes and block-houses that you could devise.¹⁰¹

For the invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the Marine divisions had dozer and flamethrower tanks.

But these tools of war were not available to Captain George P. Hunt's Company K, 3/1, at Peleliu on D-Day, when it landed on White Beach, the extreme left of the 1st Marine Division beach-head. Hunt's Marines encountered here a classic Japanese defense, set in:

. . . solid, jagged coral, a rocky mass of sharp pinnacles, deep crevasses, tremendous boulders. Pillboxes, reinforced with steel and concrete, had been dug or blasted in the base of the perpendicular drop to the beach. Others, with coral and concrete piled six feet on top were constructed above, and spider holes were blasted around them for protecting infantry. It surpassed by far anything we had conceived of when we studied the aerial photographs.¹⁰²

It was such a narrow thing that at one stage during the first night, Hunt was holding the point with 18 men and depending heavily on a captured Japanese machine gun to stave off annihilation. Later it proved possible to send in reinforcements and needed supplies by LVTs, and Hunt was able to attack and overcome the enemy position.

After the Peleliu operation, Hunt was returned to Quantico to instruct a course in the rifle company in the attack. With the cooperation of Colonel Lewis

¹⁰¹ MajGen William H. Rupertus ltr to CMC, dtd 18Oct44 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File).

¹⁰² George P. Hunt, *Coral Comes High* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946), p. 58.

¹⁰⁰ Isely and Crowl, *Marines and Amphibious War*, p. 412.

W. Walt, "in charge of the attack division" at the Marine Corps Schools, a problem was designed and entitled "Assault of a Fortified Position," based on the experiences of Company K on White Beach, for use in the course of instruction at the Schools. The exact layout and construction of Japanese defenses were reconstituted for this problem. "Later Colonel Walt added the lake and amphibious craft," which gave additional realism to students and visitors alike whenever this particular problem was demonstrated.¹⁰³ For a number of years thereafter, "Assault of a Fortified Position" was a highlight and necessary ingredient in the education of young lieutenants at the Basic School.

Iwo Jima confronted invading Marines with defenses and an enemy opposition which were in many ways very much like those encountered in the Gilberts, Marshalls, and Palau Islands. The objective was relatively small in comparison with those in the Marianas. At Iwo, defensive weapons and installations were mutually supporting and thoroughly fortified. Their destruction depended upon closely coordinated teamwork by Marine infantry and supporting arms.

The hard-working infantry, as usual, was called on to perform this mission in the face of murderous enemy fire. Marine tactics generally employed upon meeting a strongpoint were these: a "pin up" team consisting of a bazooka, two BARs, and an M-1 rifle would direct a heavy volume of fire on the target. When the Japanese were sub-

jected to this base of fire, the demolition teams would move in for the kill. One such team might be armed with several sections of bangalore torpedoes, and such other explosives as pole, satchel, and shaped charges.¹⁰⁴ The other team would have two flamethrowers and their operators, which in turn were protected by two riflemen. In the end, the application of these tactics, which were graphically but aptly described at Okinawa as the "corkscrew and blowtorch" method by General Buckner, was enough to destroy

¹⁰⁴ A bangalore torpedo is a long iron pipe filled with an explosive, and fitted with a detonating cap and a long fuse. Several bangalore sections could be fitted together, and after a rounded cap was fastened to the head end, these sections could be pushed forward over most types of terrain and exploded to destroy barbed wire entanglements or to detonate buried mines. The pole charge was simply about 15 pounds of block TNT tied together, capped, fuze, and mounted at the end of a long pole, ready to be fired. The beauty of the pole charge was that it could be placed in position out of hand-reach. Satchel charges also consisted of about 15 pounds of explosives either taped to a board fitted with a rope or wire loop for carrying, or placed in a haversack for the same purpose. Once the fuze was lit, the satchel could be flung at an enemy fortification or position. A shaped charge was as the name suggests, a charge composed of cast TNT shaped like a cone so that the explosive energy was focused and concentrated to move in one direction. Fastened to a pole and emplaced against a concrete blockhouse, when exploded the shaped charge would blow a small hole on the outside of the position, but once having penetrated the wall, the concentrated energy fanned out with tremendous force, carrying with it concrete and steel fragments and a concussive blast, which in itself was capable of killing all the defenders within the fortification.

¹⁰³ Mr. George P. Hunt ltr to author dtd 17Jun66.

even the most steadfastly held Japanese defensive position.

It was tactics such as these which moved Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, who was present and an observer at Iwo Jima, to express great admiration "for the guy who walks up beaches and take enemy positions with a rifle and grenades or his bare hands."¹⁰⁵ Mr. Forrestal gave an exaggerated description, of course, of how Marine infantry overcame General Kuribayashi's island fortress, but the Secretary of the Navy was not far off the mark.

Okinawa was the ultimate amphibious assault landing in the Pacific War, and the ultimate weapon here was the infantryman and his supporting arms. The most complete employment of tank-infantry tactics perhaps best characterizes the nature of the fighting on Okinawa. In the rapid drive north which led to the decisive and successful battle for Motobu Peninsula, 6th Division Marines rode the tanks which later provided fire support in the heavy fighting to rid northern Okinawa of the Japanese. But it was in the southern portion of the island, both on level ground and in cave-studded draws that the development of the tank-infantry team reached a climax.

In both the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions, tanks functioned as a major direct-fire, close-support weapon. At all times, IIIAC tanks operated within the limit of observation and control of the infantry. Generally depending upon the tactical situation, tank-infantry teams were employed in one of two ways on

Okinawa. In the first instance, following the neutralization of an objective by supporting fires, the ground troops—preceded by Shermans—advanced to secure the area. This type of attack proved successful only against ground lightly defended by the enemy. In cases where there were heavy and well dug-in Japanese positions, the pre-attack preparation had a temporary effect only, and when American forces were on or near the objective, the enemy would level furious fire on the attackers, pinning them down and prohibiting their movement forwards or backwards.

A second method was widely employed in southern Okinawa. Prior to a general tank-infantry advance, the Shermans—protected by fire teams—delivered close-range direct fire on caves, bunkers, and tomb emplacements in the path of the assault. Tanks and armored flamethrowers ranged out ahead of the front lines to distances up to 800 yards, systematically destroying enemy positions on forward and reverse slopes by putting point-blank 75mm fire and flame right into cave mouths and embrasures. In the fighting for Sugar Loaf, tanks were emplaced in hull defilade firing positions at the front to deliver flat trajectory fire into enemy lines opposite. Of proven worth in the tank-infantry attacks were the M-7s with their 105mm guns. These vehicles served admirably as siege guns and were the most powerful organic weapon in the infantry regiment. Like the tanks, the M-7s could and did roll right up to the face of Japanese emplacements to deliver their fire.

Peculiar to the terrain of Okinawa is a series of sharp, rocky coral ridges

¹⁰⁵ Quoted in *New York Times*, 26Feb45, p. 1, column 6.

which the enemy defended with skill and ferocity against all attackers. These ridges form the precipitous walls of valleys, upon the floors of which were emplaced mutually supported weapons, concealed in caves, and sited for murderous crossfire. The entrances to the valleys were very often mined to discourage tank operations. Usually, the cave positions enfiladed any advance in the open space leading to the valleys. In most cases, the caves were so high on the cliff faces that the infantry was unable to close to assault them.

As demonstrated by the fighting for the Awacha Pocket, and later at both Dakeshi and Wana Ridges, the maneuver of Marine forces was restricted by the funnelling influence of the ever-narrowing cliffs. This, in effect, forced the infantry to mount what generally became a frontal attack, "a slugging match with but temporary and limited opportunity to maneuver."¹⁰⁶

Born of the necessity for reducing Japanese emplacements in the areas just named, the Marines devised a suitable tactic employing all arms organic and available to the infantry. According to this solution, it was important for attack elements first to take the high ground, from where they could support a methodical cleaning out of the draws and valleys below by tank-infantry-flamethrower-demolitions teams. Once a ridge position had been secured, combat engineers cleared mines from the entrances of the valleys. From the ridge-tops, all supporting arms were called upon to place as much fire as possible on

the valley walls. Closely following this fire, the tank-infantry teams started into the pocket, working both sides of the valley simultaneously to prevent the numerous enemy positions from supporting each other. "Each cave position is attacked by fire until neutralized, then burned out with flamethrowers, and eventually sealed by demolitions."¹⁰⁷

It may be clearly seen from this brief exposition on the evolution of Marine infantry tactics in the war that the way of the Marine infantryman in no way became safer, although his path was made easier as new methods and deadlier weapons became his. This in no way mitigates the fact that under any condition infantry combat simply is a dirty and hard business, where training, discipline, and courage earn dividends.

SPIRITUAL AND MEDICAL SERVICES

The most important thing that can be said about chaplains, doctors, and corpsmen in any war is that they were "there," and that they were there with the troops when they were needed. The services performed by these naval personnel in Marine Corps uniforms have been praised by generals and privates alike. The members of the Navy Corps of Chaplains and Medical and Dental Corps ministered to the spiritual and physical needs of all ranks and religions under all conditions. Although unarmed, they were subjected to the same rigors and discomforts in combat as Marine assault troops.

¹⁰⁶ MajGen Pedro A. del Valle, "Cave Warfare," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 29, no. 7 (Jul45), p. 58.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

Early in World War II, the Navy Chaplains Division established the policy of assigning a Protestant and a Catholic chaplain to each Marine regiment, and six other chaplains to serve the other units in the division. This complement of chaplains in each division came to a total of 16 with the addition of a Division Chaplain and his assistant, a Jewish chaplain who ministered to the Marines of his faith throughout the division.¹⁰⁸

Like the Marines to whom they had been assigned, Navy chaplains often landed with the assault waves. In the midst of the fighting, they would go from man to man, giving aid and comfort as best they could, and assisting the doctors and corpsmen in treating the wounded. It made no difference what faith a chaplain represented, for he had learned a cardinal rule when first entering the Chaplain's School: "Cooperation with Compromise."¹⁰⁹ Therefore, it was not unusual for a Protestant chaplain to counsel or comfort a serviceman of another religion, or for a fellow chaplain of another persuasion to do the same for a Protestant, a Catholic, or a Jew. As soon as the combat situation permitted, chaplains held divine services, very often within the range of enemy guns. Several times during the war, a major religious holiday occurred after a combat operation had begun. Such was the case at Peleliu, where the Jewish New Year, Rosh Hashonah, fell when the fighting

was heaviest. But by Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement, which is the holiest of all Jewish religious observances, conditions were fairly secure at the beach area. Of this holiday on Peleliu, Rabbi Edgar E. Siskin, the Jewish chaplain of the 1st Marine Division, wrote afterwards:

We held services in the morning in the Division CP area. Word had got around somehow and the boys drifted in from all parts of the island. Some had come from lines where fighting was still going on. They straggled in—bearded, dirty, carrying their weapons. The altar rigged by Chaplain Murphy, Division Chaplain, was improvised out of ammunition boxes, and was covered over by a length of captured Japanese silk. Over this we draped our Ten Commandments Banner. The symbolism of this act was not lost to our small congregation.

And there we were—72 men—praying, chanting the old Yom Kippur mode, summoned by a call heard above the tumult of battle. There we were not 200 yards from a ridge still held by the Japs, within range of sniper and mortar fire. And throughout the service the artillery kept up a shattering fire overhead. . . . This Yom Kippur no service anywhere, I dare say, surpassed in the significance ours, for all its makeshift appointments and bedraggled worshippers.¹¹⁰

It was commonplace in the experience of all chaplains who served with Marines to have held religious services in a combat area while the guns were still firing. Innumerable Catholic masses and Protestant observances were held on the hood of a jeep, which served as an altar, and many confessions could not be heard over the sound of firing,

¹⁰⁸ Capt Clifford M. Drury (ChC), USN, *The History of the Chaplain Corps, United States Navy, 1939-1949*, v. 2 (Washington: BuPers, ND, 1950), p. 110.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

¹¹⁰ Lt Edgar E. Siskin (ChC), USN, "Yom Kippur on Peleliu," *Hebrew Union College Bulletin*, Apr45, pp. 7-8.

although they were being whispered directly into the ears of confessors.

Naval Medical Corps personnel played no less an important role in their support of Marine Corps assault units than the chaplains. Unless one has been in combat and has heard the anguished cry of "Corpsman! Corpsman!" above the din of battle, much of what Navy doctors and hospital corpsmen do in combat is diminished greatly in telling. And unless one has himself been wounded in combat, treated where he has fallen, and evacuated under fire, it is even more difficult to convey the feeling of blessed relief experienced by a casualty who knows the tender care and expert treatment he is soon to receive. It was important for combat troops to know that, if they were unfortunate enough to become wounded in action, they would not have to wait long before they received medical assistance.

With but few variations, the operations of medical units in amphibious assault landings generally remained the same throughout the war. At the time that a division operation plan was prepared, the medical annex to the administrative plan was written and published. In this document were the basic instructions for the employment of medical units in the impending assault. In the ship-to-shore movement, medical personnel landed in approximately the same wave as the headquarters of the unit to which they were attached. Company corpsmen sometimes were assigned to individual rifle platoons. Medical officers were never assigned below the battalion level and remained at their respective aid stations during combat. Shore party medical personnel and the

collecting station group landed as soon as possible after the shore party command group. Whenever the tactical situation permitted, the hospital section, medical battalion, and malaria control unit were sent ashore. The normal chain of evacuation of a casualty was through the battalion aid station via the regimental aid station to the beach, and from here to an attack transport, a hospital ship, or the division or corps hospital. "The first link in the elaborate chain of care established by the Medical Department" was formed by the infantry company aid men who landed with and closely followed the assault wave.¹¹¹ The respectful disposition of the remains of both friendly and enemy dead was an important element in this chain of care.

Battalion aid stations were set up behind the units they supported at a distance in relation to the size of the beachhead and the depth to which it had been extended. Here, they could give more complete treatment than that available in the midst of the fighting. These aid stations moved forward progressively in pace with the rate of the advance.

The advance element of the medical company, the collecting party, landed soon after the aid station was set up and in operation. With its ambulance jeeps, the collecting parties went forward to the company aid areas to evacuate the wounded to either the battalion aid stations or the beach, where landing craft carried the casualties to transports and

¹¹¹ Capts Bennett F. Avery, Louis H. Roddis, and Joseph L. Schwartz (MC), USN, eds., *The History of the Medical Department of the United States Navy in World War II*, v. 1 (Washington: BuMed, ND, 1953), p. 67.

hospital ships offshore. As soon as the airfield on an objective had been seized and put into operation, transport planes flew in to evacuate casualties to hospitals in the rear areas or to the United States. On Okinawa, the artillery spotting planes were pressed into service to fly Marine casualties to field hospitals north of the fighting.

The use of LSTs for casualty handling and evacuation was developed early in the South Pacific campaigns. Designated LST(H)s and staffed with surgical teams from rear echelons for each operation, these vessels became an important link in the chain of evacuation. In the Central Pacific fighting and until the Iwo Jima and Okinawa operations, there was a shortage of LSTs for this purpose, but their availability at these later landings proved ideal for giving early care when further evacuation was impossible.

The heroism of medical personnel under fire in combat has been well chronicled in almost every action report submitted during the Pacific fighting. During the early phases of the Saipan assault, for instance, the beach was shelled continuously and had become a scene best described as one of extreme confusion. Into this inferno landed the medical section of the beach parties. "Working for as long as 48 hours at a time without rest . . . , they gave emergency medical treatment and set up casualty evacuation stations in the sand. . . . From these stations, the company aid men went out to administer first aid exposing themselves to enemy fire in order to reach the wounded."¹¹²

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 83.

These gallant efforts resulted in a high casualty rate amongst hospital corpsmen. Iwo Jima, like other Marine assault operations, was no less costly in the loss of medical personnel. In the 4th Division alone, the casualty rate among corpsmen was 38 percent.¹¹³

On all combat operations, the work of dental officers and technicians was invaluable. In addition to carrying out their regular duties, dental officers also assisted in the sick bays and operating rooms. They often relieved the medical officers of routine functions, gave anesthesia, and aided in identifying the dead. Dental surgeons were also trained "to work as a team with otorhinolaryngologists in treating gunshot wounds of the jaws and face."¹¹⁴

Proof of the devotion to duty and professionalism of Navy Medical Corps personnel is exhibited by the numerous lives they saved, the high proportion of casualties they sustained, and the number of decorations they were awarded. All seven Medals of Honor given to members of the Medical Corps went to company aid men serving with the FMF. In addition, 69 Navy Crosses and 486 Silver Stars, plus numerous lesser combat decorations, were awarded the doctors, dentists, hospital corpsmen, and dental technicians.¹¹⁵

TAPS

In the final analysis, battles are not won by machines, but by men filled with the zest of life and imbued with a sense of discipline and a willingness to sacri-

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, v. 2, pp. 88-111.

for self for others. The Marine Corps campaigns of the Pacific War came to symbolize the courage and offensive spirit that brought victory to this nation in World War II. In these battles, 80 Marines won the Medal of Honor "For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity" at the risk of their lives "above and beyond the call of duty"; 48 of these men were given posthumous awards. A total of 957 Navy Crosses were presented other Marines for heroism in the same actions. That these decorations and American victory were not won easily is evident by the following World War II Marine casualty statistics:

Killed in action	15,161
Died of wounds	3,259
Captured and died	268
Missing, presumed dead	795
Prisoner of war, presumed dead	250

Non-battle casualties in a combat zone	4,778
Wounded in action	67,207
Total	91,718 ¹¹⁶

The Tomb of the Unknowns at Arlington Cemetery exemplifies the sacrifice of every American who gave his life in battle for his country. Perhaps no words that have been said here in eulogy to our fallen heroes are as meaningful to the living as those lines written many years ago by the English author John Donne in "For Whom the Bell Tolls":

*Any man's death diminishes me,
because I am involved
in mankind*

¹¹⁶ These figures were collated by the Reports and Statistical Unit, Personnel Services Br, Data Systems Div (APB/5), HQMC, n.d.

Marine POWs¹

CAPTURE

All but four of the 2,274 Marines who became prisoners of war in World War II were taken by the Japanese. The known exceptions were Marines assigned to the Office of Strategic Services, better known as the OSS, who were captured in 1944 by German forces while engaged in covert activities in company with the French underground. Of the remainder of the Marines who were captured, 268 died en route to or in prison camp, and 250 men, who were known to have been captured but are

otherwise unaccounted for, are presumed to have died. A total of 1,756 captured Marines returned to the jurisdiction of the United States; a very small number of these were escapees, and the rest were liberated at the end of the war.² The majority of the Marine POWs had been captured early in the war. The rest, mostly aviation personnel, fell captive to the Japanese after the beginning of Marine air operations in the Allied South Pacific drive.

On 8 December 1941 (Manila Time), Japanese forces took their first Marine prisoners of war—the officers and men of the American Embassy Guard, Peiping, and of the Marine Legation Guard, Tientsin. A detail of 22 men from the Tientsin detachment was captured while stockpiling supplies at the Chingwangtao docks in anticipation of an immediate evacuation. The North China Marines were scheduled to depart Chingwangtao on 10 December 1941 in the *President Harrison*, which had evacuated the 4th Marines from Shanghai during the last week of November.

At approximately 0800 on the 8th, however, about 1,000 Japanese troops surrounded the Tientsin barracks, while three enemy planes circled overhead. The Marine gate sentry phoned his commanding officer, Major Luther A. Brown, and stated that a Japanese officer wanted

¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this appendix is derived from: 4th Mar Unit Hist, Philippine AreaOp, and POW, WWII Files, all in HistBr, HQMC; Col Gregory Boyington, USMC (Ret), *Baa Baa Black Sheep* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1958), hereafter Boyington, *Black Sheep*; Martin Boyle, *Yanks Don't Cry* (New York: Bernard Geis and Associates, 1963) hereafter Boyle, *Yanks Don't Cry*, excerpts reprinted with the permission of Bernard Geis Associates from *Yanks Don't Cry* by Martin Boyle. ©1963 by Martin Boyle; Kenneth W. Condit and Edwin T. Turnbladh, *Hold High the Torch: A History of the 4th Marines* (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1960), hereafter Condit and Turnbladh, *Hold High the Torch*; James P. S. Devereux, *The Story of Wake Island* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1947), hereafter Devereux, *Wake Island*; Col Jack Hawkins, *Never Say Die* (Philadelphia: Dorrance & Company, Inc., 1961), hereafter Hawkins, *Never Say Die*; Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal*; Lodge, *The Recapture of Guam*; Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, *Central Pacific Drive*.

² Casualty figures provided by Reports and Statistical Unit, Personnel Services Branch, Data Systems Division (APB/5) HQMC, n.d.

to speak to him.³ The officer, a Major Omura who was well known to Brown, brought a written proposal that all officers and men be assembled in one place in the barracks compound, and all of their weapons and equipment in another, while the Japanese took over. The alternative to surrender was "that the Japanese would enforce their proposal with the troops at hand."⁴

Brown told the major that he would sign the proposal only if the Japanese accorded his men the privileges due them under the Boxer Protocol to which Japan and the United States had been signatories. Following a telephone conversation with the local Japanese commander, Lieutenant General Kyoji Tominaga, with whom Brown had been friendly in prewar days, Major Omura stated that Tominaga agreed to the stipulation and that Japan would honor it if valid. Brown believed that this stipulation should have guaranteed the repatriation of his men.⁵

General Tominaga arranged for Brown to telephone Colonel William W. Ashurst, senior Marine officer in North China and commander of the American Embassy Guard in Peiping. Ashurst told Brown that he was accepting a similar Japanese proposal and advised the Tientsin Marine commander to do the same.⁶ The embassy and legion guards

thought that if they offered no resistance, they would be considered part of the diplomatic entourage and therefore would be repatriated. Unfortunately, the basis for this belief was nonexistent. Because their initial treatment was relatively mild, and because they received repeated informal Japanese assurances that they would be repatriated, the Marines made no attempt to escape.⁷

Following the establishment of communications with the Japanese Government through Swiss diplomatic channels for the purpose of setting up the exchange of Japanese and American consular officials, the United States attempted to get Japan to recognize the diplomatic status of the North China Marines. In a telegram on 26 December 1941, the Swiss Government was requested to inform Japan that "The United States Government considers that its official personnel subject to this exchange includes . . . the marine guards remaining in China and there under the protection of international agreement. . . ."⁸

In reply, Japan stated that "it is unable to agree to include United States Marine Guards remaining in China as they constitute a military unit."⁹ The United States was busy at this time setting up the exchange program overall,

³ Col Luther A. Brown ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 5Oct66, hereafter *Brown ltr*.

⁴ Col Luther A. Brown interview with HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 29May58, hereafter *Brown interview*.

⁵ *Brown ltr*.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ MIS, G-2, WD, Escape Rpt Nos. 665, Capt Richard M. Huizenga, and 666, Capt James D. McBrayer, Jr., both dtd 12Jul45 (NARS, FRC, Alexandria, Va.), hereafter *Escape Rpt*, with number and name of individual concerned.

⁸ U. S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1942*, v. 1 (Washington: GPO, 1960), p. 382, hereafter *U. S. Diplomatic Papers, 1942*.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 389.

and informed the Imperial Government through Swiss channels that it would revert to this point at a later date. Japan inferred from this statement that "the United States Government do not insist in inclusion of the Marine Guards in the present exchange."¹⁰ This inference was incorrect because on 13 March, when it provided a list of the Americans to be repatriated, the Department of State referred to what it had said previously regarding the return of the Marine guards and stated that it expected the Japanese Government "to take cognizance of their true status as diplomatic guards."¹¹

Neither Major Brown nor Colonel Ashurst, who had surrendered the Peiping guard at 1100 on 8 December, knew of this diplomatic interchange. On 3 January 1942, the Peiping Marines were brought to Tientsin and quartered with Brown's troops. At Major Brown's intercession, Major Edwin P. McCaulley, who had retired and was living in Peiping but was recalled to active duty as the Quartermaster for the Peiping Guard, was relocated by the Japanese to a Tientsin hotel, and later returned to the United States on the first exchange ship.¹²

On the 27th, the entire group of Marines was moved, together with all personal effects, by train to Shanghai, where a Japanese officer told them in English as they entered the prison camp, that "they were *not* prisoners of war although they would be treated as such and that North China Marines would

be repatriated."¹³ Until the exchange ships left without the Marines, the men believed that they would be repatriated. Brown said after the war that they were convinced that they were at least slated to be returned to the United States, but that the excuse the Japanese gave for failing to send them back was that there was not enough room for them on board the exchange ships.¹⁴ This may have been a valid excuse, for many grave problems concerning ship-board accommodations arose which threatened the whole repatriation process.¹⁵

On 2 February 1942, the North China Marines arrived at Woosung prison camp, at the mouth of the Whangpoo River near Shanghai, where they joined the Marine survivors of Wake Island who had arrived on 24 January. Also at Woosung were a handful of Marines, who, unlike the others, received diplomatic immunity and were to be repatriated later in 1942. These men were Quartermaster Clerk Paul G. Chandler, First Sergeant Nathan A. Smith, Supply Sergeant Henry Kijak, and Staff Sergeant Loren O. Schneider, all members of the 4th Marines who had been left at Shanghai to settle government accounts after their regiment had sailed for the Philippines.¹⁶ For some unknown reason, unless they had been gulled into

¹³ *Brown interview.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *U. S. Diplomatic Papers, 1942*, pp. 427ff.

¹⁶ LtCol William T. Clement (Fleet Marine Officer, U. S. Asiatic Fleet) ltr to CMC, dtd 6Apr42, Subj: Dispositions and employment of U. S. Marines on the Asiatic Station during the initial stages of the War (MiscRpts File, Philippine Area Ops Files, HistBr, HQMC).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 402.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 404.

¹² *Brown ltr.*

believing so, the Japanese thought that these last four were part of the U. S. consular staff at Shanghai and therefore entitled to diplomatic immunity.

Chandler and the other three Marines became prisoners on 8 December, and were transferred several times to other prisons in the Shanghai area before they, too, arrived at Woosung. This was a former Japanese Army camp, approximately 20 acres overall, and completely enclosed with two electrified fences. The buildings were all frame structure and unheated. Most of the prisoners were not dressed warmly enough to withstand the biting Chinese winter, and all were insufficiently fed.¹⁷

The second group of Marines to become captives of the Japanese were the 153 members of Lieutenant Colonel William K. MacNulty's Marine Barracks,

¹⁷ Capt Paul G. Chandler interview in Columbus, Ohio, *Citizen*, 16Sep42. A thorough check of known available sources does not indicate that any other Marine besides McCaulley and the quartet from the 4th Marines was repatriated. This group was taken from Woosung on 9 June; and together with other diplomatic personnel being exchanged they boarded either the Japanese *Asama Maru* or the Italian *Conte Verde*, which departed Japan on 25 June 1942. On 22 July, these liners arrived at the Portuguese Southeast African port of Lourenco Marques. Here, the Swedish liner *S. S. Gripsholm* had arrived a short time before with Japanese officials to be returned to their country. On 24 July, with the repatriates on board, the *Gripsholm* steamed for the United States and arrived there on 25 August after having stopped at Rio de Janeiro to drop off South American diplomats and their families. Because discussions for a second exchange of this type were then underway, the returnees were requested to keep their statements to the press regarding their conditions of imprisonment while in Japan to a minimum.

Sumay, Guam, including the 28 Marines assigned to the Insular Patrol (Police). Saipan-based Japanese bombers hit the island of Guam on 8 December (Manila Time) and again on the 9th. The Guam Marines took up positions in the butts of the rifle range on Orote Peninsula and, after making all possible preparations for a stiff defense, awaited the anticipated Japanese assault.

It was not long in coming, for early on the 10th, two separate enemy forces landed, one above Agana, and the main group below Agat. Aware of the overwhelming superiority of the enemy and in order to safeguard the lives of Guamanian citizens, Captain George J. McMillin, USN, Governor of Guam, surrendered the island to the Japanese shortly after 0600. Scattered fighting continued throughout the day as the enemy spread out over the island and met isolated pockets of opposition. Nonetheless, the defenders could offer only token resistance to the well-armed Japanese, who quickly had control of the entire island.

On 10 January 1942, the American members of the Guam garrison were evacuated to prison camps in Japan. After a five-day sea voyage, the prisoners arrived at the island of Shikoku and were imprisoned at Zentsuji,¹⁸ where they remained until they were transferred in June 1942 to Osaka on

¹⁸ Of interest is the fact that Zentsuji Prison Camp was built to house German prisoners of the Japanese in World War I. Upon the release of the Germans, the camp was inactivated until it was reopened to hold Guam Marines in 1942. CWO Earl B. Ercanbrack ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 21Oct66, hereafter *Ercanbrack ltr 1966*.



NORTH CHINA MARINES, en route to prison camp in Shanghai, are paraded through the streets of Nanking by their captors on 10 January 1942. (Photograph courtesy of Colonel Luther A. Brown)



POW QUARTERS at Fengt'ai, where the Woosung prisoners were held for a short time before being transferred to camps in Japan. (Photograph courtesy of Colonel Luther A. Brown)

Honshu. First Sergeant Earl B. Ercanbrack, as senior Marine noncommissioned officer of the Guam men, became camp leader at Osaka from the date of their capture until October, when Japanese Army authorities turned the POWs over to the tender mercies of civilian guards and work supervisors. Until that time, the Marines were treated fairly. Although the Marines were assigned to heavy manual labor both at Osaka and Zentsuji, none of the men felt that the "work was unfair or the treatment other than just and honorable."¹⁹ This situation changed after the middle of October when the POWs were treated "as criminals, subjected to ridicule and humiliation, and . . . suffered cruel and unjust

punishment without opportunity to offer protest or seek justice."²⁰

Some of the Guam prisoners believed that it was not entirely proper to work so hard for the enemy, and a number of the POWs at Osaka "formed a somewhat informal, loose group or faction who felt that it was our duty to slow down the National (Jap) War Effort. We never seemed to properly understand the Jap guards, we stumbled, spilled bags, caused minor damage and bettered our own morale but did little real damage to their war effort."²¹ In October 1942, 80 men of the Osaka camp were called out of formation, advised that they had been observed by prison authorities, who had decided that the Americans were non-cooperative and therefore to be transferred to a more severe camp. "So this group, half USMC and half USN (known thereafter as the 'Eighty Eight Balls') were sent to Hirohata to work as stevedores shoveling coal and iron ore at Seitetsu Steel Mills."²²

Perhaps some insight into the reasons underlying Japanese treatment of prisoners may be found in the following statement made by a senior enemy officer to Ercanbrack's group on the day that it was transferred to Hirohata camp, west of Osaka. The Japanese colonel told the Americans that:

We were cowards, else we would have killed ourselves as brave Japanese soldiers would have done, that he could not forget that our comrades in arms were killing Japanese brothers and husbands, that we

¹⁹ Marine Gunner Earl B. Ercanbrack ltr to International Red Cross Representatives, dtd 30Aug45, Subj: Report of Treatment while held as Prisoners of War, hereafter *Ercanbrack ltr I*. To explain the discrepancy between Ercanbrack's rank noted in the text and that given in this citation, he stated in a report to the Commandant that he assumed the warrant rank of Marine Gunner in February 1945. He took this action because "Realizing the responsibility resting on me [as Camp Leader] should I act in taking over the camp . . . and further realizing that the situation of the war was developing where American invasion seemed possible and imminent," he believed that this rank would give him the fuller authority of a commanding officer. 1stSgt Earl B. Ercanbrack ltr to CMC, dtd 12Nov45, Subj: General Report of Commanding Officer, Independent Detachment of American Forces Held as Prisoners of War, Osaka Prisoner of War Camp, Hirohata Sub-Camp, for the period 6Oct43-2Sep45, hereafter *Ercanbrack ltr II*.

Ercanbrack vacated the warrant rank when he was liberated but upon his return to the United States, he was officially promoted to the rank of Warrant Officer, with the appointment backdated to 31 January 1943.

²⁰ *Ercanbrack ltr I*.

²¹ *Ercanbrack ltr 1966*.

²² *Ibid*.

chose the disgrace of a cowardly surrender and that we must suffer.²³

As Japanese war reverses mounted and Allied planes began bombing the Home Islands, the lot of the POWs grew worse.

After a heroic stand against tremendous odds, on 23 December the defenders of Wake Island surrendered to become the third group of Marines to be captured by the enemy. The Wake prisoners were comprised of the survivors of the 1st Defense Battalion detachment and VMF-211.²⁴ Also taken at the same time with these Marines and a few Army Air Corps and Navy personnel were some 1,100 civilian contract employees who were actively engaged in constructing new and extensive defenses on the island when war struck.

Immediately following the capitulation of the Wake Island garrison,²⁵ the men were subjected to numerous indignities regardless of rank. By sunset of 23 December, all of the Americans on the island had been rounded up. Commander Winfield S. Cunningham, the island commander, Major James P. S. Devereux, the senior Marine officer on

Wake, and eight others were confined in a one-room cottage. Most men of the Marine detachment had been taken at their defense positions, but not before they had dismantled and destroyed their personal weapons and had damaged beyond any further use their crew-served pieces. Those wounded prior to 23 December and those who had been hospitalized for other reasons had been placed in an underground ammunition magazine for protection from Japanese bombs.

Both the wounded and others captured after the enemy landings were held under guard at the VMF-211 aircraft parking area until dusk on 25 December, when they were marched around the island to the vacated civilian barracks. At this time, the wounded who were completely unable to walk were taken to the improvised hospital mentioned above. "During this period of approximately 54 hours, there was no medical attention of any kind, no form of protection from the sun by day and cold rain by night, no food, and almost no water."²⁶

On 11 January 1942, the Americans were alerted that they would be evacuated to prison camps shortly. A group of regulations, violation of any one of which could result in the death penalty, was read to the prisoners. Amongst the heinous crimes for which they could be executed were such things as: "talking without permission and raising loud voices," "carrying unnecessary baggage in embarking," and "using more than two blankets."²⁷

²⁶ Putnam ltr.

²⁷ Devereux, *Wake Island*, p. 211.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Actually, "VMF-211 was represented on Wake Island by only 12 aircraft, 13 pilots, and, if I remember correctly, 13 of its own enlisted men plus 27 Marines from the other squadrons of the parent Group, and 1 hospital corpsman; in short, 50% of its aircraft, approx. 40% of its pilots and about 10% of its own enlisted personnel. It was 'the squadron' only in the sense that its CO was present." BGen Paul A. Putnam ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 17Oct66, hereafter *Putnam ltr.*

²⁵ For the events leading up to and including the surrender, see Devereux, *Wake Island*, and Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal*, pt III, "The Defense of Wake," pp. 95-149.

Early on the morning of 12 January, the prisoners were herded aboard the *Nitta Maru*, a relatively new Japanese passenger liner; enlisted Marines, sailors, and civilians were placed in the holds, while the officers and the senior civilian supervisor were locked in the mail room. Left on the island were approximately 300 civilian construction workers, who were to rebuild installations there, and another 100 or so civilians and servicemen who were too ill to be moved. Most of those who remained were later evacuated to prison camps in either China or Japan. Tragically, nearly 100 of the civilians were lined up on a beach on Wake the night of 7 October 1943 and executed by a machine gun firing squad. For this crime, Rear Admiral Shigematsu Sakai-bara—the Japanese commander of Wake—and a number of his officers were tried, found guilty, and hanged after the war's end.²⁸

Dressed in whatever tattered tropical clothing they could find²⁹ and carrying only the barest minimum of personal possessions allowed by their captors, the Americans spent 12 days on board the ship under very difficult conditions. They were systematically deprived of their valuables, fed only sporadically, not permitted to talk to one another, and given no room for exercise. On 18 January, the ship arrived at Yokohama, where the squadron commander of VMF-211, Major Paul A. Putnam, and a number of other

men were removed and taken to camps in Japan. Six days later, the Wake prisoners arrived at Shanghai. Here they were told that they would be paraded through the city and marched out to the Woosung camp. Somehow the parade did not materialize.³⁰ Major Devereux particularly remembered the bitter cold the prisoners felt at Yokohama and Shanghai, for they were only partially clad in khaki uniforms and not acclimated to the change from the tropical weather of Wake.³¹ Once the Americans arrived at Woosung, the Japanese Navy relinquished its responsibility for the POWs to the Army. Most of the Wake prisoners remained at Woosung until they were transferred in December to Kiangwang, five miles away. In May 1945, they began a journey that was, for most of them, to end eventually in Japan.³²

³⁰ *Escape Rpt* No. 667, 1stLt John F. Kinney, dtd 12Jul45.

³¹ Because of the extreme cold and their lack of proper clothing, the Wake prisoners made a practice of wrapping blankets over their shoulders when they were marched into the camp compound for exercise. Ishihara, one of the civilian interpreter-guards soon put a stop to this. According to one of the former prisoners, the conversation went as follows: "Ishi: (Infuriated, waving his saber) 'Why you take blankets from bed, you stupid individualists?' (His supreme insult). Marine: 'We're cold!' Ishi: 'It's wintertime, you're supposed to be cold! No more blankets!'" SgtMaj Robert R. Winslow ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 19Oct66, hereafter *Winslow ltr*.

³² A number of the Wake Marines and civilians had been shipped to Japan previously. One detail was sent in the spring of 1943, and "If I remember correctly, my detail was shipped to Osaka in August 1943. We were placed in barracks located in the shipyard area and worked as stevedores and longshoremen until early spring of 1945." *Ibid*.

²⁸ See pt III, chap 3, *supra*.

²⁹ "Most of the POWs had been stripped of all clothing during the capture." BGen John F. Kinney ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 20Oct66.

Chronologically, the next group of Marines captured belonged to the Marine detachment of the USS *Houston*. This heavy cruiser, together with the Australian light cruiser HMAS *Perth* and two other Allied naval vessels, had been ordered to block the Japanese invasion of Java and to destroy the enemy attack force headed for Banten Bay on the northwest corner of the Dutch colonial possession. Shortly after midnight of 28 February, *Perth* and *Houston*, outnumbered in a punishing engagement with Japanese warships guarding the landing force, were sunk within 40 minutes of each other. Of the more than 1,000 men on the *Houston*, only 368 survived; 24 of this number were Marines from the 74-man detachment.

Even before their capture, the lot of the survivors was not an easy one. Oil-soaked and half-drowned—many of them wounded—they remained in the water or on life rafts for eight hours or more. Some of the men were picked up by Japanese landing craft between dawn and 0800 on 1 March. They were taken to the beach on St. Nicholas Point, Banten Bay, where they were pressed into unloading enemy transports and hauling supplies.³³ Many of the

men had neither clothes nor shoes and were covered from head to toe with fuel oil from the ships that had been sunk. These men became badly sunburned, and to aggravate matters, they were given little or no medical attention or food and “no water . . . as the Japs didn’t have any themselves. There were a few cases of beating to hurry up the work—this was the main Japanese landing and the invaders were obviously pressed for time.”³⁴

The captives were fed rice and meat balls late that night and the following morning, when the officers were separated from the enlisted prisoners and trucked to the town of Serang. On 2

Other Powers, 1923–1937, v. IV (Washington, 1938), p. 5234, hereafter *Geneva Convention* with article number.

The Geneva Convention of 1929 was ratified by the United States on 16 January 1932, and by other countries before and after this date. Although not one of the states which had ratified this code before the war, Japan informed the Swiss Government in February 1942 that it “is strictly observing Red Cross Convention as a signatory state” and while it didn’t consider itself bound by the Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, it would apply “provisions of that Convention to American prisoners of war in its power.” *U. S. Diplomatic Papers, 1942*, p. 382.

A review of the depositions taken for, the testimony given at, and findings of the court of numerous trials of the Far East War Crimes Tribunal indicate that Japanese officials in charge of prisoner of war activities observed neither the spirit nor the letter of any of the articles of this treaty.

³⁴ 1st Lt Edward M. Barrett POW Rpt, n.d. (POW WWII (USS *Houston*) File, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC). One of the four officers of the ship’s Marine detachment, Lieutenant Barrett presumably made this report shortly after his liberation from prison camp on 7 September 1945.

³³ Article 31 of the Geneva “Convention of July 27, 1929 Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War” states in part: “Labor furnished by prisoners of war shall have no direct relations with war operations. It is especially prohibited to use prisoners for manufacturing and transporting arms or munitions of any kind, or for transporting material intended for combatant units.” S. Doc. No. 134, 75th Cong., 3d sess, *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements Between the United States of America and*

March, in a temperature of 100 degrees, the enlisted sailors and Marines, barefooted and lightly clad, were marched the nearly 30 miles to Serang over a concrete highway, pushing Japanese ammunition and supply carts all of the way.

Some *Houston* survivors were picked up by a Japanese transport ship, which took them on board, searched them, and then returned them to their life rafts. One of the Americans put on a life jacket, swam to shore, and spent three days in the coastal hills trying to join Allied forces on Java. Unfortunately for this Marine, natives found him and turned him over to Japanese troops. Another life raft, with four Marines and two sailors aboard, drifted for three days around the northwest coast of Java and through the Sunda Strait. On the afternoon of 3 March, it was beached at Laboehan (Labuan), and the six Americans took to the jungles. After two days of thrashing about, they met Javanese natives who promised to guide them to Dutch forces, but instead led them right to a Japanese machine gun position.³⁵

It was believed that many of the men who survived the sinking of the *Houston* reached the beaches of Java, only to be killed outright by natives armed with knives. On the march from Serang to Batavia, the natives stoned the POWs and otherwise abused them with little or

no interference from the Japanese guards.³⁶

Before the end of the week following the loss of the *Houston* and *Perth*, all Allied survivors of the naval engagement had been captured and detained in Serang. Conditions here were very bad; dysentery and malaria broke out among the prisoners, who were afforded little medical relief. The captives went almost completely without food, and by the end of March, they began succumbing to beriberi and other diseases caused by malnutrition.

Between 12 and 15 April, the POWs were removed from Serang to Batavia, where they were interned in a former Dutch military cantonment known before the war as the Bicycle Camp, for some unknown reason. Under vastly improved conditions, the prisoners remained here until October, when after a transfer first to Shanghai, they were again transferred, this time to Burma where their real ordeal began.

When they were captured, members of the 4th Marines experienced somewhat different circumstances than had the *Houston* Marines. Following its withdrawal from Shanghai, the 4th Marines landed on 30 November and 1 December 1941 at the U. S. Naval Station, Olongapo, on Subic Bay, Luzon, Philippine Islands. Immediately after the Japanese attack on the Philippines, the regiment was committed to action along with other forces which had been stationed in the islands. After an epic, four-month-long stubborn resistance, the American and Filipino defenders of Bataan were forced to surrender on

³⁵ PFC Bert E. Page, Jr., POW Rpt, dtd 24Aug45. Hereafter, all like reports by Marine survivors of the *Houston* will be cited *Houston POW rpt* and name of individual making statement.

³⁶ *Houston POW rpt*, Cpl Howard R. Charles.

9 April 1942, and the men on Corregidor, nearly a month later on 6 May.³⁷ Collectively, the number of Marines taken prisoner in the Philippines formed the largest Marine contingent the Corps lost at any one time.

Included in the ranks of the 4th Marines captured in the Philippines were men from Marine organizations which had been stationed in the islands when the 4th arrived from China. These units—Marine Barracks, Olongapo, and 1st Separate Marine Battalion, Cavite—were absorbed by the regiment in December 1941 and January 1942. As the fighting progressed, the 4th detached some of its units for commitment where fighting was heaviest and they were needed—and where they were finally captured.

At the end of the war, after Marine Corps authorities had checked all possible sources, official Marine records listed 105 Marines captured on Bataan and 1,283 on Corregidor. Of this number, 490 men never survived for a number of reasons. Some succumbed to wounds received during the fighting, others died because of malnutrition, beatings, and various diseases. Finally, a number of men were executed for illegal or real violations of Japanese prison regulations, some were killed when American aircraft bombed enemy ships transporting prisoners to Japan, and still others were outrageously mur-

dered in a massacre at the Puerto Princesa prison camp.

One of the most difficult and trying periods experienced by American POWs is better known as the Bataan Death March, which followed the fall of that peninsula. Much has been written of the suffering, indignities, and atrocities which constituted the common fate of the Americans and Filipinos who surrendered to Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma's forces. Primarily because of his responsibility for the insensate and uncontrolled brutality of his soldiers during this infamous event, Homma was tried, found guilty, and executed after the end of the war. It would serve no purpose to recount, step by step, the bloody and tragic evacuation of the POWs from Bataan to Camp O'Donnell, a trek that was approximately 85 miles of hell.

Corregidor held out a month longer than Bataan—to 6 May 1942, when at 1200, the white flag of surrender was hoisted over this and the other fortified islands in Manila Bay. Despite these obvious signs of capitulation, the Japanese on Bataan continued to pour artillery fire on Corregidor and enemy aircraft flew sortie after sortie over the island, dropping bombs that day and night. Early the next morning it was quiet; the fighting had ended for the embattled inhabitants of Corregidor, but not the war—and the Japanese were to remind them constantly of this fact in both word and deed until the Americans were liberated over three years later.

Late on the afternoon of the 7th, the Japanese began collecting and concentrating their prisoners in a small beach area near a large galvanized iron build-

³⁷ See Condit and Turnbladh, *Hold High the Torch*, pp. 195–240; Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal*, pp. 155–202; and Hanson W. Baldwin, "The Fourth Marines at Corregidor," *Marine Corps Gazette*, vols. 30–31, nos. 11–12 and 1–2 (Nov–Dec46, Jan–Feb47.)

ing which had been the garage of an Army coast artillery unit. Enroute to this place of confinement, which eventually was to hold nearly 13,000 Americans and Filipinos, the prisoners were searched many times by Japanese soldiers who took "watches, fountain pens, money, clothing, canteens, mess gear, etc., in fact anything we had that they wanted."³⁸ This unmitigated thievery, in which Japanese officers also took part, was a commonplace experience of nearly every American prisoner, no matter where or when he had been captured.

Initially, there was neither food nor water for the Corregidor prisoners except for the meager amount they may have been able to keep with them, and "for one well near a partially destroyed garage. The water was of doubtful quality and the amount of water in the well was very small."³⁹ The POWs' thirst was so great that they drained the radiators of wrecked automobiles, trucks, and tractors and drank the rusty fluid. A water pipeline was finally installed, "... one spigot of one-half inch pipe for the Americans and one spigot of the same size for the Filipinos,"⁴⁰ who had been segregated from the others. It was frequently necessary for an individual to stand in line for 24 hours before he could fill his canteen, and often a guard would walk up and turn off the spigot,

apparently as a form of punishment. Particularly aggravating the suffering of the prisoners was the weather, for May is the hot season in Luzon.

This in itself created serious health problems, because many bodies on the island remained unburied until approximately 10 days after the surrender. A Navy chaplain, who remained on Corregidor for two months after the Japanese took over, told another prisoner that some bodies were not found and buried until the first or second week of June.

In addition to the hardships imposed upon the prisoners by the enemy and their difficulty in adjusting to their status as captives, all POWs—regardless of rank—were required to salute or bow to every Japanese soldier—from private to general—whose paths they crossed. Non-observance of this regulation resulted in a beating of various degrees of severity. As a matter of fact, prisoners could be and very often were beaten on the slightest pretext or for no reason at all. This was one aspect of the character and personality of the Japanese which American POWs were unable to fathom for the entire period of their captivity.⁴¹

Prisoners were fed sporadically during their first few days of captivity on Corregidor, and only those who were

³⁸ Capt Austin C. Shofner Rpt of Experiences and Observations, dtd 3Dec43, hereafter *Shofner rpt.*

³⁹ BGen Curtis T. Beecher ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 7Oct66, hereafter *Beecher ltr.*

⁴⁰ *Shofner rpt.*

⁴¹ As noted later in this appendix, one reason for the beatings may have been the fact that such treatment was a common form of punishment in the Japanese Army. The language barrier that very often existed between captive and captor may be another possible reason for these beatings, because the guards may have felt that a stick was more effective in getting results than an unintelligible order.

lucky or energetic ate during this time.⁴² At the first Japanese ration issue, the food was distributed inequitably. After this, some form of discipline and order appeared in the ranks of the POWs, and the Americans took charge of the ration issue.

The Japanese numbered each prisoner and divided the entire group of POWs into divisions of 1,000. These divisions were then sub-divided into groups of 100. Rations were allotted according to the strength of each division, which issued the food to the 100-man groups. In some cases, group kitchens had already been established. In other instances, three or four cooking groups were formed which took the entire ration, cooked it, and then apportioned it to their members on an equitable basis. In this manner, every prisoner was fed and nourished on the same sort of starvation diet as his fellows.

Because the Japanese authorities were not unduly concerned with enforcing sanitary regulations and establishing some sort of discipline and order within the ranks of the POWs, the prisoners took it upon themselves to organize a military police company of approximately 100 men, nearly half of whom were Marines. Physical and moral persuasion were employed by the MPs since the company had no real authority to enforce its orders. In spite of the boiling sun, the swarms of flies, the

paucity of food and water, and the lack of even minimal sanitary facilities, conditions improved considerably once the full weight and effect of the MP company were asserted.

On the night of 22 May, a heavy, cold rain fell on Corregidor, worsening the miserable lot of the prisoners. At dawn the next day, they were told to pack their belongings and prepare to leave the island bastion. After considerable confusion and milling about, the POWs were marched to the docks, and loaded aboard several vessels in the bay, where they spent the night under absurdly crowded conditions. Early on the morning of 24 May, the men were herded into landing barges, put ashore at the southern end of Dewey Boulevard in Manila, and marched through the city to Bilibid Prison in the infamous Japanese "Victory Parade." The Japanese, in the words of one of the prisoners:

. . . compelled the Filipino civilians to attend the parade, many of whom cried while others tried to slip us food. The Filipinos . . . caught giving food to the Americans were brutally punished by the Japs. We had only one short water stop during the hike. Many people dropped out because of the terrific heat, heavy packs, almost no sleep for three days. . . . Everyone had to keep hiking until they passed out, then a truck picked up the unconscious and brought them in.⁴³

The prisoners were herded into old Bilibid Prison, where all remained until the morning of the 25th. Early that day, the first of several groups to be transferred was moved by train to prison camps located in the vicinity of Cabanatuan, approximately 75 miles north of

⁴² Prior to this ration issue, "the Japanese did permit some parties to go foraging for rations. I personally led one group to the Navy supply tunnel where we found various dry stores and brought them back to the beach. We also foraged for wood for fuel for cooking fires." *Beecher ltr.*

⁴³ *Shofner rpt.*

Manila. The rail trip was a trying ordeal for the already ill-treated prisoners. At some stops on this trip, "the Filipinos tried to give the prisoners food and candy and sometimes succeeded."⁴⁴ Groups of 100 were crowded into box-cars in which there was just enough room for each man to stand up during the six-hour trip. A total of 1,500 men in four groups left Bilibid and were sent to Cabanatuan Camp 3, a march of 20 kilometers from the town. The remainder of the Corregidor prisoners were sent to Camps 1 and 2, not too far from 3. Because of a severe water shortage at Camp 2, it was evacuated after the POWs had been there two days and the men were sent to one of the other two camps.

While at Bilibid Prison, all American officers in the grade of colonel and above were segregated from the rest of the prisoners for transfer to camps other than those set aside for lesser ranked POWs.⁴⁵ One of the officers transferred was Colonel Samuel Howard, the commander of the 4th Marines. His group was moved on 3 June to a prison camp outside of Tarlac, Luzon, where it remained until 12 August. Among these officers was Lieutenant General Jonathan M. Wainwright, the former commander of American forces in the Philippines and the senior American officer present in camp. On 12 August, the officers were entrained for Manila, and placed on board the *Nagara Maru*, which sailed the following day for For-

mosa, leaving behind American soldiers, sailors, Marines, and civilians, and Filipino servicemen. All were to endure months of hard labor, starvation, mistreatment, and numerous indignities at the hands of the Japanese before General MacArthur's forces liberated the Philippines.

Tragically, the last Marines captured in a group in the Pacific War were nine members of Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson's 2d Raider Battalion, which raided Makin Island in the Gilberts on 17-18 August 1942. Although this raid was successful within the limits imposed on the overall operation, serious consequences resulted from its aftermath.

Following their surprise landing, the Marine raiders had killed every enemy soldier on the island and destroyed many of the Japanese supply dumps and facilities there. When the battalion had completed its mission and attempted to return to the submarines which had carried it to Makin, the Marines found that the surf was heavier than had been expected and were unable to maneuver their rubber craft through the breakers to clear water. The submarines remained submerged through most of the 18th, but moved into the mouth of the island lagoon at approximately 1930 that evening. There they met and took aboard tattered raiders, who had managed to jury-rig their rubber boats to a native outrigger canoe, in which they were able to negotiate the tossing surf. Both submarines then immediately departed for Pearl Harbor.

Nobody knew it at the time, but nine Marines had been left behind. They were captured later by Japanese reinforcements which mounted out of a nearby

⁴⁴ *Beecher ltr.*

⁴⁵ The exceptions were "two Army colonels who arrived in Camp 3. They were later (in September, I believe) taken to join other colonels and general officers." *Ibid.*

island garrison on 18 and 20 August. Thirty-three Japanese flew in to the atoll on 20 August, and a larger group arrived at Makin on a ship the following day. These Japanese reported that they found 21 Marine bodies, 5 rubber boats, 15 machine guns, 3 rifles, 24 automatic rifles, 350 grenades, "and a few other things."⁴⁶

The captured Marines received satisfactory care at the hands of their captors on Makin, and humane treatment continued for nearly a month after they had been moved to Kwajalein. Early in October, Vice Admiral Koso Abe, Marshall Islands commander, was advised that he need not send these prisoners to Tokyo. A staff officer from a higher headquarters told Abe that a recently established policy permitted the admiral to dispose of these men on Kwajalein as he saw fit. Abe then ordered the Marines beheaded. A native witnessed the executions, and based on his and other testimony in war crimes trials after the war, Abe was convicted of atrocities and hanged at Guam. Captain Yoshio Obara, Kwajalein commander who had been ordered to arrange the executions, was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment, and Lieutenant Hisakiichi Naiki, also involved in the affair, was sentenced to 5 years in prison.⁴⁷

After the capture of the men left on Makin, the only Marines to fall into

Japanese hands were individual pilots and aircraft crewmen whose planes were shot down over or near enemy territory. The story of Major Gregory Boyington, VMF-214 commander and recipient of the Medal of Honor, who was shot down over Rabaul on 3 January 1944, in general reflects the experiences of other Marine aviators who were downed and survived, only to become prisoners.

After Boyington's plane was hit and set afire, he parachuted and landed in the water. He spent eight hours in his life raft before being picked up and taken to Rabaul by a Japanese submarine. In the middle of February 1944, Boyington and five other POWs were flown from Rabaul to an airport on the outskirts of Yokohama by way of Truk, Saipan, and Iwo Jima. Upon setting down on Japanese soil, the six prisoners were walked from the airport to a point outside of Yokohama and trucked a distance to a streetcar terminal. Here they boarded a trolley which took them to a Japanese Navy-run POW camp at Ofuna, the prewar Hollywood of Japan.

Processed through or at Ofuna were captured Allied submariners, pilots, and technicians whom the enemy believed could provide special information of value. Holding Boyington and some others as captives rather than POWs, the Japanese never reported their whereabouts or existence to the International Red Cross and these men were therefore listed as missing or killed in action. Boyington remained at Camp Ofuna until the last months of the war, when he was transferred to Camp Omori near Tokyo, and there he was liberated.

With the exception of those aviators who were downed near Chichi Jima in

⁴⁶ WDC Japanese Docs Nos. 161,013, 161,110, and NA12053, "Records of Various Base Forces" and "Base Force Guard Units and Defense Unit Records," 17-22Aug42 (OAB, NHD).

⁴⁷ ComMarianas, "Recordings of Proceedings of a Military Commission, 1946," Files 149234-150837 (JAG, ND).

the Bonin Islands and executed there, most pilots and crewmen underwent to a greater or lesser degree the same incessant round of beatings and interrogations as had Major Boyington. The severity of their initial period of captivity depended on where they had been captured and who their captors were as well as how long it took before they were transported to POW camps in Japan.

OSS MARINES

The circumstances of the capture and subsequent imprisonment of the four Marines captured by the Germans in Europe were considerably different than the experiences of the men taken in the Pacific. Interestingly enough, the Marines in Europe were captured within a few days of each other, although they were on different missions. Major Peter J. Ortiz, and Sergeants John P. Bodnar and Jack R. Risler went into captivity on 16 August 1944, and Second Lieutenant Walter W. Taylor on the 21st.

Ortiz was a veteran OSS-man who, before entering the Marine Corps in 1941, had served with the French Foreign Legion and risen through the ranks of that organization. He was an officer at the time of the fall of France when captured by the Germans for the first time. He escaped from a POW camp in Austria and made his way to the United States by way of Lisbon, Portugal. He returned to France as a member of a three-man interallied mission called UNION, which was dropped in southeast France on the night of 6-7 January 1944 to impress *maquis*⁴⁸ leaders in

the Rhone Valley and Savoy regions that " 'organization for guerilla activity especially on or after D-Day is now their most important duty.' " ⁴⁹ Although the agents on this mission were dropped in plain clothes, they took their uniforms with them, and the leader of the group claimed that they were "the first allied liaison officers to appear in uniform in France since 1940." ⁵⁰ "Ortiz, who knew not fear, did not hesitate to wear his US Marine captain's uniform in town and country alike; this cheered the French but alerted the Germans, and the mission was constantly on the move." ⁵¹ Their task completed, the UNION group was withdrawn from France and returned to England in late May 1944.

The Marine officer returned to the Haute Savoie region of France again on 1 August 1944 with a mission entitled

⁴⁸ A *maquis* was a French resistance or guerilla unit. There were a number of these throughout France during the latter period of the German occupation, and Americans were attached to some of them as advisors and instructors.

⁴⁹ Undated *ordre de mission* [operation order] in an SOE file, cited in M.R.D. Foot, *SOE in France: An Account of the British Special Operations Executive in France 1940-1944* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966), p. 367, hereafter Foot, *SOE in France*. The SOE was, loosely speaking and for want of a better definition, analogous to the American OSS. When the OSS was formed, its personnel were introduced into many sections of the SOE and received their initial training under the British.

⁵⁰ SOE, *History*, v. XXIVA, 1944, p. 8, cited in *Ibid*.

⁵¹ *Ibid*. While in France, Ortiz had been promoted to major, a rank which he assumed upon his return to England in May.

UNION II. This was an all-American group of seven men headed by an OSS Army major and containing Ortiz, Sergeants Bodnar and Risler, a third Marine sergeant, Frederick J. Brunner, and several other men. Dropped with these agents were numerous containers of supplies for the *maquis* in the region. The quickening pace of French guerrilla activities here as well as elsewhere in France made these units the objects of German search parties, and particularly in this area for it was still under the control of strong enemy forces. For the Haute Savoie, Allied liberation was still in the future.

On 16 August, Ortiz and his group were surrounded by a *Gestapo* party in the vicinity of Centron, a small village in the Haute Savoie region just south of Lake Geneva, the local headquarters of the OSS team. Ortiz surrendered because he believed that if he and his men shot their way out of the entrapment, local villagers would undoubtedly suffer reprisals for German deaths which a fire fight surely would have produced.⁵²

⁵² Ortiz had ample evidence on which to base his estimate of what the *Gestapo* might do. The destruction of the population and town of Lidice in Czechoslovakia following the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich, the *Gestapo* overlord of the country, and the mass murder of 700 inhabitants of the French village of Oradour-sur-Vayres in retaliation for the killing of a German officer was all too-well-known to Ortiz and he did not want to subject the population of Centron to the same fate. Ortiz was awarded a Navy Cross for heroic accomplishments during his first mission into France in early 1944. He was awarded a Gold Star in lieu of a second Navy Cross for his activities during UNION II, and a portion of the citation accompanying this award reads: "When he and his team were attacked and

Brunner, however, managed to escape the trap, swam a swiftly flowing river to the other side of the village, and traveled across 15 miles of enemy-held territory to reach the relative safety of another resistance group.⁵³

Upon their capture, Ortiz and the others passed through a series of German POW camps before they finally arrived at Marlag-Milag Nord. This was a group of POW camps for Allied naval and merchant marine personnel in Westertimke (Tarmstadt Oest), which was located in a flat, sandy plain between the Weser and Elbe Rivers, 16 miles northeast of Bremen.

Lieutenant Taylor, the other Marine captured in Europe, was the operations officer of the OSS intelligence team assigned to the 36th Infantry Division, Seventh Army, for the invasion of Southern France in the Cannes-Nice area. On D plus 5 (20 August 1944),

surrounded during a special mission designed to immobilize enemy reinforcements stationed in that area, he disregarded the possibility of escape and, in an effort to spare villagers severe reprisals by the *Gestapo*, surrendered to this sadistic Geheim[e] Staats Polizei." In grateful recognition of his services leading to the liberation of France, the French Government made Ortiz a Chevalier of the Legion d'Honneur and awarded him the *Croix de Guerre* with Palm. Great Britain honored him by making him an Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire.

⁵³ During the balance of his stay in France, Brunner actively participated in the liberation of Albertville, and elsewhere in the Haute Savoie region. In recognition of his services, the French Government awarded him the *Croix de Guerre* with Silver Star. Unfortunately, this was a posthumous award because Brunner was killed in a plane crash in Germany on 19 March 1945 while on another OSS mission.

Taylor, his section chief, and a Marine sergeant attached to the team went behind German lines to determine what German intentions were—retreat or fight. Taylor and an agent recruited from a local resistance group were to reconnoiter Grasse—15 miles inland and directly west of Nice. Recalling this mission, Taylor said:

I was to stay behind with the agent and the Citroen [a car the two had "liberated"], accomplish the mission of taking him in and waiting and then taking him out; and then we were to get to the 36th as fast as we could. The agent had been leading the Resistance fight against the Germans ever since the landing and was absolutely exhausted, falling asleep time and time again while we were briefing him. . . . At dawn the next morning, the agent and I headed for the town of St. Cezaire, which was declared to be in the hands of the Resistance and where I was to let the agent down and wait for his return from Grasse. However, during the night, due to Allied pressure on Draguignan and Fayence, what evidently was a company of Germans had taken up positions in St. Cezaire. On approaching the dead-still town by the steep and winding road, we ran into a roadblock of land mines; we both thought it was Resistance, and the agent took my carbine and jumped out of the car to walk toward the line of mines. He lasted just about 10 feet beyond the car and died with a bullet through his head. I still thought it was the trigger-happy Resistance but started to get out of there . . . even faster when I finally saw a German forage cap behind some bushes above the road. But the car jammed against the outer coping, and a German jumped down on the road in front of me and threw a grenade under the car, I tried to get out of the right door and luckily did not, because I would have been completely exposed to the rifle fire from the high cliff on that side above the car. The grenade exploded and I was splashed un-

conscious on the road. When I came to, I was surrounded.

It might be interesting to note that when I have thought about the incident of my capture I have always pictured us as coming down a long hill and seeing, across a wooded stream valley, the site of the road-block with men in uniform scurrying about and climbing the cliff-embankment. I have always blamed myself for thinking them to be Resistance and not recognizing them as Germans . . . and thus causing our trouble and the death of the agent. However, after years of trying, in 1963 I returned to the scene and found that the reality was quite different from my image, that the road did not go down the opposite side of the valley, that there were no trees, that the actual site of the road-block is completely invisible from any part of the road until one is within about 20 yards, in other words that I could not possibly have seen men . . . scurrying or been aware of the block.⁵⁴

The Nazis took Taylor to Grasse for treatment and interrogation. The hand grenade had shredded his left thumb and there were approximately 12 shell fragments embedded in his left leg, "6 of which at last count remain."⁵⁵ On the ride to Grasse, being strafed by Allied aircraft all the way, Taylor managed to get rid of an incriminating document by stuffing it behind the seat cushion of the vehicle in which he was riding. In Grasse he was subjected to intensive interrogation, which ended when he vomited all over the uniform of his inquisitor. From 21 August to 10 September, he was passed through and treated at six different Italian and German hospitals in Italy. On the 10th, he was sent to a POW hospital at Freising,

⁵⁴ Mr. Walter W. Taylor ltr to Hd, HistBr, HQMC, dtd 31May66, hereafter *Taylor ltr*.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*.

Oberbayern, some 20 miles north of Munich and approximately 17 miles northeast of infamous Dachau.

Six weeks later, Taylor was transferred to a hospital 15 miles further east at Moosburg, where he remained until the end of November, when he was well enough to be placed in a transient officers' compound nearby. At the end of January, Taylor was sent to the same camp in which Ortiz was imprisoned. On 9 April 1945, the prisoners at the Westertimke camp were given three hours to move out of camp because of the imminent approach of British forces. The suddenness of this move disrupted the escape plans of Taylor, who had prepared and laid aside false identity cards, maps, compass, civilian clothes, food, and other items necessary for an escape between 15 and 20 April. By the 10th, the Germans had moved the prisoners out and onto the road toward Luebeck, northeast of Hamburg. Taylor, Ortiz, and another man planned to leave that night. During the afternoon, however, continuous Allied strafing of the area created such confusion that the three Americans were able to break from the column in which they were marching and make for the nearby woods, where they were joined by a sergeant major of the Royal Marines—another escapee.

For eight days, the men hid in the woods by day and moved at night, intent on evading German troops and civilians. The escapees waited to be overrun by British forces and made some attempt to find Allied front lines, whose positions were uncertain and, from the sound of the gunfire they heard, were constantly changing. When they could

not make contact with the British, the escaped POWs returned to the vicinity of the camp from which they had been moved. Their food soon gave out and two of the party became sick from drinking swamp water, whereupon they returned to the camp to find it, to all intents and purposes, in the hands of the Allied prisoners. Merchant seamen and ailing military personnel had replaced the nominal guard left behind by the Germans. In fact, on the night that the runaways returned, the British prisoners took over the actual guarding and administration of the camp. On 29 April, British forces liberated the prisoners, and on the next day they were trucked out of the area for return to their respective countries.

PRISON CAMPS: LOCATIONS, CONDITIONS, AND ROUTINE

Article 77 of the Geneva Protocol states that, on the outbreak of war, each of the belligerents was to establish an information bureau, which would prepare POW lists and forward them to a central information agency, ostensibly to be organized by the International Red Cross. By this means, information about POWs could be sent to their families. The Protocol, in addition, stipulated that each of the belligerents was bound to notify the others within the shortest possible time of the names and official addresses of prisoners under its jurisdiction.

For nearly a year after the attack on Pearl Harbor, it was virtually impossible for the United States to obtain reliable information concerning Ameri-

cans imprisoned by the Japanese.⁵⁶ It was not until the war had ended and the POWs were liberated that the families of a number of them found out that they were still alive. The special prisoner category into which Major Boyington fell is an example of this. Another was that of the survivors of the *Houston* whose existence was not known until very near the end of the fighting.

The Casualty Division at Headquarters Marine Corps maintained the records of Marines reported to have been taken prisoner. Information concerning Marine POWs came from such sources as the Provost Marshal General of the Army, the Department of State, the International Red Cross, as well as from reports of escaped prisoners. As soon as the Casualty Division definitely learned that a Marine was a POW, his next of kin was notified and asked to keep in touch with the HQMC Prisoner of War Information Bureau. As long as the individual Marine continued in a POW status, his allotments were paid and his pay and allowances accrued to his benefit. If authoritative word was received that a Marine had died in a prison camp or that he had been killed in action, his account was closed out and all benefits paid to his beneficiaries.

Soon after the North China, Wake, and Guam Marines had been captured, the Casualty Division was able to list them as POWs. Little of what had happened to the Marines captured in the

Philippines was learned until a considerable time after their imprisonment. The Japanese were quite slow in reporting the names of prisoners or of Allied personnel who had died in prison camp. The enemy also had an irresponsible attitude about forwarding mail from POWs to their families or delivering mail to the prisoners despite major attempts to open lines of communication through neutral powers for this purpose.

In the summer of 1943, the Japanese restricted the number of words on incoming letters to 25 per message, and mail sent by POWs was limited to only a few words on a form with a printed message supplied by their captors.

Marine POWs were imprisoned in some 33 camps located in Burma, China, Formosa, Japan, Java, Malaya, Manchuria, the Philippines, and Thailand. Very often they were transferred through a series of camps before they were liberated. The North China and Wake Island Marines were imprisoned initially at Woosung camp, outside of Shanghai. The prisoners' quarters consisted of seven ramshackle barracks, each of which was "a long, narrow, one-story shanty into which the Japs crowded two hundred men."⁵⁷ Adjacent to the end of the buildings were toilets and a wash rack. Facing the toilets, much too close for normal standards of sanitation, was the galley where the POWs' food was prepared. Administrative offices, quarters for the guards, and storerooms comprised the rest of the camp area. Surrounding Woosung was an electrified fence, and inside that

⁵⁶ 1stLt Clifford P. Morehouse, "Prisoners of the Enemy," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 28, no. 1 (Jan44), p. 23. Lieutenant Morehouse was a member of the War Prisoner's Aid Committee, YMCA.

⁵⁷ Devereux, *Wake Island*, p. 217.

IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY.

I am still in a P. O. W. Camp near Moulmein, Burma, There are 20,000 Prisoners, being Australian, Dutch, English, and American. There are several camps of 2/3000 prisoners who work at settled labour daily.

We are quartered in very plain huts. The climate is good. Our life is now easier with regard to food, medicine and clothes. The Japanese Commander sincerely endeavours to treat prisoners kindly.

Officers' salary is based on salary of Japanese Officers of the same rank and every prisoner who performs labour or duty is given daily wages from 25 cents (minimum) to 45 cents, according to rank and work.

Canteens are established where we can buy some extra foods and smokes. By courtesy of the Japanese Commander we conduct concerts in the camps, and a limited number go to a picture show about once per month.

LOVE TO ALL AM DRAINING FINE

George E. Ross

another electrified fence was erected around the barracks and the toilets. In the time that the prisoners remained at this camp, two of them were electrocuted when they accidentally touched the wire barrier. According to Colonel Luther A. Brown, who was in this camp, "one Marine POW was murdered by a Japanese sentry with rifle fire at close range. Colonel Ashurst demanded that the sentry be tried and punished, however, the Japanese transferred the sentry."⁵⁸

Each prisoner was given a mattress filled with straw and two cotton blankets

for his bedding, but the Japanese covers were so skimpy, they were:

... not half as warm as one ordinary American blanket. The jerry-built barracks gave little protection against the intense cold, and during the bitter winter we were soon pooling our blankets and sleeping four in a bunk to keep from freezing to death.⁵⁹

Living conditions at Woosung were not particularly good, nor was Japanese treatment of the prisoners gentle. Each morning and evening, the POWs fell out in sections of approximately 36 men for a roll call. Invariably one or more of

⁵⁸ Brown ltr.

⁵⁹ Devereux, *op. cit.*

the men would be slapped or beaten for such minor offenses as not standing at attention or appearing to be inattentive.⁶⁰

According to Major Devereux:

The guards were brutal, stupid, or both. They seemed to delight in every form of abuse, from petty harassment to sadistic torture, and if the camp authority did not actively foster this type of treatment, they did nothing to stop it.⁶¹

One former Marine POW has written in retrospect:

Possibly their actions reflected their basic training. On the first night in Woosung, Major Brown heard a rumpus in the guard-room nearby. On going to the door he saw the Japanese sergeant of the guard strike a private in the face, then the private bowed to the sergeant, and the same routine [was] repeated several times until the private's nose was bloody.⁶²

One of the most brutal guards at Woosung was a civilian interpreter by the name of Isamu Ishihara, who had learned English in Honolulu where he had been educated and later worked as a taxi driver. This man was dubbed the "Beast of the East" by the prisoners he "flogged, kicked, and abused. . . ."⁶³

One day in Woosung, for no apparent reason, Ishihara became infuriated with Sir Mark Young, the former Governor General of Hong Kong, and whipped out his sword to strike the elderly Briton. Major Brown of the Tientsin Marines

twisted the sword out of Ishihara's hands and made him back off. Brown suffered no punishment for this daring act. Immediately after this episode, Captain Endo, the Japanese camp executive officer, beat Ishihara with a 2x4 board, and the interpreter was forbidden thereafter to wear a sword.⁶⁴

Other incidents in the camp reflected what appeared to be the Japanese respect of force, firm action, or courage. At one evening check, Ishihara struck a Marine platoon sergeant. The sergeant returned the blow knocking the Japanese to the ground. On rising, the latter approached the sergeant, placed his hand on the Marine's shoulder, and said, "You are a good soldier."⁶⁵ Later, on the event of the Emperor's Birthday, the Marine sergeant was given a reward for being a "model POW."

One of those who experienced Ishihara has written:

The following anecdote may well be apocryphal, but I have heard it from several sources. Ishihara . . . tried to turn himself in as a war criminal when the trials were being conducted in Japan. At first the investigators brushed him off as the Japanese version of the compulsive confessor who harasses our police with confessions to all the crimes he reads about in the newspapers. But he was persistent, and finally his story was confirmed by statements made by the survivors of his lunatic fits of rage. . . . At his trial, the prosecutor asked Ishihara why his hand was bandaged. Ishihara replied, 'If I were Japanese soldier, I commit harakiri when Japan surrenders; but since I am only civilian working for Army, I only cut off little finger, that's enough.' Anyway . . .

⁶⁰ Sworn statement of Cpl Jerold Story, dtd 9Apr45, hereafter *Story*. After several unsuccessful attempts, Story finally escaped from a jail in Shanghai on 6 October 1944.

⁶¹ Devereux, *Wake Island*, p. 218.

⁶² *Brown ltr.*

⁶³ Devereux, *op. cit.*

⁶⁴ *Brown ltr.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

all of us who knew 'Ishi' believe it fits him to a 'T.' ”⁶⁶

The Japanese attitude toward their prisoners was expressed many times in various ways. One Christmas, a prison camp commander left no doubt in the minds of his charges about their status when he told them:

From now on, you have no property. You gave up everything when you surrendered. You do not even own the air that is in your bodies. From now on, you will work for the building of Greater Asia. You are the slaves of the Japanese.⁶⁷

Colonel Ashurst, the senior officer prisoner, continually protested the treatment the POWs were receiving and attempted to get the Japanese authorities to recognize the Geneva Protocol as the basis on which Woosung should be run, but to no avail. A representative of the International Red Cross visited Woosung after the POWs had been there for eight or nine months, and managed to arrange for a few shipments of food and supplies to the prisoners. The general attitude of the Japanese captives was that without these Red Cross food and medical parcels, many more prisoners would not have survived the war.

The food at Woosung consisted of a cup of rice and a bowl of watery vegetable soup for breakfast and dinner, and a loaf of bread weighing approximately 150–160 grams (less than half a pound) and vegetable soup again for supper. These rations were supplemented with whatever else the prisoners could obtain from the guards by paying exorbitant prices on the black market.

⁶⁶ Winslow ltr.

⁶⁷ Devereux, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

The protests of Colonel Ashurst and the continued visits of members of the Swiss Consulate as representatives of the International Red Cross finally bore fruit, for in December 1942, the prisoners were moved to Kiangwan, five miles distant from Woosung. Here conditions were just slightly improved. At Kiangwan, Colonel Ashurst agreed to have the officers work on a prison farm. The officers labored for approximately 8 to 10 hours daily, from 0730 until 1200 and then from 1300 to 1730 in the summer. Enlisted prisoners worked about the same hours, but their duties were more onerous. The six-acre farm produced vegetables intended for the prisoners, but the produce was occasionally confiscated by the guards.

Following a Japanese raid on the POW farm, Major Brown and several other officers in turn conducted a night raid on the small Japanese garden. Colonel Otera, the camp commander, sent for Brown and permitted him to speak after a long heated tirade during which he brandished his sword in a menacing manner. Brown pointed out that many difficult situations had arisen:

... because of misunderstandings and differences between the Occidental and Oriental philosophies and that therefore the POWs never knew what to do and not do, even though specific rules governing POWs had been requested, but refused since they were 'part of Japanese Army Regulations and therefore secret.' Hence the solution to a dangerous situation—watch the Japanese and follow their example. Otera received this remark with great mirth and replied, 'Don't ever take Japanese vegetables again and the Japanese will not take yours.' Thereafter all POW farm produce went to [their] galley

except two shipments Colonel Ashurst agreed to send to the American Civilian Internment Center in Shanghai.⁶⁸

In another encounter with the Japanese over the POW truck farm, when camp authorities ordered the officers to spread "night soil" on the garden, Colonel Ashurst told them, "'No, they will not do it. You will have to kill me first.' The Japanese cancelled the order."⁶⁹

The enlisted POWs at Kiangwan worked on a rifle range north of the local military airport from about the beginning of January 1943 to September 1944. This work consisted of very heavy labor, and this, added to their poor diet, resulted in many cases of malnutrition and tuberculosis. In September 1944, the enlisted men were put on other details, such as digging ditches and building emplacements and gasoline storage dumps.

For these labors, the prisoners were paid, but in such small amounts that little was left after ever-increasing deductions were made for such items as food, clothing, heat, electricity, rent, and anything else the Japanese authorities could assess them for. The POWs pooled their last few payrolls at Kiangwan to buy a few pounds of powdered eggs for the sick.⁷⁰ The POWs began a recreation program, using "recreational equipment donated by the people in Shanghai and delivered . . . by the International Red Cross."⁷¹

⁶⁸ *Brown ltr.*

⁶⁹ Col James D. McBrayer, Jr., ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 14Oct66, hereafter *McBrayer ltr.*

⁷⁰ *Brown ltr.*

⁷¹ BGen James P. S. Devereux ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 5Oct66.

On 17 March 1942, after the prisoners at Woosung had been forced to sign a paper promising not to escape, Corporals Jerold Story, Connie Gene Battles, and Charles Brimmer, and Private First Class Charles Stewart, Jr., escaped from the prison camp. They headed for the Jessfield Road area outside of Shanghai, where they made contact with a British woman who hid them. The Japanese learned of their presence in the woman's house, surrounded it on 16 April, and the Marines gave themselves up. The four men were imprisoned in the Jessfield Road Jail in separate cells, interrogated, and beaten. The next day, they were removed to the infamous Bridge House Jail in Shanghai, and questioned for long hours at a stretch over a period of nine days.

During the time that he spent at the Bridge House, Story was beaten on an average of once every three days, and on 29 June 1942, he and his companions were transferred to Kiangwan. Here they were tried by court-martial. The Marines were not told what the charges were, were not given counsel of any sort, and were not even allowed to make a plea. It would not have done any good anyway, because the trial was conducted in Japanese. After the trial was over, the men learned that Battles, Stewart, and Story had been sentenced to four years in prison, and Brimmer, seven years. It appeared that the latter had been given the longer sentence because the Japanese believed him to be the ring leader. Story recalled that Brimmer had admitted this, even though it was not true, to stop the Japanese from beating him.

When they told Brimmer he got seven

years, we all started to laugh and told him he would be an old man before he left the prison. As we started to walk out of the courtroom the Japs called us back and raised Brimmer's sentence to nine years, evidently because we had laughed.⁷²

For about 10 days after their trial, the Marines were kept at Kiangwan, but on 9 July 1942, they were removed to Ward Road Gaol in Shanghai. This was a completely modern prison used only for those POWs convicted and sentenced by Japanese courts for "criminal offenses." On 9 October 1944, Story, together with a British and an American naval officer, sawed the bars out of their cells, climbed down ropes which they had manufactured from blankets, and escaped over the prison wall into Shanghai. The three eventually made their way to Chungking and freedom.

On the night of their escape, they met other prisoner-escapees from the jail. These men were Commander Winfield S. Cunningham, Brimmer, Stewart, another Marine, and a Navy pharmacist's mate. These men were recaptured. In March 1942, Cunningham and the head of the construction gang on Wake, Nathan Dan Teeters, had escaped from Woosung, only to be recaptured almost immediately. Apparently in response to continuous American complaints about the treatment of U. S. prisoners, on 11 December 1942 Japan notified the United States by cable through Swiss channels of the attempted escape in March of Cunningham and the Marines and said:

Plan escape made by persons in question constitutes grave violation (Japanese Law of 1915) regarding punishments inflicted

prisoners war, their chief in this case Commander Cunningham liable death penalty according this law. Nevertheless, Japanese authorities showed clemency and condemned them to punishment which considered very light compared gravity accusations. As consequence Japanese government does not see itself in position entertain protest of American Government.⁷³

Commander Cunningham was sentenced to 10 years' close confinement in prison for the crime of desertion from the Japanese Army, and jailed with Story and the other Marines at Ward Road Gaol in mid-1942. Through various channels of information, the United States Government was able to obtain accurate and documented accounts of alleged Japanese violations of the Geneva Protocol occurring in prison camps near large cities which were visited, when permitted, by the representatives of the International Red Cross and neutral observers.

In response to the information it had received about the trials of Cunningham and the others, on 12 December 1942, the United States drew up a well-documented list of complaints, containing the names of the individuals concerned and the incidents in which they were involved, and indicted the Japanese Government for its treatment of civilian and military POWs. The Department of State vehemently protested the illegal sentences imposed on the escapees by the Japanese military court, and emphatically denied the legality of the court-martial themselves. The United States demanded that the sentences be cancelled, the punishments for the at-

⁷² *Story*.

⁷³ *U. S. Diplomatic Papers, 1942*, p. 832.

tempted escapes be given in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol, and that the prisoners be treated with the respect due given to the prisoner's grade or rank and position. The Japanese did not respond to these demands.⁷⁴

At Kiangwan as at Woosung earlier, the POWs continued the dull, uneventful routine of prison camp life. Evening roll call was held at 2030, and depending upon the season, between 2100 and 2300, when taps was sounded, the lights went out in the barracks. "Then the hungry, weary prisoners lay in the dark, trying to forget the thoughts a man cannot forget, hoping to sleep until the bugle called them out to slave again."⁷⁵

Of these days, Major Devereux recalled:

That was our routine, our way of life for almost four years—except when it was worse. But . . . that is only part of the story of our captivity, the easiest part. Hidden behind the routine, under the surface of life in prison camp, was fought a war of wills for moral supremacy—an endless struggle, as bitter as it was unspoken, between the captors and the captives. The stakes seemed to me simply this: the main objective of the whole Japanese prison program was to break our spirit, and on our side was a stubborn determination to keep our self-respect whatever else they took from us. It seems to me that struggle was almost as much a part of the war as the battle we fought on Wake Island.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 838. One reason for the trials by court-martial of the escapees was that all POWs were under the Japanese military regulations normally imposed on recruits in the Japanese Army.

⁷⁵ Devereux, *Wake Island*, p. 222.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

To retain their self-respect and maintain a form of unit integrity, even in prison, the POWs established their own internal organization. Such principles of military discipline as respect for seniors and saluting continued despite the situation. The prisoners were generally under continuous pressure from their fellow Americans to remain clean and neat, even under the most difficult circumstances. A recreation program was begun, but was limited in scope because some forms of athletics were too strenuous for the POWs' weakened condition. Some attempt was made to institute an education program, and in 1942 the men organized classes in mathematics, history, and other subjects of interest. No more than 10 men were allowed to meet at any one time, for any group larger than that was immediately suspected of planning an escape. After the movement to Kiangwan, the education project was abandoned because the work load became too heavy.⁷⁷

American prisoners at all camps soon discovered that no matter how badly they were treated, they had one defensive weapon they could employ to prevent the Japanese from breaking their pride entirely, and that weapon was their universal observance of military discipline and continued existence as a military organization. Without this de-

⁷⁷ Major Brown made good use of the time he spent in prison, for he learned Russian so well that a handbook on Russian verbs he prepared while a prisoner was suitable for use by advanced students of the language. *Brown interview*. "Major Brown . . . was known as 'Guidebook Brown' due to his authorship of the forerunner of the present 'Guidebook for Marines.'" *Winslow ltr.*

fense, at isolated times the POWs became only a mob of craven creatures upon whom the enemy prison guards could and did visit all forms of cruel and unusual punishment. By maintaining military discipline even while in prison, the officers were able to represent their men properly in dealings with the Japanese and very often prevented the men from suffering heavier beatings than those which were meted out. By acting as a buffer, the officers at times received the punishment due to be given to someone else. And most important, the realization that they were still part of a military organization was a very vital factor in maintaining POW morale at as high a level as possible.

Although the health of the prisoners at Kiangwan could not by any stretch of the imagination be categorized as good, it was not critical and the death rate was very low. A primary reason for this condition was that the POWs were not in a tropical climate and the weather, by and large, was not too bad. Overwork and malnutrition, however, contributed to the high incidence of diarrhea, dysentery, tuberculosis, malaria, influenza, and pellagra. During their more than three years at Woosung and Kiangwan, the prisoners received from the United States three shipments of Red Cross food parcels and medical supplies which undoubtedly sustained the men, although Japanese soldiers pilfered from these shipments and sold the stolen items in Shanghai.

Of these three shipments, the only large one:

based on the fact that the supplies (medical and individual boxes) were not under his control. The Japanese tried in many ways, over a considerable time, to get Colonel Ashurst to sign the invoices, but he was adamant. There were some prisoners who wished Colonel Ashurst to sign, evidently hoping to receive some part of the shipment. Apparently under orders from higher authority the camp Japanese finally turned the supplies over to Colonel Ashurst, and he signed for them. As against the strong possibility that little benefit to the POW's would have been derived from the supplies, if signed for without control, Colonel Ashurst's superb handling of the issue provided us with a significant amount of essential food and medical supplies.⁷⁸

The Marines at Kiangwan were kept fairly well abreast of the progress of the war, as:

. . . Sgt Balthazar Moore, USMC, and Lt John Kinney, USMC, and [I] manufactured a short wave radio out of stolen parts and listened fairly regularly to KWID in San Francisco, and BBC from New Delhi. Unfortunately the true reports had to be mixed with spurious information because of the tendency of a lot of people to talk too loud, too long, and in the wrong place at the wrong time. Col Ashurst, Major Brown and Major Devereux were regularly informed of the true context [of the news]. Additionally, small crystal sets were manufactured; lead and sulphur for the crystal; and wire and a 'Nescafe' can for the earphone. The shortwave radio set was hidden in various places but perhaps the best place was in the forty to fifty gallon 'ordure crocks' in the toilets, or buried under the barracks. The information provided by the short wave radio and the crystal sets (which obtained

. . . was held by the Japanese while they put pressure on Colonel Ashurst to sign a receipt for the lot. This he refused to do,

⁷⁸ MajGen Frank C. Tharin ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 19Oct66, hereafter *Tharin ltr*.

Russian newscasts from Shanghai) served to stabilize the morale of the prisoners.⁷⁹

By March 1945, the POWs began hearing numerous rumors to the effect that they were to be moved from Kiangwan. Although the prison guards insisted that nothing like that was to take place, the POWs began preparing for a journey by discarding possessions they no longer needed and hoarding food and the like for what might turn out to be a difficult trip. Still other prisoners began preparations for an escape during the move. One of the Wake prisoners recalled:

On 8 May 1945 the Japanese organized a working party to go into Shanghai to prepare railroad cars for a move of the prisoners. Two Marine Officers volunteered to accompany the working party in the hope that something could be done that would assist in an escape during the trip. It was well known from information gained from recently captured aviators that the 100 mile stretch of the railroad north of Nanking was virtually in the hands of the Chinese. On arrival at the railroad yard in Shanghai, it was found that the cars to be used were standard Chinese boxcars with sliding doors in the center and windows on either side of the ends. The Japanese instructions were that barbed wire was to be nailed over the windows and barbed wire put up to enclose the ends of the boxcars leaving a space between the doors free for the guards. It was obvious that the only means of escape would be through the windows and that this would be impossible if within full view of the guards. Also provided by the Japanese for each end of the car was a five gallon can to be used as a toilet during the trip. After considerable discussion with the Japanese, they finally agreed that the Officer's car should provide some privacy for the toilet. This was to be accomplished

by removing doors from a nearby Japanese barracks and installing these in the corner of the boxcar, thus enclosing not only the toilet but the window. The barbed wire was carefully put on the window so that it would be easily unhooked. Directly outside of the windows were metal rungs that would provide a ladder to descend prior to jumping to the ground. With this arrangement, it appeared that certainly one person could make an escape, and if the guards were not alert it was possible that several might escape before the decreased numbers would be noticed.⁸⁰

The main party of 901 prisoners left on 9 May; remaining behind in Shanghai were 25 seriously ill and wounded men. The first leg of the trip, Shanghai to Nanking, approximately 100 miles, took 24 hours. Upon arrival at Nanking, the POWs were taken from the train, marched through the city, and boated to the other side of the Yangtze River, where they reboarded their trains, which had crossed the river empty. On the night of 10-11 May 1945, First Lieutenants John F. Kinney and John A. McAlister, taken prisoner at Wake Island, First Lieutenants Richard M. Huizenga and James D. McBrayer, captured in North China, and Mr. Lewis S. Bishop, a former pilot with the Flying Tigers, escaped from the train.

The following is McBrayer's account of the escape:

These four Marine officers had long planned for an escape, slowly accumulating tools necessary to cut through a fence, etc. Once they learned of the planned move of the prisoners by train, they laid plans to cut a hole in the bottom of the boxcars and escape via the 'rods' while the train was moving. Fortunately the boxcar in

⁷⁹ *McBrayer ltr.*

⁸⁰ Col William W. Lewis memo to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 10Nov66.

which they were placed had a small window in the corner which was covered with barbed wire and small iron bars, which they could cut with their stolen tools.

The boxcars had contained forty to fifty officers, about twenty to twenty-five being wired in by barbed wire in each end. Four Japanese guards were in the wired-off middle section between the sliding doors of the boxcars. Blankets and blackout equipment was placed over all openings in the car because of U. S. aircraft strikes. Huizenga, Kinney, McAlister, and McBrayer placed the 'five gallon gasoline can toilet' near the window in their end of the car so as to give a reasonable excuse to be near the blacked out window.

The POW train left Nanking traveling north toward Tientsin about midnight, the four Marine officers took turns going to the 'head,' and cutting the wires and bars when it appeared the Japanese guards were not looking or alert, particularly while the guards were eating supper.

The four Marine officers planned to jump off the train about midnight near the Shantung border because of the Communist 8th Route Army operations in that area. They planned to jump in pairs as Huizenga and McBrayer each spoke some Chinese, but Kinney and McAlister did not. However, each had a small 'pointee-takee,' which a Chinese-American had prepared for them in camp in the event the officers became separated. When the time came to escape—about midnight—the officers discovered there were no hand holds on the side of the car, consequently they could not hang on and jump in pairs. [Therefore,] it was out of the window and out into the black night.

The prison train was making about forty miles per hour when each jumped into the black unknown. Each officer had to time his approach to the window when the four Japanese guards were not looking, and slide up under the blanket covering the window and jump. Consequently the individual officers were strung out up and down the track for many miles. Lewis Bishop . . . had not been included in the

escape plans, but when he saw the hole he followed. Each officer was quite battered by the jump from a fast moving train. Each one also had . . . [a] harrowing experience prior to establishing contact with friendly Chinese guerrillas. The latter brought the five escaped officers together in about five days; it was only then that the four Marines knew Bishop had jumped from the train.

The five . . . stayed with the Chinese guerrillas and made a long swing to the east and joined elements of the Chinese Communist New Fourth Army. They traveled with the Chinese Communist troops until they reached the boundary between the Chinese Communist and Chinese Nationalist Armies. An apparent armistice was declared between the two Chinese forces, and the escapees were transferred to the Nationalist troops. At this point the escape seemed in doubt as both the . . . Communists and the Nationalists told [the Americans], 'the other side will kill you and blame it on us to cause trouble with your government.' Fortunately, the treatment of the escapees by the guerrillas, the Communists and the Nationalists, was excellent, and the former POWs gained strength and weight.

During their tour of the Anwei-Shantung provincial areas the escapees attended many patriotic rallies, and always they were requested to sing the American National Anthem. As they could not really sing the 'Star Spangled Banner' and do it justice, they invariably responded with the Marine Corps Hymn. So if part of China today thinks 'From the Halls of Montezuma' is the U. S. National Anthem, you know who to blame: Huizenga, Kinney, McAlister, and McBrayer, Marines, and Bishop, a Marine 'by adoption.'⁸¹

Aided by the Chinese forces, the five Americans finally reached an emergency airstrip at Li Huang on 16 June, and subsequently returned to the United States. The night after these five

⁸¹ *McBrayer ltr.*

escaped, two civilian prisoners also left the train; one made a successful get-away, but the other was recaptured and badly beaten.

On 14 May, the prison caravan reached Fengt'ai, slightly west of Peiping, where there were fewer facilities, less food, and more miserable conditions than at either Woosung or Kiangwan. At Fengt'ai:

All prisoners were put in a large warehouse. Instead of rice, flour was announced as the staple food. Claiming that flour, per se, was an impossible diet the POW mess officer demanded that the Japanese provide some means to process this into bread. An oven was finally located (it had belonged to the N. China Marines in Peiping) and bread production started.

Later, the Japanese ordered the mess officer to make hardtack 'for the Japanese Army' and hundreds of pounds of hardtack poured out of the oven, put into sacks and stored. Much thought went into the manufacture of this hardtack, unfortunately. When the prisoners later arrived in Hokkaido the hardtack was there, to be a part of our ration. It was completely spoiled and inedible. Our sabotage of the Japanese war effort had boomeranged.⁸²

Approximately a month later—on 19 June—the POWs began another trip by boxcar, this time to the port of Pusan in Korea, which had an infinitely worse camp than the previous ones the prisoners had been in. After three days here, they were packed into the crowded lower deck of a ferry steamer, which transported them to Honshu. When unloaded, the POWs:

... again were crowded into trains and sent around the island of Honshu via Osaka and Tokyo by train and ferry to the island of Hokkaido, where they were

regrouped in various camps in the mining area. The officers were separated from the enlisted men and put in a small compound, meeting there a group of Australian officers. The men were sent to a number of camps where they found Australian, Indonesian and other prisoners.⁸³

They remained on Hokkaido until liberated.

In the southern part of Japan, the Guam Marines were put to work in earnest at Zentsuji in early March 1942, two months after their arrival. For their first major task, they had to construct rice paddies on the side of a mountain near the prison camp. As one Marine recalled:

The axes that were used to knock down the trees were the most modern equipment I saw on the entire project. The rest of the equipment was even more basic—hoes, rakes, a shovel or two, and hands.⁸⁴

Groups of prisoners were continually transferred to other camps from Zentsuji in the months following their arrival. In May 1942, one such group was sent to Osaka Prisoner of War Camp 1, which was actually a warehouse not far from the docks of this port city. As a matter of fact, most of the POW camps situated in such metropolitan areas of the country as Tokyo, Osaka, Kobe, and Yokohama were in warehouses or buildings of the same type. In violation of other articles of the Geneva Protocol, many of these city camps were directly in the center of strategic areas, and the men imprisoned there were forced to work as stevedores, loading and unloading war material from military trans-

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ Boyle, *Yanks Don't Cry*, p. 42.

⁸² *Tharin ltr.*

ports. The majority of the camps in Japan, however, were situated in rural or suburban locales. The stockades consisted of several areas of fenced-in grounds and one- and two-story wooden barracks of the kind generally used by the Japanese Army.

Some Guam Marines were transferred in October 1942 to Hirohata Sub-Camp, which was within the Osaka camp groupment. Hirohata was administered by enlisted Japanese Army personnel, and by *hanchos*, or civilian labor supervisors who wore a red armband to mark their authority, and who had the power of life and death over their hapless captives. Although otherwise unarmed, the *hanchos* carried clubs or bamboo sticks of some sort which they wielded with relish on all ranks whether provoked by the prisoners or not.⁸⁵ Most of these civilians and many of the soldiers at the camp conducted black market activities, selling at exorbitant prices to the prisoners Red Cross supplies, food, and other items that the men were entitled to.

As far as the beatings were concerned, the Marines soon noticed that it was commonplace for senior Japanese Army personnel to beat their juniors for some major or minor provocation, real or imagined. Beatings were admin-

istered right down the chain of command, from officer to NCO, from sergeant to private. One prisoner noted that these Japanese beatings took "place daily in their own army and Jap civilians suffered the same indignities and brutal, savage treatment from the Jap Army as we did."⁸⁶

Although Japanese authorities constantly told the prisoners that the rations they were issued were equal in amount and quality to those issued to the Japanese Army,⁸⁷ the physical condition of the POWs proved otherwise. Hirohata prisoners lost on the average 45 pounds per man during the period of their imprisonment. Their daily ration usually consisted of 600 grams (21 ounces) dry weight of either rice, wheat, beans, corn, or flour. This ration was increased to 680 grams per day for a short while, and then reduced to 540 grams in the winter of 1943-1944. During the growing season, the men's diet was supplemented to a limited degree by green vegetables which were used to make a watery soup. Even though the Hirohata men were engaged in the heaviest types of manual labor, such as shoveling iron ore, coal, and slag and required a more nourishing diet than that which they were given, they received very small amounts of fish or meat once a month, if they were lucky. On their rest days, "men were permitted to make hikes through the rice paddies," where they obtained such supplements to their diet as "... snakes,

⁸⁵ Although under no compulsion to say so at the time, some of the liberated POWs reported during initial interrogations after they had been freed that they had been beaten for some infraction of a petty but strict prison rule. Undoubtedly, the prisoners very often did all that they could to try the patience of their captors. They expected quick punishment when caught for violating a camp law, and were not often disappointed. *CinCPac Surrender and Evacuation Rpt*, p. 51.

⁸⁶ *Ercanbrack ltr II*.

⁸⁷ It is possible that the considerable height and weight differences between Japanese and Americans may have resulted in what the latter believed to be a starvation ration.

grasshoppers, small frogs, turtles, and edible roots.”⁸⁸

The Hirohata prisoners alleviated the food problem somewhat by pooling all foodstuffs, tobacco, and relief supplies they received. Thereafter, an equal ration was given to each man. Men who had been weakened by hunger and disease and were dying were given double rations by common agreement.

First Sergeant Ercanbrack of the Guam Marines was made the senior commander of the Hirohata prisoners, and in turn organized the men imprisoned with him into platoons. To lessen the punishment which the prison authorities might want to mete out, he maintained tight control over his command. All matters pertaining to internal discipline, cases of theft, or any disputes that arose amongst the other POWs were referred to him for action. Ercanbrack managed to keep detailed records of what transpired during his imprisonment, including deaths, treatment of POWs, and the conduct of the POWs—good or bad. Since any action of an individual prisoner might result in mass punishment for the entire camp, the maintenance of stringent internal discipline by the prisoners themselves was a necessity. Theft of Japanese supplies was not only condoned, but was actually necessary for survival. To be uncooperative with the guards or to show them disrespect generally would result in a beating or worse, but this was something the individual brought upon himself.

On the other hand, the theft of a fellow prisoner's rations or possessions,

or any action which would affect the general welfare of the prisoners overall, was a matter which had to be and was handled by the POWs' own leaders. They took a very serious view of any misconduct and for the common survival of all, harsh but just punishment was given. Although it might seem somewhat humorous to read at this late date, the senior POW was undoubtedly quite serious when he made the following comment alongside the names of several men in the report he submitted upon his liberation: “Not recommended for reenlistment.”⁸⁹ Their offenses: “profiteering and theft of food during starvation times”; their victims, fellow prisoners.

The basic drive for self-preservation and an innate belief in the fact that, in the end, the United States would win the war did more than anything else to bolster the morale and instinct for survival of the POWs. If they were caught talking to Japanese natives, the prisoners were beaten severely, and so were the civilians. Nonetheless, the captives were able to keep somewhat abreast of the general trend of the war through the good intentions of these civilians, who were pro-American, but surreptitiously so for obvious reasons. One of these was the interpreter at the Hirohata camp, of whom more shall be said later.

A Guam Marine who was at the Osaka Prisoner of War Camp remembered that:

. . . the last three or four months of 1943 were about the best months we had as prisoners of war, or anyway the least bad. We had a lot of reasons for feeling

⁸⁸ *Ercanbrack ltr II.*

⁸⁹ Encl (D) to *Ercanbrack ltr II.*

pretty good in late 1943. For one thing, the Japanese civilians were keeping us fairly well posted on how the war was going, and we had every reason to expect it to end soon. After all, we knew that the Japanese were finally getting their lumps . . . because the civilians told us about the beating their Navy took in the Coral Sea and at Midway, and we knew that the Marines had pushed the Japs out of the Solomons and that the Japanese had made similar 'strategic withdrawals' out of New Guinea and Attu Island in Alaska. All in all it looked like we were doing all right.⁹⁰

If nothing else, most of the prisoners still had hope.

There were some, however, who almost wished death would come to relieve them of their misery, so terrible were the conditions of their imprisonment. Among this forlorn group were the Marines and sailors captured when the *Houston* went down. Again, as in the case of other groups, it is difficult to trace the travels of each man from the *Houston*. Most of the Marines from the ship's detachment had very much the same experiences, however. While at the Bicycle Camp prison in Batavia, Java, these men were joined by other Americans, survivors of the 2d Battalion, 131st Field Artillery.⁹¹

Japanese rations at Bicycle Camp were no better than they had been at Serang, but, fortunately, the U. S. artillerymen had been able to bring their

clothing and supplies into the prison with them. These items they shared with the Marines. The soldiers had been able also to retain battalion funds amounting to several thousand *guilders* with which they purchased food in Batavia. These rations, too, they shared with the *Houston* men, who, in addition, were each given 10 *guilders* for purchasing tobacco and a little extra food at a canteen operated by Australian POWs. In post-liberation interrogations, *Houston* Marines universally praised the officers and enlisted men of the 131st Field Artillery for their unstinting generosity during their difficult times together.

In addition to the Americans and the Australians, Bicycle Camp held British and Dutch POWs, all of whom worked at a local oil refinery, handling barrels and loading trucks and trains. The prisoners found that the guards were Koreans for the most part, and very brutal. Most prisoners thought that the reason for the general cruelty was the pressure applied to the guards by the Japanese authorities.

The most serious incident occurring at this camp took place on 3 July 1942, when the Japanese produced a paper for all American prisoners to sign. It was an affidavit requiring them to pledge allegiance to the Japanese Army and to promise to neither escape nor attempt an escape. The POWs protested the order and sent it back to the camp commandant. It was returned with a demand that the Americans sign it, whereupon they said they would obey only those orders that did not conflict with the oath they had taken to their own government. When the Japanese

⁹⁰ Boyle, *Yanks Don't Cry*, p. 137.

⁹¹ This battalion was originally scheduled to join the 148th Field Artillery on Luzon, but the ships transporting it could not break the Japanese blockade of the Philippines. Instead, the artillerymen were landed at Soerabaja, and thrown into the Banten Bay defenses at St. Nicholas Point, where they were overrun and captured in the Japanese invasion.

camp commander received this answer, he took away all privileges the Americans had, closed down their kitchen, confined them to their barracks, and caused many of them to be beaten. On 4 July, with some sort of twisted logic, the camp commander marched the entire group of American POWs to his headquarters, where he forced them to sign the document.⁹²

Bicycle Camp POWs could purchase food and other items from the natives when they were on working parties outside of the camp, but the Japanese would allow nothing to be brought back into the prison compound. Guards beat all violators, and in addition, forced them either to kneel in the sun for an entire day without water or stand at attention for 12 to 72 hours at a stretch.

In the first week of September 1942, a large group of prisoners, including the Americans, was transported to Singapore on the *Dai Naichi Maru*. With 1,400 POWs and a number of Japanese troops on board, the ship was bulging at the seams. After a five-day voyage, the prisoners debarked at Singapore and were immediately taken to Changi, an English Army barracks before the fall of the crown colony. Here, British troops were also imprisoned.

Although housing conditions were not too bad at Changi, the place had been stripped clean by the Japanese. Shortly after their arrival, the Marines were given a Red Cross food supply issue, containing corned beef, cocoa, milk, and a meat and vegetable ration. This was manna to men who had been on an all-rice diet for eight long months.

At Changi, the Americans were put to work clearing a rubber plantation so that vegetable gardens could be started. There was continuous bickering between the English and the American POWs, because each side had its own concept of how much cooperation the Japanese should receive. In general, the British favored a more ordered relationship which was based on an established pattern of conduct between the prisoners and their captors. Few Americans were disposed to accept either the British disciplinary system or the limited degree of cooperation with the Japanese which was the basis of this working relationship.⁹³

Although they were in POW status, most Americans believed that they should and could sabotage the Japanese war effort. This they did in every possible way whenever disruptive acts could be accomplished surreptitiously or made to look like accidents.

Generally, the work of POWs was very closely supervised. Nevertheless, the prisoners were able to commit acts of sabotage which were not very often discovered. Some Marines were assigned to an oil refinery at Saigon. Here they drained gasoline drums and then added water to fill the drums again. Their work was not inspected and the drums were immediately loaded on barges and taken to the local military airport. Word came back from the field that four or five planes cracked up daily because of the contaminated fuel. At the refinery there was a large dynamo which was out of order and an American sailor was directed to repair it. Instead he threw sand

⁹² *Houston POW rpt*, Sgt Charley L. Pryor.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

into the moving parts, but unfortunately was caught and severely beaten by the Japanese; he could have been executed.

A group of the men from the 4th Marines, after transfer from the Philippines to Japan, was assigned to build a dam on Honshu, at Mitsushima on the Tenryu River. The POWs were put to work building the dam under the supervision of a Japanese construction company. After the end of the war, Master Sergeant Fred Stolley visited the scene of his labors as a POW. Here he met the president of the construction company who took him on a tour of the dam which had been completed in the post-war era. The Japanese told Stolley:

'I never would have finished it if I had to depend on your work alone. You people were very bad at times . . . what did you do with my machine tools?'

I winced. We had taken two cases of valuable machine tools and used them for reinforcing in the cofferdam. It was one of the few ways we had of fighting back at the time.⁹⁴

Other Marines had other ways of fighting back. The Guam men, working as stevedores on the Osaka docks, became quite adept at unloading ships as slowly as possible. They found that their military or civilian guards didn't care how much work was accomplished as long as they made some headway,

. . . and we took advantage of this laxity and got away with a lot of gold-bricking. We were never in a rush to get a ship unloaded until later on in the war when it was a lead-pipe cinch that the ship would be sent to the bottom by our sub-

marines a day or so after clearing the Inland Sea.⁹⁵

Another gambit successfully attempted was to overload cargo nets so that they would burst and drop their loads, often over the side of the ship into the water. At one time, the Guam Marines managed to sabotage the major winch on one of the ships on which they were working, and to hold up its unloading for many hours. When the POWs were fortunate, they found that the ship's cargo contained food supplies and other valuable items which they pilfered and smuggled back to camp. Very often the guards would look the other way until the POWs had their fill, and then the Japanese would take what remained to their families or to the black market. On other occasions the prisoners were discovered with these stolen items on their persons by the camp guards, who then severely punished the Americans or withdrew their limited privileges.

Once, the Guam men were unloading a pig-iron cargo from a freighter into barges alongside. The man on the cargo winch purposely set an overloaded net down on a barge which obviously could not carry the four-ton load. The barge sank slowly, followed by the bars of pig-iron. A Marine who observed all of this philosophically commented: "There wasn't anything heroic about sending a big barge load of pig-iron to the bottom of Osaka Harbor, but it made a gang of *horios* [prisoners] a little bit happier as we trudged back to our barracks."⁹⁶

Actually, while their acts of defiance did not seem very heroic to the POWs

⁹⁴ Fred Stolley, "Return to Mitsushima," *Leatherneck*, v. XLV, no. 3 (Mar62), p. 83.

⁹⁵ Boyle, *Yanks Don't Cry*, p. 98.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

who committed them, they were heroes in a real sense. If they were caught, as a number were at various times, they could be beaten, tortured, or executed. Despite the knowledge of what could happen to them if discovered, the POWs determinedly continued committing minor and major acts of sabotage. It was their way of fighting the war.

Less than a week after their arrival at Changi in 1942, some of the *Houston* Marines were again put aboard a ship bound for Burma, and were taken ashore and imprisoned in Moulmein. From this city, located across the Bay of Chaungzon from Rangoon, the POWs were marched five miles to a train which carried them to Thanbyuzayat. This was a base camp for the railroad to Bangkok, which the Japanese were building wholly with prisoner labor. Thanbyuzayat housed the hospital and supply dumps servicing the subsidiary work camps built temporarily along the railroad right of way. The sub-camps were titled 5 Kilometer Camp, 25 Kilometer Camp, 40 Kilometer Camp, etc., each deriving its name according to the distance they were located from Thanbyuzayat.

On their first day at the main camp, the Japanese officer in charge tried to impress on the POWs the futility of escape because of the isolation of the locale. He called the prisoners the rabble of a defeated army and reminded them that they were under Japanese control. The enemy officer added that he had orders to build a railroad to Bangkok and assured them that he was going to do it, even if it meant the burial of an Allied soldier under every rail tie along the way. Two days after this jolly wel-

come to Burma, the POWs were marched to the 40 Kilometer Camp and immediately put to work excavating rail beds. The extremely difficult labor lasted from dawn to dark and under living conditions that ranged from poor to hardly bearable. Each man was given a daily work quota to fulfill. If soil conditions were good, the work day lasted 14 hours, which was considered a relatively short day. At other times, the work assigned required 20 hours to complete.

This group remained at 40 Kilometer Camp until the end of November 1943, when it marched back to 26 Kilometer Camp, remaining there through Christmas. At this time, they began organizing for an escape, for they had received word from fellow prisoners at Thanbyuzayat base—where a clandestine radio receiver was located—that British forces were making a drive in their direction. Under the leadership of two officers from the 131st Field Artillery, the POWs formed squads and managed to steal four or five machine guns and a dozen or more hand grenades from their Japanese guards. Unfortunately, nothing developed from the rumor of the English advance, although planning for the uprising “did wonders for the men’s spirits.”⁹⁷

The 25 or 26 Kilometer Camp, as it was variously called, was a cholera-infested area in which at least 60 native laborers had died of the disease before the POWs had arrived. Some unburied bodies were still in evidence when the prisoners marched in. In addition to the malnutrition, dysentery, and other diseases common to the POWs, many

⁹⁷ *Houston POW rpt*, Cpl Howard R. Charles.

men were suffering from skin ulcers. In the work that they were doing, it was very easy for the prisoners' legs to be bruised or cut, and every cut or bruise meant an ulcer. Once a prisoner's limbs became ulcerated, they were difficult to heal. Sometimes it was impossible for the men with ulcers even to stand up to work, but nevertheless, they were taken out on stretchers and given a hammer to break rocks. Not only did the oppressive jungle heat and humidity prevent healing, there were few medicines available with which POW doctors could treat the men.

Throughout the following months, whenever the work in the vicinity of one camp was completed, the men would be moved to another, only to begin the same cycle of construction all over again. Work at the 30 Kilometer Camp progressed under the most difficult conditions, because the rainy season began while the prisoners were here. Heavy rains caused the road beds to wash out and cave in. The POWs were often forced to work day and night, and sometimes did not get to bed until 0200, only to be called out again to begin their labors again at daybreak. During the heavy rains, many of the prisoners contracted malaria and were unable to work at all.

In December 1943, the railroad was finally completed, and the men were given a three-day rest at Thanbyuzayat, the first such break they had experienced since they began working in Burma. Late in the month, the POWs were loaded 35 to 40 men each into 6 x 20-foot boxcars and transported out of the jungle into Thailand. In the three-day trip, they were fed fish and rice once

a day. Just after Christmas, they arrived in Thailand, where the men were separated into several different groups and sent to a number of camps throughout the country. In April 1944, some of the prisoners were sent out of Thailand to Saigon, where they worked as stevedores in the dock area. Allied bombing raids were by that time on the increase, and without shelters of their own, the POWs "took a beating from the planes."⁹⁸ When the war ended, a number of the prisoners were liberated in Saigon. An interesting sidelight of this period was that just after V-E Day, native Annamites began an uprising against French authorities who had returned to power and street fighting erupted. Fortunately, none of the POWs was hurt.

Some prisoners remained in Thailand following their departure from the jungles of Burma. These men were taken to Kanchanburi, which was the largest city they had been in to that time, excluding their brief stay in Singapore. The Thai people with whom the POWs came in contact treated them decently and did what they could to ease their suffering. After approximately a year in this area, these men were moved to various places in the country, wherever the Japanese had work for them. Conditions depended upon the attitude of the guards, which ranged from complete indifference to thoroughgoing brutality. Most of this group were liberated from a number of different camps in Thailand at war's end.

Those *Houston* Marines who had remained in Singapore at Changi when

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

the first group left in December 1942, were moved several weeks later, in January 1943. Some followed in the tracks of the first, and ended up working on the railroad. They too were forced into the hard labor that became the lot of all Allied POWs in this area. One Marine told about work at 100 Kilometer Camp, where there were many sick prisoners, most of them suffering from fever and tropical ulcers. This camp was located at the foot of a mountain in a low place on the Burma side of the Burma-Thailand border.

Rain was a constant factor in the lives of the POWs who lived here in almost knee-deep mud all of the time. The route of the railroad in this area was laid over ground that consisted of a very hard lava formation. The prisoners had to break up the volcanic rock with hammers, and each time the hammer fell, showers of stone splinters flew off, some piercing uncovered portions of the men's bodies and embedding themselves like shell fragments in the POWs' flesh. Scratches developed into ulcers, and the ulcerations soon began suppurating. Very often, because of inadequate treatment and the lack of drugs, blood poisoning set in. Those afflicted were so run down to begin with that their bodies could not throw off the effects of the blood poisoning and their systems were unable to develop antibodies. As a result, they died.⁹⁹

This second group of *Houston* POWs, like the first to leave Singapore, also worked on the railroad until it was completed and was transferred first to Thailand and later to Saigon. Existing rec-

ords show that one Marine from the *Houston* detachment remained in Batavia until April 1943, when he and other POWs were transferred first to one camp and then another within a period of several months. In June, the group to which this Marine belonged was transferred to Singapore, where it remained approximately a month loading Japanese transports. In July 1943, it was taken across the Straits of Malacca to the South Siak River and up it to the vicinity of Pakanbaru, approximately in the center of Malaya. Here the POWs were employed in construction of a railroad from the time they arrived until they were liberated.

Like the *Houston* Marines, the Marines captured in the Philippines found their captors neither compassionate nor gentle and their future existence a matter of doubt. It was questionable whether the American POWs would succumb first from malnutrition and disease, brutal and inhumane treatment, or death by execution. Initially, it appeared that any one or all of these factors would have an equal opportunity of depleting the ranks of the prisoners which General Homma's forces held.

Upon his removal from Manila together with other senior American POWs, Colonel Howard of the 4th Marines was taken to Formosa, arriving there at Karenko prison camp on 16 August 1942. Up to this time, Howard, General Wainwright, and the others had been accorded satisfactory treatment, except for an insufficient diet. Things quickly changed at Karenko, however, for they were all placed on a starvation diet here, forced to perform coolie labor, and suffered many personal indignities.

⁹⁹ *Houston POW rpt*, Sgt Charley L. Pryor.

In late October 1943, the group was moved to Japan, and moved again in November, this time to Manchuria via Korea. Howard's group finally was sent to Mukden, where it remained until liberated on 20 August 1945 first by an OSS team and then by a party of Russian soldiers.

At Camp O'Donnell on Luzon, the Corregidor prisoners learned the horrible details of the Bataan Death March from the survivors of that infamous episode. Approximately 2,000 Bataan men died before the POWs were shifted to Cabanatuan.

Here, conditions were slightly improved. The death rate of Americans at Cabanatuan continued at 40 to 50 daily. This situation prevailed until 16 January 1943, which was the first day in the history of the camp without a death. Colonel Beecher constantly complained to the Japanese about the ration.¹⁰⁰ Causing these deaths was a combination of malnutrition, disease, exposure, and the constant mistreatment by Japanese guards who found every POW fair game for their excesses.¹⁰¹ The Japanese made no effort to furnish medical supplies, to establish a hospital, or even to alleviate the suffering of either Americans or Filipinos. Army and Navy medical personnel captured with the rest did their best under the circumstances, but in view of the limited resources available to them, their best was not good enough.

Sometime in December 1943 the ration issue was materially increased,

"Not so much due to my complaints," wrote General Beecher, "but due to a change of policy. We also received bulk Red Cross supplies, which were issued to the messes; medicine, food, etc. They saved our lives."¹⁰²

On the morning of 26 October 1942, 1,000 POWs hiked from the Cabanatuan Camp 1 to a rail loading point at Cabanatuan, were loaded into boxcars—80 men to each car—and transferred to Bilibid prison.

At one of the frequent train halts, a town about 30 miles from Manila, all the American prisoners received quite a surprise. A group of Filipino children tested the Jap guards on our boxcar and found out that they did not understand English. The children then sang, 'God Bless America.'¹⁰³

After one night in Bilibid, the POWs were crowded aboard a coal-burning transport which carried them to Davao, on Mindanao, making stops at several other Philippine island ports along the way. Disembarking at Davao on the morning of 7 November, the prisoners began an 18-mile march to the Davao Penal colony. Formerly a civil prison, the Japanese had converted it into a POW camp. Conditions here were a distinct improvement over those experienced previously.

The Davao Penal Colony actually was a plantation of many thousands of acres. Before the war, it had produced all of the food required for the 2,000 inmates imprisoned there, and in fact shipped the surplus production to other Philippine prisons. Approximately 75 acres were devoted to banana trees, and a

¹⁰⁰ Beecher ltr.

¹⁰¹ 1stLt Jack Hawkins Rpt of Experiences and Observations, dtd 3Dec43, hereafter *Hawkins rpt.*

¹⁰² Beecher ltr.

¹⁰³ Shofner rpt.

large orchard contained papaya, citrus, avocado, and other tropical fruit trees. There were several hundred cows and water buffalo roaming about. The farm also had about 10,000 egg-producing poultry. In fact, there was plenty of food, but not for the POWs. Nonetheless, the prisoners found that their food here was better than that which had been received elsewhere in captivity, and they were issued rations of meat and fish once or twice a week. Rice, however, remained the staple item in their diet.

All officers and enlisted POWs were forced to work at Davao. Some of the projects to which they were assigned consisted of hauling gravel from a creek bed to a railroad siding, cutting logs in the jungle, building Japanese defensive positions, different farming chores, and prison housekeeping duties. Depending upon the work detail involved, the workday began between the hours of 0600 and 0800 and ended at 1700, with two hours for lunch.

Before Christmas 1942, a group of Davao POWs, consisting of Captain Austin C. Shofner and First Lieutenants Jack Hawkins and Michiel Dobervich of the 4th Marines and seven other American servicemen, began formulating plans to escape. Their primary aim was to reach Allied territory (Australia) to report the inhumane Japanese treatment of POWs.¹⁰⁴ The escape party was increased to 12 men with the addition of two Filipino prisoners who were to guide the rest to safety.

The would-be escapees spent two months accumulating necessary supplies and rations, which they cached at a spot

outside of the prison camp. One aspect of the method of escape was solved by getting all members of the escape group on one or the other of two labor details which worked outside of the camp in close proximity to each other. On 14 March 1943, these men made a successful dummy escape run.

On 4 April, the day set for the actual escape, everything went according to schedule. At 0800, the work parties left the camp, headed for the direction of their work areas, and then doubled back to the rendezvous point, evading Japanese sentries. When they met at 0830, they uncovered their previously hidden supplies, and waited two suspense-filled hours within 300 yards of the Japanese barracks for their Filipino guides to arrive. These two men had been delayed for some minor reason by the enemy guards.

At 1030, the escapees quickly left the camp area. "It was a great feeling to be free again, and when we finally got started we literally flew through the jungle for the first hour," recalled Captain Shofner.¹⁰⁵ In their hurry and the guides' nervousness, the men missed the trail they were heading for. Fortunately, a heavy rain began falling and lasted all day, washing away the tracks they may have left. After three rainy days and two sleepless nights in a swamp, all the while plagued by voracious mosquitos, the men became increasingly exhausted. At 1730 of the third day, they heard some rifle, machine gun, and mortar fire and observed what appeared to be huts burning in the distance. They changed the direction of

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

their march away from this area.

On the fourth day, 7 April, the escape party headed in the direction of the previous night's firing, and upon arriving found evidence of a fight. Heading north away from the camp, about 10 kilometers beyond the scene of the fire fight, they arrived at an occupied house, whose inhabitants conducted the party to a guerrilla outpost at Longaog.

The 12 fugitives remained here several days, resting up and being treated to the hospitality and generosity of their hosts. At the outpost, they were given some interesting information; the swamp that they had just crossed was infested with crocodiles. When the former prisoners told the local guerrilla commander of their plans to reach the east coast of Mindanao and to sail to Australia, he said that they would have to contact his superior, who was in control of the whole area and whose assistance was required to obtain the necessary equipment and guides for the trip.

A guide from this man, Captain Claro Laureta of the Philippine Constabulary, soon arrived to conduct the escapees on a two-day journey to Laureta's headquarters, where they met the guerrilla chieftain and detailed their plans and requirements. Laureta told them of some of the difficulties they might encounter in the long sea voyage and then informed them that a large guerrilla organization officered by Americans existed in the northwest portion of the island and that it had radio communication with Australia. Furthermore, he had learned that an American submarine recently landed and supplied the guerrillas.

Shofner, Hawkins, Dobervich, and the others discussed the relative merits of adhering to their original plan or hazarding a hike to the north over hundreds of miles of mountainous terrain, uninhabited except for tribes of savage headhunters, who "killed for the sake of killing."¹⁰⁶ Laureta offered to send with the group an armed escort and two guides who had just recently returned from the north.

After they had agreed on this new course of action and all preparations for the trek had been made, the escaped prisoners and their escort left the guerrilla encampment on 21 April. They reached Medina, a town on the northwest coast of Mindanao, following a long, tiring, and dangerous journey. Here they were greeted by Lieutenant Colonel Ernest E. McLish, USA, who had been serving with a Philippine Army regiment when Corregidor fell, and had hidden in the mountains of Mindanao rather than surrender. After a period of hiding, he began organizing a resistance movement, which, when formed, became the 110th Division and subordinate to the 10th Military District, the senior command responsible for coordinating all guerrilla activity on Mindanao. Its commander was Colonel Wendell W. Fertig, a U. S. Army reservist, who "had over 33,000 men on his rolls in February 1945, some 16,500 of them armed."¹⁰⁷

While waiting to be evacuated from the Philippines by submarine, the

¹⁰⁶ Hawkins, *Never Say Die*, p. 135.

¹⁰⁷ Robert R. Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines—The War in the Pacific—United States Army in World War II* (Washington: OCMH, DA, 1963), p. 586.

former prisoners were asked to join the 110th Division to assist in directing guerrilla activities. On 11 May, Shofner was appointed a major and Hawkins and Dobervich made captains in the Army of the United States. Shofner became deputy chief of staff and assistant operations officer of the division, Hawkins became the division intelligence officer, and Dobervich, the supply officer. For nearly six months, they held these positions while, at the same time, taking part in the raids on Japanese garrisons on Mindanao. Finally, on 15 November 1943, the three Marines boarded an American submarine at Nasipit, Butuan Bay, Mindanao, which took them to Australia, and they reported for duty with United States forces eight days later.

Of the American prisoners remaining in the Philippine Islands, a group of approximately 350 was transferred at the end of July 1942, from Cabanatuan Camp 3 to Puerto Princesa, Palawan Island, where it was put to work constructing a Japanese airfield. The treatment of the POWs here was as brutal as that received by the men on the Death March. One of the three Japanese interpreters at Puerto Princesa was a small man who constantly carried brass knuckles and delighted in punching the prisoners in the mouth with them.¹⁰⁸

Another instance of Japanese cruelty to prisoners occurred when two Marines were caught eating a papaya they had picked in violation of a camp order. A Japanese cook saw them eating the

fruit and decided to punish them himself. He broke the left arm of each man with an iron bar and then beat them about the buttocks with it. At another time, upon being told by a prisoner that the food was no good, this same cook threw a dipper-full of boiling tea on the man's feet. Although the prisoner jumped away, the liquid reached his ankles. Suffering third-degree burns and lacking adequate medical attention, his foot, as a result, healed slowly and became heavily scarred.

In January 1944, the Puerto Princesa prisoners received some Red Cross supplies, but the Japanese took out and kept all drugs and medicines, leaving only adhesive tape, gauze, and sulfa powder. It was presumed that this last item was left in the boxes because enemy medical personnel were ignorant of either its presence or use.

During one of the Allied air raids on the Palawan field, one POW had a large gash opened in his head by a flying rock which hit him. His side became paralyzed, his eyes crossed, and he appeared to have suffered a bad concussion. All that the Japanese offered in the way of medical aid was a supply of cotton. One of the doctors amongst the prisoners made some instruments for operating on the injured man to ease his suffering. Despite these ministrations, the man did not improve and remained a stretcher case, helpless and incoherent. Later, Japanese guards shot him while he was still on the stretcher.

As bad as conditions were at Puerto Princesa, they became increasingly worse after the American air raids, beginning in October 1944, seemed to indicate that friendly forces were un-

¹⁰⁸ Sworn statement of Sgt Douglas W. Bogue and PFC Glen W. McDole, signed and dtd 17Feb45.

doubtedly going to return to the Philippines soon. During the previous month, all Japanese guards at the camp were replaced by veteran combat troops, the POW food ration was cut, and 159 of the surviving Americans were returned to Manila. Once Allied bombings began in earnest, camp authorities took out their frustrations on the Americans by beating and starving them. In some cases, but not until after a few of the POWs were wounded in the first air raids, they were allowed to build shelters for themselves.

In anticipation of early liberation, the Americans at Puerto Princesa attempted to maintain a high degree of morale and to take whatever maltreatment came their way as best they could.¹⁰⁹ The climax of the whole situation on Palawan came on 14 December 1944, when Japanese seaplanes operating from Puerto Princesa sighted an American invasion convoy in the Sulu Sea headed for Mindoro. Upon receiving this sighting report and believing that Puerto Princesa was the target for the landing, the Japanese camp commander prepared to carry out his orders to kill the prisoners remaining in his custody.

At approximately 1400 on the 14th, all of the POW working parties were returned to the prison compound and forced to remain in the immediate vicinity of their air raid shelters. These shelters were nothing more than trenches, each about five feet deep, and long enough to hold about 50 men.

There was a roof of some type overhead and a small entrance at each end of the shelter. Some men had constructed individual shelters of a similar type close to the barbed wire fence enclosing the compound and near the edge of a cliff which dropped to a beach some 60 feet below.

After the prisoners had been sitting near their shelters for approximately 30 minutes, two American P-38 aircraft appeared overhead, whereupon the Japanese guards forced the Americans into their shelters. Immediately, some 50 or 60 Japanese soldiers rushed forward carrying light machine guns, rifles, and buckets of gasoline. They surrounded all of the shelters, and into the first one tossed a lighted torch followed by a bucket of gasoline; they repeated this in the other two. As soon as the burning and screaming prisoners ran out of the shelters, they were mowed down by the machine guns and rifles. Several wounded Americans, flames shooting from their clothes and bodies, rushed the Japanese and fought them hand to hand.

Prisoners in the shelters near the barbed wire fence without hesitation tore through the wire and scrambled down the cliff to the beach. Some 30 to 40 managed to reach the water's edge and began swimming across Honda Bay, towards the northern section of Palawan. Most of these men were shot by riflemen standing at the edge of the cliff overlooking the beach. Meanwhile, in the camp, the Japanese began throwing dynamite into the shelters to kill those prisoners whom the guards believed were still alive.

¹⁰⁹ CinCPac-CinCPOA Escape and Evasion Rpt No. 23, dtd 15Feb45, interrogations of Sgt Douglas W. Bogue, PFC Glenn W. McDole, and RM1 Fern J. Barta, USN.

One Marine managed to escape and hid in the rocks immediately below the bluff, where he remained all the while the butchery above him was in progress. After dark, and before enemy soldiers began patrolling the beaches, this man and four other survivors of the shooting and burning swam to the opposite shore. Reaching it, the five immediately plunged into the Palawan jungles, through which they wandered for five days and nights without food and water. The escapees finally reached the Iwahig Penal Colony, where a thriving Filipino underground organization took them in, fed and clothed them, and then evacuated them to a point where an American submarine could pick them up.

Approximately 140 men died in the Puerto Princesa Massacre. Those who escaped learned later that, after all of the remaining POWs had been killed, the Japanese authorities had let it be known to Filipinos in the area of the camp that the Americans had all been killed in bombing raids by American planes. To ensure that this story would be the only one told, the Japanese camp authorities executed all of the Filipinos working at Puerto Princesa at the time.¹¹⁰ Altogether, 23 Marines perished in the massacre.

Luckier, it appears, were the Hirohata prisoners, who were destined for a similar end. According to Ercanbrack:

Our Camp Interpreter, Mr. Tahara, was . . . elderly (about 65) . . . educated in the U. S. and professing to be a Christian. For the last 2 years of the war, he was increasingly friendly with me . . . and

often [asked] that if and when Japan lost the war [would I] give him a letter of some kind to prove that he had not, as an individual, been cruel to POWs. He aided us to the best of his ability, often helped us to deceive the . . . authorities to preclude punishment and, in general, tried to help us.

In 1944 . . . Tahara came to me and advised 'I am very sorry—we must all die.' Tahara told me that orders had been issued by Tokyo which would require, the moment the first American set foot on Japanese soil, that all POWs be killed and that the camp authorities then commit suicide.

Shortly afterwards, the Japs began daily drills. A platoon of Japs would arrive at our camp from Himeji barracks (they were required to move on the double for the 11 kilometers), hastily set up their machine guns to completely encircle the camp and execute other maneuvers clearly indicating a plan they wished to execute without mistake. Their arrival, their maneuver, their critique, and their departure took place two or three times each week. The . . . authorities made mention that the soldiers were being trained to protect us from irate civilians who might wish to harm us if U. S. troops started to invade. On one occasion, I made a point blank statement to the [Japanese second in command], Sgt. Fukada, that it was regrettable that we should have to die after so long a term in prison camp—he agreed and stated he would have liked to have lived after the war was over, perhaps the country would some day be a good country again.

I believed that orders directing massacre of the prisoners had been issued and am still of that opinion.

I confided in only my senior Staff NCOs and drew up 'Plan A' for escape. The plan contemplated cutting the wires to Himeji (their phone line was buried and connected with Himeji barracks as a 'hot line'—Tahara had pointed out where the line could be cut), heading for the hills in squad units (our squads numbered about

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, and sworn statement of Sgt Douglas W. Bogue, dtd 17Feb45.

60 men) and hiding out until we could contact friendly forces. I am quite sure we could have taken over the camp and made a break-out—but am very doubtful that we could have survived for long due to the proximity of Himeji where about 35,000 [Japanese troops] were garrisoned. Tahara obtained some maps of the surrounding country (rather melodramatic at this time—but I had the control map sewn into my shoes by Cpl Ward USMC who was camp cobbler) and, with the NCOs we held 'command post exercises' frequently to perfect our break-out plan. Tahara, of course, was to go with us.¹¹¹

Fortunately, the Japanese plan was never implemented.

Another shocking incident involving Marine POWs as well as prisoners from the other services occurred in late 1944. Early that year, the Japanese high command apparently realized that it would be unable to retain its hold on the Philippines, and it gave orders for the evacuation of Japanese nationals and the remaining POWs in the islands to Japan. Some of these POWs had been brought back to Manila in mid-1944 from the Davao Penal Colony. Early in October 1944, the Japanese authorities began bringing in the prisoners from other outlying areas, collecting them all at Bilibid Prison.

A majority of the men were in fair physical condition when they arrived in Manila, but after a 60-day starvation diet, they were all in very poor health for an impending sea voyage. On 13 December, they were formed up into a column of 100-man groups and marched to the Manila docks. Along the way, "People lined the streets to see us pass and many gave us 'V' signs when they

thought the Jap guards weren't watching them."¹¹²

When the prisoners arrived at the docks, they saw that Manila Bay was glutted with the hulks of Japanese ships sunk in American air raids. A total of 1,619 POWs were herded aboard the *Oryoku Maru*, a relatively new passenger vessel of approximately 10,000 tons.¹¹³ Also boarding the ship were 2,000 Japanese sailors whose ships had been sunk, and about 3,000 Japanese women and children. By 1800, all of the prisoners and the rest of the passengers had been crowded into all available space; the POWs, jammed into the holds "at bayonet point."¹¹⁴

After the POWs boarded the ship, Japanese guards attempted to lower food and water to the men in the holds, but owing to the confusion and the crowded conditions, few men got rations that night. The holds were stifling, hot, crowded, and lacking in sanitary facilities, except for a number of two-gallon wooden buckets, which were inaccessible to most of the prisoners. As a result of the cumulative effect of these conditions, several men went berserk that night, and killed a number of their fellow POWs. Other prisoners suffocated. Among this number was Lieutenant Colonel John P. Adams, the former commander of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines. Some of the men became so

¹¹¹ *Ercanbrack ltr 1966*.

¹¹² Personal Diary of LtCol Roy L. Bodine, Jr., DC, USA, p. 7. A copy of this handwritten diary was introduced into evidence in the war crimes trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita in Manila following the war.

¹¹³ "I know the exact figure because the roster was turned over to me." *Beecher ltr*.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*.

crazed by thirst, they even drank their own urine and cut their wrists to drink their own blood. About 15 prisoners failed to survive the first night.¹¹⁵

Colonel Beecher asked Toshino, the guard commander, to evacuate the prisoners that night, but "an attempt to go up a ladder to go . . . on deck resulted in a guard shooting into the hold." Beecher "pointed out to the interpreter who was the go-between to Toshino that we would surely be bombed in the morning."¹¹⁶

Early the next morning, in company with six or seven cargo vessels, a cruiser, and a destroyer, the *Oryoku Maru* steamed out of the harbor and up the coast of Luzon. At approximately 0800, U. S. Navy aircraft spotted the convoy sneaking up the coast, and sank all ships except the cruiser, which high-tailed it back to Manila, and the *Oryoku Maru*. The prisoners in the holds hugged the bulkheads in an attempt to escape the shell fragments and bullets which ricocheted through the open cargo hatch, but a number of the POWs became casualties. The attack continued throughout most of the day. At 2200 the POW-laden vessel limped into Subic Bay. The Japanese then removed the women and children and landed them at Olongapo. Next, the sailors left, swimming the 500–800 yards to the

beach because all of the remaining life rafts and boats had been riddled in the air attacks.

The POWs were not evacuated until the morning of the 15th and at the exact time that Navy planes resumed the attack on the ship. One bomb dropped directly into a hold, killing many of the trapped prisoners. The men who attempted to climb up the ladders to the deck during the attack were shot to death by the Japanese guards. Finally, at 0900, the prisoners received word to evacuate the ship as best they could. This they did, leaving behind all of their meager belongings, including clothes and shoes, on the ship.

Just after the POWs evacuated the ship, "a flight of four planes came in on a bombing run. The leader apparently recognized the fact that we were American prisoners. He wagged his wings and the planes did not drop their bombs. Thus, we were spared many more casualties."¹¹⁷

Many of the POWs drowned while swimming ashore, as the two days and the night aboard the ship had drained them of what slight physical strength they might have had. On the beach, the Japanese guards had set up and fired machine guns to mark the boundaries of the zone in which the prisoners were to come ashore; anyone carried outside of that zone by the tide or current was shot at. Only 1,200 of the original group of 1,619 survived the ill-fated trip. A total of 21 Marines was killed.

Once ashore and rounded up, the POWs were marched to the tennis court of the old Marine base at Olon-

¹¹⁵ Summary of the evidence in the case of *US v Toshino et al* (POW, WWII, Philippines File). Toshino was the commander of the guards charged with escorting the prisoners to Japan. He and another guard were sentenced to be hanged for what later happened to their remaining charges; the rest of his men were sentenced to imprisonment for periods varying from 10 to 25 years.

¹¹⁶ *Beecher ltr.*

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

gapo, and it seemed to many of the Marines in the group who had been stationed here in prewar days that their lives had now gone full circle. The POWs sat in the wire-enclosed court from 15 to 21 December without protection against the elements. For two days they received no food whatsoever, and at no time did the Japanese give them either medical supplies or treatment. Toshino told Colonel Beecher "that there was no rice available." But Beecher noted that although this "was true during the first day but not thereafter, I could not prevail upon him to feed us."¹¹⁸ On the 21st and 22d the men were loaded on trucks and taken to San Fernando, Pampanga, approximately 22 miles away. Half of the group was put in a schoolhouse, and the other half in a theater. Here they were permitted to cook an issue of rice and given an adequate supply of water.

On the 21st, Colonel Beecher and the POW doctors were ordered by the Japanese to pick out 15 men who were in the worst physical condition. These individuals were to be sent back to Manila where they could be treated properly. At 1900 on the 21st, the 15 men—one of whom was Lieutenant Colonel Samuel W. Freeny, Beecher's former executive officer—were put on a truck, driven two miles to a nearby cemetery, and beheaded.

The prisoners were moved once again, this time by train in crowded boxcars, in a 17-hour journey with neither food nor water. This trip was to San Fernando, La Union, a port city on the west coast of Luzon and slightly north of

Lingayen Gulf. Ten men did not survive the journey. The others remained here for two days before they were crammed aboard two ships on 27 December, at which time they began what can only be described as a hell voyage. In the four day period en route to the port of Takao on Formosa, they were furnished an extremely inadequate supply of food and water. The conditions in the holds of the two ships, the *Brazil Maru* and the *Enoura Maru*, both indescribably filthy, were such that the POWs were reduced to living an animal-like existence in a dank, dark, and fetid atmosphere that beggars the imagination. As the vessels approached Formosa, the weather grew colder, and the suffering of the POWs increased apace.

When the ships arrived at Takao, all of the prisoners were crowded aboard the *Enoura Maru*. If, as the records indicate, there were only 350 POWs on the other ship, and discounting the approximate number of men who may have died prior to and immediately following the second departure from the Philippines, it would appear that the *Enoura Maru* then was loaded with more than 1,300 prisoners. They were crowded into two large holds of the ship, and forced to remain there for the entire 11 days it lay in the port of Takao.

Over 400 prisoners were killed on their ninth day in the Formosan harbor when American aircraft bombed the area and hit the unmarked ship. Colonel Beecher asked that doctors and medical supplies to aid the wounded be sent aboard. For two days the Japanese authorities left the POWs in the after hold—which was the worst hit—with no attention whatsoever. Eventually, the dead were taken

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

out in cargo nets, and a doctor boarded the ship, "but did not even go into the after hold."¹¹⁹ In addition to those killed, many others were wounded. A number of men succumbed en route to the port of Moji, on the island of Kyushu, when the trip to Japan resumed. After the bombing raid, the healthy, the sick, the wounded, and the dying were again transferred to the *Brazil Maru* for the voyage north. To evade Allied planes and submarines, the ship headed for the China coast, following it until nearing Shanghai. The civilian master of the vessel wanted to put in there to obtain food and clothes for the POWs, but he was overruled by the Japanese guard commander. Approximately 30 to 40 prisoners died daily from the cold, starvation, and lack of water during this part of the voyage. The other POWs stripped the corpses of their clothes before the bodies were hoisted from the holds and thrown overboard without even the pretence of a burial service.

Moji harbor was reached on 29 January 1945; only 470 prisoners had survived the trip, and within 30 days after their arrival in Japan, nearly 300 more died in the various camps and hospitals to which they had been sent. Between 25 and 29 April 1945, the hapless remnants of the original group of 1,619 prisoners were sent to prison camps in Korea, where they were liberated at the end of the war.

Japanese ships carrying American POWs were sent from the Philippines in increasing numbers in the last half of 1944, and like the ships mentioned above, these too were attacked by Ameri-

can aircraft and submarines with a resultingly high loss of life amongst the prisoners. Existing records indicate that 184 survivors of the 4th Marines died under these circumstances. Attacking pilots had no way of knowing what cargo the Japanese ships were carrying. On the other hand, submariners very often attempted to pick up survivors of ships they sank. It is not difficult to imagine the horror and the heartbreak of the subs' crews when they discovered that the men they had rescued were emaciated and dying American POWs.

The American invasion occurred before the Japanese were able to evacuate all of the prisoners they held in the Philippines. General MacArthur, extremely anxious about the fate of the American civilians and military personnel imprisoned in jails and camps in Manila and elsewhere in the islands, directed his commanders to bend every effort to liberate these people. As a result of this order, Army units mounted special operations keyed to retrieve the prisoners from the enemy. On 3 February 1945, troopers of the 1st Cavalry Division crashed through the gate of Santo Tomas prison in Manila, where some 3,700 Americans had been interned. Later that evening, another 3,767 prisoners were freed from Bilibid Prison. Marines were among the POWs liberated in both groups; in addition, some of the men recovered at Cabanatuan were also survivors of the 4th Marines. The remainder of the surviving members of the regiment as well as other Marines who had been captured elsewhere were still suffering and starving in prison camps in Japan, China, Korea, Formosa, and other isolated areas in

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

Southeast Asia, and waiting for their day of liberation.

RECOVERY

Through the various diplomatic channels discussed earlier and based on the reports of men who had escaped from prison camp, the Allied powers had amassed a fairly accurate, if not altogether complete, picture of where and under what conditions their nationals were being held captive. The anxiety of American officials and their determination to liberate the POWs as soon as possible was heightened by their knowledge. Accordingly, they prepared contingency plans for the recovery of Allied military personnel, who were dubbed Recovered Allied Military Personnel (RAMPs) in these plans.

Meanwhile, as the intensity of American air raids over the Home Islands stepped up in 1945, and carrier planes and bombers zoomed over the prison camps in increasing numbers, the morale of the POWs rose accordingly. Now and then in little ways, the Japanese guards indicated to the prisoners that they knew Japan had lost the war and that the end was not too far in the future. The appearance of Allied aircraft over Japan did not always work to the favor of the prisoners, for in some cases when areas near the camps were bombed, the guards took out their resentment and frustration by beating their captives. In a few cases, POW camps, which never were marked as such by the Japanese, were bombed by American planes.

On one of these attacks, in April 1945, Osaka was raided by B-29s the

day after the death of President Roosevelt. The primary target in this raid was the dock area, where the Guam prisoners worked daily. When the bombs began falling, the Marines were herded into a brick and wood warehouse at the edge of the harbor, and once they were in this building, the steel doors were slammed shut and barred from the outside. Soon some incendiary bombs landed on the roof of the fire trap and set the building ablaze. Climbing up a wall of human bodies to reach a small ledge at the base of the rafters, one Marine managed to break a window and drop the 20 feet to the street outside. He then grabbed an iron bar that was close by, and pried the warehouse door open. At the end of an hour, when the raid was over, the POWs marched back to Osaka Prisoner of War Camp 1, and all that they found of their former barracks was the cinder foundation.¹²⁰

Two hundred of the prisoners from this camp were moved approximately 50-60 miles northwest of Osaka to Notogawa, a small village on the western banks of Biwa-ko, the largest lake in Japan. Other men from the Osaka camp were moved elsewhere to makeshift camps away from the city. The work at Notogawa was hard and did not provide the kinds of opportunities for looting and easing the lot of the POWs as their jobs in unloading cargo ships in Osaka harbor had.

The only bright spot in the monotonous and tiring days at Notogawa was the large formations of B-29s and carrier planes which, with increasing frequency, appeared overhead. Despite the

¹²⁰ Boyle, *Yanks Don't Cry*, pp. 196-199.

threat of frenzied beatings and deadlier punishment, the POWs cheered on the American planes as though they were at a football game and the aircraft were the players on the field.

Following the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Allied prisoners became aware of the fact that something spectacular had taken place. One day a Japanese noncommissioned officer tried to question Major Boyington about the bomb. It was beyond the ability of the Japanese to explain what had happened and beyond the comprehension of the American to accept that just one bomb could have caused all of the damage and deaths about which he was told.

For most of the prisoners in Japanese camps, the end came suddenly and without warning. One day they were under close guard and subjected to all forms of harassment, and the next, all was quiet, and they were given food and medicine, which up to that time had been withheld from them.

A Guam Marine remembered:

The August sunlight slowly brightened the room and one by one the men awoke, grumbling to themselves as they went outside to the wash rack. The mess cooks came back, lugging the buckets, and ladled out the rice and soup. We ate in silence. It was unusually quiet; it seemed as if the last spark of our energy had been burned out during the excitement of seeing our Navy planes so close to us.

We finished eating and waited for the work whistle to blow. A half hour passed and still we waited. Slowly, the time crept by, and the odd silence gripped the barracks, a silence so heavy I felt I could reach out and grab a handful of it. Still no whistle, no shouting guards.¹²¹

¹²¹ Boyle, *Yanks Don't Cry*, p. 213.

Finally, one of the men in the barracks got up from the table, opened the door, and went out to see what had happened. The rest of the prisoners followed him, and saw the POWs in the other barracks looking out of their windows. Those who had gone out discovered that:

The big, heavy inner gate that separated us from the guard shack and the outside gate was locked, but the soldiers who usually manned the sentry boxes overlooking the inner compound were not at their posts.

Then, slowly, it dawned on us. The war was over. Somehow, somewhere, it must have ended.¹²²

The men at the Hirohata camp were told on 15 August that because there was a lack of raw materials at the mill in which they had been working, they were not required to report there. Informally, the pro-American interpreter said that the war was over. On the 27th, the POWs painted the letters "P. W." on all of the roofs of the camp buildings,¹²³ and later that same day four carrier planes flew over with a supply drop. Three days later, B-29s dropped food and clothing to the men. Sergeant Ercanbrack, the senior man at Hirohata, arranged for a flag-raising ceremony on 2 September, and using parachute silk and the red lining from the barracks black-out curtains, devised American and British flags. The Japanese colors were struck that day, the National

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 214.

¹²³ When the Japanese received instructions to paint these letters on the roofs, the men at Hirohata had a problem, ". . . there was no yellow paint. . . . Marine/Japanese ingenuity solved that—we used white paint and tinted it with every can of curry powder on hand. Did not look bad, either." *Ercanbrack ltr 1966*.

Colors and the Union Jack were raised, and the camp superintendent surrendered his command.¹²⁴

In northern Hokkaido, where Major Devereux and other Woosung prisoners had been taken to join some Australian officers captured at Rabaul, it was not known that an atomic bomb had been dropped. Also at this camp were some British soldiers, one of whom cryptically told Devereux that "We're having a bowl of caviar tonight," and another officer was told, "Sir, Joe is in."¹²⁵ In this manner, it was learned that Russia had entered the war against Japan. Following this news, the guards began treating the prisoners with kid gloves. On 14 August, all of the Japanese in the camp gathered at the main office to listen to a radio broadcast, which appeared to have been an official announcement of some kind. When it was over, all of the Japanese appeared stunned; they had just heard that their country had sued for peace. None of the prisoners were told, but they were informed that there would be no need for working parties the following day. All rations were increased and little by little the restrictions were relaxed.

Even before the surrender ceremony on the USS *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay, the Allied forces began implementing the plans they had prepared for the liberation of the POWs. The Allies were faced with the difficult task of supplying the prisoners in widely scattered camps with food, clothing, and medical supplies until the men could be evacuated. Although

evacuation proceedings were not to begin until after the surrender document had been signed, Admiral Halsey ordered the commander of Task Group 30.6, the organization assigned the mission of liberating, evacuating, and giving medical assistance to POWs in the Third Fleet area of responsibility, to begin emergency evacuation of prisoners in the area of Tokyo Bay.¹²⁶

In the period between the inception of this task group on 15 August and the beginning of actual evacuation operations on the 29th, Commodore Rodger W. Simpson, Commander, Task Group 30.6, had organized and trained special medical and communications units and small landing forces. Prior to this time, in preparing his plans, Commodore Simpson had made extensive use of the detailed information of POW camps acquired from carrier plane visual and photographic reconnaissance and material derived from other intelligence sources.

The plan developed for evacuation activities had two phases. One, "Operation Spring-Em," was to cover the evacuation of prisoners in and around the Tokyo Bay Region. Included in each of the forces to be employed in this phase was a company of Marines which was set to act as the security element. This unit was to spearhead the landing and to act as military police to ensure the orderly and unopposed activities of the evacuation party. The second phase of the operation plan, called "Jail Break," provided for the evacuation of POWs in areas east of the 135th meridian, and those parts of Japan not easily acces-

¹²⁴ *Ercanbrack ltr II*. There were also Commonwealth prisoners at Hirohata.

¹²⁵ Devereux, *Wake Island*, p. 237.

¹²⁶ See pt IV, chap 1, p. 484, above.

sible from the initial areas of occupation.

On the 29th, the task group proceeded up Tokyo Bay and anchored off Omori. The task group commander with medical and evacuation parties loaded in LCVPs, and with the assistance of an air spotter overhead in a TBM from the carrier USS *Cowpens*, headed towards the beach and Omori Camp 8. As the evacuation team neared the shore:

The appearance of the landing craft in the channel off the prisoner of war camp caused an indescribable scene of jubilation and emotion on the part of hundreds of prisoners of war who streamed out of the camp and climbed up over the piling. Some began to swim out to meet the landing craft. After some difficulty in being heard, the prisoners of war were assured that more boats would be coming and that they should stand steady for an orderly evacuation, and that the liberation party wanted to go immediately to those who were ill and extend medical assistance and evacuate them first.¹²⁷

Commodore Simpson learned from the senior POW officer that there were many seriously ill prisoners at the Shinagawa hospital camp. The party that went to this place later reported that "it was an indescribable hell hole of filth, disease, and death."¹²⁸

By the early morning of 30 August, all of the men at Shinagawa together

¹²⁷ CTG 30.6 AR, dtd 22Sep45, Subj: Covering Evacuation of POW during period 29Aug-19Sep45 (OAB, NHD).

¹²⁸ *CinCPac Surrender and Occupation Rpt*, p. 20. It is interesting to note that two members of the Swiss Legation in Tokyo visited the camp on 19 February 1945 and gave it a fairly favorable report. MID, WD, Extracts of POW Camp Information Rpt No. A-P 85, dtd 17May45, in USAF Japanese Prison Camps 1943-45 File No. 142.7511 (ASI (HA), Maxwell AFB, Ala.).

with the entire prison population at Omori had been evacuated. Each POW was taken on board the hospital ship USS *Benevolence* and put through a clearing and examination process. This procedure, which most of the prisoners liberated from Japan experienced before their trip home, involved a bath, medical examination, and an issue of clean clothes. They were then fed and afterwards filled out a mimeographed form which requested information about camp conditions and instances of brutality. Following this, the RAMPs were assigned to a bed in the hospital ship, or, if ambulatory, transferred to billets on an APD alongside of the AH. During the night of the 30th, the CTG 30.6 staff evaluated the mass of information it had received from the RAMPs about the location of other POW camps. As a result of this intelligence, the evacuation unit was divided into two separate groups in order to expand overall operations.

A conference was held at the Yokohama headquarters of the commander of the Eighth Army on 1 September, when Admiral Halsey agreed to coordinate Third Fleet evacuation operations with those of the Eighth Army Recovered Personnel Officer. Once this joint program had begun, and both ships and personnel were assigned to various areas coming under the cognizance of the two major commands, all means of transportation—both Japanese and American—were to be employed to evacuate the POWs.

Without the outstanding assistance of members of the Swedish Legation, the Swiss Legation, and the International Red Cross, in arranging train schedules

and in furnishing information on the location of POW camps, the composition of the occupants, and their general condition, the success of this joint venture would have been less than it was. The United States assumed the responsibility for the evacuation of all liberated prisoners and civilians from Japan to either Manila or Guam, and from Guam to the States, using both surface and air transportation. Commonwealth POWs, with the exception of Canadian servicemen, were to be transported from Manila to their destination in British vessels. Canadian ships carried their own nationals home.

At the same time that Allied prisoners were being liberated in the Tokyo-Yokohama area, steps were being taken to evacuate the men from camps located in Manchuria, Korea, North and Central China, Formosa, and the outlying sections of the Home Islands. The authorities responsible for taking steps to recover these other POWs estimated that it would take 30 days to get them all, and further recognized that to save many of the critically ill, prompt and adequate supply of these camps by air drops was essential. The air supply task was shared by Marianas-based B-29s and FEAF aircraft located on Okinawa. After the program had begun, the Twentieth Air Force became responsible for its functioning.

In planning these activities, the most difficult problem that arose was determining the exact locations of the camps to be supplied. Although some lists had been compiled, there was little assurance of their accuracy. At first and until 27 August, the only basis on which the Twentieth Air Force could prepare its

plans was a document entitled the "Black List," which had been issued by the Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, and a similar CinCPac-CinCPOA publication. Not only were these lists incomplete, they were inaccurate as well because, during the wholesale bombing of Japanese coastal areas in the last months of the war, the POWs had been removed from many of the camps listed.

One of the surrender conditions imposed upon the Japanese was the requirement that it furnish General MacArthur a complete list of the names, locations, and populations of all POW camps in existence under Japanese control, and that all such camps be clearly marked. On 27 August, the first such list, the "Yellow List," was made available and it contained a total of 73 camps. Before the supply drops could take place, however, the camp locations had to be verified. Two days later, the 314th Bombardment Wing on Guam began the first of a series of reconnaissance flights, which took its planes over the islands of Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu. Planes of the same wing flew over Hainan, Peiping, Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Mukden on 31 August. These flights verified the existence and location of 57 additional camps.

From 27 August to 20 September, AAF aircraft flew 900 effective sorties over 158 POW and civilian internment camps, dropping supplies. After the first three days of operations, the planned altitude of 500 to 1,000 feet for dropping the supplies was found to be too low for efficient operation of the cargo parachutes. As a result, the air crews were directed to release the paradrops at alti-



SHADOW of a B-29 on a supply-drop mission passes over the POW camp at Nagasaki. (USAF 58504)



AMERICAN AND BRITISH POWs (r.) raise their nations' colors over the camp at Hirohata. (Photograph courtesy of CWO Earl B. Ercanbrack)

tudes above 1,000 feet in order that the chutes could function more effectively, avoid casualties among the prisoner personnel, and prevent the destruction of the bundles of supplies.¹²⁹

Various other factors reduced the effectiveness of the B-29 supply drops to the POWs. The B-29 crews had no previous experience in this work and there was no time for them to test supply drop techniques before the missions began. Because there was such a short supply of cargo parachutes, they were used only for dropping food and medicine containers; the other bundles were dropped free.

The B-29s had accurately located the warehouse in Osaka where the POWs from Guam and elsewhere had been imprisoned. The men soon had plenty of food and medicine and wore the new clothes included in the supply drops. These prisoners found the food drops exciting and it seemed to them that the plane crews in each of the aircraft were trying to outdo the others in seeing how close to the ground they could come. One group of POWs saw "a big Superfortress dip in for an air drop and watched it level off not over 50 feet from the ground, dipping even lower as it roared straight for the building we were standing on." And then to their amazement, the B-29 approached "with breathtaking speed, then, at the last second, it lurched upward, swooping to within ten feet of the roof's edge, and the thundering noise almost shook the warehouse apart" as the men fell flat.¹³⁰

¹²⁹ Twentieth AF TacMissionRpt, Subj: POW Supply Missions, 27Aug-20Sep45, n.d. (ASI(HA), Maxwell AFB, Ala.).

¹³⁰ Boyle, *Yanks Don't Cry*, p. 232.

Some of the air drops also brought death as the heavily loaded pallets hurtled from the sky. The parachutes were not always big enough to hold the heavy loads, and as they collapsed, the food pallets and steel drums rained down and exploded like bombs when they hit the ground. Major Boyington remembered heading for the nearest air raid shelter when the drops began. In his camp, three or four prisoners were hit and killed by the parcels dropping from the sky. Many of the loads went right through ramshackle roofs of the POW barracks.

One such instance was recalled by Sergeant Major Robert R. Winslow, a Wake Marine, who was in a camp at Naoetsu—on the northwest coast of Kyushu—on V-J Day. Upon receiving news of the end of the war, Winslow reported:

. . . we took over the camp, set up an MP force, and actually ran liberty details into town. Some of our hale and hearty survivors spent some time futilely searching the vicinity for our former guards and Camp Commander, who had mysteriously disappeared. . . . After about two weeks we commandeered a train and traveled to Tokyo where we were met by the occupation forces.¹³¹

At the Hokkaido camp:

A day or two after the Japanese surrendered, the officers were informed. Immediate steps were taken to send officers to the other camps, locate Marines and see that discipline was maintained. Radios were provided and food brought in. An announcement was made over the radio directing POWs to identify POW camps in such a manner as to be seen from the air and to remain there until U. S. teams arrived to evacuate the ex-POWs. About

¹³¹ Winslow ltr.

three weeks after the surrender a team arrived in the area, a trainload of ex-prisoners was transported to Chitose and flown out (to Atsugi).¹³²

At the same time that these activities were under way and after the surrender instrument had been signed, a Fifth Fleet delegation conferred with SCAP authorities regarding the evacuation of RAMPs from southern Japan. The plan agreed upon called for the Eighth Army to extend its evacuation operations west and to evacuate POWs through Osaka to Tokyo until relieved by Fifth Fleet and Sixth Army units. Similar to the joint program established by the Third Fleet and the Eighth Army, the other two major commands organized two evacuation groups comprised of landing craft, truck companies, hospital ships, Army contact teams, and Navy medical units. The ports of Wakayama and Nagasaki were to be employed as evacuation centers for all of western Japan. Though the responsibility of delivering RAMPs to these two ports belonged to the Army, the mission of medical examinations and processing became a Fifth Fleet function.

Repatriation began at Nagasaki on 11 September. A medical examination and processing station was set up in a large dockside warehouse, and the hospital ship *Haven* was tied up at the dock to serve as a screening hospital. It also provided the processing station with steam, hot water, general utilities, and food.

A total of 9,061 RAMPs was evacuated from Nagasaki; of this number 685 were stretcher cases or patients so

weak they required hospitalization. The remainder were ambulatory troop passengers, who, after arriving at Okinawa, were flown to Manila in C-46s for further transfer to the United States. By 22 September, the evacuation of POWs from Nagasaki was completed.

Operations at Wakayama began on 14 September. Because of the excellent port facilities in this city and the fact that it was a rail center, all RAMP processing was completed here by the next day. A total of 2,575 men was handled this quickly. Only a handful of the prisoners were civilians; the rest were military personnel from camps in the Hiroshima area. These POWs had been captured on Guam, Wake, Corregidor and Bataan. There were also Australians taken in Java, Dutch from Sumatra, and British from Singapore and Hong Kong.

At all the stopping-off places of the homeward-bound RAMPs, everything possible was done for the comfort and well-being of the returning former POWs. On Okinawa, the 2d MAW commander recalled:

General 'Vinegar Joe' Stilwell . . . took a personal interest in them and made many inspections to ensure that their every want was taken care of.

For example, I had a request from him one day to send planes of different types over their barracks to perform maneuvers, etc., for such an exhibition had been requested by the POWs. Shortly after I had complied with the request, he called me and asked me to tell my pilots not to do quite such a good job, for one had just hit the flagpole. Luckily, no one was killed, and the plane was damaged but slightly!¹³³

¹³³ LtGen Louis E. Woods ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 19Oct66, hereafter *Woods ltr II 1966*.

¹³² *Tharin ltr*.

It is difficult in the extreme to describe or to plumb the depths of the emotions and the attitudes of the former POWs at the moment of and following their liberation. Considerable literature concerning prisoners of war and prison camps has been published since the end of World War II. Despite the close attention to detail in the almost day-to-day accounts appearing in these works, they could not provide the essential spirit or the feelings of the men when they had learned that the war was over and that they were to go home, because most were published long after the actual date of liberation. For the most part, news of the end of the war was anticlimactic and to many of the prisoners, it seemed that they were emerging from a bad dream that had lasted much too long. Others, concerned about their homes and families, could hardly wait to send messages to their loved ones, stating that they were safe and well. For still other former prisoners, liberation was a moment of triumph, a time for which they had waited so long, when they could inflict just retribution on the men who had kept them in such abject captivity.

One former prisoner stated:

It's not pleasant to recall the humiliation, degradation and endless days of monotonous drudgery, and looking back on it now the whole experience has an unreal aspect as though it may have happened to someone else and I read about it somewhere. I suppose it's human nature to suppress unpleasant memories and there are very few bright spots to remember from 44 months in prison camp.¹³⁴

On the other hand, there is considerable evidence to indicate that in some

prison camps the life of the prisoners was not a continuous hell on earth. As the former commander of VMF-211 has written:

True, there were some tough times and rough times and hungry times for all of us. But there were also times, at least in some camps, when a man could laugh heartily at a truly humorous incident or situation. And there were even times—short times, I grant—when a man could almost enjoy life if only he would try. Too . . . broader recognition [should be given] to the really surprising number of Japanese who went far out of their way, and even risked their own safety, to make things a little better for the prisoners.¹³⁵

Yet, there are few indications that the Japanese guards and camp commanders were punished other than as a result of sentences handed down after the war crimes trials. Although the POWs could have resorted to mob violence and killed their brutal captors, they did not. Summed up, the general attitude of the former prisoners was that if they themselves punished the Japanese in a manner similar to their treatment in prison, then they would have descended to their former guards' level of inhumanity. This reaction was enough to deter the most bitter POW from venting his pent-up hatred on the men who had forced him to live under conditions that very often were not fit even for the lowest forms of animal life.

Some prisoners encountered kindly guards, men who would keep them informed of the true course of the war and relate how Japan was being defeated on all fronts. Other Japanese would slip the POWs extra rations or

¹³⁴ Winslow *ltr.*

¹³⁵ Putnam *ltr.*

cigarettes or medicine. These individual acts of charity and mercy shone like rays of hope in a dark sea of despair, and often sustained the lagging morale of prisoner groups.

A question that remains for the most part unresolved to this date is why the Japanese treated prisoners of war as they did in World War II. A partial explanation for the initial treatment of Americans taken in the Philippines may rest in the fact that the Japanese forces were woefully unprepared to handle the unexpectedly large number of men they had captured. This may in some small way answer the question of why there was a Bataan Death March. But what of the treatment meted out to POWs after this period, after the enemy had consolidated his hold on the islands and he could establish some sort of prison camp administration? Why were the prisoners so brutally and miserably handled? There seems to be neither rhyme nor reason for the treatment of POWs in camps in the Home Islands and elsewhere or for the subhuman conditions in which some of them were forced to live.

It was noted earlier in this appendix that all Allied POWs were subject to military regulations normally imposed on Japanese Army recruits. In essence, the regulations were harsh, restrictive, and demanding of immediate obedience. Viewed in this light, the Japanese treatment of POWs is somewhat more comprehensible, for life in the Japanese Army reflected the authoritarian and strict society from which it was derived. The basic philosophy underlying the way of the military was the *Samurai*

code of *Bushido*—the “way of the warrior.”

For centuries this rigid code had affected every aspect of Japanese life and all classes were bound to respect its dictates. Although *Bushido* supposedly governed the conduct and mores of the warrior and aristocratic classes alone, actually this philosophy permeated down to the lowest stratum of Japanese society. It is for this reason, perhaps, that even the lowest-ranking Japanese soldier emulated his superiors in the beliefs that to become a prisoner was the ultimate disgrace, and those who became prisoners should be treated severely.

A vital concept in the warrior's code was that suicide was preferable to capture. The general inability of American forces in the Pacific to take Japanese prisoners indicates to a degree that the average Japanese soldier firmly believed in this code. Furthermore, he was told that it was a criminal act, punishable by death, for him to fall captive. “The disgrace of becoming a prisoner was so great that Japanese troops considered it a duty to kill their own wounded rather than to permit them to be captured.”¹³⁶ This uniquely Japanese attitude became part and parcel of the treatment accorded Allied POWs. If the Americans were not ashamed of having surrendered—a fact which the enemy found difficulty in comprehending—then it was the duty of the Japanese Army to forcibly remind the Americans of their disgrace, their dishonor, and their lowly status.

It is difficult to assess what the effect of prolonged imprisonment was on the

¹³⁶ Stanley L. Falk, *Bataan: The March of Death* (New York: Norton, 1962), p. 231.

Marine prisoners. Some of them were broken in body and spirit at the time of their liberation, and a number of them died shortly after from the results of the treatment they had received. Other men, in much better condition, were either discharged from the Marine Corps or returned to duty in an active status. Perhaps the best indication of the frame of mind of most Marine returnees was found in the reminiscences of Lieutenant General Louis E. Woods, who, in August 1945, was the senior Marine officer on Okinawa, where many of those being evacuated by air stopped for a brief time. General Woods recalled:

Inasmuch as the Army authorities were handling all arrangements, I did not bother them [the former Marine POWs] unless they especially asked to see me. I did have a goodly number of officers and men detailed to be with them and help in any way

possible. The only requests I ever had were for Marine Corps ornaments for all and some small American flags.¹³⁷

Amplifying this, General Woods later wrote:

When I received word that the POWs wanted ornaments, I tried to get them from our source of supply on Okinawa. Imagine my surprise when I was told I could not have 500 of them. When I asked why not, I was told by the Quartermaster that if he gave me 500, he would have none left on his shelves. (You see Quartermasters haven't changed much since 1776). So I went back to my Headquarters and took all the Marine ornaments from the personnel of one of the Aviation Groups.¹³⁸

It was in this spirit that Marine RAMPs returned to the Corps and were welcomed back by other Marines of all ranks.

¹³⁷ LtGen Louis E. Woods ltr to Col William P. McCahill, dtd 29Aug65.

¹³⁸ Woods ltr II 1966.

Bibliographical Notes

This history is based principally upon official Marine Corps records, i.e., the reports, diaries, journals, orders, plans, etc., of the units and commands involved in the operations described. Records of the other Services have been consulted and used when they pertained to the actions with which this book is concerned. On matters pertaining to activities and decisions at high strategic levels, the authors consulted the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or official publications which had made considerable use of JCS records.

To cover the inevitable gaps and inadequacies that occur in the sources consulted, extensive use was made of the knowledge of key participants in the actions herein described. These men, representing all Services, have been generous with their time in making themselves available for interviews, and in commenting critically on draft manuscripts, not only of this volume, but also of preliminary monographs. The historical offices of the Army, Navy, and Air Force have made detailed reviews of draft chapters and furnished much valuable material to the history. The War History Office of the Defense Agency of Japan has read and commented upon the passages dealing with the Okinawa operation and provided worthwhile information that has been incorporated into the narrative.

Because this volume deals with so many disparate, and yet related, subjects, many different sources were consulted in its preparation. Such sources have been fully cited in the text and are discussed here in relation to the particular operation or event for which they have the greatest pertinency. Unless otherwise noted, all records cited are obtainable through the Archives of the Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps.

A number of published works of general interest have been consulted frequently in the writing of this volume. The more important of these are listed below.

Books

Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds. *The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki—The Army Air Forces in World War II*, v. 5. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953. The Air Force official history details the final year of the Pacific War. Well documented, the book is a reliable source for the actions of Air Force commands in the Pacific and the part they played in the defeat of Japan.

FAdm William F. Halsey and LCdr J. Bryan, III. *Admiral Halsey's Story*. New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, Inc., 1947. This popular treatment of one of the most spectacular figures in the Pacific War presents a fascinating and useful picture of the final naval operations of the war in the waters of the western Pacific and surrounding Japan.

Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl. *The U. S. Marines and Amphibious War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951. An essential book and important source for the study of the development of amphibious tactics and techniques and their application in the Pacific during World War II. Additionally, the authors have commented on each major Marine amphibious assault landing of the war and present a number of pertinent conclusions relative to each campaign.

FAdm Ernest H. King and Cdr Walter M. Whitehill. *Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1952. Admiral King's autobiography covers his entire naval career and provides revealing insights into the character of the man and his contributions to American strategy as well as an overview of the conduct of that strategy in the war.

FAdm William D. Leahy. *I Was There*. New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1950. Another autobiography by a high-ranking naval officer who served as the wartime Chief of Staff to Presidents Roose-

velt and Truman. This account is based on the contemporary notes and diaries of the author.

Robert Sherrod. *History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II*. Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952. Although this is an unofficial history, it was written with substantial Marine Corps research support and contains valuable aviation unit historical data unavailable elsewhere. Much of the very readable text is based upon interviews and eyewitness accounts that were not retained for later study.

The War Reports of General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, General of the Army H. H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations. Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1947. A convenient compilation of the official reports of the chiefs of the armed services issued during and just after the war, which provides an excellent overall review of U. S. operations in World War II.

PART I

PROLOGUE TO THE END

Official Documents

The minutes of the CominCh-CinCPac Pacific Conferences of mid-1944 were particularly helpful in developing the course that American strategy and tactics were to take in late-1944 and 1945. Added to these are the records of the JCS and CCS as cited in previously published official histories, which aided in tracing how the decision to invade the Ryukyus was determined. Intelligence surveys by higher headquarters were used extensively to build a picture of enemy troop strength and dispositions, and the nature of the terrain that the Japanese held.

The main sources for the status report on the FMF were the Annual Reports of the Commandant to the Secretary of the Navy and the operational diaries prepared at HQMC by the G-1 and G-3 Sections of the Division of Plans and Policies and by the Division of Aviation. An additionally valuable source were the monthly FMF air and ground status reports also prepared by the G-3 Section. A study

of Marine ground training in World War II, prepared by the Historical Branch, and a history of FMFPac prepared at Pearl Harbor in 1951, present an excellent picture of the posture of the six Marine divisions at the beginning of 1945.

Other valuable official sources utilized in the writing of this part are: "History of United States Army Forces Middle Pacific and Precursor Commands During World War II, 7 December-2 September 1945, History of the G-5 Section," n.d., held by OCMH; "Department of the Army Estimate of Japanese Strength and Disposition of Forces," October 1945, File No. 320.2, Geographic V-Japan, also held by OCMH; and Military Intelligence Division, United States Army, War Department, "Disposition and Movement of Japanese Ground Forces, 1941-1945," 10 December 1945, held by the Operational Archives Branch, Naval History Division.

Japanese Sources

In the years immediately following the end of the war, former Japanese officials working under the auspices of General MacArthur's headquarters prepared a series of monographs detailing Japanese actions in many Pacific and Asian campaigns and at the various headquarters in the Home Islands. In the middle 50s, a number of these original studies were revised and expanded, again by knowledgeable Japanese. The monographs vary considerably in their value, but, on the whole, they are honestly presented and useful in gaining an insight into Japanese actions. The Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, which has a complete file of these studies, has prepared an annotated guide and index, *Guide to Japanese Monographs and Japanese Studies on Manchuria 1945-1960* (Washington, 1961), which is an excellent aid in evaluating the individual items.

Among the several Japanese monographs that were used with this part, No. 45, the 382-page history of the *Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section*, was particularly helpful. It provides an overall view of the progress of the war as seen from Tokyo and contains appendices of Army orders. The operational record of the *Thirty-second Army* and its subordinate commands is embodied in *Okinawa*

Operations Record (No. 135 of the series), which is extremely valuable in developing how that command prepared for the inevitable invasion of Okinawa and how it fought the battle.

Books

The first three volumes of this series, *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal*, *Isolation of Rabaul*, and *Central Pacific Drive*, as well as the draft manuscript of the fourth, "Operations in the Western Pacific," were useful in reviewing how the Marine Corps fared in the first three years of the war and how it developed and employed amphibious warfare doctrine in that period. Among a number of other books concerning emerging American strategy in the last year of the war, the problems facing Japan, and the status of the FMF in the Pacific, the following were of great value.

Lt Robert A. Aurthur and Lt Kenneth Cohlma. *The Third Marine Division*. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948. A compact division history, this book is a good source for unit background.

Robert J. C. Butow. *Japan's Decision to Surrender*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954. A scholarly dissertation to the steps leading from the Cairo Declaration to the Imperial Rescript and to the capitulation of Japan, and an excellent source for the diplomatic history of the Pacific War.

Bevan G. Cass, ed. *History of the Sixth Marine Division*. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948. As the last of the wartime Marine divisions to be formed, the 6th—and its predecessor unit, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade—were involved in only the Guam and Okinawa campaigns and the occupation of North China. By its very nature, the Ryukyus operation receives the fullest coverage in this work.

Ray S. Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division—The War Department—United States Army in World War II*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1951. An official Army history relating the story of high-level war planning in the Operations Division of the War Department. An excellent background study based on the important primary sources in the subject area.

Howard M. Conner. *The Spearhead: The World War II History of the 5th Marine Division*. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1950. Although this unit history is primarily concerned with the Iwo Jima operation, the only campaign of the 5th Division in World War II, it contains some interesting background material, particularly concerning the status of the division at the beginning of 1945.

Richard W. Johnston. *Follow Me! The Story of the Second Division in World War II*. New York: Random House, 1948. This work contains considerable information on the organization of the division and its role as a diversionary force for the Okinawa campaign.

Toshikasu Kase. *Journey to the Missouri*. David N. Rowe, ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950. A first-hand account by a former Japanese official of the factors and considerations influencing Japan's surrender and of the fateful day on which that country signed the instruments of capitulation.

George McMillan. *The Old Breed: A History of the First Marine Division in World War II*. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1949. This unit history, which concerns itself more with the spirit of the 1st Division than with a recital of details of its combat actions, is generally accorded to be one of the finest books of its type written after the war.

Samuel Eliot Morison. *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, v. VIII, XII, and XIII. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1958, 1959, and 1960. These three volumes by Rear Admiral Morison, *New Guinea and the Marianas, Leyte, June 1944–January 1945*, and *The Liberation of the Philippines—Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas: 1944–1945*, comprise a highly readable account of Navy operations in the final stages of World War II. Written with considerable assistance and cooperation from the Navy, the histories are, however, very much the personalized work of the author and are most effective in their description of American naval actions and personalities and of Japanese operations.

Carl W. Proehl, ed. *The Fourth Marine Division in World War II*. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946. Of interest in a review of the status of the 4th Division at the beginning of 1945.

United States Army, War Department. *Handbook on Japanese Military Forces*. TM-E 30-480. Washington, 1 Oct 44. A basic source on the organization and equipment of Japanese land forces with useful detail on weapons characteristics and textbook tactics.

PART II OKINAWA

Official Documents

As the largest amphibious assault of the Pacific War, Okinawa resulted in the participants generating much paperwork which took the form of operation plans and orders, action reports, message files, unit journals, and the like, much of which has been preserved and is held in the archives of the individual Services or has been retired to a Federal Records Center. Because ICEBERG was to be the prologue to the invasion of Japan, all the tactical innovations developed in the Pacific to that time were employed together with whatever new military hardware was made available to Tenth Army units. It was a matter of the highest interest, therefore, that each major unit prepare a detailed evaluation of the way it had fought the campaign, and these evaluations are found in the action reports of the Tenth Army, III Amphibious Corps, and XXIV Corps. Division action reports, and, in the case of the Marines, regimental and battalion special action reports, provide a useful insight into the conduct of the battle on battalion and regimental level.

From the naval point of view, the action reports of the Fifth Fleet and subordinate task force and group commanders are an invaluable source of information concerning naval support of the land campaign as well as some stark facts and figures which in no way tell the whole story of the Navy's desperate and magnificent fight against the *Kamikaze* menace. Additionally, the report of the British Combined Operations observers assigned to the Okinawa campaign provides an interesting insight into how our Allies viewed American conduct of a joint amphibious operation.

Unofficial Documents

While writing the monograph used extensively in preparing this account of the battle for Okinawa, Major Nichols and Mr. Shaw

sent copies of their preliminary draft to various individuals who had major roles in the operations. Many of these men replied and their comments have been cited throughout this part. Similarly, the draft manuscript of this volume was sent to key participants and to the historical agencies of the other Services, and the resultant replies have been used when applicable in revising the narrative. All such comments are retained in the files of the Marine Corps Historical Archives.

With the establishment of the Marine Corps Oral History Program, a new dimension was added to the techniques employed by Marine Corps historians. As a result, some of the first interviews conducted with retired prominent Marines by the author of this part of the book dwelled on matters concerning the Okinawa operation, and pertinent comments were incorporated into the body of the text with the permission of the individual interviewees. Particularly helpful were the comments of Generals Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., and Gerald C. Thomas, Lieutenant General Pedro A. del Valle, and Major Generals Wilburt S. Brown and Ford O. Rogers.

Several other unofficial documents exist. Through the generosity of General Vandegrift, his personal correspondence for the period of his tour as Commandant was made available for Historical Branch use. The letters he received from Lieutenant Generals Holland M. Smith and Roy S. Geiger are invaluable for an overview of the Okinawa operation. Extracts from this correspondence together with copies of some of the letters are available in the Marine Corps Historical Archives for use by qualified researchers.

Another source is a personal narrative prepared immediately after the war by General Oliver P. Smith, who, as a brigadier general, was the Marine Deputy Chief of Staff of the Tenth Army. This document is particularly important because of the insight that General Smith gives to the operations of as large a joint command as the Tenth Army and the role of Marine officers on the joint staff. The resulting 152-page typescript goes far toward giving the reader a feeling of Marine participation in high-level staff operations on what was predominantly an Army command.

A third unpublished document of value in the study of ICEBERG is "A History of the 7th Marines on Okinawa Shima," which was an ambitious project prepared at the behest of Colonel Edward W. Snedeker by his staff officers and battalion commanders. This work has some outstanding sketch maps which meld excellently with accounts of small unit actions in the regiment.

In no way has all of the material uncovered by draft comments or during the course of interviews been used in this book or in the Nichols-Shaw monograph which preceded it. The files contain much unpublished information that is of value to the student of the operation, particularly in regard to details of small unit action and the assessment of the accomplishments and character of individuals.

Japanese Sources

In addition to the previously mentioned Japanese monographs held by the Office of the Chief of Military History, two others were used: No. 86, *History of the Fifth Air Fleet*, which provided some data on the development of the *Kamikaze* as an offensive/defensive weapon, and No. 123, *Homeland Defense Naval Operations*, which related to confused and often thwarted Japanese preparations for the defense of the Home Islands, and Honshu, in particular.

A major Japanese source is: Takushiro Hattori. *Dai Toa Senso Zenshi*, v. IV [The Complete History of the Greater East Asia War]. Tokyo: Matsu Publishing Company, 1955. A manuscript translation of this excellent study is available at the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. The author, a ranking staff officer during the war and an historian afterwards, has written a comprehensive history which contains enough detail to provide a useful strategic review from the Japanese viewpoint of every major campaign of the war.

In terms of pertinent captured documents, by the time that ICEBERG became a reality, the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area, and other Allied intelligence agencies had amassed a mountain of data concerning the enemy. While much of this was not directly concerned with Okinawa, the material contained a wealth of information relating to

Japanese defensive doctrine and more than a hint of how Okinawa would be defended. A considerable volume of documents and prisoners—Okinawans primarily—were captured on the island itself. As noted in the narrative of this part, little fruitful information was gained, however, as a result of POW interrogation and translation of the documents, and the Japanese situation was very often not uncovered until after it had been met head-on by Tenth Army troops.

Books and Periodicals

Once again Craven and Cate, *Matterhorn to Nagasaki*, Isely and Crowl, *Marines and Amphibious War*, and Sherrod, *History of Marine Aviation* and the Hattori manuscript are invaluable sources. Among other works which shed considerable light on the Okinawa campaign are:

Roy E. Appleman, et al. *Okinawa: The Last Battle—The War in the Pacific—U. S. Army in World War II*. Washington: History Division, Department of the Army, 1948. Although generally concerned with the operations of the Tenth Army as a whole in the Okinawa campaign, this official Army history focuses primarily on the actions of XXIV Corps divisions. At the same time, it gives a balanced treatment to the role of III Amphibious Corps units in the fighting.

Maj Orville V. Bergren. "School Solutions on Motobu," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 29, no. 12 (Dec45). Written by the Operations Officer of the 4th Marines, this article gives a concise and clear account of the maneuvers and fighting involved in seizing Motobu Peninsula and Mount Yae Take.

RAdm Worrall R. Carter. *Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953. An official Navy history of the massive logistic support of the fleet in the Pacific campaigns, with some emphasis on the Okinawa operation.

Chief of Naval Operations. *Amphibious Operations—Capture of Okinawa*, 27Mar-21Jun45 (OpNav 34-P-07000). Washington: Government Printing Office, 22Jan46. A compilation of pertinent excerpts of action reports by the major unit commanders at Okinawa concerning American surface, ground, and air operations in the campaign.

Orlando R. Davidson, *et al.* *The Deadeyes: The Story of the 96th Infantry Division*. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947. This history is an interesting account of an Army division which made a fine record for itself both in the Philippines and on Okinawa.

MajGen Pedro A. del Valle. "Old Glory on Shuri," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 29, no. 8 (Aug45). The commander of the 1st Marine Division relates the story of the Marine battle for Shuri and how a member of the division placed the American flag over the ancient castle.

MajGen Pedro A. del Valle. "Southward from Shuri," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 29, no. 10 (Oct45). In this article, the author relates the breakout of his division following the fall of Shuri and the pursuit of the withdrawing Japanese forces.

Saburo Hayashi and Alvin D. Coox, *Kōgun*. Quantico: Marine Corps Association, 1959. Originally published in Japan, this English language account of the Japanese Army High Command's actions during the war in the Pacific was written by a former member of the *Imperial General Headquarters*.

Capt Rikihei Inoguchi and Cdr Tadashi Nakajima, former *IJN*, with Roger Pineau. *The Divine Wind: Japan's Kamikaze Force in World War II*. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1958. The Japanese coauthors of this work were intimately concerned with the formation of the *Kamikaze* corps and the concepts which led to its origin, and therefore shed much light on the operations of the suicide units.

Capt Edmund G. Love. *The 27th Infantry Division in World War II*. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1949. Written by an official Army historian who observed the division in combat, this is a work which narrates the operations of the division on Okinawa as well as on Saipan and in the Gilberts and Marshalls.

Samuel Eliot Morison. *Victory in the Pacific, 1945—History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, v. XIV. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960. This last-but-one volume of the highly readable unofficial account of Navy operations in World War II tells of naval support activities in the Iwo Jima and

Okinawa campaigns as well as naval operations in the last year of the war. An especially interesting account of the Navy's war with the *Kamikazes*.

LtCol Max Myers, ed. *Ours to Hold It High*. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947. The story of the 77th Infantry Division provides a good overall view of the fighting on Okinawa and helpful information on its training and personnel.

Maj Charles S. Nichols, Jr. and Henry I. Shaw, Jr. *Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific*. Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1955. This official monograph, the last of 15 written concerning Marine Corps operations in World War II, covers the fighting in good style and considerable detail, and gives adequate coverage to Navy and Army participation in the Okinawa campaign.

Capt James R. Stockman. "Night Operations on Okinawa," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 30, no. 9 (Sep46). A well-researched article concerning the many night operations conducted during the course of the Okinawa battle by Army as well as Marine Corps units.

Alexander A. Vandegrift and Robert B. Asprey. *Once A Marine*. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1964. The autobiography of the 18th Commandant of the Marine Corps written with the assistance of a former Marine officer. It contains particularly interesting details regarding the discussion of a second amphibious assault on the southeastern beaches of Okinawa.

PART III

THE END OF THE WAR

Official Documents

Although Operation OLYMPIC was never launched, Allied forces were ready. Joint staff studies, plans, orders, and other paperwork had been prepared and published, and the assault forces, in most cases, had already staged and were ready to mount for the invasion. Considerable documentation, therefore, exists to assist the researcher in following the step-by-step, day-to-day preparation for the assault on Kyushu. The researcher is not so successful in determining what the final plans were for Operation CORONET, the invasion

of Honshu. When Japan capitulated, all assault planning became moot.

Because they are so well-documented, Cline's *Washington Command Post* and Craven and Cate's *Matterhorn to Nagasaki* were utilized extensively to determine CCS and JSC activities and decisions. The historical archives of the Service historical agencies maintain in good order all of the pertinent documents published at all levels of the proposed invasion force.

Concerning the advent of Marine carrier aviation, considerably more searching was required to develop the attempts of senior Marine officers to make fuller use of Marine pilots and planes in the war. Because the commissioning of Marine escort carriers was primarily a Navy decision on the highest levels, the minutes of the CominCh-CinCPac Pacific Conferences and the items for the agenda thereof provided considerable information. Additionally, the war diaries of the first escort carriers and carrier squadrons commissioned are also quite important.

Of invaluable assistance in tracing the reduction of the Fleet Marine Force following the Japanese surrender, and then its postwar development, are the Annual Reports of the Commandant to the Secretary of the Navy, the *Administrative History of the United States Marine Corps in the Postwar Period*, and the *Administrative Activities of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific*. In addition, the reports of the Department of the Pacific, Marine Garrison Forces, Pacific, and the various Marine barracks activities in the Pacific provide considerable data regarding the many changes that took place in the composition and missions of Marine forces in the Pacific.

Tracing the activities of Marine organizations involved in accepting the surrender of Japanese Pacific garrisons is simplified to a great degree by the existence of reports submitted by the senior Marine officers of each surrender group. The reports of the naval commands responsible for supervising the surrender are also available.

Perhaps the most important document utilized in writing the story of the surrender of former Japanese holdings in the Pacific is *CinCPac Report of Surrender and Occupation*

of Japan, dated 11 February 1946. This report, held in the Operational Archives Branch of the Naval History Division, is a tremendous source of information in relating how each island garrison was surrendered to American forces, what the condition of Japanese troops and civilians was in each case, and how the former enemy were repatriated home. There is some information about the search for war criminals in this document, but more on this subject is found in *Historic Narrative of Special War Crimes Duties Performed by Personnel of the Marine Barracks, Guam*. For the purposes of this section, the CinCPac report noted above is also a valuable source of information concerning surrender ceremonies at Tokyo Bay and the activities preceding this event—especially those relating to fleet activities.

Similarly, the Marine Corps Historical Archives holds considerable material relating to demobilization and the subsequent postwar development of the Marine Corps. Orders, bulletins, directives, and pertinent memoranda exist to enable researchers to trace the solution of personnel problems facing the Corps in this period.

Unofficial Documents

Again, the files containing General Vandegrift's personal correspondence served as a fruitful source in determining the background of the problems facing the Commandant and his subsequent decisions in this difficult period for the Marine Corps. In addition, comments received on the draft manuscript of this section from senior commanders and staff officers filled in the gaps which exist in the documentation. Of great importance was certain information concerning the Marine carrier program developed in the course of several interviews with General Thomas for the Marine Corps Oral History Program.

Books and Periodicals

Used to great advantage in this section were Aurther and Cohlma, *The Third Marine Division*, Cass, *History of the Sixth Marine Division*, Conner, *The Spearhead*, Johnston, *Follow Me!*, King and Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record*, Leahy, *I Was There*, McMillan, *The Old Breed*, Morison, *Liberation*

of the Philippines, and Proehl, *The Fourth Marine Division in World War II*. In addition, the following books and articles proved fruitful for research.

LtCol Walter L. J. Baylor, *Last Man Off Wake Island*. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1943. An autobiographical account by the Marine officer who was the last man to leave Wake Island before it fell to the Japanese. The author was also the first American to set foot on Wake at the time of the Japanese surrender.

K. Jack Bauer and Alvin D. Coox. "Olympic vs Ketsu-Go," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 49, no. 8 (Aug65). This is the combined effort of Dr. Bauer, who presents the Allied plan for the invasion of Kyushu, and Dr. Coox, who outlines the Japanese defensive plans.

Kenneth W. Condit, Gerald Diamond, and Edwin T. Turnbladh. *Marine Corps Ground Training in World War II*. Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1956. A valuable study of the training of commissioned and enlisted Marines in the prewar and World War II periods. Contains detailed information concerning infantry and specialist training.

LtCol Henry G. Morgan, Jr. "Planning the Defeat of Japan: A Study of Total War Strategy." This unpublished manuscript held in the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, is an important source which depends to a great degree on CCS and JCS documents relating to the subject.

Harry S. Truman. *Year of Decision—Memoirs*, v. I. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955. In this, the first volume of his memoirs, President Truman relates the circumstances under which he first became aware of the American development of the atomic bomb, and the agonizing decisions facing him concerning its employment.

PART IV

OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

Official Documents

A wealth of material concerning the initial period of the occupation of Japan is available in the archives of the various Service historical offices, as well as in the National Archives. General MacArthur's SCAP headquarters quite assiduously prepared and published detailed

accounts covering the period he remained in Japan. Also, the Eighth Army published monographs relating its mission and responsibilities and how they were carried out. Equally important are the reports of the naval commands involved in the occupations of Yokosuka and Tokyo initially, and later of Sasebo and Nagasaki. Pertinent information concerning the conduct of Marine occupation duties is found in *VAC Operation Report, Occupation of Japan*, and the war diaries of the corps covering the period it remained in Japan. The operation reports and war diaries of the 2d and 5th Marine Divisions and their subordinate commands are also valuable sources for this interesting period of the Corps' history. From the historian's point of view, documentary evidence of the last months of Marine occupation duties is not as ample as the material reflecting the first months in Japan, but it is sufficient to permit a full enough view of the period.

Unofficial Documents

Copies of the draft manuscript of this section were sent out for comment to the former commanders and staff officers of the Marine occupation force in Japan. With the advent of the end of the war, it was possible once more for individual Marines to maintain diaries and other personal records. From these documents and subsequent replies commenting on the draft, certain items of information not otherwise appearing in official reports were made available to the author. Because of the very real human interest stories which come out of an operation such as this, the occupation of a defeated nation, a vast mass of newspaper and magazine articles was written. Many such items relating to the Marines in Japan can be found in issues of *Leatherneck* for the period.

Books and Periodicals

Kenneth W. Condit and Edwin T. Turnbladh. *Hold High The Torch: A History of the 4th Marines*. Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1960. An official history of one of the oldest infantry regiments in the Marine Corps, this work is particularly valuable for an accounting of the occupation of Yokosuka as well as other highlights in the

history of the unit.

LtCol Michael S. Currin. "Occupation of Kyushu," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 30, no. 10 (Oct46). This article, written by the former Operations Officer of the 2d Marine Division, relates some of the problems his organization faced while occupying and disarming Japan.

Henry I. Shaw, Jr. *The United States Marines in the Occupation of Japan*, Marine Corps Historical Reference Series No. 24. Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1961. In reality a brief history of the subject, this well-researched booklet served as the foundation on which this part was written.

PART V

NORTH CHINA MARINES

Official Documents

The plans, orders, and war diaries of III Amphibious Corps units provide the basis for the accounting of the movement to and landing of the Marines in North China. The general Chinese situation at that time is developed in the Wedemeyer papers and in dispatch traffic. Once the Marines were established ashore, the G-2 sections of the IIIAC and 1st Marine Division war diaries provide the most interesting reading and give the background on the civil war action. In general, the scope and quality of reports on Marine activity dropped in direct ratio to the reduction of Marine strength. By February 1947, the requirement for submission of war diaries was dropped and the records of Marines in China after that point (and for some months prior to that time) are scant. Extensive research in retired classified correspondence files of Marine Corps Headquarters, in classified records of Commander, Naval Forces, Western Pacific, and in State Department records of evacuation of American civilians from China was necessary to establish a meaningful narrative of the 1947-1949 period.

The researcher on this period of American involvement in North China will find the records of all Services excellent in 1945, and good in the first months of 1946. After that period, the experience will be frustrating, highlighted by an occasional and sometimes unexpected find of pertinent information. Many

records that were submitted were destroyed; in a number of instances, the reports that survive provide a bare minimum of information. One exception to this observation is the multi-volumed report of General Marshall's Executive Headquarters, held by the Office of the Chief of Military History, which provides a detailed picture of the unsuccessful peace mission's activities.

Unofficial Documents

Without the active cooperation of a number of senior officers involved in Marine operations in North China, it would have been impossible to reconstruct a picture of the policy direction to commanders and to develop the rationale behind a number of deployments and decisions. In particular, General Worton's account of his trip to North China in advance of the actual occupation and the several interviews with General Rockey and his letters concerning the whole span of his command were invaluable in filling gaps in the official records. The comments on the draft manuscript by the many participants in the China action, interviews with Generals Shepherd, Rockey, Woods, Peck, and Worton, Admiral Barbey, and others, comprise a unique source file on this period. Several letters from General Rockey to General Vandegrift reporting on the first days of IIIAC involvement provide a useful contemporary picture of the landings and movements once ashore.

Japanese Sources

For a reconstruction of the Japanese situation in China and Manchuria at the end of the war, three of the monographs prepared for the Office of the Chief of Military History, Nos. 129, 154, and 155, which deal with the situation of the *China Expeditionary Army* and the operations against Soviet Russia, are useful. The story of Japanese repatriation is developed mainly from American official records. Highly complimentary letters from Japanese repatriates to Generals Shepherd and Peck, commenting on the attitude and behavior of the Marines supervising repatriation activities, are filed with the interviews of these officers.

Books and Periodicals

While many secondary sources touch on the situation in North China during the 1945-1949 period, there is a surprising lack of comment or recognition of the presence of Marines. Useful in developing the public attitude toward this unusual occupation duty are a number of inserts and speeches in the volumes of *Congressional Record* for the period. The publications of most direct use in this section were:

LtCol Henry Aplington, II. "North China Patrol," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 33, no. 6 (Jun49). An interesting account of the frustrating search for Marines captured near Chinwangtao by the Communists in July 1946.

John King Fairbank. *The United States and China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958, rev. ed. A scholarly, but highly readable history of Sino-American relations.

Herbert Feis. *The China Tangle*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953. A largely successful attempt to present a coherent picture of the involved Chinese situation with emphasis on the last years of the Nationalist hegemony.

LtCol James D. Hittle. "On the Peiping-Mukden Line," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 31, no. 6 (Jun47). A detailed accounting of the activities of 2/7 on rail and bridge guard during the winter of 1945-1946.

Chiang Kai-shek. *Soviet Russia in China*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957. The Generalissimo's own views of the role of the Soviets in the defeat of his forces and their forced retreat from mainland China.

F. F. Liu. *A Military History of Modern China*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956. Very helpful book on the organization, leaders, and actions of both Nationalist and Communist forces.

Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sutherland. *Stilwell's Command Problems—China-Burma-India Theater—United States Army in World War II*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1956. The most pertinent of three Army histories on the China operations, this provides an excellent account of the final months of the war.

Henry I. Shaw, Jr. *The United States Marines in North China, 1945-1949*. Washington:

Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1968 ed. A preliminary study to this part which outlines the Marine participation.

Mao Tse-tung. *Strategic Problems of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War*. Peiping: Foreign Language Press, 1954. A primer for Chinese Communist guerrilla actions which provides insight into the activities of the units in North China.

U. S. Department of State. *United States Relations with China*. Washington, 1949. The China "White Paper," which is replete with contemporary documents, some of which apply to the Marines. A necessary source work, but one which shows the strains of its hasty preparation.

U. S. Senate. Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations. *Hearings on the Military Situation in the Far East, 3 May-17 August 1951*. Washington, 1951. The "MacArthur Hearings" contains many interesting and revealing references to the situation in China prior to the American withdrawal.

Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer. *Wedemeyer Reports!* New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958. A highly personalized and opinionated account of an officer deeply involved in the American actions in China at the highest levels.

PART VI

CONCLUSION

Official Documents

Many primary sources exist to enable the researcher to trace the Marine Corps and Navy development of amphibious warfare doctrine. These documents are to be found, for the most part, in the Marine Corps Historical Archives and the Operational Archives Branch, Naval History Division. The most valuable information on this subject, as well as for studies on the role of Marine Corps Headquarters in World War II and the development of tactical innovations and changes in tactical organization, etc., was developed from the Annual Reports of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Marine Corps orders and bulletins, Fleet Marine Force ground and air status reports, the World War II operational diaries of the Division of Plans and Policies (and of the G-2 and G-3 Sections therein) and the

Division of Aviation. In addition, the following files in the Historical Archives of the Marine Corps were used with great profit: subject, exercise reports, and tables of organization. Personnel statistics were derived from a study of contemporary muster rolls.

Unofficial Documents

Interesting and valuable comments pertaining to the prewar and World War II operations of Headquarters Marine Corps and the Division of Plans and Policies, and the major policy decisions emanating therefrom, were developed in the course of Oral History Program interviews with Generals Thomas, del Valle, and Peck. Other outstanding source material derived from first-hand knowledge is found in the letters of comment on the draft manuscript. Generals del Valle and Peck were again most cooperative, as were Generals Woods, Pfeiffer, and Fellows, among others. Admiral Moore, who was chief of staff to Admiral Spruance, contributed a useful insight into the problem of command relationships in the Pacific during the early part of the war and how it was subsequently solved to a degree. Dr. Elizabeth B. Drewry, Director of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York, was most cooperative in providing copies of the correspondence between President Roosevelt and Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Evans F. Carlson concerning the establishment of the Marine raider program. Not the least important of the documentation utilized in this part are the pertinent letters which exist in the Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File.

Books and Periodicals

To provide the basis for many of the conclusions drawn in this section, the first three volumes of this series and the draft manuscript of the fourth were invaluable because of the considerable research that went into their writing. Also used once again with great profit were Condit, Diamond, and Turnbladh, *Marine Corps Ground Training in World War II*, Isely and Cowl, *Marines and Amphibious War*, King and Whitehill, *King's Naval Record*, Vandegrift and Asprey, *Once A Marine*, and *War Reports*. Additional sources were:

Cpts Bennett F. Avery, Louis H. Roddis,

and Joseph L. Schwartz (MC), USN, eds. *The History of the Medical Department of the United States Navy in World War II*, v. I. Washington: Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Navy Department, 1953. This official Navy History is an extremely valuable source primarily for the statistics that it offers.

Adm William H. P. Blandy. "Command Relationships in Amphibious Warfare," *USNI Proceedings*, v. 77, no. 66 (Jun51). An expert in amphibious warfare, especially in the area of naval gunfire support of the landing force, writes tellingly of the real problems of command relationships which existed in the Pacific and how they were solved.

MajGen Pedro A. del Valle. "Cave Warfare," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 29, no. 7 (Jul45). The then-commander of the 1st Marine Division details the tank-infantry tactics employed by his Marines in reducing Japanese positions in the areas of Dakeshi and Wana Ridges on Okinawa.

Sgt George Doying. "The Buck Rogers Men," *Leatherneck*, v. 23, no. 4 (Apr45). An informative article concerning the men and operations of Marine Corps provisional rocket platoons.

Capt Clifford M. Drury (ChC), USN. *The History of the Chaplain Corps, United States Navy, 1939-1949*, v. II. Washington: Bureau of Naval Personnel, Department of the Navy, 1950. This official Navy history provides a good insight into the way the naval service ministers to the religious needs of sailors and Marines in combat.

VAdm George C. Dyer. "The Amphibians Came to Conquer." MS. n.d. This is a preliminary draft of a partially completed biography of Admiral Richmond K. Turner, which is being prepared by Admiral Dyer under the auspices of the Naval History Division for publication by the Government Printing Office.

Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr. "Shanghai, 1937," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 49, no. 11 (Nov65). The 23d Commandant of the Marine Corps recalls his days as a company grade officer with the 4th Marines in Shanghai and the development of a tactical formation for the controls of riots which possibly served as the forerunner of the World War II fire team.

Col Robert D. Heinl, Jr. "The Gun Gap and How to Close It," *USNI Proceedings*, v. 91,

no. 9 (Sep65) A recognized historian and writer, who served as a naval gunfire officer in World War II, utilizes his knowledge and experiences to make a plea for fuller use of larger gunfire support ships in the Vietnam war.

Maj Robert D. Heintz, Jr. "The U. S. Marine Corps: Author of Modern Amphibious War," *USNI Proceedings*, v. 73, no. 11 (Nov47). A soundly written article tracing the role played by the Marine Corps in the development of amphibious warfare doctrine and techniques.

Maj Carl W. Hoffman. *The Seizure of Tinian*. Washington: Historical Division, HQMC, 1951. An official Marine Corps history which is particularly good in describing the development of tank-infantry tactics.

Lt Lee W. Holmes. "The Birth of the Fire Team," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 36, no. 11 (Nov52). Lieutenant Holmes conducted considerable research in attempting to develop the genesis of the fire team concept adopted by the Marine Corps, and this article goes far in answering many questions.

LtCol Frank O. Hough and Maj John A. Crown. *The Campaign on New Britain*. Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1952. This official Marine Corps monograph concerning the Cape Gloucester operation describes the many changes in tactics and weapons that took place in the 1st Division following the Guadalcanal campaign.

Maj John H. Johnstone. *United States Marine Corps Parachute Units*—Marine Corps Historical Reference Series No. 32. Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1962. In addition to the detailed information about the formation, training, operations, and disbandment of the Paramarines, this useful booklet contains a brief history of the Marine Corps glider program.

Joint Board on Scientific Information Policy, *U. S. Rocket Ordnance, Development and Use in World War II*. Washington, 1946. This little study is valuable for the information it gives on the employment of rockets by Marine Corps aviation in the late stages of the war.

Capt Leonard G. Lawton, "Tank-Infantry Team," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 29, no. 11 (Nov45). A profitable article dealing further

with the development and employment of tank-infantry teams in combat.

Lt Lewis Meyers. "Tactical Use of Flame," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 29, no. 11 (Nov45). A very interesting and fruitful study concerning the research and development of flame as a tactical weapon with emphasis on the Marine Corps role in this area.

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Department of the Navy. *Landing Operations Doctrine, U. S. Navy, 1938 (FTP-167)*. Washington, 1938. The basic document which governed Navy and Marine Corps conduct of amphibious operations in World War II.

Gen Holland M. Smith and Percy Finch. *Coral and Brass*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949. Reliable for the personal opinions and actions of General Smith, and not too accurate concerning details of small unit actions.

LtGen Holland M. Smith. "The Development of Amphibious Tactics in the U. S. Navy," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 30, no. 6 (Jun46) through v. 31, no. 3 (Mar47). General Smith contributed considerably to the developments which he discusses in this authoritative five-part article. The last five parts of this study—which was scheduled to be written in ten parts—were never completed; and General Smith's conclusions unfortunately do not appear in what was published.

Adm Raymond A. Spruance. "The Victory in the Pacific," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, v. XCI, no. 564 (Nov46). An interesting but brief survey of the Pacific War with emphasis on planning and strategy.

Capt James R. Stockman. *The Battle for Tarawa*. Washington: Historical Section. Division of Public Information, HQMC, 1947. One of the early official Marine Corps monographs which is valuable for a study of the development of assault team tactics.

Col Donald M. Weller. "Firepower and the Amphibious Assault," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 36, nos. 3-4 (Mar-Apr52). A recognized Marine Corps naval gunfire expert writes about the employment of this supporting arm in combat.

Col Donald M. Weller. "Salvo—Splash!," *USNI Proceedings*, v. 80, nos 8-9 (Aug-Sep54). A valuable survey of the historical

development of naval gunfire training and operations in World War II with emphasis on Pacific operations.

LtCol Don P. Wyckoff. "Super Soldiers," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 47, no. 11 (Nov63). The thesis of this author is that regular infantry organizations are as well or better equipped to conduct the type of operations for which such special organizations as the Commandos and Marine Raiders and paratroops were established.

APPENDIX A

MARINE POWS

Official Documents

It is completely understandable that the so-called "fog of war" veils from view the condition, location, unit integrity, and well-being of combat organizations and individuals once they have been captured. It is a matter of record that the Services received information concerning hapless American prisoners only long after the fact of their capture. This information was acquired generally from the International Red Cross, as a result of escape reports, or, as most often was the case, at the end of the war when the POWs were recovered and interrogated. To a large extent, the material in this appendix is derived from the following files in the Marine Corps Historical Archives: POW, World War II; POW, World War II, Philippines; POW, World War II (USS *Houston*); Philippines Area Operations; and 4th Marines Unit History. Of great value to the researcher investigating the last days of Corregidor is the report of Lieutenant Colonel William T. Clement, who was the Fleet Marine Officer in the Asiatic Fleet (Miscellaneous Reports File, Philippines Area Operations File). The reports filed by Captain Austin C. Shofner and Lieutenant Jack Hawkins following their escape from the Philippines proved valuable in developing the events that transpired in the fall of Corregidor and their experiences following that time. Similarly, the escape reports of Captains Richard M. Huizenga and James D. McBrayer, Jr. and Lieutenant John F. Kinney were helpful in filling out the story of the Marines captured

at Wake Island and in North China, and their subsequent adventures.

Conditions at the various prison camps are detailed in full in these escape reports and are also found in the sworn statements of Sergeant Douglas W. Bogue and Private First Class Glenn W. McDole, which shed light on the events leading to the Puerto Princesa massacre and its aftermath. All of these escape reports are held in the Marine Corps Historical Archives.

For postwar events, most notably the dropping of supplies to the prisoners and their eventual recovery, fuller documentation exists. The Twentieth Air Force tactical mission report of its POW supply-dropping mission is in the archives of the Aerospace Studies Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Among the Navy documents relating to this period are the *CinCPac Surrender and Occupation Report* noted earlier, and the report of Task Group 30.6 concerning the evacuation of prisoners during the period 29 August-19 September 1945.

Although not used in the preparation of this appendix, certain classified documents were made available to the Historical Branch casting new light on the activities of Marines who were assigned to the OSS in Europe and subsequently captured there.

Unofficial Documents

Without doubt, this appendix could not have been as extensive as it is without the outstanding cooperation and full accounts given by individuals to whom the draft manuscript was sent for comment. In addition to their accounts, photographs and documents hitherto unpublished were provided by Brigadier Generals Curtis T. Beecher and John F. Kinney, Colonels Luther A. Brown and James D. McBrayer, Jr., Chief Warrant Officer Earl B. Ercanbrack, and Mr. Walter W. Taylor, whose assistance is gratefully acknowledged by the author. Unfortunately, not all accounts or documentary and pictorial material could be included in this book, but they are filed appropriately in the Historical Archives of the Marine Corps as testimony to the very real heroism and courage exhibited by all Marines who became prisoners of war.

Books and Periodicals

In researching the fall of Wake Island and the Philippines and the capture of the North China Marines, the first volume of this series was used to good advantage. Condit and Turnbladh, *Hold High the Torch* provided additional material on the 4th Marines on Corregidor and Bataan. Other published sources utilized for this appendix are:

Hanson W. Baldwin, "The Fourth Marines at Corregidor," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 30, nos. 11-12 (Nov-Dec46) and v. 31, nos. 1-2 (Jan-Feb47). A journalistic account based on official documents and interviews concerning the role of the 4th Marines in the defense of the Philippines.

Col Gregory Boyington. *Baa Baa Black Sheep*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1958. An interesting autobiography by a colorful personality who was in addition a Marine Corps ace awarded the Medal of Honor. What he has written about his capture and treatment later at the hands of the enemy is perhaps typical of what was experienced by other Marine pilots.

Martin Boyle. *Yanks Don't Cry*. New York: Bernard Geis and Associates, 1963. Another autobiography by a former prisoner, in this case an enlisted Marine who was captured at Guam.

James P. S. Devereux. *The Story of Wake Island*. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1947. General Devereux relates in this book the particulars of the fall of Wake Island and his later experiences in Japanese prison camps.

M. R. D. Foot. *SOE in France: An Account of the British Special Operations Executive in France, 1940-1944*. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966. The official British account of Allied covert activities in occupied France. The story of Peter J. Ortiz, a Marine officer assigned to the OSS and a member of a joint Anglo-American undercover team, is covered in this work.

Col Jack Hawkins. *Never Say Die*. Philadelphia: Dorrance & Company, Inc., 1961. A personalized autobiography by one of the Marines who escaped from a Japanese prison camp in the Philippines.

Maj Orlan R. Lodge. *The Recapture of Guam*. Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1954. The official Marine Corps monograph concerning the Guam operation with some material on the loss of the island at the beginning of the war.

Lt Clifford P. Morehouse. "Prisoners of the Enemy," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 28, no. 1 (Jan44). A factual article written during the war by the Marine Corps member of the YMCA War Prisoner's Aid Committee. Of interest in that the author provides considerable information on the wartime activities of the Casualty Reporting Division at Headquarters Marine Corps.

Robert R. Smith. *Triumph in the Philippines—The War in the Pacific—United States Army in World War II*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1963. In this official Army history, full treatment is given to the activities of those Americans who remained in the Philippines after they had fallen and participated in guerrilla activities. It was with one of these underground units that Captain Shofner and Lieutenants Hawkins and Dobervich served until evacuated to Australia by submarine.

Fred Stolley. "Return to Mitsushima," *Leatherneck*, v. XLV, no. 3 (Mar62). A former Marine prisoner of war relates his return to the place in Japan where he had been held for most of the war.

U. S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1942*, v. I. Washington: 1960. In this collection of diplomatic documents are a number of interesting and important letters concerning Marine prisoners and North China Marines in particular.

Guide to Abbreviations

AA	Antiaircraft	ArmdAmph	Armored Amphibian
AAA	Antiaircraft Artillery	Arty	Artillery
AAF	Army Air Forces	ASCO	Assault Signal Company
AAFPOA	Army Air Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas	ASI	Aerospace Institute
AAR	After-action report	Asslt	Assault
Acft	Aircraft	Asst	Assistant
ACofS	Assistant Chief of Staff	AT	Antitank
ADC	Assistant Division Commander	AutoRpr	Automotive repair
ADCC	Air Defense Control Center	AvGas	Aviation gas
Addees	Addressees	Avn	Aviation
Adm	Admiral	AW	Automatic Weapons
Admin	Administrative	AWS	Air Warning Squadron
Adv	Advance	B-24	Army four-engine bomber, the Consolidated Liberator
AF	Air Force	B-29	Army four-engine bomber, the Boeing Super-Fortress
AFB	Air Force Base	Bar	Barracks
AFPOA	Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas	BAR	Browning Automatic Rifle
AG	Adjutant General	Btry	Battery
AGC	Amphibious command ship	BB	Battleship
AH	Hospital ship	BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
AirDel	Air Delivery	BCOF	British Commonwealth Occupation Force
AirFMFPac	Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific	BENT	Beginning evening nautical twilight
AKA	Cargo ship, attack	BGen	Brigadier General
Alex	Alexandria	BLT	Battalion Landing Team
ALMAR	All Marine Corps (Bulletin)	Bn	Battalion
ALP	Air Liaison Party	Br	Branch
Ammo	Ammunition	Brig	Brigade
Amphib	Amphibian (-ous)	Bu	Bureau
Amtrac	Amphibian tractor	Bul	Bulletin
Ann	Annual	BuMed	Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
AN/VRC	Army-Navy Vehicle, Radio, Communication	BuPers	Bureau of Naval Personnel
Anx	Annex	Cal	Caliber
AP	Armor-piercing	CAP	Combat Air Patrol
APA	Transport, attack	Capt	Captain
APB	Barracks ship, self-propelled	CAS	Close Air Support
APD	Transport, high speed	CASCU	Commander, Air Support Control Unit
APH	Transport for wounded	CASD	Carrier Air Service Detachment
App	Appendix		
Ar	Army		
AR	Action Report		

CCF	Chinese Communist Forces	Ed	Editor, edited
CCS	Combined Chiefs of Staff	EENT	End of evening nautical twilight
Cdr	Commander	Encl	Enclosure
CG	Commanding General	Engr	Engineer
Chap	Chapter	Evac	Evacuation
ChC	Chaplain Corps	Exec	Executive
CinCAFPac	Commander in Chief, Army Forces in the Pacific	FAdm	Fleet Admiral
CinCPac	Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet	FAirWest	Fleet Air, West Coast
CinCPOA	Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas	FAirWing	Fleet Air Wing
CinCUS	Commander in Chief, United States Fleet	FDC	Fire direction center
Cm	Centimeter	FEAF	Far East Air Forces
CMC	Commandant of the Marine Corps	FEC	Far East Command
CMCS	Commandant, Marine Corps Schools	F4U	Navy - Marine single - engine fighter, the Chance-Vought Corsair
CNA	Chinese Nationalist Army	F6F	Navy - Marine single - engine fighter, the Grumman Hellcat
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations	F6F-5N	Navy - Marine single - engine night fighter, the Grumman Hellcat
CO	Commanding Officer	Fld	Field
Co	Company	FLEX	Fleet Landing Exercise
CofS	Chief of Staff	Flt	Fleet
Col	Colonel	FMF	Fleet Marine Force
Com	Commander (Units)	FOF	Fukuoka Occupation Force
Comd	Command	FRC	Federal Records Center
CominCh	Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet	FSCC	Fire Support Coordination Center
Conf	Conference	FTP	Fleet Training Publication
Const	Construction	G-1	Division (or larger unit) Personnel Office(r)
CP	Command Post	G-2	Division (or larger unit) Intelligence Office(r)
Cpl	Corporal	G-3	Division (or larger unit) Operations and Training Office(r)
CT	Combat Team	G-4	Division (or larger unit) Logistics Office(r)
CV	Aircraft Carrier	GarFor	Garrison Forces
CVE	Escort Carrier	Gd	Guard
CWO	Chief Warrant Officer	Gen	General
D	Diary	GHQ	General Headquarters
DA	Department of the Army	GP	General purpose
DC	Dental Corps	GPO	Government Printing Office
DE	Destroyer Escort	Grd	Ground
DepNavOps	Deputy Chief of Naval Operations	GroPac	Group Pacific
Dir	Director	Gru	Group
Det	Detachment	GSA	General Services Administration
Disp	Dispatch		
Dist	Distribution		
Div	Division		
DOW	Died of Wounds		
Dtd	Dated		
DUKW	Amphibian truck		

Hd	Head	LCVP	Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel
HE	High Explosive	LD	Line of Departure
H&I	Harassing and Interdiction	LFASCU	Landing Force Air Support Control Unit
Hist	History; historical	LMG	Light Machine Gun
HMAS	His Majesty's Australian Ship	Loc	Located
HMS	His Majesty's Ship	LSD	Landing Ship, Dock
Hosp	Hospital	LSM	Landing Ship, Medium
How	Howitzer	LST	Landing Ship, Tank
Hq	Headquarters	LST(H)	Landing Ship, Tank (Hospital)
HQMC	Headquarters Marine Corps	LSV	Landing Ship, Vehicle
HRS	Historical Reference Section	Lt	Lieutenant
H&S	Headquarters and Service	LtCol	Lieutenant Colonel
HVAR	High Velocity Aircraft Rocket	LtGen	Lieutenant General
IG	Inspector General	Ltr	Letter
IGHQ	Imperial General Headquarters	LVT	Landing Vehicle, Tracked
IIB	Independent Infantry Battalion	LVT(A)	Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Armored)
IIIAC	III Amphibious Corps	MAG	Marine Aircraft Group
IJA	Imperial Japanese Army	Maj	Major
IJN	Imperial Japanese Navy	MajGen	Major General
IMAC	I Marine Amphibious Corps	Mar	Marine(s)
IMB	Independent Mixed Brigade	MarFAirWest....	Marine Fleet Air, West Coast
IMR	Independent Mixed Regiment	MarPac	Department of the Pacific, U. S. Marine Corps
Inf	Infantry	MASG	Marine Air Support Group
Intel	Intelligence	MAW	Marine Aircraft Wing
Inter	Interrogation	MB	Marine Barracks
IsCom	Island Command	MBDAG	Marine Base Defense Aircraft Group
JAG	Judge Advocate General	MCAS	Marine Corps Air Station
Jnl	Journal	MCASD	Marine Carrier Air Support Detachment
JANAC	Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee	MCVG	Marine Carrier Aircraft Group
JASCO	Joint Assault Signal Company	MD	Marine Detachment
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff	Med	Medical
JICPOA	Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area	Memo	Memorandum
JLC	Joint Logistic Command	MG	Marine Gunner
JOB	Japanese Order of Battle	MGCIS	Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron
JUSMAG	Joint U. S. Military Advisory Group	MIA	Missing in Action
JWPC	Joint War Plans Committee	MID	Military Intelligence Division
KCRC	Kansas City Records Center	MilGovt	Military Government
KIA	Killed in Action	Min	Minutes
KMA	Kailin Mining Administration	MIS	Military Intelligence Section
Lant	Atlantic	Misc	Miscellaneous
LCdr	Lieutenant Commander	Mm	Millimeter
LCI	Landing Craft, Infantry		
LCS	Landing Craft, Support		

MOTG	Marine Operational Training Group	Per	Personnel
MP	Military Police	PFC	Private First Class
MS	Manuscript	Ph	Phase
Msg	Message	Phib	Amphibious; Amphibious Forces
MT	Motor Transport	PhibsPac	Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet
N.	Note	Pion	Pioneer
NA	National Archives	Plt	Platoon
NABS	Naval Air Bases	POA	Pacific Ocean Areas
NAD	Naval Ammunition Depot	POW	Prisoner of War
NARS	National Archives and Records Service	P&P	Division of Plans and Policies
NAS	Naval Air Station	Prelim	Preliminary
Nav	Navy; Naval	Prov	Provisional
NavWesPac	Naval Forces, Western Pacific	Pt	Part(s); Point
NCB	Naval Construction Battalion	PubInfo	Public Information
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer	Pvt	Private
N.d.	No date	PW	Prisoner of War
ND	Navy Department	RAdm	Rear Admiral
NGF	Naval gunfire	RAMP	Recovered Allied Military Personnel
NHD	Naval History Division	RCT	Regimental Combat Team
No.	Number	R5D	Navy - Marine four - engine transport, the Douglas Skymaster
NOB	Naval Operating Base	Rec	Reception
O	Officer	Recon	Reconnaissance
OAB	Operational Archives Branch	Reinf	Reinforced
OCMH	Office of the Chief of Military History	Ret	Retired
Ofc	Office	Rev	Revised
OIC	Officer in Charge	RM1.....	Radioman, 1st class
OP	Observation Post	RN	Royal Navy
Op	Operation(s)	Rpt	Report
Oper	Operation(s)	RR	Railroad
OPlan	Operation Plan	SAD	Support Air Direction
OpNav	Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	SAR	Special Action Report
OpOrd	Operation Order	SC	Submarine Chaser
Ord	Ordnance	S&C	Secret and Confidential
OSS	Office of Strategic Services	SCAJAP	Shipping Control Administration, Japan
OY	Navy - Marine single - engine observation plane, the Consolidated-Vultee Sentinel	SCAP	Supreme Commander Allied Powers
P, pp	Page, pages	SCAT	South Pacific Combat Air Transport Command
P-47	Army single-engine fighter, the Republic Thunderbolt	SCR	Signal Corps Radio
PackHow	Pack Howitzer	Sec	Section
PBY-5A	Navy-Marine two-engine patrol bomber with amphibian boat hull, the Consolidated Catalina	SecNav	Secretary of the Navy
		SecState	Secretary of State
		Sep	Separate
		Serv	Service
		Sgt	Sergeant

SgtMaj	Sergeant Major	Trng	Training
Shpg	Shipping	Trps	Troops
Sig	Signal	TS	Top Secret
SMS	Supply and Maintenance Squadron	TU	Task Unit
SNLF	Special Naval Landing Force	UDT	Underwater Demolitions Team
SO	Special Order	UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
SOE	Special Operations Executive	USA	United States Army
SOPA	Senior Officer Present Afloat	USAF	United States Air Force
SoPac	South Pacific	USAFFE	United States Army Forces, Far East
SP	Shore Party	USAFMidPac....	United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific
Spd	Speed	USAFPOA	United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas
Spec	Special	USASTAF	United States Army Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific
Spt	Support	UsForChina-	
Sqd	Squad	Thtr	United States Forces, China Theater
Sqn	Squadron	USMC	United States Marine Corps
Stf	Staff	USN	United States Navy
Subj	Subject	USNB	United States Naval Base
Sum	Summary	USNI	United States Naval Institute
Suppl	Supplement	USNR	United States Naval Reserve
Sup	Support	USS	United States Ship
SWPA	Southwest Pacific Area	USSBS	United States Strategic Bombing Survey
T/A	Table of Allowances	USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Tac	Tactical	V	Volume
TAF	Tactical Air Force	VAC	V Amphibious Corps
TAGO	The Adjutant General's Office	VAdm	Vice Admiral
TBF	Navy - Marine single - engine torpedo bomber, the Grumman Avenger	VLR	Very Long Range
TBM	Navy - Marine single - engine torpedo bomber, the General Motors Avenger	VMB	Marine Bomber Squadron
TCS	Vehicle mounted, high frequency radio	VMD	Marine Photographic Squadron
T/E	Table of Equipment	VMF	Marine Fighter Squadron
TF	Task Force	VMF(CVS)	Marine Carrier Fighter Squadron
TG	Task Group	VMF(N)	Marine Night Fighter Squadron
T.H.	Territory of Hawaii	VMO	Marine Observation Squadron
TIC	Target Information Center	VMR	Marine Transport Squadron
TIO	Target Information Officer	VMSB	Marine Scout Bomber Squadron
Tk	Tank	VMTB	Marine Torpedo Bomber Squadron
TM	Technical Manual		
Tntv	Tentative		
T/O	Table of Organization		
TOT	Time on Target		
TQM	Transport Quartermaster		
Tr	Translator(ed)		
Trans	Transport		
Transdiv	Transport Division		
Transron	Transport Squadron		
Trk	Truck		

VMTB(CVS) ...	Marine Carrier Torpedo Bomber Squadron	WDCOS	Chief of Staff, War Department
WARCOS	Chief of Staff, War Department	WIA	Wounded in Action
WarD	War Diary	WesPac	Western Pacific
WASC	War Area Services Committee	WP	White Phosphorous
WD	War Department	Wpns	Weapons
WDC	Washington Documents Center	WW	World War
		YMCA	Young Mens Christian Association
		Z/A	Zone of Action
		ZofA	Zone of Action

Military Map Symbols

SIZE SYMBOLS

• • •	Platoon/Detachment
I	Company/Battery
II	Battalion/Squadron
III	Regiment/Group
X	Brigade
XX	Division/Wing
XXX	Corps
XXXX	Army

UNIT SYMBOLS

	Basic Unit
	Enemy Unit
	Marine Unit (Serving with units of other services)
	Proposed Unit Location
	Artillery
	Aviation
	Cavalry

UNIT SYMBOLS

	Engineer
	Infantry
	Naval Base Force
	Recon
	Service
	Tank

EXAMPLES

	Tank Platoon, 1st Tank Battalion
	Company A, FMF Reconnaissance Battalion
	Marine Observation Squadron 2
	8th Service Regiment
	23d Shipping Engineer Regiment (Japanese)
	Naval Base Force (Japanese)
	Americal Division
	V Amphibious Corps
	Eighth Army

Chronology

The following listing of events is limited to those coming within the scope of this book, and those events treated in previous volumes applying equally to the matters discussed in this work.

1941

- 8Dec Personnel of American Embassy Guard, Peiping, and of Marine Legation Guard, Tientsin, become first Marine POWs in World War II.
- 10Dec Guam surrenders to Japanese landing force.
- 23Dec Wake Island falls to enemy.

1942

- 6Feb U. S. and Great Britain establish Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS).
- 9Mar Java surrenders to Japanese, ending conquest of Netherlands East Indies.
- 30Mar Pacific Ocean divided into Pacific Ocean Areas under Adm Nimitz and Southwest Pacific Area under Gen MacArthur.
- 9Apr Bataan falls to the Japanese.
- 6May Corregidor and Manila Bay forts surrender.

1943

- 2-6Dec..... At Second SEXTANT Conference in Cairo, Allied leaders agree upon strategic concept for prosecution of Pacific War.

1944

- 1Jan LtGen Alexander A. Vandegrift becomes 18th Commandant of the Marine Corps.

- 2Jan U. S. Army troops land at Saidor, New Guinea.
- 31Jan-7Feb U. S. forces assault and capture Kwajalein and Majuro Atolls in the Marshalls.
- 16-17Feb Task Force 58 strikes Truk, revealing weakness of that base.
- 17-22Feb U. S. forces assault and capture Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshalls.
- 20Feb-28Mar ... U. S. forces assault and capture the main islands of the Admiralties.
- 6Mar 1st Marine Division lands near Talasea on New Britain in the Bismarcks.
- 12Mar JCS issue directives to CinCPOA and CinCSWPA regarding future operations in their respective areas.
- 22Apr U. S. Army troops land at Aitape and Hollandia in northern New Guinea, beginning drive up the coast.
- 6Jun Allied forces invade the continent of Europe at Normandy.
- Joint War Plans Committee issues study establishing 1945 Pacific invasion schedule for planning purposes.
- 15Jun-9Jul U. S. forces assault and capture Saipan in the Marianas.
- 19-20Jun Battle of the Philippine Sea. Japanese naval air arm suffers decisive defeat.
- 18Jul Premier Hideki Tojo resigns.
- 21Jul-10Aug U. S. forces assault and capture Guam in the Marianas.
- 24Jul-1Aug VAC troops assault and capture Tinian in the Marianas.

26-29Jul	Adm Nimitz and Gen MacArthur meet with President Roosevelt at Pearl Harbor to determine future Pacific strategy.	the Japanese capital by land-based planes.
11-16Sep	At OCTAGON Conference in Quebec, CCS establish a new schedule of Pacific operations. Kyushu to be invaded in October and Honshu in December 1945.	25Nov CinCPOA issues operation plan for invasion of Iwo Jima; tentative date is set for 3Feb45.
15Sep.....	U. S. Army troops assault and capture Morotai in the Netherlands East Indies.	15Dec U. S. Army troops invade Mindoro in the Philippines.
15-30Sep	U. S. forces assault and capture Peleliu and Angaur in the Palaus.	25Dec Leyte declared secure.
23Sep	U. S. Army troops seize Ulithi Atoll in the Western Carolines.	
3Oct	JCS direct Adm Nimitz to invade Ryukyus (Operation ICEBERG) two months following Iwo Jima operation.	1945
9Oct	CinCPOA issues warning order for ICEBERG.	2Jan U. S. Army landings on east and west coasts of Mindoro.
10Oct	First U. S. carrier raid on Okinawa.	3Jan ComFifthFlt issues OPln 1-45 for Okinawa operation.
14Oct	VAC directed to prepare plans for Iwo Jima operation.	6Jan Tenth Army Tentative OPln 1-45 for ICEBERG issued.
20Oct	U. S. Army troops land on Leyte in the Philippines.	9Jan Sixth Army lands in Lingayen Gulf area of Luzon.
21Oct	Marine Carrier Groups, AirFMFPac, activated at MCAS, Santa Barbara, California.	15-16Jan TF 38 carrier aircraft raid Formosa, Hong Kong, Hainan, and Swatow.
23-25Oct	Battle of Leyte Gulf. U. S. naval forces eliminate Japanese surface fleet as a major threat.	24Jan Combined air-sea bombardment of Iwo Jima.
25Oct	CinCPOA issues Joint Staff Study outlining plans for Okinawa operation.	25Jan First support mission flown by Marine dive bombers in the Philippines.
28Oct	CNO directs the formation of the Marine Air Support Division.	29Jan U. S. Army forces land on Luzon at Subic Bay.
24Nov	Saipan-based B-29s bomb Tokyo in the first attack on	16Feb Final operation plan for Okinawa issued by Tenth Army.
		16-17Feb TF 38 aircraft raid Tokyo area.
		17Feb Joint Expeditionary Force for Okinawa assembles and begins rehearsals.
		19Feb-16Mar ... VAC assaults and captures Iwo Jima in the Volcano Islands.
		1Mar B-29s and carrier-based planes begin preliminary air bombardments of Okinawa.
		10Mar U. S. Army troops land on Mindanao.
		11Mar Gen Buckner places Tenth Army OPln 1-45 into effect by dispatch.

18-19Mar	TF 58 strikes Kyushu, Kure, and Inland Sea areas.	6Apr	XXIV Corps divisions first encounter strong enemy resistance on the southern front.
19Mar	USS <i>Block Island</i> , first Marine escort carrier commissioned, departs San Diego for war duty in the Pacific with MCVG-1 embarked.	6-7Apr	First of ten major <i>Kamikaze</i> attacks mounted on Allied shipping in waters off Okinawa.
21Mar	Western Islands Attack Group carrying assault troops of 77th Infantry Division sorties from Leyte Gulf for the opening phase of ICEBERG.	7Apr	TAF aircraft begin operations from Okinawa fields. TF 58 planes sink <i>Yamato</i> , <i>Yahagi</i> , and four Japanese destroyers in the Battle of the East China Sea.
23Mar	Carrier strikes, intensive surface bombardment, underwater demolition, and mine-sweeping operations begin preinvasion preparations against Okinawa.	8Apr	Gen Mulcahy, commanding TAF, assumes control of aircraft ashore.
24Mar	Preassault staging of ICEBERG force begins.	9-10Apr	3/105 of the 27th Infantry Division assaults and captures Tsugen Shima, the only defended island in the Eastern Islands group.
26-31Mar	77th Infantry Division assaults and captures Kerema Retto and Keise Shima.	10Apr	27th Infantry Division (less 3/105) lands on Okinawa to reinforce XXIV Corps. 2d Marine Division returns to Saipan.
26Mar	TF 57 begins first of 10 attacks between this date and 20Apr against Sakashima Gunto.	11Apr	Heavy <i>Kamikaze</i> attacks mounted against TF 58.
27Mar	Transport and covering forces of the Joint Expeditionary Force sortie from Leyte Gulf and Ulithi for ICEBERG.	12Apr	President Roosevelt dies, is succeeded by Vice President Truman.
	Demonstration Group, carrying troops of 2d Marine Division, leaves Saipan.	15-16Apr	TF 58 aircraft raid Kyushu.
1Apr	Tenth Army, comprised of IIIAC and XXIV Corps makes unopposed landing on Okinawa; Yontan and Kadena airfields secured.	16Apr	77th Infantry Division invades Ie Shima.
2Apr	Forward elements of the 7th Infantry Division reach the eastern coast of Okinawa, severing the island.	18Apr	Gen Buckner establishes his CP on Okinawa. 81st Infantry Division released as Area Reserve by CinCPOA.
3Apr	1st Marine Division troops reach the east coast.	19Apr	XXIV Corps begins major assault against outer ring of Shuri defenses.
5Apr	Reconnaissance of the Eastern Islands begins.	20Apr	6th Marine Division troops capture Motobu Peninsula.
		22Apr	Phase II of ICEBERG completed with end of all organized major resistance in northern Okinawa and Ie Shima. Phase I continues.

29Apr	German and Italian troops in northern Italy surrender to Allied troops.	24-25May	6th Marine Division moves to outskirts of Naha.
30Apr	1st Marine Division begins relief of 27th Infantry Division on right (west) of Tenth Army line.		7th Infantry Division advances on Yonabaru.
	77th Infantry Division relieves the 96th Infantry Division in XXIV Corps zone.	25May	JCS direct the invasion of Japan, Operation OLYMPIC, with a target date of 1Nov45.
3-4May	Attempted <i>Thirty - second Army</i> counterlanding on west coast of Okinawa blunted.	26May	Enemy movement south of Shuri observed by spotter planes.
4May	27th Infantry Division relieves 6th Marine Division in northern Okinawa.	27May	Third Fleet relieves Fifth Fleet. Gen Buckner now directly responsible to CinCPOA for operations of the Tenth Army.
7May	IIIAC takes over the western zone of the Tenth Army front in southern Okinawa. Nazi Germany surrenders unconditionally.	30May	5th Marines captures Shuri Castle.
8May	First elements of the 6th Marine Division enter III-AC lines.	2Jun	VAC reports by dispatch to Sixth Army for purposes of planning for OLYMPIC.
11May	Tenth Army launches coordinated attack across entire front.	3-4Jun	RCT-8 secures Iheya Shima.
12May	Tori Shima occupied.	4Jun	6th Marine Division assaults Oroku Peninsula.
13-14May	Task Force 58 strikes launched against Kyushu.	9Jun	RCT-8 secures Aguni Shima.
17May	Adm Hill relieves Adm Turner as control of all forces ashore passes to Gen Buckner, who assumes responsibility to ComFifthFlt for defense and development of captured positions.	11-12Jun	Organized resistance ends on Oroku Peninsula.
20May-4Jun	Bulk of Japanese <i>Thirty-second Army</i> withdraws under cover of rain from the Shuri bastion to new positions in Kiyamu Peninsula.	14Jun	JCS order commanders in Pacific to prepare plans for immediate occupation of Japan.
21May	7th Infantry Division recommitted on the east coast to encircle Shuri.	18Jun	Gen Buckner killed in action; Gen Geiger assumes command of Tenth Army.
24May	Japanese airborne suicide group lands on Yontan airfield; all enemy destroyed.	21Jun	Organized resistance ends on Okinawa.
		22Jun	Official flag-raising ceremony at Tenth Army headquarters marking capture of Okinawa.
		23Jun	Gen Stilwell assumes command of Tenth Army.
		30Jun	Completion of the mop-up of southern Okinawa. General Rockey relieves Gen Geiger as commander of IIIAC. FMFPac Reconnaissance Battalion secures Kume Shima.

1Jul	Marine escort carriers support Allied landings on Balikpapan. TF 51 dissolved by CinCPOA: Gen Stilwell assumes responsibility for defense and development of Okinawa Gunto.	28Aug	Task Force 31 enters Tokyo Bay. First advance units of occupation force land at Atsugi Airfield.
3Jul	Gen Geiger relieves Gen Smith as commander of FMFPac.	30Aug	L-Day for the occupation of Yokosuka. Marines of 2/4 land on Futtsu Saki at 0558. General Clement accepts surrender of Yokosuka Naval Base.
5Jul	Philippines campaign declared ended.		Army airborne units land at Atsugi to occupy Yokohama area.
10Jul	TF 58 aircraft mount strike against Tokyo.		Gen MacArthur lands in Japan.
15Jul	IIIAC detached from Tenth Army and placed under operational control of FMFPac.	1Sep	VAC headquarters departs Hawaiian Islands for occupation of Kyushu.
16Jul	Atomic bomb successfully tested at Los Alamos, New Mexico.	2Sep	Japanese Empire formally surrenders to Allies in ceremonies on board USS <i>Missouri</i> in Tokyo Bay.
26Jul	Allies issue Potsdam Declaration.	6Sep	Disbandment of Fleet Landing Force. Marine component returns to duty as ships' detachments.
1Aug	Heaviest B-29 raid in war on Japan.	7Sep	Gen Stilwell accepts the surrender of the Japanese Ryukyus garrisons signifying the beginning of American political hegemony in Okinawa.
4Aug	27th Infantry Division reaches Hedo Misaki, ending three and a half-month mopping up action in northern Okinawa.	19Sep	Led by Gen Worton, IIIAC advance party departs Guam for North China.
6Aug	Tinian - based B-29 drops atomic bomb on Hiroshima.	22Sep	5th Marine Division arrives and lands at Sasebo.
8Aug	ComThirdFlt OPln 10-45 for the occupation of Japan is distributed.	23Sep	First elements of 2d Marine Division (2d and 6th Marines) land at Nagasaki. 6th Marine Division (less 4th Marines) begins loading operations at Guam for deployment to China.
9Aug	Tinian - based B-29 drops atomic bomb on Nagasaki. Russia invades Manchuria.	24Sep	Gen Krueger, commander of the Sixth Army, assumes command of all occupation forces ashore on Kyushu. Gen Worton and his party arrive in Tientsin.
10Aug	Japan sues for peace.		
14Aug	4th Marines (Reinforced), comprising the Yokosuka Landing Force, departs Guam for Japan.		
15Aug	Hostilities against Japan officially suspended.		
21Aug	CinCPac issues warning order to IIIAC for occupation of North China.		
27Aug	Ships of the Third Fleet enter Sagami Wan.		

26Sep	IIIAC, less the 6th Division, departs Okinawa for China.	20Nov	4th Marines detached from administrative control of 6th Division and placed directly under FMFPac. MAG-22 redeployed from Japan to the United States.
29Sep	VAC publishes the operation order for occupation of Fukuoka.		
30Sep	IIIAC, including the 1st Marine Division and attached units, arrives at Taku Bar and begin unloading for occupation duties. Leading elements of Fukuoka Occupation Force under command of Gen Robinson arrive in Fukuoka.	24Nov	Control of former 5th Marine Division zone of responsibility in Japan passes to 2d Marine and 32d Infantry Divisions as the 5th prepares for redeployment home.
10Oct	1/7 lands at Chinwangtao.	28Nov	4th Marine Division disbanded at Camp Pendleton.
6Oct	In Tientsin, Gen Rockey accepts the surrender of the 50,000 Japanese troops in the Tientsin, Tangku, and Chinwangtao areas. First major armed clash between Marines and Chinese Communists in North China takes place on Tientsin-Peiping road. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing headquarters established at the French Arsenal near the airfield east of Tientsin.	5Dec	First ships carrying 5th Division troops leave Japan.
11Oct	6th Marine Division begins landing at Tsingtao.	24Dec	Gen Shepherd relieved by Gen Howard as commander of the 6th Marine Division.
15Oct	IIIAC Corps Shore Brigade disbanded and its duties taken over by 7th Service Regiment, FMFPac.	28Dec	3d Marine Division (less 1/3 in the Bonins and 2/21 on Truk) disbanded on Guam.
22Oct	First group of Japanese repatriates leave Tientsin for home.	31Dec	VAC relieved of all occupation duties. Eighth Army assumes command of all occupation troops in Japan. 3d Marine Aircraft Wing disbanded at Ewa, T.H.
24Oct	Fukuoka Occupation Force dissolved when it is relieved by 32d Infantry Division.		
25Oct	Gen Shepherd and LtGen Chen Pao-Tsang, CNA, acting for the Nationalist government, accept the formal surrender of the Japanese garrison in Tsingtao and on the Shantung Peninsula.		
19Nov	Repatriation runs begin from Tsingtao.		
		1946	
		8Jan	VAC departs Sasebo for San Diego.
		21Jan	2d Marine Division relieves 32d Infantry Division of occupation duties on Kyushu.
		5Feb	5th Marine Division disbanded at Camp Pendleton.
		11Feb	2d Marine Division reduced to peacetime strength when third battalion of each infantry regiment and last lettered battery of each artillery battalion relieved of occupation duties and sent home for disbandment.
		14Feb	IIIAC issues operation plan for the reduction of its forces to conform to new Marine Corps peacetime tables of organization.

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|-------------|---|-------------|---|
| 15Feb | VAC disbanded at San Diego. | 29Jul | Chinese Communists ambush a Peiping-bound Marine supply convoy at Anping. |
| 11Mar | IIIAC directs the formation of six liaison teams for assignment to Executive Headquarters to supervise the truce in China. | 3Sep | 4th Marines, less 3/4, embarks for Norfolk to become a component of the 2d Marine Division. |
| 26Mar | 6th Marine Division disbanded at Tsingtao. | | Marine Forces, Tsingtao, disbanded, and 3/4 (Reinforced) comes under operational control of Commander, Naval Facilities, Tsingtao. |
| 31Mar | 4th Marine Aircraft Wing disbanded at San Diego. | 18Sep | Gen Howard relieves Gen Rockey as commander of 1st Marine Division. |
| | 9th Marine Aircraft Wing disbanded at Cherry Point. | 30Sep | Last relief of Marine rail guards by Nationalist troops takes place. |
| 1Apr | 3d Marine Brigade activated at Tsingtao. | 30Oct | Chinese Communists stage raid on 1st Marine Division ammunition supply point at Hsin Ho. |
| 15Apr | 1st Marine Division completes redeployment in Hopeh. | 16Dec | Activation of FMFLant at Camp Lejeune, with the commander of the 2d Marine Division assigned additional duties as CG, FMFLant. |
| 17Apr | Gen Howard relinquishes command of 3d Brigade to Gen Clement. | | |
| 10Jun | IIIAC Corps Headquarters and Corps Troops disbanded. | | |
| | Gen Rockey becomes CG, 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) and Marine Forces, China, the latter a task force designation for the division and 1st Wing. | 1947 | |
| | 3d Marine Brigade disbanded at Tsingtao. Most of its organic units now comprise 4th Marines (Reinforced) or Marine Forces, Tsingtao, with Gen Clement commanding. | 5Jan | 7th Marines embarks and sails from Chinwangtao for the United States, reporting to FMFPac for operational and administrative control. |
| 15Jun | 2d Marine Division relieved of occupation duties in Japan by 24th Infantry Division. | 18Jan | 11th Marines, in company with the 1st Tank Battalion (—), sails from Chinwangtao for Guam. |
| 24Jun | 2d Marine Division headquarters departs Sasebo for its new home at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. | 5Apr | Marine ammunition supply point at Hsin Ho struck again by Chinese Communists in even greater force. |
| 15Jul | With departure of last repatriation ship from Tangku, more than 540,000 Japanese have been repatriated from North China under Marine supervision. | 1May | FMFWesPac activated at Tsingtao with Gen Pfeiffer in command. AirFMFWesPac activated the same date with Col Hart commanding. |

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| <p>12May Marine activities in Hopeh reduced and center in Tientsin as last motor convoy carrying 5th Marines gear clears Peiping and the regiment sails from China for Guam.</p> <p>20May 1st Marines depart Tientsin for Tsingtao.</p> <p>20Jun 1st Marine Division headquarters and detached units depart China for San Diego, leaving behind the division rear echelon, which reports to FMFWesPac for operational control.</p> | <p>1Sep 1st Marine Division rear echelon departs China.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">1949</p> <p>23Jan AirFMFWesPac ceases flight operations at Tsangkou Field, as last shore-based Marine planes fly out of China.</p> <p>8Feb Major portion of FMFWesPac departs Tsingtao for United States.</p> <p>26May Last Marines leave China, as elements of Company C, 7th Marines, depart Tsingtao on board USS <i>Manchester</i>.</p> |
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Fleet Marine Force Status-30 April 1945 ¹

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
<i>Outside U.S.A.</i>				
<i>Hawaiian Area</i>				
<i>Oahu</i>				
Headquarters and Service Battalion, FMFPac.....	244	1,265	42	29
Signal Battalion, FMFPac.....	72	415	49	0
Tactical and Gunfire-Air Observation Training Center (Provisional), FMFPac.....	35	12	0	0
Transient Center, FMFPac.....	260	8,106	40	284
45th Replacement Draft, FMFPac.....	36	1,012	0	0
62d Replacement Draft, FMFPac.....	47	1,050	0	0
Headquarters Company, Supply Service, FMFPac.....	103	352	0	3
6th Base Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac.....	134	2,865	9	62
41st Depot Company, Supply Service, FMFPac.....	4	160	0	0
Marine Air Support Control Units, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet.....	95	272	0	4
Headquarters Squadron, AirFMFPac.....	87	232	7	0
Air Warning Squadron-11, 3d MAW.....	26	312	0	7
Headquarters Squadron-3, 3d MAW.....	102	797	10	30
Marine Observation Squadron-4, 3d MAW.....	11	34	0	0
Marine Observation Squadron-5, 3d MAW.....	11	27	0	0
Service Squadron-14, 3d MAW.....	15	379	0	0
Marine Transport Squadron-953, 3d MAW.....	91	451	1	8
Marine Utility Squadron-1, 3d MAW.....	18	86	0	0
Marine Utility Squadron-3, 3d MAW.....	19	70	0	0
Headquarters Squadron-44, MASG-44.....	22	141	5	15
Service Squadron-44, MASG-44.....	18	461	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadron-215, MASG-44.....	93	301	1	4
Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron-332, MASG-44.....	22	326	1	4
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron-333, MASG-44.....	48	290	1	7
Area Sub-Total.....	1,613	19,416	166	457

See footnote at end of table.

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
<i>Hawaii</i>				
5th Marine Division.....	847	14,855	129	938
11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMFPac.....	27	508	2	8
5th Amphibian Truck Company, FMFPac.....	7	187	0	0
5th Joint Assault Signal Company, FMFPac.....	33	404	14	0
2d Marine Detachment (Provisional), FMFPac.....	11	254	0	4
3d Rocket Detachment (Provisional), FMFPac.....	3	52	0	0
Corps Evacuation Hospital I, FMFPac.....	0	1	27	225
6th Separate Laundry Platoon, FMFPac.....	1	57	0	0
8th Field Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac.....	99	1,580	5	31
1st Service and Supply Battalion, Supply Service, FMFPac.....	30	639	2	13
27th Replacement Draft, FMFPac.....	27	213	2	12
31st Replacement Draft, FMFPac.....	3	28	1	1
Area Sub-Total.....	1,088	18,778	182	1,232
<i>Kauai</i>				
1st Marine Detachment (Provisional), FMFPac.....	14	276	3	11
3d Service and Supply Battalion, Supply Service, FMFPac.....	27	563	0	9
Area Sub-Total.....	41	839	3	20
<i>Maui</i>				
Headquarters and Service Battalion, VAC.....	107	699	11	60
Medical Battalion, VAC.....	1	97	29	230
Motor Transport Battalion, VAC.....	6	110	0	0
Signal Battalion, VAC.....	65	738	3	14
2d Bomb Disposal Company, VAC.....	12	71	0	0
Air Delivery Section, Headquarters and Service Battalion, VAC.....	3	83	0	0
4th Marine Division.....	836	15,317	126	1,043
1st FMFPac Amphibian Tractor Group Headquarters (Provisional).....	4	4	0	0
3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion FMFPac.....	47	551	2	11
5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMFPac.....	31	511	3	28
10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMFPac.....	33	523	3	29
2d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMFPac.....	37	812	4	34
3d Military Police Battalion (Provisional), FMFPac.....	19	336	0	0
12th Motor Transport Battalion (Provisional), FMFPac.....	28	518	1	1
4th Amphibian Truck Company (Provisional), FMFPac.....	6	181	0	0
1st Joint Assault Signal Company, FMFPac.....	33	395	13	0
2d Separate Topographical Company, FMFPac.....	6	78	0	0
2d Separate Laundry Platoon, FMFPac.....	1	64	0	0
8th Separate Laundry Platoon, FMFPac.....	1	62	0	0

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
1st Separate Radio Intelligence Platoon, FMFPac.....	1	49	0	0
5th Separate Radio Intelligence Platoon, FMFPac.....	1	49	0	0
3d Marine Detachment (Provisional), FMFPac.....	10	272	0	3
1st Rocket Detachment (Provisional), FMFPac.....	1	57	0	0
2d Service and Supply Battalion, Supply Service, FMFPac.....	34	1,031	2	10
55th Replacement Draft, FMFPac.....	36	1,256	0	0
59th Replacement Draft, FMFPac.....	35	1,251	0	0
Area Sub-Total.....	1,394	25,115	197	1,470
<i>Midway</i>				
6th Defense Battalion.....	29	710	3	21
Headquarters Squadron 23, MAG-23.....	25	173	6	14
Service Squadron 23, MAG-23.....	22	602	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 324, MAG-23.....	55	225	1	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 343, MAG-23.....	31	291	1	8
Area Sub-Total.....	162	2,001	11	51
<i>Southwest Pacific</i>				
<i>Lingayen</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 24, MAG-24.....	36	119	8	22
Service Squadron 24, MAG-24.....	19	481	0	0
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 133, MAG-24.....	48	285	1	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 241, MAG-24.....	55	281	1	8
Area Sub-Total.....	158	1,166	10	38
<i>Luzon</i>				
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 244, MAG-24.....	47	298	1	8
<i>Mindanao</i>				
Air Warning Squadron 3, 1st MAW.....	18	249	0	6
Air Warning Squadron 4, 1st MAW.....	17	243	0	6
Headquarters Squadron 12, MAG-12.....	27	148	13	24
Service Squadron 12, MAG-12.....	23	469	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 115, MAG-12.....	54	229	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 211, MAG-12.....	52	216	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 218, MAG-12.....	64	188	2	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 313, MAG-12.....	50	247	1	8
Headquarters Squadron 32, MAG-32.....	28	134	9	20

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Service Squadron 32, MAG-32.....	24	513	0	0
Marine Bombing Squadron 611, MAG-32.....	70	471	1	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 142, MAG-32.....	62	292	1	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 236, MAG-32.....	53	278	1	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 243, MAG-32.....	49	284	1	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 341, MAG-32.....	50	272	1	8
Area Sub-Total.....	641	4,233	32	128
<i>Samar</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 14, MAG-14.....	31	129	9	19
Service Squadron 14, MAG-14.....	23	508	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 221, MAG-14.....	52	204	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 222, MAG-14.....	53	196	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 223, MAG-14.....	53	194	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 251, MAG-14.....	53	210	1	8
Area Sub-Total.....	265	1,441	13	51
<i>Auckland, New Zealand</i>				
3d Field Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac.....	15	92	0	0
<i>Banika, Russell Islands</i>				
4th Base Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac.....	98	2,818	6	42
<i>Emirau</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 61, MAG-61.....	30	158	9	18
Service Squadron 61, MAG-61.....	26	429	1	15
Marine Bombing Squadron 413, MAG-61.....	65	392	1	9
Marine Bombing Squadron 433, MAG-61.....	68	410	1	8
Marine Bombing Squadron 443, MAG-61.....	69	436	1	8
Area Sub-Total.....	258	1,825	13	58
<i>Green Island</i>				
Marine Bombing Squadron 423, MAG-61.....	70	437	1	8
<i>Guadalcanal</i>				
South Pacific Echelon (Provisional), FMFPac.....	14	74	1	3
4th Casual Company (Provisional), FMFPac.....	13	104	2	28

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
2d Field Service Command, Supply Service, FMFPac.....	12	34	0	0
4th Service and Supply Battalion, Supply Service, FMFPac....	34	818	3	14
Area Sub-Total.....	73	1,030	6	45
<i>Los Negros</i>				
Marine Air Detachment 1, 1st MAW.....	58	477	4	15
Marine Service Squadron 25, MAG-25.....	20	385	0	0
Area Sub-Total.....	78	862	4	15
<i>Munda, New Georgia</i>				
Marine Air Base Squadron 1, 4th MAW.....	12	357	2	15
<i>Torokina, Bougainville</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 1, 1st MAW.....	23	196	5	18
Headquarters Squadron 25, MAG-25.....	23	196	5	18
Marine Transport Squadron 152, MAG-25.....	55	322	1	8
Marine Transport Squadron 153, MAG-25.....	58	317	1	8
Area Sub-Total.....	159	1,031	12	52
<i>Central Pacific</i>				
<i>Okinawa</i>				
Headquarters and Service Battalion, IIIAC.....	134	955	10	31
Medical Battalion, IIIAC.....	1	99	30	233
Signal Battalion, IIIAC.....	81	883	4	10
Headquarters Battery, Corps Artillery, IIIAC.....	33	227	3	8
1st Bomb Disposal Company, IIIAC.....	12	73	0	0
Air Delivery Section, Headquarters and Service Battalion, IIIAC.....	2	150	0	2
1st Marine Division.....	882	16,994	141	1,059
6th Marine Division.....	929	16,578	123	998
Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, FMFPac.....	20	279	0	13
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMFPac.....	34	540	3	28
1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMFPac.....	42	831	4	36
1st Military Police Battalion, FMFPac.....	32	452	0	0
1st 155mm Howitzer Battalion, FMFPac.....	34	587	2	10
1st Separate Engineer Battalion, FMFPac.....	46	827	3	20
2d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac.....	54	1,270	4	32

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
3d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Provisional), FMFPac.....	40	789	3	34
3d 155mm Howitzer Battalion, FMFPac.....	32	591	2	10
4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMFPac.....	29	468	3	29
5th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac.....	59	1,259	4	30
6th 155mm Howitzer Battalion, FMFPac.....	32	591	2	10
7th 155mm Howitzer Battalion, FMFPac.....	31	644	2	12
8th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMFPac.....	29	531	2	28
8th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac.....	61	1,276	4	30
8th 155mm Howitzer Battalion, FMFPac.....	31	644	2	13
9th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMFPac.....	26	492	2	9
9th 155mm Howitzer Battalion, FMFPac.....	33	638	2	13
11th Motor Transport Battalion, FMFPac.....	99	558	2	10
16th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac.....	58	1,283	4	31
Headquarters Battery, 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Group, FMFPac.....	22	144	0	2
Headquarters Battery, 2d Field Artillery Group (Provisional), FMFPac.....	11	77	0	1
1st Separate Topographical Company, FMFPac.....	7	121	0	0
3d Amphibian Truck Company (Provisional), FMFPac.....	6	192	0	0
4th Joint Assault Signal Company, FMFPac.....	36	344	13	108
6th Amphibian Truck Company (Provisional), FMFPac.....	6	188	0	0
6th Joint Assault Signal Company, FMFPac.....	39	422	13	0
1st War Dog Platoon, FMFPac.....	1	79	0	0
3d Separate Laundry Platoon, FMFPac.....	1	55	0	0
3d Separate Radio Intelligence Platoon, FMFPac.....	2	46	0	0
4th War Dog Platoon, FMFPac.....	1	79	0	0
5th Separate Laundry Platoon, FMFPac.....	1	57	0	0
7th Separate Laundry Platoon, FMFPac.....	1	62	0	0
4th Rocket Detachment (Provisional), FMFPac.....	3	58	0	0
5th Rocket Detachment (Provisional), FMFPac.....	2	55	0	0
Corps Evacuation Hospital II, FMFPac.....	0	0	36	237
Corps Evacuation Hospital III, FMFPac.....	0	0	17	151
7th Field Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac.....	132	3,456	6	54
26th Replacement Draft, FMFPac.....	34	961	4	23
29th Replacement Draft, FMFPac.....	51	1,169	2	5
32d Replacement Draft, FMFPac.....	57	1,169	5	25
33d Replacement Draft, FMFPac.....	43	952	0	16
Headquarters Squadron 2, 2d MAW*.....	70	386	28	20
Marine Observation Squadron 6, 2d MAW.....	8	28	0	0
Marine Observation Squadron 7, 2d MAW.....	9	28	0	0
Marine Observation Squadron 3, 4th MAW.....	13	29	0	0
Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 131, MAG-21.....	59	394	1	8
Headquarters Squadron 31, MAG-31.....	18	100	7	20
Service Squadron 31, MAG-31.....	25	522	0	0

See footnote at end of table.

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Marine Fighter Squadron 224, MAG-31.....	54	224	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 311, MAG-31.....	56	224	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 441, MAG-31.....	54	224	1	8
Marine Night Fighter Squadron 542, MAG-31.....	41	218	1	8
Headquarters Squadron 33, MAG-33.....	31	130	6	19
Service Squadron 33, MAG-33.....	22	548	0	4
Marine Fighter Squadron 312, MAG-33.....	63	213	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 322, MAG-33.....	63	214	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 323, MAG-33.....	61	223	1	7
Marine Night Fighter Squadron 543, MAG-33.....	42	218	1	8
Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 232, MAG-33.....	56	307	1	8
Headquarters Squadron 43, MAG-43.....	48	213	5	5
Air Warning Squadron 6, MAG-43.....	19	258	0	6
Air Warning Squadron 7, MAG-43.....	24	272	0	6
Air Warning Squadron 8, MAG-43.....	24	295	0	6
Area Sub-Total.....	4,241	65,931	516	3,555
<i>Marine Carrier-based Aviation</i>				
<i>On board USS Bennington (CV-20)</i>				
Marine Fighter Squadron 112, MAG-42.....	34	168	2	3
Marine Fighter Squadron 123, MAG-42.....	34	131	0	5
<i>On board USS Block Island (CVE-106)</i>				
Carrier Air Support Detachment 1, MCVG-1.....	10	227	0	2
Marine Carrier Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 233, MCVG-1.....	20	45	0	1
Marine Carrier Fighter Squadron 511, MCVG-1.....	29	9	1	0
<i>On board USS Bunker Hill (CV-17)</i>				
Marine Fighter Squadron 221, MAG-42.....	39	137	0	4
Marine Fighter Squadron 451, MAG-42.....	36	169	1	3
<i>On board USS Gilbert Islands (CVE-107)</i>				
Carrier Air Support Detachment 2, MCVG-2.....	11	228	0	2
Marine Carrier Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 143, MCVG-2.....	20	45	0	0
Marine Carrier Fighter Squadron 512, MCVG-2.....	30	8	1	0

Units and Locations	Strength			
	SMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
<i>On board USS Vella Gulf (CVE-111)</i>				
Carrier Air Support Detachment 3, MCVG-3.....	11	226	0	2
Marine Carrier Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 234, MCVG-3.....	20	45	0	0
Marine Carrier Fighter Squadron 513, MCVG-3.....	30	8	1	0
Area Sub-Total.....	386	1,723	7	24
<i>Angaur</i>				
7th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac.....	54	1,239	4	29
<i>Engebi</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 22, MAG-22.....	26	112	8	19
Service Squadron 22, MAG-22.....	23	510	0	0
Air Warning Squadron 1, MAG-22.....	19	228	0	6
Marine Fighter Squadron 113, MAG-22.....	55	224	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 422, MAG-22.....	52	224	1	8
Headquarters Squadron 94, MAG-94.....	32	225	8	19
Service Squadron 94, MAG-94.....	19	601	0	0
Marine Night Fighter Squadron 533, MAG-94.....	44	269	1	9
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 151, MAG-94.....	38	310	1	8
Area Sub-Total.....	308	2,703	20	77
<i>Eniwetok</i>				
51st Defense Battalion, FMFPac.....	63	1,317	6	32
Marine Fighter Squadron 111, MAG-94.....	41	257	1	8
Area Sub-Total.....	104	1,574	7	40
<i>Guam</i>				
Forward Echelon, Headquarters, FMFPac.....	21	78	0	0
Headquarters Battery, Corps Artillery, VAC.....	25	218	5	9
3d Marine Division.....	934	15,469	127	1,046
Transient Center, Forward, FMFPac.....	126	1,408	22	119
War Dog Training and Administrative Headquarters (Provisional), FMFPac.....	2	35	0	0
1st Base Headquarters Battalion, FMFPac.....	73	548	104	447
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMFPac.....	4	154	0	0
9th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac.....	58	1,239	4	30
14th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac.....	56	1,234	4	28
52d Defense Battalion, FMFPac.....	67	1,252	7	33

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
2d Military Police Battalion, FMFPac.....	32	418	0	1
5th 155mm Howitzer Battalion, FMFPac.....	32	661	2	10
10th 155mm Howitzer Battalion, FMFPac.....	32	684	2	12
11th 155mm Howitzer Battalion, FMFPac.....	35	664	2	14
12th 155mm Howitzer Battalion, FMFPac.....	33	653	2	13
2d Separate Engineer Battalion, FMFPac.....	67	844	3	20
Headquarters Battery, 2d Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Provisional), FMFPac.....	18	138	0	1
3d Joint Assault Signal Company, FMFPac.....	37	355	14	0
1st Separate Laundry Platoon, FMFPac.....	1	60	0	0
4th Separate Radio Intelligence Platoon, FMFPac.....	3	48	0	0
3d War Dog Platoon, FMFPac.....	1	66	0	0
6th War Dog Platoon, FMFPac.....	1	60	0	0
7th War Dog Platoon, FMFPac.....	1	58	0	0
1st Field Service Command, Supply Service, FMFPac.....	21	82	1	1
5th Field Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac.....	130	3,001	5	65
46th Replacement Draft, FMFPac.....	53	1,201	0	1
54th Replacement Draft, FMFPac.....	34	1,218	0	0
56th Replacement Draft, FMFPac.....	35	1,250	0	0
57th Replacement Draft, FMFPac.....	18	570	0	0
63d Replacement Draft, FMFPac.....	50	1,250	0	0
64th Replacement Draft, FMFPac.....	50	1,243	0	0
Marine Photographic Squadron 354, 4th MAW*.....	47	288	1	4
Headquarters Squadron 21, MAG-21.....	47	239	9	20
Service Squadron 21, MAG-21.....	23	485	0	0
Air Warning Squadron 2, MAG-21.....	19	243	0	6
Marine Fighter Squadron 225, MAG-21.....	49	208	1	9
Marine Night Fighter Squadron 534, MAG-21.....	33	217	1	8
Marine Observation Squadron 1, MAG-21.....	11	44	0	1
Marine Observation Squadron 8, MAG-21.....	9	28	0	0
Marine Transport Squadron 252, MAG-21.....	61	344	1	8
Marine Transport Squadron 253, MAG-21.....	82	313	1	8
Marine Transport Squadron 952, MAG-21.....	65	323	1	8
Marine Utility Squadron 2, MAG-21.....	19	118	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 314, MAG-22.....	63	225	1	8
Area Sub-Total.....	2,031	28,107	290	1,838
<i>Kwajalein</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 4, 4th MAW.....	106	698	7	15
Headquarters Squadron 15, MAG-15.....	17	116	4	15
Marine Bombing Squadron 613, MAG-94.....	67	452	2	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 155, MAG-94.....	39	341	1	7
Area Sub-Total.....	229	1,607	14	45

See footnote at end of table.

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
<i>Majuro</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 13, MAG-13.....	23	130	5	19
Service Squadron 13, MAG-13.....	19	478	0	0
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 231, MAG-13.....	45	317	1	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 331, MAG-13.....	67	315	1	8
Area Sub-Total.....	154	1,240	7	35
<i>Peleliu</i>				
4th Antiaircraft Battalion, FMFPac.....	38	900	4	38
12th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac.....	53	1,248	4	30
3d Base Headquarters Battalion, FMFPac.....	30	233	29	9
10th Service Battalion (Provisional), Supply Service, FMFPac.....	16	331	0	5
Headquarters Squadron 11, MAG-11.....	35	131	2	0
Service Squadron 11, MAG-11.....	36	736	8	19
Marine Fighter Squadron 114, MAG-11.....	44	256	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 121, MAG-11.....	42	221	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 122, MAG-11.....	44	222	0	8
Marine Night Fighter Squadron 541, MAG-11.....	31	219	1	8
Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 134, MAG-11.....	59	367	1	8
Area Sub-Total.....	428	4,864	51	141
<i>Saipan</i>				
2d Marine Division.....	905	16,553	129	1,053
2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMFPac.....	31	515	2	9
11th Service Battalion (Provisional), Supply Service, FMFPac.....	38	1,198	4	44
2d Amphibian Truck Company, FMFPac.....	6	165	0	0
2d Joint Assault Signal Company, FMFPac.....	36	362	15	0
4th Separate Laundry Platoon, FMFPac.....	1	58	0	0
2d War Dog Platoon, FMFPac.....	2	36	0	0
2d Rocket Detachment (Provisional), FMFPac.....	3	53	0	0
35th Replacement Draft, FMFPac.....	63	1,208	1	11
41st Replacement Draft, FMFPac.....	62	1,176	1	10
Marine Bombing Squadron 612, MAG-21.....	75	518	1	8
Marine Observation Squadron 2, MAG-21.....	11	33	0	0
Marine Transport Squadron 353, MAG-21.....	75	365	0	0
Area Sub-Total.....	1,308	22,240	153	1,135

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
<i>Tinian</i>				
17th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac.....	55	1,302	4	29
18th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac.....	53	1,264	4	28
Marine Torpedo Bomber Squadron 242, MAG-21.....	51	308	1	8
Area Sub-Total.....	159	2,874	9	65
<i>Ulithi</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 45, MAG-45.....	28	122	1	0
Service Squadron 45, MAG-45.....	29	504	9	18
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 245, MAG-45.....	47	281	1	8
Area Sub-Total.....	104	907	11	26
<i>Miscellaneous</i>				
Aviation personnel attached to Marine divisions, amphibious corps, and JASCOs.....	41	55		
<i>West Coast, U.S.A.</i>				
<i>San Diego</i>				
Headquarters Company, Marine Training and Replacement Command, San Diego Area.....	49	137	2	5
Headquarters Squadron, Marine Fleet Air, West Coast.....	91	566	2	3
Marine Photographic Squadron 354, Marine Fleet Air, West Coast.....	46	274	1	4
Area Sub-Total.....	186	977	5	12
<i>Camp Elliott</i>				
Base Depot, Marine Training and Replacement Command, SDA.....	90	563	2	20
<i>Camp Gillespie</i>				
Headquarters and Service Squadron, 2d AWG.....	17	159	0	1
Air Warning Squadron 9, 2d AWG.....	18	220	0	6
Area Sub-Total.....	35	379	0	7

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
<i>Camp Pendleton</i>				
Headquarters Battalion, Marine Training Command, SDA.....	86	976	20	74
Schools Regiment, Marine Training Command, SDA.....	640	1,004	0	0
Specialist Training Regiment, Marine Training Command, SDA.....	297	2,071	49	868
2d Infantry Training Regiment (8 battalions), Marine Training Command, SDA.....	164	1,793	0	0
62d Replacement Draft (Rear Echelon).....	4	281	0	0
Area Sub-Total.....	1,191	6,125	69	942
<i>El Centro</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 35, MAG-35.....	291	749	4	19
Service Squadron 35, MAG-35.....	27	749	0	0
Service Squadron 43, MAG-35.....	16	335	2	15
Marine Transport Squadron 352, MAG-35.....	49	241	1	7
Headquarters Squadron 42, MAG-42.....	55	609	4	27
Service Squadron 42, MAG-42.....	34	673	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 214, MAG-42.....	32	141	0	3
Marine Fighter Squadron 452, MAG-42.....	35	155	1	5
Area Sub-Total.....	539	3,652	12	76
<i>El Toro</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 41, MAG-41.....	54	447	5	30
Service Squadron 41, MAG-41.....	19	433	0	0
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 141, MAG-41.....	1	1	0	0
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 464, MAG-41.....	49	277	1	5
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 474, MAG-41.....	52	263	1	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 484, MAG-41.....	16	248	1	5
Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 943, MAG-41.....	58	332	1	8
Headquarters Squadron 46, MAG-46.....	76	332	7	28
Service Squadron 46, MAG-46.....	27	751	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 461, MAG-46.....	90	333	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 462, MAG-46.....	88	304	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 471, MAG-46.....	119	340	0	8
Area Sub-Total.....	649	4,061	18	108
<i>Miramar</i>				
Supply Squadron 5, Marine Fleet Air, West Coast.....	15	258	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 217, Marine Fleet Air, West Coast..	10	12	0	0

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Marine Fighter Squadron 217, Marine Fleet Air, West Coast..	5	29	0	0
Headquarters Squadron, Personnel Group.....	907	239	65	0
Marine Wing Service Squadron 1, Personnel Group.....	0	3	0	0
Marine Wing Service Squadron 2, Personnel Group.....	0	2	0	0
Marine Wing Service Squadron 3, Personnel Group.....	0	2	0	0
Marine Wing Service Squadron 4, Personnel Group.....	0	2	0	0
Marine Air Control Squadron 1, Personnel Group.....	12	1,198	0	0
Marine Air Control Squadron 2, Personnel Group.....	9	1,495	0	201
Marine Air Control Squadron 3, Personnel Group.....	5	363	0	0
Marine Air Control Squadron 4, Personnel Group.....	5	1,588	0	0
Marine Air Control Squadron 5, Personnel Group.....	5	2,269	0	0
Area Sub-Total.....	973	7,460	65	201
Mojave				
Headquarters Squadron 51, MASG-51, 2d Div, Marine Carrier Groups, AirFMFPac.....	20	40	0	0
Service Squadron 51, MASG-51, 2d Div, Marine Carrier Groups, AirFMFPac.....	36	830	10	31
Carrier Air Support Detachment 5, MASG-51.....	5	147	0	2
Carrier Air Support Detachment 6, MASG-51.....	6	158	0	2
Carrier Air Support Detachment 8, MASG-51.....	2	38	0	2
Marine Fighter Squadron 124, MASG-51.....	5	5	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 321, MASG-51.....	32	30	1	1
Marine Carrier Fighter Squadron 514, MASG-51.....	34	38	1	0
Marine Carrier Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 144, MASG-51.....	24	73	0	0
Marine Carrier Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 454, MASG-51.....	22	63	1	0
Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 621, MASG-51.....	30	75	0	0
Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 622, MASG-51.....	28	46	0	0
Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 624, MASG-51.....	26	91	0	0
Area Sub-Total.....	270	1,634	13	38
Port Hueneme				
Headquarters Squadron 62, MAG-62.....	11	169	1	4
Santa Barbara				
Air Warning Squadron 12, 2d AWG.....	20	231	0	6
Headquarters Squadron 48, MASG-48.....	18	49	0	0
Service Squadron 48, MASG-48.....	65	747	6	32
Carrier Air Support Detachment 7, MASG-51.....	1	106	0	2
Marine Fighter Squadron 213, MASG-51.....	8	9	0	0

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Marine Fighter Squadron 472, MASG-51.....	35	5	0	0
Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 623, MASG-51.....	22	92	0	0
Area Sub-Total.....	169	1,239	6	40
<i>Eagle Mountain Lake, Texas</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 53, MNFG-53.....	46	167	1	0
Service Squadron 53, MNFG-53.....	21	580	4	27
Marine Night Fighter Squadron 531, MNFG-53.....	94	219	0	0
Marine Night Fighter Squadron 532, MNFG-53.....	15	185	1	0
Marine Night Fighter Squadron 544, MNFG-53.....	35	191	2	5
Area Sub-Total.....	201	1,342	8	32
<i>East Coast, U.S.A.</i>				
<i>Camp Lejeune</i>				
Headquarters Battalion, Marine Training Command.....	34	1,592	0	0
Range Battalion, Marine Training Command.....	6	251	0	0
Quartermaster Battalion, Marine Training Command.....	43	458	0	0
Schools Regiment, Marine Training Command.....	645	1,756	0	0
Specialist Training Regiment, Marine Training Command.....	370	3,327	0	0
Infantry Training Regiment (10 battalions), Marine Training Command.....	304	7,572	0	0
7th Separate Infantry Battalion.....	22	620	0	23
65th Replacement Draft.....	36	591	0	0
66th Replacement Draft.....	7	41	0	0
Area Sub-Total.....	1,467	16,208	0	23
<i>Norfolk</i>				
Marine Base Depot.....	19	346	1	9
<i>Quantico</i>				
Infantry Training Battalion, MCS.....	35	1,040	2	40
Field Artillery Training Battalion, MCS.....	70	657	0	9
Area Sub-Total.....	105	1,697	2	49
<i>Bogue</i>				
Air Warning Squadron 18, 1st AWG.....	13	151	0	6
Headquarters Squadron 93, MAG-93.....	27	110	4	5

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Service Squadron 93, MAG-93.....	24	485	2	14
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 933, MAG-93.....	45	252	1	4
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 934, MAG-93.....	43	248	0	4
Area Sub-Total.....	152	1,246	7	33
<i>Cherry Point</i>				
Marine Wing Service Squadron 9, 9th MAW.....	312	2,801	16	28
Headquarters Squadron 9, 9th MAW.....	126	891	8	19
Headquarters and Service Squadron 1, 1st AWG.....	48	457	5	2
Air Warning Squadron 16, 1st AWG.....	21	186	0	6
Headquarters Squadron 81, MOTG-81.....	50	668	2	26
Service Squadron 81, MOTG-81.....	25	679	0	0
Marine Operational Training Squadron 811, MOTG-81.....	37	412	0	0
Marine Operational Training Squadron 812, MOTG-81.....	30	370	0	0
Marine Operational Training Squadron 813, MOTG-81.....	24	504	0	8
Marine Operational Training Squadron 814, MOTG-81.....	172	552	0	0
Headquarters Squadron 91, MAG-91.....	42	125	6	4
Service Squadron 91, MAG-91.....	19	528	0	14
Marine Fighter Squadron 911, MAG-91.....	48	225	1	4
Marine Fighter Squadron 912, MAG-91.....	48	190	1	4
Marine Fighter Squadron 913, MAG-91.....	49	191	1	5
Marine Fighter Squadron 914, MAG-91.....	47	191	0	4
Area Sub-Total.....	1,098	8,970	40	124
<i>Congaree</i>				
Air Warning Squadron 14, 1st AWG.....	17	180	0	6
Headquarters Squadron 52, MAG-52.....	29	114	1	5
Service Squadron 52, MAG-52.....	22	563	4	15
Marine Fighter Squadron 521, MAG-52.....	58	191	1	4
Marine Fighter Squadron 522, MAG-52.....	30	165	1	3
Marine Fighter Squadron 523, MAG-52.....	37	173	1	3
Area Sub-Total.....	193	1,386	8	36
<i>Greenville</i>				
Marine Photographic Squadron 254, 9th MAW.....	37	317	1	12

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
<i>Kinston</i>				
Marine Photographic Squadron 154, 9th MAW.....	28	211	2	8
Marine Photographic Squadron 954, 9th MAW.....	19	256	1	4
Area Sub-Total.....	47	467	3	12
<i>Newport</i>				
Service Squadron 62, 9th MAW.....	15	380	5	16
Marine Bombing Squadron 614, 9th MAW.....	67	433	1	4
Area Sub-Total.....	82	813	6	20
<i>Oak Grove</i>				
Air Warning Squadron 17, 1st AWG.....	14	171	0	6
Headquarters Squadron 34, MAG-34.....	26	124	1	5
Service Squadron 34, MAG-34.....	21	464	4	16
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 931, MAG-34.....	45	215	0	3
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 932, MAG-34.....	43	223	1	4
Area Sub-Total.....	149	1,197	6	33
<i>Parris Island</i>				
Marine Fighter Squadron 524, MAG-52.....	30	224	1	4
<i>Vero Beach</i>				
Air Warning Squadron 13, 1st AWG.....	13	224	0	5
Total FMF (Ground) Overseas.....	10,562	188,627	1,499	9,722
Total FMF (Air) Overseas.....	5,704	30,399	286	1,119
Total FMF (Ground) in U.S.A.....	2,921	25,076	76	1,048
Total FMF (Air) in U.S.A.....	4,774	35,451	197	788
Total FMF Overseas.....	16,266	219,026	1,785	10,841
Total FMF in U.S.A.....	7,695	60,527	273	1,836
Total FMF.....	23,961	279,553	2,058	12,677

¹ Strength figures and unit designations were abstracted from the FMF Status Reports, Ground and Air, for April 1945 held in the Archives of the Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps. Units en route or ordered to the indicated areas (indicated by an asterisk *) are listed under those areas regardless of their temporary locations.

Fleet Marine Force Status-31 October 1946¹

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
<i>Outside U.S.A.</i>				
<i>Hawaiian Area</i>				
<i>Oahu</i>				
Headquarters and Service Battalion, FMFPac (less Topographic Company).....	79	540	8	16
Headquarters Battalion, Service Command, FMFPac.....	26	143	0	4
6th Service Depot.....	51	1,188	4	23
Area Sub-Total.....	156	1,871	12	43
<i>Maui</i>				
18th Service Battalion.....	5	94	1	3
<i>Ewa</i>				
Headquarters Squadron, AirFMFPac.....	49	290	1	3
Headquarters Squadron 15, MAG-15.....	16	64	1	5
Service Squadron 15, MAG-15.....	14	295	1	4
Marine Transport Squadron 352, MAG-15.....	37	302	0	2
Marine Transport Squadron 953, MAG-15.....	42	299	0	3
Area Sub-Total.....	158	1,250	3	17
<i>Midway</i>				
Marine Fighter Squadron 322, MAG-15.....	20	73	0	0
<i>Central Pacific Area</i>				
<i>Guam</i>				
Heavy Antiaircraft Group, 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion..	14	333	0	0
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 1st MarDiv.....	7	67	0	0
5th Service Depot.....	59	1,254	6	22
Area Sub-Total.....	80	1,654	6	22

See footnote at end of table.

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
<i>Kwajalein</i>				
Marine Detachment (Provisional).....	5	108	0	0
<i>Eniwetok</i>				
Marine Detachment (Provisional).....	2	65	0	0
<i>China Area</i>				
<i>Tientsin</i>				
1st Marine Division, Reinforced (less 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion).....	353	9,295	119	420
7th Service Regiment.....	28	707	4	18
7th Casual Officer Detachment.....	50	0	0	0
109th Replacement Draft.....	6	1,001	0	0
Headquarters Squadron 1, 1st MAW.....	81	326	4	11
Marine Wing Service Squadron 1, 1st MAW.....	8	40	1	0
Marine Observation Squadron 3, 1st MAW.....	9	26	0	0
Area Sub-Total.....	535	11,395	128	449
<i>Tsingtao</i>				
3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Reinforced).....	43	1,240	9	38
12th Service Battalion.....	23	415	4	6
Marine Observation Squadron 6, 1st MAW.....	8	19	0	0
Marine Transport Squadron 153, 1st MAW.....	53	514	2	12
Area Sub-Total.....	126	2,188	15	56
<i>Peiping</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 24, MAG-24.....	29	123	2	2
Service Squadron 24, MAG-24.....	20	468	3	7
Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 7, MAG-24.....	11	90	0	5
Marine Fighter Squadron 115, MAG-24.....	35	136	0	3
Marine Fighter Squadron 211, MAG-24.....	29	129	0	2
Marine Fighter Squadron 218, MAG-24.....	30	129	1	3
Marine Night Fighter Squadron 533, MAG-24.....	32	176	1	2
Area Sub-Total.....	186	1,251	7	24

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
<i>East Coast U.S.A.</i>				
<i>Camp Lejeune</i>				
2d Marine Division.....	231	3,373	13	104
2d Air Delivery Platoon.....	1	2	0	0
Transport Company, FMF.....	1	6	0	0
Signal Company (Provisional), FMF.....	2	9	0	0
8th Service Regiment.....	20	283	0	3
Topographic Company, Headquarters and Service Battalion, FMFPac.....	0	4	0	0
1st Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (less Heavy Antiaircraft Group).....	10	65	0	1
2d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (Composite).....	8	79	0	0
3d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (Composite).....	9	229	0	0
Area Sub-Total.....	282	4,050	13	108
<i>Marine Carrier-based Aviation</i>				
<i>On board USS Salerno Bay (CVE-110)</i>				
Marine Fighter Squadron 114, MAG-11.....	29	176	0	2
<i>On board USS Mindoro (CVE-120)</i>				
Marine Fighter Squadron 225, MAG-11.....	26	174	0	2
<i>On board USS Palau (CVE-122)</i>				
Marine Fighter Squadron 461, MAG-11.....	27	180	0	2
Area Sub-Total.....	82	530	0	6
<i>Cherry Point</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 2, 2d MAW.....	60	268	4	9
Marine Wing Service Squadron 2, 2d MAW.....	2	2	0	0
Headquarters Squadron, MACG-1.....	21	240	2	2
Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 5, MACG-1.....	8	6	0	2
Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 6, MACG-1.....	2	1	0	2
Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 8, MACG-1.....	3	3	0	1
Headquarters Squadron 11, MAG-11.....	13	143	2	3
Service Squadron 11, MAG-11.....	14	332	0	5
Headquarters Squadron 14, MAG-14.....	16	44	2	2
Service Squadron 14, MAG-14.....	11	354	1	7

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Marine Fighter Squadron 122, MAG-14.....	5	47	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 212, MAG-14.....	1	31	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 222, MAG-14.....	1	31	0	0
Headquarters Squadron 21, MAG-21.....	18	94	2	4
Service Squadron 21, MAG-21.....	10	362	0	3
Marine Transport Squadron 252, MAG-21.....	31	249	0	2
Marine Transport Squadron 952, MAG-21.....	22	240	0	1
Headquarters Squadron 22, MAG-22.....	6	5	2	8
Service Squadron 22, MAG-22.....	18	895	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 113, MAG-22.....	3	0	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 314, MAG-22.....	2	0	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 422, MAG-22.....	1	0	0	0
Marine Observation Squadron 1, MAG-22.....	2	0	0	0
Headquarters Squadron 53, MAG-53.....	49	573	2	7
Service Squadron 53, MAG-53.....	1	1	0	0
Marine Night Fighter Squadron 531, MAG-53.....	1	1	0	0
Marine Night Fighter Squadron 532, MAG-53.....	1	1	0	0
Marine Photographic Squadron 354, MAG-53.....	2	7	0	0
Area Sub-Total.....	324	3,930	17	58
<i>West Coast U.S.A.</i>				
<i>Camp Pendleton</i>				
3d Marine Brigade (less 3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Reinforced) at Tsingtao).....	76	212	2	41
10th Casual Officer Detachment.....	45	0	0	0
Area Sub-Total.....	121	212	2	41
<i>Marine Carrier-based Aviation</i>				
<i>On board USS Rendova (CVE-114)</i>				
Marine Fighter Squadron 214, MarFAirWest.....	26	152	1	2
<i>On board USS Badoeng Straits (CVE-116)</i>				
Marine Fighter Squadron 452, MarFAirWest.....	29	179	1	2
<i>On board USS Saidor (CVE-117)</i>				
Marine Fighter Squadron 513, MarFAirWest.....	31	179	1	2
Area Sub-Total.....	86	510	3	6

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
<i>El Toro</i>				
Headquarters Squadron, MarFAirWest.....	141	437	6	15
Headquarters Squadron, MACG-2.....	16	42	0	0
Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 3, MACG-2.....	1	1	0	0
Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 4, MACG-2.....	2	1	0	0
Headquarters Squadron 12, MAG-12.....	13	27	0	4
Service Squadron 12, MAG-12.....	15	196	0	2
Headquarters Squadron 25, MAG-25.....	13	71	1	2
Service Squadron 25, MAG-25.....	11	227	0	4
Marine Transport Squadron 152, MAG-25.....	22	213	0	3
Marine Fighter Squadron 224, MAG-32.....	5	40	0	1
Marine Fighter Squadron 311, MAG-32.....	3	0	0	1
Headquarters Squadron 33, MAG-33.....	28	69	0	3
Service Squadron 33, MAG-33.....	13	77	3	9
Marine Fighter Squadron 223, MAG-33.....	37	174	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 312, MAG-33.....	34	174	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 323, MAG-33.....	34	174	0	1
Marine Photographic Squadron 254, MAG-33.....	14	137	0	0
Area Sub-Total.....	402	2,060	10	45
<i>Miramar</i>				
Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1, MACG-2.....	15	256	0	0
Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 2, MACG-2.....	2	1	0	0
Marine Transport Squadron 253, MAG-25.....	29	162	0	2
Headquarters Squadron 31, MAG-31.....	22	65	2	4
Service Squadron 31, MAG-31.....	13	269	0	8
Marine Night Fighter Squadron 534, MAG-31.....	19	161	0	2
Marine Night Fighter Squadron 542, MAG-31.....	12	133	0	3
Headquarters Squadron 32, MAG-32.....	10	166	0	3
Service Squadron 32, MAG-32.....	6	136	0	3
Area Sub-Total.....	128	1,349	2	25
Total Ground (Overseas).....	751	16,450	155	550
Total Air (Overseas).....	522	3,500	17	64
Total Ground (In U.S.A.).....	403	4,262	15	149
Total Air (In U.S.A.).....	1,022	8,411	32	140
Total FMF (Overseas).....	1,273	19,950	172	614
Total FMF (In U.S.A.).....	1,425	12,673	47	289
Total FMF.....	2,698	32,623	219	903

¹ Strength figures and unit designations were abstracted from the FMF Status Reports, Ground and Air, for October 1946 held in the Archives of the Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps. Units en route or ordered to the indicated areas (indicated by an asterisk *) are listed under those areas regardless of their temporary locations.

Table of Organization G-100 Marine Division

4 September 1945 ¹

Unit	USMC		USN		TOTALS	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Division Headquarters.....	(84)	(276)	(4)	(5)	(88)	(281)
Headquarters Battalion.....	161	1,601	19	13	180	1,614
Headquarters Company.....	(95)	(539)	(6)	(9)	(101)	(548)
Signal Company.....	(17)	(331)			(17)	(331)
Military Police Company.....	(6)	(93)			(6)	(93)
Reconnaissance Company.....	(5)	(104)		(4)	(5)	(108)
Assault Signal Company.....	(34)	(418)	(13)		(47)	(418)
War Dog Platoon ²	(1)	(63)			(1)	(63)
Rocket Platoon.....	(3)	(53)			(3)	(53)
Tank Battalion.....	27	586	1	9	28	595
Headquarters and Service Company.....	(12)	(91)	(1)	(9)	(13)	(100)
3 Tank Companies.....	(5)	(165)			(5)	(165)
Service Troops.....	86	1,673	71	417	157	2,090
Service Battalion.....	(37)	(681)	(5)	(9)	(42)	(690)
Headquarters Company.....	(7)	(36)	(5)	(9)	(12)	(45)
Supply Company.....	(8)	(149)			(8)	(149)
Service Company.....	(9)	(267)			(9)	(267)
Ordnance Company.....	(13)	(229)			(13)	(229)
Motor Transport Battalion.....	(48)	(848)	(1)	(9)	(49)	(857)
Headquarters and Service Company.....	(8)	(58)	(1)	(9)	(9)	(67)
Automotive Repair Company.....	(19)	(330)			(19)	(330)
Amphibian Truck Company.....	(5)	(140)			(5)	(140)
4 Truck Companies.....	(4)	(80)			(4)	(80)
Medical Battalion.....	(1)	(144)	(65)	(399)	(66)	(543)
Headquarters and Service Company.....	(1)	(24)	(30)	(49)	(31)	(73)
5 Medical Companies.....		(24)	(7)	(70)	(7)	(94)
Engineer Battalion.....	40	814	1	20	41	834
Headquarters and Service Company.....	(22)	(232)	(1)	(20)	(23)	(252)
3 Engineer Companies.....	(6)	(194)			(6)	(194)
Pioneer Battalion.....	40	665	3	32	43	697
Headquarters and Service Company.....	(13)	(86)	(3)	(32)	(16)	(118)
3 Pioneer Companies.....	(9)	(193)			(9)	(193)
Artillery Regiment.....	177	2,421	8	55	185	2,476
Headquarters and Service Battery.....	(26)	(210)	(4)	(9)	(30)	(219)
155mm Howitzer Battalion.....	(37)	(588)	(1)	(10)	(38)	(598)
Headquarters and Service Battery.....	(16)	(135)	(1)	(10)	(17)	(145)
3 155mm Howitzer Batteries.....	(7)	(151)			(7)	(151)
3 105mm Howitzer Battalions.....	(38)	(541)	(1)	(12)	(39)	(553)
Headquarters and Service Battery.....	(17)	(136)	(1)	(12)	(18)	(148)
3 105mm Howitzer Batteries.....	(7)	(135)			(7)	(135)

Unit	USMC		USN		TOTALS	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
3 Infantry Regiments.....	137	3,130	11	134	148	3,264
Headquarters and Service Company.....	(23)	(207)	(5)	(14)	(28)	(221)
Weapons Company.....	(6)	(169)			(6)	(169)
3 Infantry Battalions.....	(36)	(918)	(2)	(40)	(38)	(958)
Headquarters and Service Company....	(15)	(213)	(2)	(40)	(17)	(253)
3 Rifle Companies.....	(7)	(235)			(7)	(235)
Division Totals.....	942	17,150	136	948	1,078	18,098

¹ All unit strength figures enclosed in parentheses are included in strength totals of parent units.
² These strength figures do not include the 36 dogs assigned to each platoon. Two Marines were assigned to handle each messenger dog, and one Marine for each scout dog.

MAJOR WEAPONS AND TRANSPORTATION—MARINE DIVISION

Weapons	Number	Transportation	Number
Carbine, .30 Cal., M1 or M2.....	10,371	Ambulance:	
Carrier, personnel:		¼-ton, 4 x 4.....	53
Half-track, M3, radio-equipped		½-ton, 4 x 4.....	12
(MAQ).....	1	Car, 5-passenger.....	3
Half-track, M3, radio-equipped		Station wagon, 4 x 4.....	2
(SCR-528).....	4	Tractor:	
Flamethrower:		Miscellaneous.....	91
Mechanized, M3-4-3.....	18	Trailer:	
Portable, M2-2.....	108	¼-ton, cargo.....	219
Gun, 37mm, M3, antitank.....	24	½-ton, dump.....	19
Gun, machine:		1-ton, cargo.....	172
.30 Cal., Browning, M1917A1.....	162	1-ton, water, 300 gallon capacity.....	118
.30 Cal., Browning, M1919A4.....	356	Miscellaneous.....	136
.50 Cal., Browning, heavy barrel,		Truck:	
flexible.....	162	¼-ton, 4 x 4.....	411
Gun, submachine, .45 Cal.,		¼-ton, 4 x 4, with radio.....	124
Thompson, M1A1.....	49	1-ton, 4 x 4, cargo.....	210
Howitzer:		2 ½-ton, 6 x 6, cargo.....	177
105mm, M2A1, w/carriage M2A2.....	36	2 ½-ton, 6 x 6, prime mover.....	84
105mm, M7 or M7B1, motor car-		2 ½-ton, 6 x 5, dump.....	61
riage, w/armament, radio-		Miscellaneous.....	26
equipped (TCS).....	12		
155mm, M1, w/carriage M1 or			
M1A1.....	12		
Launcher, rocket, 2.36-inch, M9A1			
or M18.....	153		
Mortar:			
60mm, M2 or M19.....	117		
81mm, M1.....	36		
Pistol, automatic, .45 Cal., M1911.....	1,707		

Weapons	Number	Transportation	Number
Rifle, Automatic, Browning, .30 Cal., M1918, A2.....	867		
Rifle, U.S., .30 Cal., M1.....	6,261		
Shotgun, Winchester, riot type, 12 gauge, M1912 or M1897.....	306		
Tank:			
Flamethrower, primary armament, w/tank, medium, radio-equipped (SCR-528 and AN/VRC-3).....	9		
Medium, M4A2, or M4A3, radio-equipped (AN/VRC-3 and SCR-508).....	16		
Medium, M4A2 or M4A3, radio-equipped (AN/VRC-3 and SCR-528).....	30		
Vehicle, tank recovery, M32B2 or M32B3, radio-equipped (SCR-528).....	4		

Comparison of Organization, Marine Division¹

Unit	D Series	E Series	F Series	G Series	Notes
Marine Division.....	19,514	19,965	17,465	19,176	
Special Troops.....	3,031	2,317			
HqBn.....	(697)	(851)	1,004	1,794	
HqCo.....	(334)	(420)	(483)	(649)	
SigCo.....	(267)	(340)	(292)	(348)	
MPCo.....	(96)	(101)	(102)	(99)	
ReconCo.....		*	(127)	(113)	*Prior to F-Series T/O, Recon-Co was ScoutCo of Tank Bn
AssltSigCo.....				(465)*	*In May 1945, JASCO reorganized when J(oint) dropped and unit became organic to Marine division.
RocketPlt.....				(56)	
WarDogPlt.....				(64)*	*Not including the 36 dogs assigned to each platoon.
SpecWpnsBn.....	(856)	(757)			
H&SBtry.....	(99)	(102)			
40mmAAABtry.....	(307)	(307)			
90mmAAABtry.....	(126)				
3 AT Btrys.....	(100)	(116)			
Parachute Bn.....	(583)*				*Became Corps Troops unit 15Apr43.

See footnote at end of table.

Unit	D Series	E Series	F Series	G Series	Notes
Lt TankBn.....	(895)	(707)	630	623	*Became 1st, 2d, etc. TankBn w/F-Series.
H&S Co.....	(80)	(85)	(123)	(113)	
Scout Co.....	(175)	(139)*	*Redesignated to Div ReconCo w/F-Series.
4 Tank Cos.....	(160)	(161)*	(169)	(170)	*Reduced to 3 cos. w/E-Series.
Service Troops.....	1,946	2,200	1,889	2,247	
Service Bn.....	(959)	(661)	(751)	(732)	
HqCo.....	(55)	(62)	(68)	(57)	
Serv&SupCo.....	(352)	(455)	(502)	
Service Co.....	(276)	
Supply Co.....	(157)	
OrdCo.....	(109)	(144)	(178)	(242)	
DivTransCo.....	(116)	
3 RegtlTransCos.....	(109)	
MT Bn.....	(527)	(539)	(906)	
H&S Co.....	(188)	(194)	(76)	
3 TransCos.....	(113)	(115)	
AutoRprCo.....	(349)	
AmphibTrkCo.....	(145)	
4 Trk Cos.....	(84)	
MedBn.....	(506)	(526)	(599)	(609)	
H&SCo.....	(16)	(21)	(89)	(104)	
5 MedCos.....	(98)	(101)	(102)	(101)	
AmTracBn.....	(481)	(486)*	*Became Corps Troops unit 5May44.

Unit	D Series	E Series	F Series	G Series	Notes
EngrRegt.....	2,452	2,513*	*EngrRegt as such broken up into an EngrBn and a PionBn on 5May44; Seabees taken away from divisions, to be assigned/attached for specific operations.
H&SCo.....	(273)	(290)	
Engr Bn.....	(614)	(645)	904	875	
HqCo.....	(29)	(60)	(307)	(275)	
3 Engr Cos.....	(195)	(195)	(199)	(200)	
Pioneer Bn.....	(743)	(744)	745	740	
HqCo.....	(119)	(120)	(127)	(134)	
3 PionCos.....	(208)	(208)	(206)	(202)	
Naval ConstBn.....	(822)	(838)	
Artillery Regiment.....	2,581	3,207	2,639	2,661	
H&S Btry.....	(159)	(204)	(229)	(249)	
105mm HowBn.....	(607)	(594)*	(602)	(592)**	*Increased to 2 per regt. **Increased to 3 per regt.
H&S Btry.....	(154)	(150)	(161)	(166)	
3 105mm HowBtrys.....	(151)	(148)	(147)	(142)	
3 75mm PackHowBn.....	(605)	(605)	(603)*	*Reduced to 2 per regt.
155mm HowBn.....	(636)	
H&S Btry.....	(162)	
3 155mm HowBtrys.....	(158)	
3 Infantry Regiments.....	3,168	3,242	3,218	3,412	
H&S Co.....	(173)	(186)	(261)	(249)	
Wpns Co.....	(196)	(197)	(203)	(175)	
3 Infantry Bns.....	(933)	(953)	(918)	(996)	

Unit	D Series	E Series	F Series	G Series	Notes
HqCo.....	(89)	(137)	(213)	(270)	
Wpns Co.....	(273)	(228)	
3 Rifle Cos.....	(183)	(196)	(235)	(242)	

¹ All unit strength figures enclosed in parentheses are included in the strength totals of parent units. For a more complete breakdown of each of the four T/O series noted in this table, see Appendix H, *supra.*, and the appropriate appendices in all previous books in this series with the exception of Volume I. The material in this appendix is derived from the Tables of Organization Subject File (HRS, HistBr, HQMC). The various T/Os were approved on the following dates: D-Series, 1Jul42; E-Series, 15Apr43; F-Series, 5May44; and G-Series, 4Sep45.

Comparison of Equipment, Marine Division¹

Item	D Series	E Series	F Series	G Series	Notes
<i>Weapons</i>					
Carbine, .30 caliber, M-1.....	5,285	11,074	10,953	10,371	
Flamethrower:					
Mechanized, E4-5.....			24		
Mechanized, M3-4-3.....				18	
Portable, M2-2.....		24	243	108	
Gun:					
20mm, AA and AT.....	54				
37mm, M3, AT.....		54	36	24	
37mm, AT, SP.....	20				
40mm, AA and AT.....	16	16			
75mm, AT, SP.....	12	12	12*		*Dropped in favor of 105mm howitzer, M7, SP
Gun, machine:					
.30 caliber, M1917A1.....	544	108	162	162	
.30 caliber, M1919A4.....	656	682	302	356	
.30 caliber, Johnson, light.....	87				
.50 caliber, Browning, heavy barrel, flexible.....	360	343	161	162	
.50 caliber, Browning, water-cooled, flexible.....	32				
Gun, submachine:					
Reising, caliber .45, w/folding stock.....	4,208				
Thompson, caliber .45, M1A1.....		78	49	49	
Howitzer:					
75mm pack.....	36	36	24		
105mm.....	12	24	24	36	
105mm, M7, SP.....				12	
155mm.....				12	
Launcher:					
Grenade, M1.....	456*				*These are for the 456 M1903 rifles in D-Series division.
Rocket, 2.36-inch, AT, M1.....	132	243			
Rocket, M1A1.....			172		
Rocket, M9A1 or A18.....				153	
Mortar:					
60mm.....	63	81	117	117	
81mm.....	36	36	36	36	
Pistol, automatic, .45 cal.....	798	299	399	1,707	

See footnote at end of table.

Item	D Series	E Series	F Series	G Series	Notes
Rifle:					
.30 caliber, M1903.....	456				
.30 caliber, M1.....	7,406	8,030	5,436	6,261	
.30 caliber, automatic, Browning, M1918M2.....	513	558	853	867	
Shotgun, Winchester, riot type, 12-gauge, M1912 or M1897.....		306	306	306	
Tank:					
Army, light, with 37mm gun.....	72	54			
Flamethrower-armed, medium, radio equipped.....				9	
Medium, M4A2 or M4A3.....			46	46	
Light, recovery.....		3			
Medium, recovery.....			3	14	
TRANSPORTATION					
Ambulance:					
¼-ton, 4 x 4.....	21	48	52	53	
½-ton, 4 x 4.....		11	12	12	
Car, 5-passenger.....	3	3	3	3	
Car, Scout, M3A1.....	14				
Station wagon, 4 x 4.....	11	12	3	2	
Tractor:					
Amphibian.....	100	100			
Miscellaneous.....	59	73	71	91	
Trailer:					
¼-ton, cargo.....		92	135	219	
½-ton, dump.....		20	19	19	
1-ton, cargo.....	142	125	155	172	
1-ton, water, 300 gallon capacity.....	62	81	73	118	
Miscellaneous.....	97	123	110	136	
Truck:					
¼-ton, 4 x 4.....	427	375	323	411	
¼-ton, 4 x 4, with radio.....		134	85	124	
1-ton, 4 x 4, cargo.....	238	268	224	210	
1-ton, 4 x 4, with radio.....		22			
1-ton, 4 x 4, reconnaissance.....	30		11		
2 ½-ton, 4 x 4, cargo.....	24	48			
2 ½-ton, 6 x 6, cargo.....	229	198	150	177	
2 ½-ton, 6 x 6, dump.....	33	51	53	61	
2 ½-ton, 6 x 6, prime mover.....				84	
Miscellaneous.....	36	51	68	26	
Total transportation.....	1,494	1,838	1,548	1,918	

¹ The material in this appendix is derived from the D-, E-, F-, and G-Series Marine Division Tables of Organization (Tables of Organization Subject Files, HRS, HistBr, HQMC).

World War II Development of the Marine Infantry Regiment¹

PART 1—INFANTRY REGIMENT T/Os

Unit	D Series	E Series	F Series	G Series	Notes
Infantry Regiment.....	3,168	3,242	3,218	3,412	
H&S Company.....	(173)	(186)	(261)*	(249)	*Company supply section became a service platoon.
Weapons Company.....	(196)	(197)	(203)	(175)	
Company Hq.....	(48)	(69)	(71)	(51)	
75mm SP Gun Platoon.....	(34)	(26)	(36)***	*Increase of two 75mm guns (total of four) in each platoon. **75mm gun platoon replaced by a 105mm howitzer (self-propelled) platoon.
3 AA and AT Platoons.....	(38)				
3 37mm Gun Platoons.....		(34)	(32)	(40)*	*Reduced to two platoons without reduction in number of guns.
105mm SP Howitzer Platoon.....				(44)	
3 Infantry Battalions.....	(933)	(953)	(918)	(996)	
Headquarters Company.....	(111)	(137)	(213)	(270)	
Battalion Hq.....	(75)	(123)	(138)	(131)	
Company Hq.....	(36)	(14)	(17)	(26)	
81mm Mortar Platoon.....			(58)	(58)	
Assault Platoon.....				(55)	
Platoon Hq.....				(10)	
3 Asslt Secs.....				(15)	
SecHq.....				(1)	
2 Asslt Sqds.....				(7)	
Weapons Company.....	(273)	(228)			
Company Hq.....	(29)	(41)			
20mm AA & AT Plt.....	(24)				
81mm Mortar Plt.....	(76)	(58)***		*Platoon strength reduced without reduction of mortars **Mortar platoon placed in battalion headquarters company.
3 Machine Gun Plts.....	(48)	(43)*		*Machine gun platoon placed in rifle company.

See footnote at end of table.

Unit	D Series	E Series	F Series	G Series	Notes
3 Rifle Companies.....	(183)	(196)	(235)	(242)	
Company Headquarters..	(29)	(28)	(53)	(51)	
Hq Sec.....			(33)	(31)	
60mm Mort Sec.....			(20)	(20)	
Weapons Platoon.....	(28)	(39)			
Plt Sec.....	(4)	(4)			
60mm Mort Sec.....	(11)	(16)*			*An additional mortar and machine gun added to platoon; which now consisted of 3 mortars and 3 machine guns.
Lt MG Sec.....	(13)	(19)*			
Machine Gun Plt.....			(44)*	(56)**	*F-Series platoon had 12 machine guns; 6 air-cooled, and 6 water-cooled. **G-Series T/O platoon given an additional two guns.
3 Rifle Platoons.....	(42)	(43)	(46)	(45)	
Platoon Hq.....	(7)	(7)	(7)	(6)	
BAR Squad.....	(8)				
3 Rifle Sqds.....	(9)	(12)*	(13)	(13)	*BAR Sqd dropped; platoon now consists of three rifle squads.

PART 2—INFANTRY REGIMENT EQUIPMENT

Unit	D Series	E Series	F Series	G Series	Notes
WEAPONS					
Carbine, .30 caliber, M1.....	943	1,405	1,794	1,383	
Flamethrower, portable, M2-2.....			81	36	
Gun:					
20mm, AA & AT.....	18				
37mm, AT.....		12	12	8	
75mm, SP.....	2	2	4		
Gun, Machine:					
.30 caliber, M1917A1.....	72	36	54	54	
.30 caliber, M1919A4.....	36	69	65	66	
.50 caliber, heavy-barrel, flexible.....	8	16	12	10	
Gun, submachine, .45 caliber, with folding stock.....	507				
Howitzer, M7, self-propelled.....				4	
Launcher:					
AT.....	47				
grenade, AT, M1.....	97				

Unit	D Series	E Series	F Series	G Series	Notes
rocket, AT, M1.....		53	43		*Carbines replaced Pistols in the infantry and artillery regiments in E- and F-Series T/Os.
rocket, 2.36-inch, M9A1 or A18.....				35	
Mortar:					
60mm.....	18	27	39	39	
81mm.....	12	12	12	12	
Pistol, automatic, .45 caliber.....	17	*	*	408	
Rifle:					
.30 caliber, M1.....	1,385	1,673	1,179	1,393	
.30 caliber, M1903.....	97				
.30 caliber, automatic, Browning, M1918M2.....	162	162	243	243	
Shotgun, 12-gauge.....		100	100	100	
TRANSPORTATION					
Ambulance, ¼-ton, 4 x 4.....		5	5	5	
Station wagon, 4 x 4.....	2	2			
Truck:					
¼-ton, 4 x 4.....	55	48	36	34	
¼-ton, 4 x 4, radio-equipped.....		11	8	12	
1-ton, 4 x 4, cargo.....	8	8	23	20	
1-ton, 4 x 4, light repair.....	1	1	2		

¹ The material in this appendix is derived from the D-, E-, F-, and G-Series Tables of Organization for each of the above units (Tables of Organization Subject File, HRS, HistBr, HQMC).

Marine Task Organization and Command List¹

A. ASSAULT AND OCCUPATION OF OKINAWA GUNTO

(24 March–30 June 1945)²

Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, FMFPac

(27Mar–30Jun45)

CO Maj James L. Jones

III Amphibious Corps Headquarters

CG LtGen Roy S. Geiger (to 30Jun-45)

MajGen Keller E. Rockey (from 30Jun45)

CofS BGen Merwin H. Silverthorn (to 30Jun45)

BGen William A. Worton (from 30Jun45)

G-1 Col Gale T. Cummings

G-2 Col Charles C. Brown

G-3 Col Walter A. Wachtler

G-4 Col Francis B. Loomis, Jr.

¹ Unless otherwise noted, names, positions held, organization titles, and periods of service were taken from the muster rolls of the units concerned, held in the Diary Unit, Files Section, Records Branch, Personnel Department, Headquarters Marine Corps. Units are listed only for those periods, indicated by the dates below parent unit designation, for which they are entitled to campaign participation credit. This information is derived from muster rolls and the U. S. Bureau of Naval Personnel, Navy and Marine Corps Awards Manual—NAVPERS 15,790 (Rev. 1953) with changes (Washington, 1953–1958). The muster rolls have been the final authority when there is a conflict in dates of unit entitlement within the overall campaign period as cited by the Awards Manual. In the case of Marine air units, many of which participated in the campaigns as flight or advance echelons only, the unit commander who was actually in the combat area is shown where muster rolls reveal this information. In order to conserve space, only units of battalion and squadron size, or larger, and sizeable separate detachments are listed for each operation, although smaller organizations may have participated also.

² Unless otherwise indicated, the campaign period for Marine units on Okinawa was 1 April–30 June 1945.

G-5 Col Elmer H. Salzman³

III Amphibious Corps Troops

CO Col Edward G. Hagen (CO, Rear Echelon)

III Amphibious Corps Headquarters and Service Battalion

CO LtCol Harry A. Traffert, Jr.

III Amphibious Corps Medical Battalion

CO LCdr Maurice A. Diehr (MC) (to 29Apr45)

LCdr Donovan C. Blanchard (MC) (29Apr–18Jun45)

Cdr Robert Mazet, Jr. (MC) (from 19Jun45)

III Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion

CO Col Robert L. Peterson

1st Military Police Battalion

CO LtCol Alfred H. Marks

1st Separate Engineer Battalion

CO LtCol Alonzo D. Gorham

11th Motor Transport Battalion

CO LtCol Franklin A. Hayner (to 28Jun45)

LtCol James M. Ranck, Jr. (from 28Jun45)

7th Service Regiment

CO Col Harold E. Rosecrans

ExO LtCol Edwin D. Partridge

S-3 None shown

Headquarters Battalion, 7th Service Regiment

CO LtCol Kenneth L. Moses

³ Additional duty, CO, Corps Service Group.

III Corps Artillery

CG BGen David R. Nimmer
 CofS Col John A. Bemis
 G-3 LtCol Frederick P. Henderson
 (to 16May45)
 LtCol Ernest P. Foley (from
 16May45)

1st Provisional Antiaircraft Artillery Group

(2Apr-30Jun45)
 CO Col Kenneth W. Benner
 ExO LtCol Willard C. Fiske
 S-3 LtCol John F. Dunlap (to 11-
 Jun45)
 LtCol Jack H. Brown (from 11-
 Jun45)

2d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion

(3Apr-30Jun45)
 CO LtCol Max C. Chapman

5th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion

(3May-30Jun45)
 CO LtCol Harry O. Smith, Jr.

8th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion

(17Apr-30Jun45)
 CO LtCol James S. O'Halloran

16th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion

(4Apr-30Jun45)
 CO LtCol August F. Penzold, Jr. (to
 19Jun45)
 LtCol Charles T. Tingle (from
 19Jun45)

2d Provisional Field Artillery Group

CO LtCol Custis Burton, Jr.
 ExO LtCol John S. Twitchell (to
 11May45)
 Maj Alfred L. Owens (11May-
 20Jun45)
 LtCol John S. Twitchell (from
 21Jun45)
 S-3 LtCol Ernest P. Foley (to
 21Apr45)
 LtCol John S. Twitchell (21Apr-
 7May45)
 Maj Alfred L. Owens (8May-
 29Jun45)
 (None shown for 30Jun45)

1st 155mm Howitzer Battalion

CO LtCol George H. Ford

3d 155mm Howitzer Battalion

CO LtCol Robert C. Hiatt

6th 155mm Howitzer Battalion

CO LtCol Lewis A. Jones

7th 155mm Gun Battalion

CO LtCol Guido F. Verbeck, Jr.

8th 155mm Gun Battalion

CO LtCol George V. Hanna, Jr.

9th 155mm Gun Battalion

CO LtCol Merritt Adelman

Headquarters, 1st Marine Division

CG MajGen Pedro A. del Valle
 ADC BGen Louis R. Jones
 CofS Col Robert O. Bare
 G-1 LtCol Harold O. Deakin
 G-2 LtCol John W. Scott, Jr.
 G-3 LtCol Russell E. Honsowetz
 G-4 LtCol Harvey C. Tschirgi

Division Headquarters Battalion

CO LtCol James S. Monahan (to
 20May45)
 (None shown 20-23May45)
 Col Kenneth B. Chappell (24-
 31May45)
 (None shown 1-23Jun45)
 LtCol John D. Muncie (from
 24Jun45)

1st Engineer Battalion

CO Maj Theodore E. Drummond

1st Medical Battalion

CO LCdr Francis Giuffrida (MC)

1st Motor Transport Battalion

CO LtCol Marion A. Fawcett (to
 15Apr45)
 (None shown 15-17Apr45)
 LtCol Calvin C. Gaines (from
 18Apr45)

1st Pioneer Battalion

CO LtCol Robert G. Ballance

1st Service Battalion

CO LtCol Calvin C. Gaines (to 18Apr45)
Col John Kaluf (WIA 6Apr45,⁴ from 18Apr45)

1st Tank Battalion

CO LtCol Arthur J. Stuart (WIA 13Jun45)

3d Armored Amphibian Battalion (Provisional)

CO LtCol John I. Williamson, Jr.

1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion

CO LtCol Maynard M. Nohrden

8th Amphibian Tractor Battalion

CO LtCol Charles B. Nerren (to 14Apr45)
Maj Bedford Williams (14-17-Apr45)
LtCol Charles B. Nerren (from 18Apr45)

1st Marines

CO Col Kenneth B. Chappell (to 6May45)
Col Arthur T. Mason (from 6May45)
ExO LtCol Richard P. Ross, Jr. (to 21May45)
LtCol James S. Monahan (from 21May45)
S-3 Maj Bernard T. Kelly (WIA 5Apr45,⁵ to 22Apr45)

Maj Jonas M. Platt (from 22-Apr45)

1st Battalion, 1st Marines

CO LtCol James C. Murray, Jr. (WIA 9May45)
LtCol Richard P. Ross, Jr. (10-13May45)
LtCol Austin C. Shofner (from 13May45)

2d Battalion, 1st Marines

CO LtCol James C. Magee, Jr.

3d Battalion, 1st Marines

CO LtCol Stephen V. Sabol (to 21May45)
LtCol Richard P. Ross, Jr. (from 21May45)

5th Marines

CO Col John H. Griebel (to 25Jun45)
Col Julian N. Frisbie (from 25Jun45)
ExO LtCol John D. Muncie (to 26Jun45)
LtCol Robert E. Hill (from 26Jun45)
S-3 Maj James H. Flagg

1st Battalion, 5th Marines

CO LtCol Charles W. Shelburne

2d Battalion, 5th Marines

CO LtCol William E. Benedict (to 21Jun45)
Maj Richard T. Washburn (from 21Jun45)

3d Battalion, 5th Marines

CO Maj John H. Gustafson (WIA 1Apr45)
LtCol John C. Miller, Jr. (4Apr-16May45)
Maj Frank W. Poland, Jr. (17-May-8Jun45)
LtCol Robert E. Hill (9-24Jun45)
LtCol Joseph L. Winecoff (from 25Jun45)

7th Marines

CO Col Edward W. Snedeker
ExO LtCol James M. Masters, Sr.
S-3 Maj Walter Holomon (to 23-May45)
LtCol Stephen V. Sabol (23May-19Jun45)
(None shown 20-25Jun45)
1stLt Charles E. Crow (from 26-Jun45)

1st Battalion, 7th Marines

CO LtCol John J. Gormley

2d Battalion, 7th Marines

CO LtCol Spencer S. Berger

⁴ WIA; records show returned to duty.

⁵ Not evacuated.

3d Battalion, 7th Marines

CO LtCol Edward H. Hurst (WIA,
19Jun45)
LtCol Stephen V. Sabol (from
19Jun45)

11th Marines

CO Col Wilburt S. Brown
ExO LtCol Edson L. Lyman
S-3 Maj Charles D. Harris

1st Battalion, 11th Marines

CO LtCol Richard W. Wallace

2d Battalion, 11th Marines

CO LtCol James H. Moffatt, Jr.

3d Battalion, 11th Marines

CO LtCol Thomas G. Roe

4th Battalion, 11th Marines

CO LtCol Leonard F. Chapman, Jr.

*8th Marines (Reinforced), 2d Marine Division
(1-30Jun45)*

CO Col Clarence R. Wallace (to
29Jun45)
Col James F. Shaw, Jr. (from
29Jun45)
ExO LtCol Martin S. Rahiser
S-3 Maj William C. Chamberlin
(WIA, 18Jun45)

1st Battalion, 8th Marines

CO LtCol Richard W. Hayward

2d Battalion, 8th Marines

CO LtCol Harry A. Waldorf

3d Battalion, 8th Marines

CO LtCol Paul E. Wallace

2d Battalion, 10th Marines

CO LtCol Richard G. Weede

2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion

CO Maj Fenlon A. Durand

Headquarters, 6th Marine Division

CG MajGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.
(WIA, 16May45)
ADC BGen William T. Clement
CofS Col John C. McQueen

G-1 Maj Addison B. Overstreet

G-2 LtCol Thomas E. Williams

G-3 LtCol Victor H. Krulak

G-4 LtCol August Larson (to 17May-
45)

LtCol Wayne H. Adams (from
17May45)

Division Headquarters Battalion

CO LtCol Floyd A. Stephenson

6th Engineer Battalion

CO Maj Paul F. Sackett

6th Medical Battalion

CO Cdr John S. Cowan (MC)

6th Motor Transport Battalion

CO LtCol Ernest H. Gould

6th Pioneer Battalion

CO LtCol Samuel R. Shaw (to 11-
May45)
Maj John G. Dibble (Acting, 11-
May-8Jun45)
LtCol Samuel R. Shaw (9-18Jun-
45)
Maj John G. Dibble (19-24Jun-
45)
LtCol Samuel R. Shaw (from 25-
Jun45)

6th Service Battalion

CO LtCol George B. Bell (to 26Apr-
45)
LtCol Alexander N. Entringer
(from 26Apr45)

6th Tank Battalion

CO LtCol Robert L. Denig, Jr.

1st Armored Amphibian Battalion

CO LtCol Louis Metzger (to 22Jun-
45)
Maj Richard G. Warga (from 22-
Jun45)

4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion

CO LtCol Clovis C. Coffman

9th Amphibian Tractor Battalion

CO Maj Theodore E. Watson

4th Marines

CO Col Alan Shapley
 ExO LtCol Fred D. Beans (to 14Apr-45)
 (None shown 14-30Apr45)
 LtCol Fred D. Beans (from 1-May45)
 S-3 Maj Orville V. Bergren

1st Battalion, 4th Marines

CO Maj Bernard W. Green (KIA, 15-Apr45)
 LtCol Fred D. Beans (15Apr-1-May45)
 LtCol George B. Bell (from 1-May45, WIA 4Jun45)

2d Battalion, 4th Marines

CO LtCol Reynolds H. Hayden (to 27-May45)
 Maj Edgar F. Carney, Jr. (from 27May45)

3d Battalion, 4th Marines

CO LtCol Bruno A. Hochmuth

22d Marines

CO Col Merlin F. Schneider (to 17-May45)
 Col Harold C. Roberts (from 17-May45, KIA 18June45)
 LtCol August Larson (18-23Jun-45)
 Col John D. Blanchard (from 24-Jun45)
 ExO Col Karl K. Louther (to 17May-45)
 LtCol August Larson (17May-17Jun45)
 LtCol John B. Baker (18-20Jun-45)
 LtCol Samuel R. Shaw (21-23-Jun45)
 LtCol August Larson (from 24-Jun45)
 S-3 LtCol John B. Baker (to 18Jun45)
 LtCol Walter H. Stephens (18-20Jun45)
 LtCol John B. Baker (21-27Jun-45)
 LtCol Walter H. Stephens (from 28Jun45)

1st Battalion, 22d Marines

CO Maj Thomas J. Myers (KIA 15-May45)
 Maj Earl J. Cook (from 15May45, WIA 17 Jun45)
 LtCol Gavin C. Humphrey (from 17Jun45)

2d Battalion, 22 Marines

CO LtCol Horatio C. Woodhouse, Jr. (KIA 30May45)
 LtCol John G. Johnson (from 31-May45)

3d Battalion, 22d Marines

CO LtCol Malcolm "O" Donohoo (WIA 16May45)
 Maj George B. Kantner (16-19-May45)
 LtCol Clair W. Shisler (from 20-May45)

29th Marines

CO Col Victor F. Bleasdale (to 15-Apr45)
 Col William J. Whaling (from 15Apr45)
 ExO LtCol Orin K. Pressley
 S-3 LtCol Angus M. Fraser (to 14-Jun45)
 LtCol George W. Killen (from 14Jun45)

1st Battalion, 29th Marines

CO LtCol Jean W. Moreau (WIA 16-May45)
 Maj Robert P. Neuffer (16-25-May45)
 LtCol Samuel S. Yeaton (26May-14June65)
 LtCol LeRoy P. Hunt, Jr. (from 15Jun45)

2d Battalion, 29th Marines

CO LtCol William G. Robb (WIA 19-Apr45)

3d Battalion, 29th Marines

CO LtCol Erma A. Wright (to 15-Jun45)
 LtCol Angus M. Fraser (from 15Jun45)

15th Marines

CO Col Robert B. Luckey
 ExO LtCol James H. Brower
 S-3 Maj William H. Hirst

1st Battalion, 15th Marines

CO Maj Robert H. Armstrong

2d Battalion, 15th Marines

CO Maj Nat M. Pace

3d Battalion, 15th Marines

CO LtCol Joe C. McHaney

4th Battalion, 15th Marines

CO LtCol Bruce T. Hemphill

*2d Marine Aircraft Wing**(Tactical Air Force, Tenth Army)*

CG MajGen Francis P. Mulcahy (to
 11Jun45)
 MajGen Louis E. Woods (from
 11Jun45)
 CofS Col Hayne D. Boyden
 G-1 Capt Robert E. Coddington
 G-2 Maj David B. Decker
 G-3 Col Perry O. Parmelee
 G-4 LtCol Charles T. Young, III
 (WIA 20Apr45)
 Capt William L. Woodruff (from
 11Jun45)

CO, Hq-
 Sqn-2 Capt Richard F. Hyland

Air Defense Command

CG BGen William J. Wallace
 CofS Col Ford O. Rogers
 G-3 Col Boeker C. Batterton

Marine Aircraft Group 14

(29May-30Jun45)

CO Col Edward A. Montgomery
 ExO LtCol Curtis E. Smith, Jr. (to
 25Jun45)
 LtCol Carl W. Nelson (from 25-
 Jun45)
 GruOpsO ... LtCol Robert H. Richard
 CO, Hq-
 Sqn-14 ... Capt Robert M. Crooks
 CO,
 SMS-14 . Maj Francis H. Smythe (to 8Jun-
 45)
 Maj Julius W. Ireland (from 8-
 Jun45)

Marine Aircraft Group 22

(12May-30Jun45)

CO Col Daniel W. Torrey, Jr.
 ExO LtCol Elmer A. Wrenn (to 23-
 Jun45)
 LtCol Curtis E. Smith (from 23-
 Jun45)
 GruOpsO ... Maj Thomas C. Colt, Jr. (to 26-
 Jun45)
 LtCol Nathan T. Post (from 26-
 Jun45)
 CO, Hq-
 Sqn-22 ... Capt Lindsay K. Dickey
 CO,
 SMS-22... Maj Bruce Prosser

Marine Aircraft Group 31

CO Col John C. Munn
 ExO LtCol Gordon E. Hendricks (to
 21Jun45)
 LtCol Kirk Armistead (from 22-
 Jun45)
 GruOpsO ... LtCol Kirk Armistead (to 22Jun-
 45)
 Maj Charles M. Kunz (from 22-
 Jun45)
 CO, Hq-
 Sqn-31 ... Maj Leon A. Danco (to 14May45)
 1stLt Frederick L. Donnelly
 (from 14May45)

CO,
 SMS-31... Maj Archibald M. Smith (to 29-
 Apr45)
 Maj Paul T. Johnston (29Apr-
 1Jun45)
 Maj Joseph A. Gray (from 2Jun-
 45)

Marine Aircraft Group 33

CO Col Ward E. Dickey
 ExO LtCol James L. Beam
 GruOpsO ... LtCol Eschol M. Mallory
 CO, Hq-
 Sqn-33 ... Capt Richard Kilbourne
 CO,
 SMS-33 . Maj Hugh B. Calahan

Marine Aircraft Group 43

CO LtCol Robert O. Bisson
 ExO (Not shown)
 GruOpsO ... LtCol Radford C. West
 CO, Hq-
 Sqn-43 ... Maj William F. Feasley

<i>Marine Air Warning Squadron 1</i> (18Apr-30Jun45)		Maj Robert C. Hammond, Jr. (31-May-14Jun45)	
CO	Capt Edward R. Stainback	Maj Allen T. Barnum (from 15-Jun45)	
<i>Marine Observation Squadron 2</i> (1-15Apr45)		<i>Marine Torpedo Bomber Squadron 232</i> (1May-30Jun45)	
CO	Capt John A. Ambler	CO	Maj Allan L. Feldmeier
<i>Marine Observation Squadron 3</i>		<i>Marine Fighter Squadron 311</i> (1May-30Jun45)	
CO	Capt Wallace J. Slappey, Jr.	CO	Maj Perry L. Shuman (to 15Jun-45)
<i>Marine Air Warning Squadron 6</i> (17Apr-30Jun45)		Maj Michael R. Yunck (from 15-Jun45)	
CO	Capt Clarence C. Gordon	<i>Fight Echelon, Marine Fighter Squadron 312</i> (9Apr-30Jun45)	
<i>Marine Observation Squadron 6</i>		CO	Maj Richard M. Day (MIA, 14-May45)
CO	Capt Donald R. Garrett	Maj Hugh I. Russell (14-24May-45)	
<i>Marine Air Warning Squadron 7</i>		Maj "J" Frank Cole (from 25-May45)	
CO	Capt Paul E. Bardet	<i>Marine Fighter Squadron 314</i> (24May-30Jun45)	
<i>Marine Observation Squadron 7</i> (6May-30Jun45)		CO	Maj Robert C. Cameron
CO	Capt William A. Seward	<i>Flight Echelon, Marine Fighter Squadron 322</i> (9Apr-30Jun45)	
<i>Marine Air Warning Squadron 8</i>		CO	Maj Frederick M. Rauschenbach (to 31May45)
CO	Maj Frank B. Freese	Maj Walter E. Lischeid (from 31May45)	
<i>Marine Air Warning Squadron 11</i>		<i>Flight Echelon, Marine Fighter Squadron 323</i> (9Apr-30Jun45)	
CO	Capt John L. Carnegie	CO	Maj George C. Axtell, Jr. (to 15-Jun45)
<i>Marine Fighter Squadron 113</i> (21May-30Jun45)		(None shown 15Jun45)	
CO	Maj Hensley Williams	Maj Martin E. W. Oelrich (from 16Jun45)	
<i>Marine Torpedo Bomber Squadron 131</i> (29May-30Jun45)		<i>Marine Fighter Squadron 422</i> (23May-30Jun45)	
CO	Maj Douglas H. Bangert	CO	Maj Elkin S. Dew
<i>Marine Fighter Squadron 212</i> (29May-30Jun45)		<i>Flight Echelon, Marine Fighter Squadron 441</i> (7Apr-30Jun45)	
CO	Maj John P. McMahon	CO	Maj Robert O. White (to 20Jun-45)
<i>Marine Fighter Squadron 222</i> (10-30Jun45)		Maj Paul T. Johnston (from 20-Jun45)	
CO	Maj Harold A. Harwood		
<i>Marine Fighter Squadron 223</i> (24-30Jun45)			
CO	Maj Howard E. King		
<i>Marine Fighter Squadron 224</i> (1May-30Jun45)			
CO	Maj James W. Poindexter (to 31-May45)		

Marine Night Fighter Squadron 533

(10May-30Jun45)

CO LtCol Marion M. Magruder

Flight Echelon, Marine Night Fighter Squadron 542

(7Apr-30Jun45)

CO Maj William C. Kellum (to 22-May45)

(None shown 23May45)

Maj Robert B. Porter (from 24-May45)

Flight Echelon, Marine Night Fighter Squadron 543

(6Apr-30Jun45)

CO Maj Clair "C" Chamberlain (to 18Jun45)

Maj James B. Maguire, Jr. (from 18Jun45)

Landing Force Air Support Control Unit 1

CO Col Kenneth H. Weir (to 16May-45)

Col Avery R. Kier (from 16-May45)

Landing Force Air Support Control Unit 2

CO LtCol Kenneth D. Kerby (to 21-May45)

LtCol Etheridge C. Best (from 21May45)

Landing Force Air Support Control Unit 3

CO Col Avery R. Kier (to 16May45)

Col Kenneth H. Weir (from 16-May45)

B. OCCUPATION OF JAPAN^a

(2Sep45-27Apr52)

*Yokosuka Landing and Occupation**Fleet Landing Force (Task Force Alpha)*

(2-6Sep45)

CG BGen William T. Clement

CofS LtCol Louis Metzger

S-1 Capt John R. Thek

S-3 Maj Orville V. Bergren

S-4 LtCol Theodore F. Beeman

4th Marines RCT

(2Sep-31Dec45)

CO LtCol Fred D. Beans

ExO LtCol Bruno A. Hochmuth

S-3 LtCol Robert W. Rickert (to 13-Sep45)

Maj Orville V. Bergren (13Sep-10Nov45)

LtCol George B. Bell (11Nov-1Dec45)

2dLt David M. Mixer (from 2-Dec45)

1st Battalion, 4th Marines

(2Sep-31Dec45)

CO LtCol George B. Bell (to 11Nov-45)

Maj Orville V. Bergren (from 11-Nov45)

2d Battalion, 4th Marines

(2Sep-31Dec45)

CO Maj Edgar F. Carney, Jr.

3d Battalion, 4th Marines

(2Sep45-14Feb46)

CO Maj Wilson E. Hunt

1st Battalion, 15th Marines

(2-15Sep45)

CO LtCol Walter S. Osipoff

Third Fleet Marine Landing Force

(2-6Sep45)

CO LtCol William F. Lantz (to 4Sep-45)

LtCol Harvey B. Atkins (from 4-Sep45)

ExO Maj Gerald L. Eagleburger

S-3 Capt Steve J. Cibik

1st Battalion, Third Fleet Marine Landing Force

CO Cdr Charles H. Becker, USN

2d Battalion, Third Fleet Marine Landing Force

CO LtCol Harvey B. Atkins (to 4Sep-45)

Capt Thomas H. Barry (from 4-Sep45)

3d Battalion, Third Fleet Marine Landing Force

CO Maj Norman A. Miller, Jr.

^a Unless otherwise indicated, the period of occupation for Marine units in Japan was 2 September 1945-27 April 1952.

2d Separate Guard Battalion (Provisional)
(15Feb-14Jun45)

CO LtCol Bruno A. Hochmuth

*Marine Detachment, U. S. Fleet Activities,
Yokosuka, Japan*
(15Jun45-30Apr47)

CO LtCol Bruno A. Hochmuth

Marine Barracks, Yokosuka, Japan

(1May47-26Jun50)

CO LtCol Bruno A. Hochmuth (to 31May47)

Col William S. Fellers (31May47-23May48)

LtCol John B. Heles (24May-14Jul48)

Col Alva B. Lasswell (15Jul48-23Jun50)

LtCol Robert C. Burns (from 23-Jun50)

Kyushu Landing and Occupation

V Amphibious Corps

(2Sep45-7Jan46)

CG MajGen Harry Schmidt

CofS BGen William W. Rogers (to 21-Dec45)

Col Dudley S. Brown (from 21-Dec45)

G-1 Col David A. Stafford

G-2 (None shown to 24Oct45)

LtCol Gooderham L. McCormick (from 24Oct45)

G-3 Col Walter W. Wensinger (to 21-Dec45)

(None shown after 21Dec45)

G-4 Col Matthew C. Horner (to 18-Dec45)

LtCol John M. Davis (from 18-Dec45)

V Amphibious Corps Troops

CO Col Alton A. Gladden

2d Marine Division

(16Sep45-7Jul46)

CG MajGen LeRoy P. Hunt

ADC BGen John T. Walker (to 29Apr-46)

(None shown after 29Apr46)

CofS Col George F. Good (to 6Nov45)
Col Gregon A. Williams (from 6-Nov45)

G-1 LtCol Glenn R. Long

G-2 Col Jack P. Juhan (to 31Oct45)
LtCol Harry O. Smith, Jr. (from 31Oct45)

G-3 LtCol Samuel G. Taxis (to 13-Apr46)

LtCol Michael S. Currin (from 13Apr46)

G-4 LtCol Jacob G. Goldberg (to 28-Jan46)

(None shown 28Jan46)

Col James O. Brauer (from 29-Jan46)

Division Headquarters Battalion

(16Sep45-7Jul46)

CO LtCol Bennett J. Clarke (to 15-Oct45)

LtCol Clarence J. O'Donnell (15-24Oct45)

LtCol Francis J. McQuillen (25-Oct45-7Jan46)

LtCol Francis C. Claggett (8-26Jan46)

LtCol Bennet G. Powers (27Jan-2May46)

LtCol William P. Spencer (from 3May46)

2d Engineer Battalion

(23Sep45-25Jun46)

CO Maj Richardson D. Kirkpatrick (to 6Oct45)

LtCol John H. Partridge (6Oct-45-17Apr46)

(None shown 18-24Apr46)

LtCol Kenneth P. Corson (25Apr-24Jun46)

Maj Harry D. Clarke (from 25-Jun46)

2d Medical Battalion

(23Sep45-23Jun46)

CO Cdr George Donabedian (MC) (to 22Oct45)

Cdr Joseph A. Clinton (MC) (22Oct-29Nov45)

LCdr Robert F. Sterner (MC) (30Nov45-26Jan46)

Cdr John J. Tordoff (MC) (from
26Jan46)

2d Motor Transport Battalion
(23Sep45-7Jul46)

CO Maj Joseph A. Meyer (to 31Jan-
46)
LtCol Alan T. Hunt (31Jan-
12Apr46)
LtCol George N. Carroll (from
13Apr46)

2d Pioneer Battalion
(23Sep45-7Jul46)

CO Maj Victor J. Simpson (to 5Oct-
45)
LtCol Tom C. Loomis (5Oct-
14Nov45)
LtCol William I. Phipps (15Nov-
45-25Jan46)
LtCol Donn "C" Hart (from 26-
Jan46)

2d Service Battalion
(23Sep45-7Jul46)

CO Col Cyril A. Martyr (to 1Nov45)
LtCol Donald C. Merker (1-30-
Nov45)
Col Lewis A. Horn (from 1Dec-
45)

2d Tank Battalion
(23Sep45-23Jun46)

CO LtCol John I. Williamson, Jr.

2d Marines
(23Sep45-12Jun46)

CO Col Richard M. Cutts, Jr. (to 25-
Oct45)
LtCol Clarence J. O'Donnell (25-
Oct45-17Apr46)
LtCol Ronald B. Wilde (from 18-
Apr46)
ExO LtCol Francis J. McQuillen (to
25Oct45)
LtCol Ronald B. Wilde (25Oct-
45-9Apr46)
LtCol John A. Anderson (from
10Apr46)
S-3 Maj Duncan H. Jewell

1st Battalion, 2d Marines
(23Sep45-12Jun46)

CO LtCol Clayton O. Totman (to 22-
Nov45)
LtCol John A. Anderson (25Nov-
45-8Apr46)
LtCol William M. Barba (9Apr-
31May46)
LtCol Robert C. McDonough
(from 1Jun46)

2d Battalion, 2d Marines
(23Sep45-12Jun46)

CO LtCol Carlo A. Rovetta (to 15-
Feb46)
LtCol Clarke J. Bennett (from
15Feb46)

3d Battalion, 2d Marines
(23Sep45-26Feb46)

CO LtCol Walter F. Layer (to 23-
Oct45)
LtCol Clarke J. Bennett (from
23Oct45)⁷

6th Marines

(23Sep45-30Jun46)
CO Col Gregon A. Williams (to 6Nov-
45)
Col Jack P. Juhan (6Nov45-24-
Jan46)
Col James P. Berkeley (25Jan-
26Mar46)
Col John F. Hough (from 27Mar-
46)
ExO LtCol Edmund B. Games (to 23-
Oct45)
LtCol Donald W. Fuller (23Oct-
45-26Apr46)
LtCol William R. Collins (from
27Apr46)
S-3 Maj William S. McLaughlin (to
3Oct45)
LtCol Donald W. Fuller (3-22-
Oct45)
(None shown 23-28Oct45)
Maj Frederick R. Smith (from
29Oct45)

⁷ Apparently in the phase-outs of the 3d battalions of the infantry regiments, when the 3d battalion commander was assigned as commander of the 2d battalion, as in this case, the officer wore two hats for a while.

1st Battalion, 6th Marines

(23Sep45-30Jun46)

CO LtCol Richard D. Strickler (to
25Apr46)
LtCol Wade M. Jackson (25Mar-
15Jun46)
Maj James R. Blackwell (from
16Jun46)

2d Battalion, 6th Marines

(23Sep45-29Jul46)

CO LtCol James R. Clarke (to 28-
Apr46)
LtCol Donald W. Fuller (from 28-
Apr46)

3d Battalion, 6th Marines

(23Sep45-29Jul46)

CO LtCol George D. Rich

8th Marines

(24Sep45-14Jun46)

CO Col Thomas G. McFarland
ExO LtCol Martin S. Rahiser (to 8-
Dec45)
(None shown 8-11Dec45)
LtCol Alan T. Hunt (12Dec45-
15Jan46)
LtCol Richard W. Hayward (from
16Jan46)
S-3 Maj John I. Warner, Jr. (to 14-
Dec45)
(None shown 14-29Dec45)
Maj Donald R. Kennedy (from
30Dec45)

1st Battalion, 8th Marines

(24Sep45-14Jun46)

CO LtCol Richard W. Hayward (to
10Jan46)
LtCol Robert S. Howell (from 10-
Jan46)

2d Battalion, 8th Marines

(24Sep45-14Jun46)

CO LtCol Herbert R. Nussbaum (to
28Jan46)
Maj William H. Junghans, Jr.
(28Jan-12Feb46)
LtCol Paul E. Wallace (from 27-
Feb46)

3d Battalion, 8th Marines

(24Sep45-26Feb46)

CO LtCol Paul E. Wallace

10th Marines

(24Sep45-25Jun46)

CO Col Saville T. Clark
ExO LtCol Edward H. Forney
S-3 LtCol William C. Capehart (to
16Mar46)
LtCol Claude S. Sanders, Jr.
(from 16Mar46)

1st Battalion, 10th Marines

(24Sep45-25Jun46)

CO Maj Joe B. Russell (to 20Oct45)
LtCol Charles O. Rogers (from
20Oct45)

2d Battalion, 10th Marines

(24Sep45-25Jun46)

CO LtCol John P. Leonard, Jr.

3d Battalion, 10th Marines

(24Sep45-25Jun46)

CO LtCol Loren S. Fraser (to 15Apr-
46)
LtCol Noah P. Wood, Jr. (from
15Apr46)

4th Battalion, 10th Marines

(24Sep45-25Jun46)

CO Maj Marshall J. Hooper (to 1-
Apr46)
LtCol Henry E. W. Barnes (from
1Apr46)

5th Marine Division

(22Sep-15Dec45)

CG MajGen Thomas E. Bourke
ADC BGen Ray A. Robinson
CofS Col Clarence R. Wallace
G-1 LtCol Warner T. Bigger
G-2 LtCol George A. Roll (to 29Nov-
45)
(None shown after 29Nov45)
G-3 LtCol Frederick R. Dowsett (to
29Nov45)
Maj Virgil W. Banning (from
29Nov45)
G-4 LtCol Russell Duncan (to 1Nov
45)
LtCol Frank C. DeSantis (from
1Nov45)

Division Headquarters Battalion

(22Sep-15Dec45)

CO LtCol Charles E. Shepard, Jr.

5th Engineer Battalion

(22Sep-15Dec45)

CO Maj William S. Kelley, Jr. (to 31Oct45)

(None shown 1-13Nov)

LtCol Michael C. Sodano (from 14Nov45)

5th Motor Transport Battalion

(22Sep-15Dec45)

CO Maj Arthur F. Torgler, Jr. (to 12Nov45)

Maj George Moore (from 12Nov-45)

5th Medical Battalion

(22Sep-15Dec45)

CO Cdr John E. Gorman (MC) (to 24Oct45)

LCdr Thomas C. Butt (MC) (from 24Oct45)

5th Pioneer Battalion

(22Sep-15Dec45)

CO LtCol Robert S. Riddell

5th Service Battalion

(22Sep-15Dec45)

CO Col Bernard Dubel

5th Tank Battalion

(22Sep-15Dec45)

CO LtCol William R. Collins

26th Marines

(22Sep-19Oct45)

CO Col Chester B. Graham

ExO LtCol Joseph P. Sayers

S-3 Maj Albert V. K. Gary

1st Battalion, 26th Marines

(22Sep-19Oct45)

CO LtCol Daniel C. Pollock

2d Battalion, 26th Marines

(22Sep-31Oct45)

CO Maj Amadeo Rea

3d Battalion, 26th Marines

(22Sep-19Oct45)

CO LtCol William K. Davenport, Jr.

27th Marines

(22Sep-5Dec45)

CO Col Thomas A. Wornham (to 24-Nov45)

Col Robert H. Williams (from 24Nov45)

ExO LtCol Donn J. Robertson

S-3 Capt Franklin L. Smith (to 29-Nov45)

(None shown after 29Nov45)

1st Battalion, 27th Marines

(22Sep-5Dec45)

CO Maj Gerald F. Russell

2d Battalion, 27th Marines

(22Sep-5Dec45)

CO LtCol John W. Antonelli

3d Battalion, 27th Marines

(22Sep-5Dec45)

CO LtCol George R. Stallings

28th Marines

(22Sep-5Dec45)

CO Col Harry P. Liversedge

ExO Col Robert H. Williams (to 23-Nov45)

(None shown after 23Nov45)

S-3 Maj Henry R. Rolph (to 23Oct45)
Capt Fred E. Haynes, Jr. (23-Oct-29Nov45)

(None shown after 29Nov45)

1st Battalion, 28th Marines

(22Sep-5Dec45)

CO LtCol Jackson B. Butterfield (to 9Nov45)

(None shown 9-11Nov45)

Maj William A. Wood (from 12 Nov45)

2d Battalion, 28th Marines

(22Sep-5Dec45)

CO LtCol Robert C. McDonough

3d Battalion, 28th Marines

(22Sep-5Dec45)

CO Maj Tolson A. Smoak

13th Marines
(22Sep-18Dec45)
CO Col James D. Waller (to 18Oct-45)
LtCol Edwin C. Ferguson (acting 18-23Oct45)
Col John A. Bemis (from 24Oct-45)
ExO LtCol Edwin C. Ferguson
S-3 LtCol Jack Tabor (to 19Oct45)
Maj James R. Crockett (from 19-Oct45)

1st Battalion, 13th Marines
(22Sep-18Dec45)
CO Maj James F. Coady

2d Battalion, 13th Marines
(22Sep-18Dec45)
CO Maj Carl W. Hjerpe (to 6Oct45)
Maj William W. Mitchell (from 6Oct45)

3d Battalion, 13th Marines
(22Sep-18Dec45)
CO Maj William M. Miller

4th Battalion, 13th Marines
(22Sep-18Dec45)
CO LtCol John S. Oldfield

Marine Aircraft Group 22
(20Sep-19Nov45)
CO Col Daniel W. Torrey, Jr. (to 21-Oct45)
Col Elliott E. Bard (21Oct-10-Nov45)
LtCol Jack R. Cram (from 11Nov-45)
ExO LtCol Nathan T. Post (to 9Nov-45)
(None shown after 9Nov45)
GruOpsO ... LtCol Elkin S. Dew
CO, Hq-
Sqn-22 ... 1stLt Paul M. Ruffner
CO,
SMS-22 . Maj Bruce Prosser

Marine Aircraft Group 31
(7Sep45-20Jun46)
CO Col John C. Munn (to 7Apr46)
Col John N. Hart (from 7Apr46)

ExO LtCol Jack R. Cram (to 6Nov45)
LtCol Clyde P. Mattison (8Nov-45-4Feb46)
LtCol John P. Condon (from 5-Feb46)
GruOpsO ... LtCol Kirk Armistead (to 14Dec-45)
LtCol Nathan T. Post (from 14-Dec45)
CO, Hq-
Sqn-31 ... Capt Thomas D. Stockwell, Jr. (to 8Jan46)
Capt Rudolph L. Bittman (from 8Jan46)

CO,
SMS-31 . Maj Joseph A. Gray (to 1Dec45)
LtCol Wayne M. Cargill (1Dec-45-30Jan46)
LtCol William A. Cloman, Jr. (31Jan-9Jun46)
Maj Frank M. Maerz (from 10-Jun46)

Marine Air Base Squadron (Provisional), Omura, Japan
(13Nov45-15Jan46)
CO Col Bernard L. Smith

Marine Observation Group 1
(23Sep45-7Jan46)
CO Maj John W. Ryland (to 6Nov-45)
Capt Richard T. Smith (acting, 6-30Nov45)
(None shown 1-10Dec45)
Capt Richard T. Smith (from 11-Dec45)
ExO Capt Richard T. Smith (to 6Nov-45)
(None shown after 6Nov45)
GruOpsO ... 1stLt Eugene "A" Wailes (to 6-Nov45)
1st Lt Cloyd E. Waters (6-30Nov-45)
(None shown after 30Nov45)

Marine Observation Squadron 2
(25Sep45-20Jun46)
CO Capt John E. Lepke (to 31Oct-45)
1stLt Willis B. Anderson (31Oct-5Nov45)

1stLt Eugene "A" Wailes (7Nov-45-1Jan46)

Capt Joseph J. Callis (2-28Jan-46)

Maj Frank L. Maerz (29Jan-4-Jun46)

Capt Eugene "A" Wailes (from 5Jun46)

Marine Observation Squadron 5

(22Sep45-7Jan46)

CO Capt Gordon Walker (to 31Oct-45)

Capt Joseph J. Callis (31Oct45-1Jan46)

(None shown after 1Jan46)

Marine Air Warning Squadron 9

(18Oct-10Nov45)

CO Maj William A. McCluskey, Jr.

Marine Air Warning Squadron 12

(8Oct-19Nov45)

CO Maj Emil H. Heintz

Marine Fighter Squadron 113

(21Sep-19Nov45)

CO Maj Hensley Williams

Detachment, Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 131

(17Sep-31Oct45)

CO Maj Wilbert H. Fuller, Jr. (to 12Oct45)

(None shown 12-25Oct45)

Maj John P. McMahon (from 26-Oct45)

Marine Fighter Squadron 224

(8Sep45-20Jun46)

CO Maj Allen T. Barnum (to 6Nov-45)

Maj James K. Dill (6Nov45-19-Jun46)

Capt Roy S. Bachstein (from 20-Jun46)

Detachment, Marine Transport Squadron 252

(13Oct45-15Jan46)

CO LtCol Glenn L. Todd

Detachment, Marine Transport Squadron 253

(20Feb-15Jun46)

CO LtCol William A. Rygg (to 24-Mar46)

LtCol William K. Lanman, Jr. (25Mar-15Apr46)

Maj Robert V. Reilly (16Apr-31May46)

LtCol Harry H. Bullock (from 1-Jun46)

Marine Fighter Squadron 311

(9Sep45-20Jun46)

CO Maj Michael R. Yunck (to 26-May46)

Maj James C. Otis (26May-11-Jun46)

Capt James W. Baker (from 12-Jun46)

Marine Fighter Squadron 314

(25Sep-19Nov45)

CO Maj Christian C. Lee (to 1Oct45)

Maj William H. Whitaker (from 1Oct45)

Detachment, Marine Transport Squadron 353

(7Sep-5Nov45)

CO LtCol Charles W. Somers

Marine Fighter Squadron 422

(26Sep-19Nov45)

CO Maj Elton Mueller

Marine Fighter Squadron 441

(7Sep45-20Jun46)

CO Maj William C. Voss (to 1Feb46)

Marine Night Fighter Squadron 542

(10Sep45-20Jun46)

CO Maj William C. Kellum (to 25-Dec45)

Maj Samuel B. Folsom, Jr. (25-Dec45-1Feb46)

Maj Roscoe M. Nelson (2Feb-19-Apr46)

Capt Robert P. Wray (acting, 20-Apr-3May46)

Maj David C. McDowell (4May-9Jun46)

Capt Robert P. Wray (from 10-Jun46)

Marine Night Fighter Squadron 543

(28Sep-16Nov45)

CO Maj James B. Maguire, Jr.

Detachment, Marine Bomber Squadron 612

(7Sep-16Oct45)

CO LtCol Lawrence F. Fox

Marine Transport Squadron 952

(7Sep45-1Mar46)

CO LtCol Stanley W. Trachta (to 31-Oct45)

LtCol Lowell S. Reeve (from 31-Oct45)

Marine Landing Force Air Support Control Unit 4

(20Sep-19Nov45)

CO Col Robert M. Haynes

C. OCCUPATION OF NORTH CHINA^a

(2Sep45-26May49)

1st Military Police Battalion, FMFPac

(30Sep45-2Mar46)

CO LtCol Alfred H. Marks

11th Motor Transport Battalion, FMFPac

(30Sep45-5Apr46)

CO LtCol James M. Ranck, Jr.

1st Separate Engineer Battalion, FMFPac

(30Sep45-16Jul46)

CO LtCol Alonzo D. Gorham (to 1-Dec45)

Maj Frank W. Poland, Jr. (1Dec-45-31Mar46)

LtCol John C. Brewer (1Apr-9Jun46)

Maj Wallace H. Robinson, Jr. (from 10Jun46)

7th Service Regiment, Service Command, FMFPac

(30Sep45-1Sep47)

CO Col Harold E. Rosecrans (to28-Feb46)

Col Homer C. Murray (28Feb46-23Mar47)

LtCol Frederick L. Wieseman (24Mar-29Aug47)

LtCol William H. Barba (from 30Aug47)

ExO LtCol Edwin D. Partridge (to 1Jan46)

Col Homer C. Murray (1Jan-27Feb46)

(None shown 28Feb-19Apr46)

LtCol Paul A. Tyler (20Apr-18Dec46)

LtCol Frederick L. Wieseman (19Dec46-24Mar47)

LtCol Paul A. Tyler (25Mar-29Apr47)

LtCol William H. Barba (30Apr-29Aug47)

(None shown after 29Aug47)

S-3 (None shown to 20Apr46)

Maj John J. Bukowy (20Apr-28May46)

(None shown 29May-9Jun46)

LtCol Marvin K. Stewart (10Jun-15Sep46)

LtCol William H. Barba (16Sep-46-21Feb47)

Capt Robert S. Hudson (22Feb-19Aug47)

(None shown after 19Aug47)

Headquarters and Service Battalion, 7th Service Regiment, Service Command, FMFPac

CO LtCol Charles W. Kelly, Jr. (to 6Feb46)

(None shown 7Feb-13Mar46)

Maj Ralph E. Boulton (14Mar-19Apr46)

Maj John J. Bukowy (20Apr-29May46)

Capt Jack M. Daly (30May-10Jun46)

LtCol Marvin C. Stewart (11-Jun-16Sep46)

Maj Victor R. Bisceglia (17Sep-6Nov46)

LtCol Marvin C. Stewart (7Nov-46-3Jan47)

^a Unless otherwise indicated, the inclusive period of the occupation of North China by Marine units is 2 September 1945-26 May 1949. For the purposes of this listing, however, the end date of the occupation period for major units is 8 February 1949, when FMFWesPac departed Tsingtao.

Maj Victor R. Bisceglia (4Jan-5May47)

LtCol Paul A. Fitzgerald (6May-29Aug47)

Maj Victor R. Bisceglia (from 30Aug47)

Motor Transport Battalion, 7th Service Regiment, Service Command, FMFPac

(30Sep45-20Apr46)

CO Maj John J. Bukowy

Supply and Maintenance Battalion, 7th Service Regiment, Service Command, FMFPac

CO Maj George C. Pafford (to 4Feb46)

(None shown 5-13Feb46)

Maj Glen C. Taylor (14Feb-15Mar46)

(None shown 16Mar-19Apr46)

Maj Franklin J. Weeman (20-26Apr46)

Capt Nathan Siegal (27Apr-19May46)

Capt Foy E. Jordan (20May-4Jun46)

Capt Richard P. Brezinski (5-16Jun46)

Capt Jack M. Daly (17-20Jun46)

LtCol William H. Barba (21Jun-46-17Mar47)

Maj Louis G. Monville (from 18Mar47)

*12th Service Battalion, Service Command, FMFPac*⁹

(17Apr46-31Jan49)

CO LtCol Paul W. Russell (to 28Sep-46)

LtCol Ralph L. Houser (28Sep46-30Sep47)

LtCol Frederick L. Wieseman (1Oct-8Dec47)

LtCol Noah P. Wood, Jr. (9Dec-47-17Jun48)

LtCol Forest C. Thompson (from 18Jun48)

III Amphibious Corps Headquarters

(30Sep45-9Jun46)

CG MajGen Keller E. Rockey

CofS BGen William A. Worton

G-1 Col Harry E. Dunkelberger (to 4Feb46)

LtCol Cornelius P. Van Ness (from 4Feb46)

G-2 Col Charles C. Brown

G-3 Col Manly L. Curry (to 16Jan46)

LtCol William K. Enright (from 16Jan46)

G-4 Col Earl S. Piper

G-5 Col Benjamin W. Gally

III Amphibious Corps, Corps Troops

(30Sep45-9Jun46)

CO Col Edward G. Hagen (to 3Oct-45)

CO LtCol Cornelius P. Van Ness (3-Oct-17Dec45)

LtCol James M. Ranck, Jr. (18-31Dec45)¹⁰

III Amphibious Corps, Headquarters and Service Battalion

(30Sep45-31Jul46)

CO LtCol Cornelius P. Van Ness (to 3Oct45)

LtCol Harry A. Traffert, Jr. (3-Oct-31Dec45)

LtCol Reynolds H. Hayden (1Jan-26Apr46)

LtCol Allen B. Geiger (from 27-Apr46)

III Amphibious Corps, Medical Battalion

(30Sep45-15Mar46)

CO LCdr Donovan C. Blanchard (MC) (to 29Oct45)

LCdr William H. Hanan (MC) (29Oct-1Nov45)

Cdr Nicholas Palma (MC) (2-Nov45-9Jan46)

Cdr Francis X. McGill (MC) (from 10Jan46)

⁹ Redesignated 2d Provisional Service Group (Light), Service Command, FMFPac, on 1 July 1948.

¹⁰ On 1 January 1946, the billet of commander of Corps Troops was merged with that of commander of the Corps Headquarters and Service Battalion as an additional duty.

<i>III Amphibious Corps, Shore Brigade</i> (30Sep-15Oct45)		Col George W. McHenry (20Jan-29Apr47)	
CO	Col Elmer H. Salzman	LtCol Charles W. Harrison (from 30Apr47)	
<i>III Amphibious Corps, Signal Battalion</i> (30Sep45-15Mar46)		G-3	LtCol William K. Enright (to 21-Aug46)
CO	LtCol Benjamin F. Kaiser, Jr.	Col Jaime Sabater (21Aug46-1May47)	
<i>Marine Forces, China</i> ¹¹ (10Jun46-19Jun47)		(None shown 2May47)	
CG	MajGen Keller E. Rockey (to 17-Sep46)	LtCol Elliot E. Bard (from 3May-47)	
	MajGen Samuel L. Howard (18-Sep46-17Jun47)	G-4	Col Earl S. Piper (to 24Jul46)
	Col Alva B. Lasswell (from 18-Jun47)	LtCol George A. Roll (24Jul-24Aug46)	
CofS	BGen William A. Worton (to 26-Aug46)	Col James M. Smith (from 25-Aug46)	
	BGen Alfred H. Noble (26Aug-16Dec46)	G-5	Col Benjamin W. Gally (to 24-Jun46)
	(None shown 17-19Dec46)	LtCol Herbert A. Vernet, Jr. (25-Jun-2Aug46)	
	Col Alva B. Lasswell (20Dec46-17Jun47)	LtCol Chester A. Henry, Jr. (3-Aug46-13Mar47)	
	(None shown after 17Jun47)	(None shown after 13Mar47)	
G-1	LtCol Cornelius P. Van Ness (to 23Aug46)	<i>Headquarters and Service Battalion, Marine Forces, China</i> (10Jun46-19Jun47)	
	LtCol Robert W. Rickert (24Aug-10Sep46)	CO	LtCol Allen B. Geiger (to 18Jun-46)
	Col Alva B. Lasswell (11Sep-19Dec46)	Maj Maurice L. Appleton, Jr. (from 18Jun46)	
	LtCol Robert W. Rickert (20Dec-46-23Jan47)	<i>Headquarters, 1st Marine Division</i> (30Sep45-19Jun47)	
	LtCol Thomas B. Hughes (24Jan-26Feb47)	CG	MajGen DeWitt Peck (to 13Jun-46)
	LtCol Robert W. Rickert (from 27Feb47)	MajGen Keller E. Rockey (13-Jun-17Sep46)	
G-2	Col Charles C. Brown (to 14Nov-46)	MajGen Samuel L. Howard (18-Sep46-17Jun47)	
	LtCol Charles W. Harrison (14-Nov46-19Jan47)	Col Alva B. Lasswell (from 18-Jun47)	
		ADC	BGen Louis R. Jones (to 10Jun-46)
		BGen William A. Worton (10Jun-25Aug46)	
		BGen Alfred H. Noble (26Aug-16Dec46)	
		(None shown 17Dec46-30Jan47)	
		BGen Edward A. Craig (31Jan-17May47)	
		(None shown after 17May47)	

¹¹ On 10 June 1946, III Amphibious Corps was redesignated Marine Forces, China, which was a task force designation for the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced). As indicated, General Rockey became the division commander and General Worton became the assistant division commander. Generally, corps staff officers were assigned the senior positions on the augmented Marine Forces/1st Division staff. In such cases, the muster rolls may indicate two individuals occupying a single staff billet for a brief period, or one individual occupying two staff billets on two command levels. This listing will therefore reflect the situation as it was.

CofS Col Robert O. Bare (to 17Oct45)
 Col Julian N. Frisbie (18Oct45-9Jun46)
 BGen William A. Worton (10-Jun-25Aug46)
 (None shown 26-31Aug46)
 Col Harry E. Dunkelberger (1-Sep-18Dec46)
 (None shown 19Dec46)
 Col Alva B. Lasswell (20Dec46-17Jun47)
 (None shown after 17Jun47)

G-1 LtCol Clarence R. Schwenke (to 30Jun46)
 LtCol Cornelius P. Van Ness (1-Jul-23Aug46)
 LtCol Robert W. Rickert (24Aug-10Sep46)
 Col Alva B. Lasswell (11Sep-19-Dec46)
 LtCol Robert W. Rickert (20Dec-46-23Jan47)
 LtCol Thomas B. Hughes (24Jan-26Feb47)
 LtCol Robert W. Rickert (from 27Feb47)

G-2 LtCol John W. Scott, Jr. (to 28-Oct45)
 LtCol James M. Masters, Sr. (28-Oct45-3Mar46)
 Maj Bernard W. McLean (4Mar-9Jun46)
 Col Charles C. Brown (10Jun-14Nov46)
 LtCol Charles W. Harrison (14-Nov46-19Jan47)
 Col George W. McHenry (20Jan-29Apr47)
 LtCol Charles W. Harrison (from 30Apr47)

G-3 LtCol Russell N. Honsowetz (to 31Jan46)
 LtCol Robert T. Vance (1Feb-30Mar46)
 LtCol Henry Aplington, II (31-Mar-30Jun46)
 LtCol William K. Enright (1Jul-20Aug46)
 Col Jaime Sabater (21Aug46-1May47)
 (None shown 2May47)

LtCol Elliot E. Bard (from 3May-47)

G-4 LtCol Harvey C. Tschirgi (to 24-Jun46)
 Col Earl S. Piper (25Jun-23Jul-46)
 LtCol George A. Roll (24Jul-24Aug46)
 Col James M. Smith (from 25-Aug46)

Division Headquarters Battalion
 (30Sep45-19Jun47)

CO LtCol John D. Muncie (to 5Nov-45)
 LtCol David W. Silvey (5Nov-22Dec45)
 LtCol Richard T. McNown (23-Dec45-17Feb46)
 Maj Alexander W. Chilton, Jr. (18Feb-30Mar46)
 LtCol Glenn C. Funk (31Mar-5Jun46)
 LtCol Gallais "E" Matheny (6-Jun-29Jul46)
 Col Augustus W. Cockrell (30-Jul-4Nov46)
 LtCol Marvin T. Starr (5Nov46-9May47)
 (None shown 10-25May47)
 Maj Henry Aplington, II (from 26May47)

1st Engineer Battalion
 (30Sep45-19Jun47)

CO LtCol Theodore E. Drummond (to 5Apr46)
 LtCol Edmund M. Williams (5-Apr-9Jun46)
 (None shown 10-22Jun46)
 LtCol Clifford H. Shuey (23Jun-14Oct46)
 LtCol John C. Brewer (from 15-Oct46)

1st Medical Battalion
 (25Oct45-2May47)

CO LCdr Francis Giuffrida (MC)
 (to 6Nov45)

Cdr Harold H. Hill (MC) (6-Nov45-27Jun46)
Cdr Louis R. Gens (MC) (from 28Jun46)

1st Motor Transport Battalion

(30Sep45-20Jun47)

CO LtCol Calvin C. Gaines (to 9Jan-46)
Capt Eero Nori (9Jan-1Jul46)
Capt Lloyd F. Barker (2Jul-11-Aug46)
LtCol Robert E. Hommel (12-Aug46-8May47)
LtCol Francis T. Eagan (from 9May47)

1st Pioneer Battalion

(30Sep45-11Jun47)

CO Maj Austin S. Igleheart, Jr. (to 31Oct45)
Maj Robert H. C. Johnston (31-Oct-10Nov45)
LtCol Lloyd G. Coutts (11Nov45-30Sep46)
LtCol Edmund M. Williams (1-Oct46-17Apr47)
Maj James P. Jacobson (18Apr-19May47)
LtCol Edmund M. Williams (from 20May47)

1st Service Battalion

(30Sep45-15Jun47)

CO LtCol William E. Benedict (to 8-Jan46)
LtCol Edward H. Drake (8Jan-14Sep46)
Maj Fraser E. West (15Sep-31-Oct46)
LtCol Earl E. Sneeringer (1Nov-46-8May47)
LtCol Gallais "E" Matheny (from 9May47)

1st Tank Battalion

(4Oct45-24Jan47)

CO LtCol Alexander B. Swenceski

*1st Marines*¹²

(30Sep45-20May47)

CO Col Arthur T. Mason (to 20Sep-46)
LtCol James M. Ranck, Jr. (21-Sep-7Oct46)
Col John E. Curry (8Oct46-20-May47)
Maj Edwin B. Wheeler (18Feb-8Mar48)
Col George W. McHenry (9Mar-27Apr48)
Col Miles S. Newton (from 28-Apr48)
ExO (None shown to 5Nov45)
LtCol Max C. Chapman (5Nov45-14Feb46)
(None shown 15Feb-5Apr46)
LtCol James M. Ranck, Jr. (6-Apr-19Sep46)
(None shown 20Sep-7Oct46)
Col James M. Ranck, Jr. (8Oct-46-10Mar47)
LtCol Edward L. Hutchinson (from 11Mar47)
S-3 Maj John V. Kelsey (to 31Mar46)
Maj Noel C. Gregory (31Mar-5Sep46)
LtCol Gallais "E" Matheny (from 6Sep46)

1st Battalion, 1st Marines

(30Sep45-27Aug47)

CO LtCol Austin C. Shofner (to 4-Feb46)
LtCol Wilbur F. Meyerhoff (4-Feb-28Oct46)
LtCol Edward L. Hutchinson (29-Oct46-6Mar47)
(None shown 7-12Mar47)
LtCol Francis T. Eagan (13Mar-30Apr47)
LtCol John A. Burns (from 1-May47)

¹² On 20May 1947, as part of the overall strength reduction of Marine units in North China, the 1st Marines was reorganized into two battalions without a regimental headquarters. The 2d Battalion was assigned that date to Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific, and was redesignated 1st Marines, Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific, on 1 October 1947.

*2d Battalion, 1st Marines*¹³

(30Sep45-30Sep47)

CO LtCol James C. Magee, Jr. (to 24Jun46)
 LtCol Glenn C. Funk (24Jun46-14Jan47)
 LtCol Harold Granger (15Jan-20May47)
 Col John E. Curry (21May-22-Aug47)
 LtCol Harold Granger (23-26-Aug47)
 Col George W. McHenry (from 27Aug47)

3d Battalion, 1st Marines

(30Sep45-15Apr46)

CO LtCol Hector R. Migneault (to 16Jan46)
 LtCol Bowers C. G. Davis (from 16Jan46)

5th Marines

(30Sep45-14May47)

CO Col Julian N. Frisbie (to 16Oct-45)
 LtCol Robert E. Hill (16Oct-8Nov45)
 Col Theodore A. Holdahl (9Nov-45-31Mar46)
 LtCol August Larson (1Apr-15-Jul46)
 Col Julian N. Frisbie (from 16-Jul47)
 ExO LtCol Robert E. Hill (to 16Oct-45)
 (None shown 17Oct-8Nov45)
 LtCol Robert E. Hill (9Nov45-27Jan46)
 (None shown 27Jan-14Mar46)
 LtCol August Larson (15-31Mar-46)
 (None shown 1-14Apr46)
 LtCol Joseph L. Winecoff (15-Apr-11Jul46)
 LtCol John A. Anderson (12Jul-30Sep46)
 (None shown 1-30Oct46)

LtCol John H. Masters (from 4Oct46)

S-3 Maj James H. Flagg (to 8Feb46)
 (None shown 8Feb-31Mar46)
 LtCol Allen B. Geiger (1-20Apr-46)
 (None shown 21-30Apr46)
 Maj Wallace E. Tow (1-24May-46)
 (None shown 25May-26Jun46)
 LtCol Carlo A. Rovetta (27Jun-17Dec46)
 LtCol Ralph A. Collins, Jr. (18-Dec46-6Feb47)
 Maj Maxie R. Williams (from 7-Feb47)

1st Battalion, 5th Marines

(30Sep45-25May47)

CO LtCol John H. Masters (to 20Oct-46)
 Maj Jeff P. Overstreet (3-8Oct-46)
 LtCol Richard T. McNown (9Oct-15Dec46)
 LtCol Theodore M. Sheffield (from 16Dec46)

2d Battalion, 5th Marines

(30Sep45-14May47)

CO LtCol John B. Baker (to 15Oct45)
 Maj Robert T. Washburn (15-31Oct45)
 LtCol Edwin C. Godbold (1Nov-45-19Jul46)
 LtCol George D. Rich (from 20-Jul46)

3d Battalion, 5th Marines

(30Sep45-15Apr46)

CO LtCol Joseph L. Winecoff

7th Marines

(30Sep45-11Jan47)

CO Col Richard P. Ross (to 28Jan46)
 Col Paul Drake (from 28Jan46)
 ExO LtCol James M. Masters, Sr. (to 27Oct45)
 LtCol Willard C. Fiske (27Oct-29Dec45)
 Maj Walter Holomon (30Dec45-4Jan46)

¹³ Redesignated 1st Marines, Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific, on 1 October 1947.

	LtCol Charles E. Shepard, Jr. (from 5Jan46)		LtCol William F. Kramer (1-21-Jul46)
S-3	Maj Walter Holomon (to 31Mar-46)		LtCol Noah P. Wood, Jr. (22Jul-1Dec46)
	Maj Wallace G. Fleissner (1Apr-13Aug46)		LtCol Thomas B. Hughes (from 2Dec46)
	LtCol Thomas C. Kerrigan (from 14Aug46)	S-3	(None shown to 31Oct45)
	<i>1st Battalion, 7th Marines</i> (30Sep45-5Jan47)		LtCol Roger S. Bruford (1Nov-20Dec45)
CO	LtCol John J. Gormley (to 9Feb-46)		LtCol Thomas G. Roe (21Dec45-6Jan46)
	LtCol Russell N. Honsowetz (9-Feb-5Jul46)		Maj William P. Oliver, Jr. (7-31Jan46)
	LtCol Norman E. Sparling (6Jul-22Dec46)		LtCol Harry N. Shea (1Feb-30-Jun46)
	LtCol Carlo A. Rovetta (from 23-Dec46)		LtCol Henry E. W. Barnes (from 1Jul46)
	<i>2d Battalion, 7th Marines</i> (30Sep45-5Jan47)		<i>1st Battalion, 11th Marines</i> (30Sep45-24Jan47)
CO	LtCol Charles T. Hodges (to 25-Feb46)	CO	LtCol Richard W. Wallace (to 3-Apr46)
	LtCol James D. Hittle (25Feb-25Jun46)		LtCol Thomas R. Belzer (3Apr-12Dec46)
	Maj Louis G. Ditta (26Jun-1Jul-46)		LtCol Fred T. Bishopp (from 13-Dec46)
	LtCol Henry Aplington, II (2Jul-17Dec46)		<i>2d Battalion, 11th Marines</i> (30Sep45-24Jan47)
	LtCol Edward H. Drake (from 18Dec46)	CO	LtCol Samuel S. Wooster (to 1-Jan46)
	<i>3d Battalion, 7th Marines</i> (30Sep45-15Apr46)		LtCol David W. Silvey (1Jan-3Mar46)
CO	LtCol Stephen V. Sabol		Maj Maurice L. Appleton, Jr. (4-31Mar46)
	<i>11th Marines</i> (30Sep45-24Jan47)		LtCol Edward L. Peoples (1Apr-26Jun46)
CO	Col Wilburt S. Brown (to 22Dec-45)		LtCol Noah P. Wood, Jr. (27Jun-21Jul46)
	LtCol Edson L. Lyman (acting, 22Dec45-11Jan46)		LtCol Edward L. Peoples (22Jul-18Aug46)
	Col Wilburt S. Brown (12Jan-30Sep46)		LtCol Warren P. Baker (from 19Aug46)
	Col Eugene F. C. Collier (from 1Oct46)		<i>3d Battalion, 11th Marines</i> (30Sep45-5Jan47)
ExO	LtCol Roger S. Bruford (to 1-Nov45)	CO	LtCol Thomas G. Roe (to 19Dec-45)
	LtCol Edson L. Lyman (1Nov45-30Jun46)		Maj John P. McAlinn (19Dec45-7Jan46)
			LtCol Roger S. Bruford (8Jan-29Dec46)

Maj David S. Randall (from 30-Dec46)

4th Battalion, 11th Marines
(30Sep45-5Jan47)

CO Maj Andre D. Gomez (to 15Jan-46)

LtCol William J. Van Ryzin (15-Jan-9Jul46)

LtCol Claude S. Sanders, Jr. (10-Jul-19Nov46)

Maj Lewis E. Poggemeyer (20-Nov-12Dec46)

LtCol Thomas R. Belzer (from 13Dec46)

6th Marine Division
(11Oct45-31Mar46)

CG MajGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. (to 24Dec45)

MajGen Archie F. Howard (from 24Dec45)

ADC BGen William T. Clement

CofS Col John C. McQueen (to 10Feb-46)

Col Harry E. Dunkelberger (from 10Feb46)

G-1 Col Karl K. Louthier (to 17Nov-45)

LtCol Frederick Belton (from 17-Nov45)

G-2 LtCol Thomas E. Williams (to 16Feb46)

LtCol Carl V. Larson (from 16-Feb46)

G-3 LtCol Victor H. Krulak (to 15Oct-45)

LtCol Wayne H. Adams (15Oct-31Dec45)

LtCol George W. Killen (from 1-Jan46)

G-4 LtCol Wayne H. Adams (to 15-Oct45)

LtCol Samuel R. Shaw (from 15-Oct45)

Division Headquarters Battalion
(12Oct45-31Mar46)

CO LtCol Floyd A. Stephenson

6th Engineer Battalion
(13Oct45-26Mar46)

CO LtCol Orin C. Bjornsrud

6th Medical Battalion
(14Oct45-26Mar46)

CO Cdr John S. Cowan (MC) (to 28Jan46)

LCdr Rich H. Pembroke (MC) (from 28Jan46)

6th Motor Transport Battalion
(14Oct45-26Mar46)

CO LtCol Robert E. McCook

6th Pioneer Battalion
(14Oct45-23Mar46)

CO LtCol Samuel R. Shaw (to 15Oct-45)

Maj John G. Dibble (15-21Oct45)

LtCol Harry A. Schmitz (22Oct-45-19Mar46)

(None shown after 19Mar46)

6th Service Battalion
(14Oct45-22Mar46)

CO Col William W. Orr (to 3Dec45)

LtCol Alexander N. Entringer (3-Dec45-19Mar46)

LtCol Harry A. Schmitz (from 20Mar46)

6th Tank Battalion
(13Oct45-26Mar46)

CO LtCol Robert L. Denig, Jr.

*4th Marines*¹⁴
(17Jan-2Sep46)

CO LtCol Fred D. Beans (to 27Jan-46)

2dLt Paul V. Stone (27Jan-7Feb-46)

2dLt Lawrence H. Guthart, Jr. (8Feb-6Mar46)

Col William J. Whaling (7-25-Mar46)

Col John D. Blanchard (26Mar-30Jun46)

¹⁴ On 1 April 1946, the 3d Marine Brigade was activated, at which time the 4th Marines became a component unit of that command. When the 3d Brigade was deactivated with the formation of Marine Forces, Tsingtao, on 10 June, the regiment became the 4th Marines (Reinforced), the reinforcing elements representing support units formerly under the brigade.

	BGen William T. Clement (1Jul-24Aug46)		<i>22d Marines</i> (11Oct45-22Mar46)
	LtCol Robert L. Denig, Jr. (from 25Aug46)	CO	Col John D. Blanchard (to 26-Mar46)
ExO	(None shown to 9Mar46)		Maj George B. Kantner (from 26Mar46)
	LtCol August Larson (9-14Mar-46)	ExO	LtCol August Larson (to 8Mar-46)
	LtCol John E. Weber (15Mar-22Apr46)		(None shown 9-14Mar46)
	LtCol William N. McGill (from 22Apr46)		Maj George B. Kantner (15-25-Mar46)
S-3	(None shown to 8Mar46)		(None shown 26Mar46)
	LtCol Jack F. Warner (8-18Mar-46)	S-3	LtCol Walter H. Stephens (to 1Dec45)
	Maj Norris E. Lineweaver (19-Mar-3Apr46)		Maj George B. Kantner (2Dec45-6Mar46)
	LtCol Richard I. Moss (4Apr-9Jun46)		(None shown after 6Mar46)
	(None shown after 10Jun46)		<i>1st Battalion, 22d Marines</i> (11Oct45-26Mar46)
	<i>1st Battalion, 4th Marines</i> (8Mar-3Sep46)	CO	LtCol Gavin C. Humphrey
CO	LtCol Joseph P. Sayers (to 22Jul-46)		<i>2d Battalion, 22d Marines</i> ¹⁸ (11Oct45-8Mar46)
	LtCol Warren P. Baker (23Jul-7Aug46)	CO	LtCol John G. Johnson
	LtCol Walter H. Stephens (from 8Aug46)		<i>3d Battalion, 22d Marines</i> ¹⁷ (11Oct45-8Mar46)
	<i>2d Battalion, 4th Marines</i> (8Mar-3Sep46)	CO	LtCol Clair W. Shisler (to 9Nov-45)
CO	LtCol John G. Johnson (to 12Apr-46)		Maj George B. Kantner (9-13-Nov45)
	Maj Jeff P. Overstreet (13-21-Apr46)		LtCol Clair W. Shisler (14-26-Nov45)
	LtCol John E. Weber (21Apr-5Aug46)		Maj George B. Kantner (26-30-Nov45)
	LtCol Edwin C. Godbold (6-15-Aug46)		LtCol Walter H. Stephens (from 1Dec45)
	LtCol Theodore F. Beeman (from 16Aug46)		<i>29th Marines</i> (11Oct45-26Mar46)
	<i>3d Battalion, 4th Marines</i> ¹⁵ (8Mar46-2Sep46)	CO	Col William A. Whaling (to 6-Mar46)
CO	LtCol Walter H. Stephens (to 5-Aug46)		(None shown after 6Mar46)
	Col Samuel B. Griffith, II (from 5Aug46)	ExO	LtCol George W. Killen (to 12-Oct45)
			Col Orin K. Pressley (12-31Oct-45)

¹⁵ On 3 September 1946, 3/4 (Reinforced) became the major element of the Marine forces in Tsingtao, and on the 12th was attached to the 1st Marine Division, Marine Forces, China, for operational control.

¹⁸ Redesignated 2d Battalion, 4th Marines on 8 March 1946.

¹⁷ Redesignated 3d Battalion, 4th Marines on 8 March 1946.

LtCol John E. Weber (1Nov45–10Mar46)

(None shown after 10Mar46)

S-3 LtCol George W. Killen (to 31-Dec45)

(None shown 1–9Jan46)

LtCol Jack F. Warner (10Jan–7Mar46)

(None shown after 7Mar46)

*1st Battalion, 29th Marines*¹⁸

(11Oct45–26Mar46)

CO LtCol LeRoy P. Hunt, Jr. (to 11-Mar46)

Maj Wallace G. Fleissner (from 11Mar46)

*2d Battalion, 29th Marines*¹⁹

(10Oct45–8Mar46)

CO LtCol William G. Robb (to 8Feb-46)

Maj Thomas J. Gross (from 8Feb-46)

3d Battalion, 29th Marines

(11Oct45–26Mar46)

CO LtCol Angus M. Fraser (to 8Feb-46)

(None shown 8–19Feb46)

LtCol Joseph P. Sayers (from 19-Feb46)

15th Marines

(11Oct45–26Mar46)

CO Col Robert B. Luckey

ExO LtCol James H. Brower (to 13-Jan46)

(None shown 13Jan–11Feb46)

LtCol Louis A. Ennis (from 12-Feb46)

S-3 Capt William W. Curtis (to 10-Dec45)

LtCol Walter S. Osipoff (10Dec-45–7Jan46)

Capt William W. Curtis (8Jan-1Mar46)

(None shown after 1Mar46)

1st Battalion, 15th Marines

(11Oct45–23Nov45)*

CO LtCol Walter S. Osipoff

2d Battalion, 15th Marines

(11Oct45–26Mar46)

CO Maj Nat M. Pace

3d Battalion, 15th Marines

(11Oct45–26Mar46)

CO LtCol Joe C. McHaney (to 8Jan-46)

LtCol Walter S. Osipoff (8–14-Jan46)

Maj George F. Vaughan (from 15Jan46)

*4th Battalion, 15th Marines*²⁰

(11Oct45–17Mar46)

CO Maj William H. Hirst (to 25Oct-45)

Maj Francis F. Parry (25Oct45–8Jan46)

Maj John S. Hartz (9Jan–24Feb-46)

Maj Marshall R. Pilcher (25–28Feb46)

LtCol Louis A. Ennis (from 1-Mar46)

*3d Marine Brigade*²¹

(1Apr–9Jun46)

Marine Forces, Tsingtao

(10Jun–3Sep46)

CG BGen William T. Clement

CofS Col Harry E. Dunkelberger

G-1 LtCol Frederick Belton

G-2 LtCol Carl V. Larsen

G-3 LtCol George W. Killen

G-4 LtCol Samuel R. Shaw

*3d Marine Brigade Headquarters Battalion*²²

(1Apr–9Jun46)

* Disbanded 23 November 1945.

²⁰ On 17 March, the 4th Battalion, 15th Marines, was redesignated Artillery, 3d Marine Brigade.

²¹ On 10 June 1946, the brigade was redesignated Marine Forces, Tsingtao.

²² Redesignated Headquarters Battalion, Marine Forces, Tsingtao, on 10 June 1946.

¹⁸ Attached to 1st Marine Division on 14 February 1946.

¹⁹ Redesignated 1st Battalion, 4th Marines on 8 March 1946.

Headquarters Battalion, Marine Forces, Tsingtao
(10Jun-3Sep46)
CO Maj Floyd A. Stephenson

*Artillery Battalion, 3d Marine Brigade*²³
(17Mar-24Aug46)
CO LtCol Louis A. Ennis

*Medical Battalion, 3d Marine Brigade*²⁴
(1Apr-10Aug46)
CO LCdr Rich H. Pembroke (MC)
(to 26Apr46)
LCdr Douglas J. Giorgio (MC)
(26Apr-7May46)
LCdr Henry R. Ennis (MC)
(from 8May46)

*Service Battalion, 3d Marine Brigade*²⁵
(1Apr-23Oct46)
CO LtCol Harry N. Schmitz (to 5-Jul46)
LtCol Kenneth P. Corson (6Jul-24Aug46)
LtCol Robert E. McCook (from 25Aug46)

*3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Reinforced)*²⁶
(3Sep46-30Sep47)
CO Col Samuel B. Griffith, II (to 22-May47)
LtCol Edward L. Hutchinson (22-May-5Jun47)
Col Jaime Sabater (from 6Jun47)

²³ On 17 March 1946, the 4th Battalion, 15th Marines, was redesignated the Artillery Battalion, 3d Marine Brigade. This unit designation was again changed on 22 May 1946, when the battalion became 3/12 (Reinforced).

²⁴ Redesignated 3d Medical Battalion, 3d Marine Brigade, on 22 May 1946. On 10 June 1946, designated 3d Medical Battalion, 4th Marines (Reinforced).

²⁵ Redesignated 3d Service Battalion, 3d Marine Brigade on 22 May 1946. On 10 June 1946, redesignated 3d Service Battalion, 4th Marines (Reinforced).

²⁶ With the disestablishment of Marine Forces, Tsingtao, 3/4 became the major Marine unit in that city. The support units formerly under Marine Forces, Tsingtao, were generally reduced to company-sized organizations and represented the battalion's reinforcement. On 12 September 1946, the reinforced battalion came under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division, Marine Forces, China. On 1 October 1947, 3/4 was redesignated 3d Marines, Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific.

*Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific*²⁷
(20May47-8Feb49)
CG BGen Omar T. Pfeiffer (to 15-Aug47)
BGen Gerald C. Thomas (from 15Aug47)
CofS Col George W. McHenry (to 27-Aug47)
Col William J. Scheyer (from 27-Aug47)
G-1 LtCol Warren P. Baker (to 25-May48)
Maj Drew J. Barrett, Jr. (25May-9Aug48)
Maj John R. Chaisson (from 10-Aug48)
G-2 Maj Carl V. Larsen (to 14Sep47)
Capt John B. Bristow (14Sep-8Dec47)
LtCol William A. Kengla (9Dec-47-26Jan49)
Capt John B. Bristow (from 27-Jan49)
G-3 Maj John P. Wilbern (to 5Jun47)
LtCol Edward L. Hutchinson (6-Jun-10Sep47)
LtCol Thomas J. Colley (11Sep47-22Oct48)
LtCol Floyd H. Moore (23Oct48-26Jan49)
LtCol William A. Kengla (from 27Jan49)
G-4 LtCol John E. Weber (to 10Sep-47)
LtCol Edward L. Hutchinson (11-Sep47-20Jan48)
LtCol Frederick L. Wieseman (21Jan-31Mar48)
LtCol Paul A. Fitzgerald (1Apr-31Jul48)
Maj Stephen C. Munson, Jr. (1-Aug-20Sep48)
Maj Edwin B. Wheeler (from 18-Sep48)²⁸

²⁷ With the withdrawal of all Marine units from Hopeh, the center of Marine activities and FMFWesPac, the major Marine command in China, were located at Tsingtao.

²⁸ No apparent reason is indicated for this discrepancy in dates in the *Muster Rolls*, FMFWesPac, Sep48 (Diary Unit, Files Sec, PersDept, HQMC).

Headquarters Battalion, FMFWesPac
(20May47-8Feb49)
CO LtCol Marvin T. Starr (to 21Sep-47)
Maj John A. Burns (22-29Sep47)
LtCol Marvin T. Starr (30Sep47-5Jan48)
LtCol Paul A. Fitzgerald (6Jan-31Mar48)
LtCol Thomas W. Brundage, Jr. (from 1Apr48)

*1st Marines*²⁹
(10Oct47-8Feb49)
CO Col George W. McHenry (to 17-Feb48)
Maj Edwin B. Wheeler (18Feb-8Mar48)
Col George W. McHenry (9Mar-27Apr48)
Col Miles S. Newton (from 28-Apr48)
ExO LtCol Harold Granger (to 8Jul-48)
Maj Edwin B. Wheeler (9-19Jul-48)
Maj John P. Wilbern (20Jul-12-Aug48)
LtCol Floyd H. Moore (13Aug-19Oct48)
Maj John P. Wilbern (20-29Oct-48)
Maj Charles H. Brush, Jr. (30-Oct48-27Jan49)
Maj John P. Wilbern (from 28-Jan49)
S-3 Maj Edwin B. Wheeler (to 19-Jul48)
Capt Emil J. Radics (20Jul-12-Aug48)
Maj John P. Wilbern (from 13-Aug48)

*3d Marines*³⁰
(10Oct47-3Feb49)
CO Col Jaime Sabater (to 31Mar48)

²⁹ The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, was redesignated 1st Marines, Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific, on 1 October 1947.
³⁰ On 1 October 1947, 3/4 (Reinforced) redesignated 3d Marines, Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific.

LtCol Frederick L. Wieseman (1-Apr-17Aug48)³¹
Col Walfried M. Fromhold (18-Aug-24Oct48)
LtCol Thomas J. Colley (from 25-Oct48)
ExO LtCol Thomas W. Brundage, Jr. (to 31Mar48)
LtCol John A. Burns (1Apr-6Jul-48)
Maj William T. Bray (7Jul-12-Aug48)
Maj James G. Juett (13Aug-2Sep48)
(None shown 3-30Sep48)
LtCol William T. McKennan (from 1Oct48)
S-3 Maj William T. Bray (to 6Jul48)
Maj James G. Juett (7Jul-12Aug-48)
(None shown 13Aug-2Sep48)
Maj James G. Juett (3-20Sep48)
Maj William T. McKennan (21-30Sep48)
(None shown 1-31Oct48)
Maj Meryl F. Kurr (from 1Nov-48)

2d Provisional Artillery Battalion,
11th Marines
(10Oct47-3Feb49)
CO Maj Elliott Wilson

1st Marine Aircraft Wing
(7Oct45-17Apr47)
CG MajGen Claude A. Larkin (to 31Oct45)
MajGen Louis E. Woods (31Oct-45-23Jun46)
(None shown 24Jun46)
BGen Lawson H. M. Sanderson (from 25Jun46)
AWC BGen Byron F. Johnson (to 17-Feb46)
BGen Walter G. Farrell (17Feb-14Jun46)
(None shown 15-21Jun46)
Col John N. Hart (22Jun-3Jul46)
(None shown after 3Jul46)
CoFS Col Clarence J. Chappell, Jr. (to 25Jan46)

³¹ Promoted to Colonel 1 July 1948.

	Col Vernon M. Guymon (25Jan-3Jul46)		Col Frank E. Lamson-Scribner (from 18Aug47)
	Col John N. Hart (4Jul46-16Apr47)	ExO	LtCol Edward B. Carney ³²
	Col Joe A. Smoak (17Apr47)	S-3	LtCol Benjamin S. Hargrave, Jr. (to 9Feb48)
G-1	LtCol Etheridge C. Best (to 13-Feb46)		LtCol George W. Herring (9Feb-9Oct48)
	(None shown 14-21Feb46)		LtCol Birney B. Truitt (10Oct48-30Jan49)
	Col William B. Steiner (from 22-Feb46)		(None shown after 30Jan49)
G-2	Maj Manual Brilliant (to 1Feb-46)	CO, HqSqn, AirFMF- WesPac ..	Col John N. Hart (to 12May47)
	Col Roger T. Carleson (1Feb-26Mar46)		Maj James N. Cupp (12May-30Jun47)
	(None shown 27Mar-15Apr46)		Maj Walter J. Carr, Jr. (1Jul47-28Feb48)
	LtCol John F. Carey (from 16-Apr46)		LtCol Lee C. Merrell, Jr. (1Mar-29Jun48)
G-3	Col Carson A. Roberts (to 12Nov-45)		Maj Walter J. Carr, Jr. (30Jun-14Nov48)
	LtCol Leonard K. Davis (12Nov-45-25Jan46)		LtCol George W. Nevils (from 15Nov48)
	Col Charles J. Schlapkohl (26-Jan-10Aug46)		
	(None shown 10Aug-2Sep46)		<i>Marine Aircraft Group 12</i>
	Col Joe A. Smoak (3Sep46-16-Apr47)		(25Oct45-26Apr46)
	Maj Frank E. Hollar (acting, 17Apr47)	CO	Col Verne J. McCaul (to 14Jan46)
G-4	LtCol Milo G. Haines (to 24Jan-46)		Col Marion L. Dawson (14Jan-3Apr46)
	Col Elliot E. Bard (25Jan46-17Mar47)		(None shown 4-5Apr46)
	LtCol Zane Thompson, Jr. (from 18Mar47)		Col Edward L. Pugh (from 6-Apr46)
CO, Hq- Sqn-1	Maj Robert W. Baile (to 24-Oct45)	ExO	LtCol Robert D. Moser (to 14-Jan46)
	Maj Finley T. Clarke, Jr. (24-Oct45-13May46)		LtCol Joseph N. Renner (14Jan-1Apr46)
	(None shown 14May46)		LtCol Elmore W. Seeds (from 2Apr46)
	Maj Kenneth D. Frazier (15May-46-24Jan47)	GruOpsO ...	Maj John S. Payne (to 30Nov45)
	(None shown 25Jan47)		(None shown 1-9Dec45)
	Maj James N. Cupp (26Jan-31-Mar47)		LtCol James B. Moore (10Dec45-14Jan46)
	Capt Robert M. Keim (from 1-Apr47)		LtCol William A. Houston, Jr. (15Jan-5Apr46)
			(None shown after 5Apr46)
<i>Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific</i>		CO, Hq- Sqn-12 ...	Maj Philip "L" Crawford (to 13-Dec45)
(1May47-8Feb49)			Maj Eugene A. Trowbridge (13-Dec45-5Apr46)
CO	Col John N. Hart (to 18Aug47)		

³² Promoted to colonel 10 July 1948.

1stLt Joseph B. Harrison (from 6Apr46)

CO,
SMS-12 . LtCol Richard E. Figley (to 13-Dec45)
Maj Philip "L" Crawford (13-Dec45-31Mar46)
LtCol Harlan Rogers (from 1-Apr46)

Marine Aircraft Group 24
(18Oct45-17Apr47)

CO Col Edward A. Montgomery (to 29Jan46)
Col Edward L. Pugh (29Jan-5Apr46)
Col Marion L. Dawson (from 6-Apr46)

ExO LtCol Martin A. Severson (to 2-Mar46)
LtCol John D. Harshberger (2-Mar-2Apr46)
LtCol Joseph E. Renner (3-17-Apr46)
LtCol John D. Harshberger (18-Apr-19Jun46)
LtCol Edwin P. Pennebaker, Jr. (from 20Jun46)

GruOpsO ... LtCol Guy M. Morrow (to 26Jan-46)
LtCol John D. Harshberger (26-Jan-10Mar46)
Maj Billie K. Shaw (11Mar-4Apr46)
LtCol John D. Harshberger (5-17Apr46)
(None shown 18-30Apr46)
Maj Philip "L" Crawford (1-28May46)
Maj William P. Addington (29-May-19Jun46)
LtCol John D. Harshberger (20-Jun-26Nov46)
LtCol Lee C. Merrell, Jr. (27Nov-46-11Apr47)
(None shown after 11Apr47)

CO, Hq-
Sqn-24 ... Capt John S. Court (to 8Apr46)
Capt William J. Suhr (8Apr-27May46)

Capt Charles F. Hughes (28May-17Jun46)

Capt Harold E. Smith (from 18-Jun46)

CO,
SMS-24 . LtCol Benjamin B. Manchester, III (to 25Jan46)
LtCol John F. Carey (25Jan-6Apr46)
LtCol William A. Houston, Jr. (7Apr-27May46)
Maj Charles S. Manning (28May-15Sep46)
LtCol William A. Cloman, Jr. (16Sep46-11Apr47)
Maj Joseph H. Elliott, Jr. (from 12Apr47)

Marine Aircraft Group 25
(7Oct45-7Jun46)

CO Col Herbert P. Becker (to 6Jun-46)
LtCol Gregory J. Weissenberger (from 6Jun46)

ExO LtCol Elmore W. Seeds (to 1Apr-46)
LtCol Edwin P. Pennebaker, Jr. (1-5Apr46)
(None shown after 5Apr46)

GruOpsO LtCol John G. Walsh, Jr. (to 25-Jan46)
(None shown 26Jan-16Feb46)
LtCol Gregory J. Weissenberger (17Apr-5Jun46)
(None shown after 5Jun46)

CO, Hq-
Sqn-25 ... Capt Lawrence N. Laugen (to 14Feb46)
Maj William P. Dukes (from 14-Feb46)

CO,
SMS-25 . Maj Philip E. Sweeny (to 12Nov-45)
Capt Stanley Roszek (12Nov45-10Jan46)
Maj Jack A. Church (11Jan-31Mar46)
LtCol James R. Christensen (1-Apr-30May46)
Maj Jack A. Church (from 1-Jun46)

Marine Aircraft Group 32

(16Oct45-26May46)

CO Col Thomas G. Ennis (to 29Jan-46)

(None shown 29Jan-4Feb46)

Col Frank D. Weir (from 5Feb-46)

ExO LtCol Wallace T. Scott (to 11Dec-45)

(None shown 12-17Dec45)

LtCol William M. Frash (18Dec-45-4Apr46)

LtCol Charles N. Endwess (5Apr-17May46)

(None shown after 17May46)

GruOpsO LtCol James B. Moore (to 6Dec-45)

(None shown 7Dec45)

LtCol William M. Frash (8-17-Dec45)

LtCol James R. Anderson (from 18Dec45)

CO, Hq-

Sqn-32 ... Capt Ernesto Giusti (to 18May-46)

Capt LaVerne Gonnerman (from 18May46)

CO,

SMS-32 . Maj Sherman A. Smith (to 20Oct-45)

(None shown 21-22Oct45)

LtCol Wyatt B. Carneal, Jr. (from 23Oct45)

Marine Observation Squadron 3

(10Oct45-22Jun47)

CO 1stLt Daniels F. Nickols, Jr. (to 18Nov45)

1stLt Victor E. Reeves (18Nov45-12Jan46)

1stLt Thomas R. Riley (13Jan-11Mar46)

Capt Billie C. Marks (12Mar-3Nov46)

Capt Jesse V. Booker (from 4-Nov46)

Marine Observation Squadron 6

(11Oct45-5Jan47)

CO Capt Joe W. Fitts, Jr. (to 15Dec-45)

1stLt Edward S. John (15Dec45-25May46)

Capt Richard B. Cropley (26May-21Aug46)

Maj James N. Cupp (22Aug-23-Sep46)

Capt Richard B. Cropley (24Sep-12Dec46)

Capt Harold F. Brown (from 13-Dec46)

Marine Air Warning Squadron 7³³

(27Oct45-31Jul47)

CO Maj Thomas Turner (to 30Nov-45)

Capt Lawrence W. Canon (30-Nov45-19Jan46)

Capt Frank M. Richard (20Jan-12Mar46)

Maj Nelson B. Palmer (13Mar-14Jun46)

Maj Albert L. Jones (from 14Jun-46)

Marine Air Warning Squadron 11

(28Oct45-20May46)

CO Capt Craig W. Parris (to 24Nov-45)

Maj Daniel H. Davis (24Nov45-28Feb46)

1stLt Wesley "W" Carscaren (1-Mar-4May46)

1stLt Dwight O. Deay (from 5-May46)

Marine Fighter Squadron 115

(14Nov45-17Jan47)

CO Maj Thomas W. Coles (to 9Mar-46)

Capt Fred J. Gilhuly (9Mar-30Apr46)

Maj John E. Reynolds (1May-16Aug46)

Maj Harry B. Hooper, Jr. (17-Aug-6Nov46)

LtCol Gordon H. Knott (from 7Nov46)

³³ Redesignated Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 7 on 1 August 1946.

Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 134
(21Oct45-26Apr46)
CO Maj Gruger L. Bright (acting, to
5Dec45)
Maj Walter F. Cornnell (5Dec45-
28Feb46)
Maj Daniel H. Davis (1Mar-
3Apr46)
LtCol William M. Frash (from
4Apr46)

Marine Transport Squadron 152
(10Nov45-7Jun46)
CO LtCol William M. Frash (to 8-
Dec45)
Maj Roscoe C. Cline, Jr. (8Dec45-
18Jan46)
LtCol Gregory J. Weissenberger
(19Jan-15Feb46)
LtCol Frank H. Collins (from 16-
Feb46)

Marine Transport Squadron 153
(5Nov45-29Jan49)
CO LtCol Louis L. Frank (to 15Apr-
46)
LtCol Neil R. McIntyre (15Apr-
46-12Mar47)
LtCol Benjamin S. Hargrave, Jr.
(acting, 13Mar-17Apr47)
LtCol Neil R. McIntyre (18Apr-
30Sep47)
LtCol James R. Christensen (1-
Oct47-7Feb48)
Maj Ernest C. Fusan (8Feb-
15Nov48)
Maj Richard "F" Ofstad (from
16Nov48)

Marine Fighter Squadron 211
(14Nov45-4Apr49)
CO Maj Angus F. Davis (to 10Mar-
46)
Capt Reinhardt Leu (10Mar-
7Apr46)
Maj Billie K. Shaw (8Apr-30Jun-
46)
Maj Joseph H. Elliott, Jr. (1Jul-
31Aug46)
LtCol John D. Howard (1Sep46-
30Apr47)

LtCol Lee C. Merrell, Jr. (1May-
47-28Feb48)
Maj James T. McDaniel (1Mar-
8Oct48)
Maj Ernest R. Hemingway (9-
Oct-1Nov48)
LtCol George W. Herring (2-
23Nov48)
Maj Walter J. Carr (24-29Nov-
48)
Maj Allan L. Feldmeier (30Nov-
10Dec48)
LtCol George W. Herring (from
11Dec48)

Marine Fighter Squadron 218
(14Nov45-7Apr47)
CO Maj Richard R. Amerine (to 10-
Mar46)
Capt Paul H. Hackstadt (10May-
7Apr46)
Maj Charles Kimak (8Apr-31-
Aug46)
LtCol Robert J. Johnson (from
1Sep46)

Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 244
(18Oct45-21May46)
CO Maj John E. Sperzel (to 24Nov-
45)
Maj Taylor R. Roberts (24Nov-
45-14Mar46)
1stLt James D. Freeze (15Mar-
4Apr46)
Maj Daniel H. Davis (5-9Apr46)
Maj Robert L. Anderson (10Apr-
16May46)
Maj Daniel H. Davis (from 17-
May46)

Detachment, Marine Transport Squadron 252
(18Sep45-31Jan46)
CO LtCol Glenn T. Todd

Detachment, Marine Transport Squadron 253
(1Dec45-28Feb46)
CO LtCol Desmond E. Canavan

Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 343
(20Oct45-20May46)
CO Maj Jack Cosley (to 10Jan46)
(None shown 11-12Jan46)

Maj Louis R. Babb (13Jan-17-May46)
 Maj Walter F. Cornnell (from 18May46)

Detachment, Marine Transport Squadron 352
 (10Oct45-31Jan46)
 CO LtCol John W. Burkhardt

Detachment, Marine Bombing Squadron 413
 (21-31Oct45)
 CO Maj Edward J. Doyle

Marine Night Fighter Squadron 533
 (7Oct45-7Jan47)
 CO Maj Robert P. Keller (to 27May-46)
 Maj Jack C. Scott (27May-4Sep-46)
 LtCol Alfred N. Gordon (5Sep-19Dec46)
 Maj John N. Burnett (acting, 20-Dec46-22Jan47)
 LtCol Alfred N. Gordon (from 23Jan47)

Marine Night Fighter Squadron 541
 (6Oct45-12Apr46)
 CO Maj Reynolds A. Moody (to 27-Nov45)
 Capt George U. Smith (from 27-Nov45)

Detachment, Marine Bombing Squadron 611
 (21-29Oct45)
 CO LtCol Winston H. Miller

Landing Force Air Support Control Unit 3
 (12Oct45-6Mar46)
 CO LtCol John T. L. D. Gabbert

D. MARINE CARRIER-BASED AIR UNITS³⁴

³⁴ Under each unit listed there will appear a letter designation for each operation in which the unit participated, and dates of involvement. Following are the campaigns and dates of entitlement:

A. Third Fleet supporting operations: Luzon attacks, 6-7Jan45; Formosa attacks, 3-4, 9, 15, and 21Jan45; China coast attacks, 12, 16Jan45; and Nansei Shoto attacks, 22Jan45.

Marine Carrier Fighter Group 1
 (USS Block Island)
 (D-10May-16Jun45)
 (E-15Jun-20Jul45)
 CO LtCol John F. Dobbins

Marine Carrier Fighter Group 2
 (USS Gilbert Islands)
 (D-21May-16Jun45)
 (E-26Jun-6Jul45)
 (F-31Jul-15Aug45)
 CO LtCol William R. Campbell

Marine Carrier Fighter Group 4
 (USS Cape Gloucester)
 (F-10Jul-7Aug45)
 CO LtCol Donald K. Yost

Marine Fighter Squadron 112
 (USS Bennington)
 (B-15Feb-4Mar45)
 (C-17Mar-11Jun45)
 CO Maj Herman Hansen, Jr.

Marine Fighter Squadron 123
 (USS Bennington)
 (B-15Feb-4Mar45)
 (C-17Mar-11Jun45)
 CO Maj Everett V. Alward (to 25-Feb45)
 Maj Thomas E. Mobley, Jr. (from 25Feb45)

Marine Fighter Squadron 124
 (USS Essex)
 (A-3-22Jan45)
 (B-15Feb-4Mar45)
 (C-17-24Mar45)
 CO Maj William A. Millington

Marine Carrier Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 132
 (USS Cape Gloucester)
 (F-10Jul-7Aug45)
 CO Capt Henry W. Hise

B. Assault and occupation of Iwo Jima; Fifth Fleet raids against Japan, 15Feb-16Mar45.

C. Third and Fifth Fleet raids in support of Okinawa operation, 17Mar-11Jun45.

D. Assault and occupation of Okinawa, 24Mar-30Jun45.

E. Balikpapan operations, 15Jun-20Jul45.

F. Third Fleet operations against Japan, 10Jul-15Aug45.

<p><i>Marine Carrier Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 143</i> (USS Gilbert Islands) (D—21May-16Jun45) (E—26Jun-6Jul45) (F—31Jul-15Aug45) CO Capt John E. Worlund</p> <p><i>Marine Fighter Squadron 213</i> (USS Essex) (A—3-22Jan45) (B—15Feb-4Mar45) (C—17-24Mar45) CO Maj Donald P. Frame (to 29Jan-45) Maj Louis R. Smunk (29Jan-4Feb45) Maj David E. Marshall (from 5-Feb45)</p> <p><i>Marine Fighter Squadron 214</i> (USS Franklin) (C—17-22Mar45) CO Maj Stanley R. Bailey</p> <p><i>Marine Fighter Squadron 216</i> (USS Wasp) (B—15Feb-4Mar45) (C—17-22Mar45) CO Maj George E. Dooley</p> <p><i>Marine Fighter Squadron 217</i> (USS Wasp) (B—15Feb-4Mar45) (C—17-22Mar45) CO Maj Jack R. Amende, Jr. (to 16-Feb45) Maj George S. Buck (from 16-Feb45)</p> <p><i>Marine Fighter Squadron 221</i> (USS Bunker Hill) (B—15Feb-4Mar45) (C—17Mar-13May45) CO Maj Edwin S. Roberts, Jr.</p>	<p><i>Marine Carrier Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 233</i> (USS Block Island) (D—3May-16Jun45) (E—26Jun-6Jul45) CO Capt Edmund W. Berry</p> <p><i>Marine Carrier Fighter Squadron 351</i> (USS Cape Gloucester) (F—10Jul-7Aug45) CO Maj Armond H. Delalio (to 5Jun-45) Maj Charles E. McLean, Jr. (from 5Jun45)</p> <p><i>Marine Fighter Squadron 451</i> (USS Bunker Hill) (B—15Feb-4Mar45) (C—17Mar-13May45) CO Maj Henry A. Ellis, Jr.</p> <p><i>Marine Fighter Squadron 452</i> (USS Franklin) (C—17-19Mar45) CO Maj Charles P. Weiland</p> <p><i>Marine Carrier Night Fighter Squadron 511</i> (USS Block Island) (D—3May-16Jun45) (E—26Jun-6Jul45) CO Maj Robert C. Maze (to 27May-45) Capt James L. Secrest (from 27-May45)</p> <p><i>Marine Carrier Fighter Squadron 512</i> (USS Gilbert Island) (D—21May-16Jun45) (E—26Jun-6Jul45) (F—31Jul-15Aug45) CO Maj Blaine H. Baesler</p>
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Marine Casualties¹

Okinawa (1Apr-22Jun45)	KIA		DOW		WIA		MIAPD		TOTAL	
	Offi- cer	En- sted	Offi- cer	En- listed	Offi- cer	En- listed	Offi- cer	En- listed	Offi- cer	En- listed
ReconBn, FMFPac.....	0	3	0	0	3	10	0	0	2	13
IIIAC Troops.....	0	18	1	4	14	148	0	0	15	170
IIIAC Artillery.....	1	10	1	11	11	458	1	1	14	480
1st Marine Division.....	56	1,036	13	149	311	6,094	0	6	380	7,285
RCT-8.....	1	36	0	11	11	317	0	0	12	364
6th Marine Division.....	27	1,337	18	274	388	7,041	1	10	434	8,662
2d Marine Aircraft Wing.....	24	21	0	9	51	162	28	3	103	195
Replacement Drafts ²	1	157	1	28	9	735	0	1	11	921
Miscellaneous Air ³	4	0	1	0	9	11	4	0	18	11
Miscellaneous Ground ⁴	0	16	0	8	0	117	0	0	0	141
Total Casualties.....	114	2,634	35	494	806	15,093	34	21	989	18,242
Marine Ships Detachments.....	1	47	0	1	8	97	0	10	9	155
Marine Carrier Air Detachments.....	10	40	0	0	7	6	2	0	19	46
Grand Total Marine Casualties.....	125	2,721	35	495	821	15,196	36	31	1,017	18,443
Naval Medical Personnel ⁵ Organic to Marine Units..	1	108	0	9	12	430	0	0	13	547
Grand Total.....	126	2,829	35	504	833	15,626	36	31	1,030	18,990

¹ These final Marine casualty figures were compiled from records furnished by Statistics Unit, Personnel Accounting Section, Records Branch, Personnel Department, HQMC. They are audited to include 26 August 1952. The key to the abbreviations used at the head of columns in the table follows: KIA, Killed in Action; DOW, Died of Wounds; WIA, Wounded in Action; MIAPD, Missing in Action, Presumed dead. Because of the casualty reporting method used during World War II, a substantial number of DOW figures are also included in the WIA column.

² Most members of replacement drafts who became casualties did so as member of regular combat units. In many instances, these men were hit before official notice of their transfer reached Headquarters Marine Corps, and therefore, they are carried on the casualty rolls as members of the various drafts.

³ Included in the miscellaneous categories are those men whose personnel records still showed them as members of units not part of Tenth Army when the report of their becoming a casualty reached Headquarters Marine Corps.

⁴ This category includes the casualties suffered by the 2d Marine Division while it was in the Okinawa area.

⁵ Compiled from NavMed P-5021, *The History of the Medical Department of the Navy in World War II*, 2 vols (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), II, pp. 1-84.

Unit Commendations

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington.

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the

FIRST MARINE DIVISION, REINFORCED,

consisting of

The FIRST Marine Division; Fourth Marine War Dog Platoon; Fourth Provisional Rocket Detachment; Fourth Joint Assault Signal Company; Third Amphibian Truck Company; Third Provisional Armored Amphibian Battalion; First Amphibian Tractor Battalion; Eighth Amphibian Tractor Battalion; Detachment, First Platoon, First Bomb Disposal Company; Second Platoon, First Bomb Disposal Company (less First Section); Battery "B", 88th Independent Chemical Mortar Battalion, U. S. Army; Company "B" (less First Platoon), 713th Armored Flame Thrower Battalion, U. S. Army,

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces during the invasion and capture of Okinawa Shima, Ryukyu Islands, from April 1 to June 21, 1945. Securing its assigned area in the north of Okinawa by a series of lightning advances against stiffening resistance, the FIRST Marine Division, Reinforced, turned southward to drive steadily forward through a formidable system of natural and man-made defenses protecting the main enemy bastion at Shuri Castle. Laying bitter siege to the enemy until the defending garrison was reduced and the elaborate fortifications at Shuri destroyed, these intrepid Marines continued to wage fierce battle as they advanced relentlessly, cutting off the Japanese on Oroku Peninsula and smashing through a series of heavily fortified, mutually supporting ridges extending to the southernmost tip of the island to split the remaining hostile force into two pockets where they annihilated the trapped and savagely resisting enemy. By their valor and tenacity, the officers and men of the FIRST Marine Division, Reinforced, contributed materially to the conquest of Okinawa, and their gallantry in overcoming a fanatic enemy in the face of extraordinary danger and difficulty adds new luster to Marine Corps History and to the traditions of the United States Naval Service."

For the President.

JOHN L. SULLIVAN,
Secretary of the Navy.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington.

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION, REINFORCED

consisting of

The Sixth Marine Division; First Marine War Dog Platoon; Fifth Provisional Rocket Detachment; Third Platoon, First Bomb Disposal Company; Marine Observation Squadron Six; Sixth Joint Assault Signal Company; First Armored Amphibian Battalion; Fourth Amphibian Tractor Battalion; Ninth Amphibian Tractor Battalion; First Section, Second Platoon, First Bomb Disposal Company; 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion, U. S. Army; Third Armored Amphibian Battalion (less 4 platoons); 91st Chemical Mortar Company (Separate), U. S. Army; First Platoon, Company B, 713th Armored Flame-Thrower Battalion, U. S. Army,
for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces during the assault and capture of Okinawa, April 1 to June 21, 1945. Seizing Yontan Airfield in its initial operation, the SIXTH Marine Division, Reinforced, smashed through organized resistance to capture Ishikawa Isthmus, the town of Nago and heavily fortified Motobu Peninsula in 13 days. Later committed to the southern front, units of the Division withstood overwhelming artillery and mortar barrages, repulsed furious counterattacks and staunchly pushed over the rocky terrain to reduce almost impregnable defenses and capture Sugar Loaf Hill. Turning southeast, they took the capital city of Naha and executed surprise shore-to-shore landings on Oroku Peninsula, securing the area with its prized Naha Airfield and Harbor after nine days of fierce fighting. Reentering the lines in the south, SIXTH Division Marines sought out enemy forces entrenched in a series of rocky ridges extending to the southern tip of the island, advancing relentlessly and rendering decisive support until the last remnants of enemy opposition were exterminated and the island secured. By their valor and tenacity, the officers and men of the SIXTH Marine Division, Reinforced contributed materially to the conquest of Okinawa, and their gallantry in overcoming a fanatic enemy in the face of extraordinary danger and difficulty adds new luster to Marine Corps history, and to the traditions of the United States Naval Service."

For the President.

JAMES FORRESTAL,
Secretary of the Navy.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington.

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the

SECOND MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces during the Okinawa Campaign, from April 4 to July 14, 1945. Bearing the entire burden of land-based aircraft support during the early part of the Okinawa Campaign, the Second Marine Aircraft Wing established facilities and operated its aircraft under the most hazardous field conditions with a minimum of equipment and personnel. Undeterred by either the constant rain during April and May or by heavy enemy artillery shelling and repeated day and night aerial bombing of the air strips, the unit succeeded in carrying out highly effective aerial operations against the enemy from Kyushu to the southernmost islands of the Ryukyu Group, flying picket-ship and anti-submarine patrols, fighter sweeps, day and night fighter and bomber strikes, reconnaissance and search missions, escort missions, and minesweeper and photographic plane cover, in addition to paradrop missions to move essential supplies to our forces. Blasting night and day at the enemy's dug-in infantry and artillery positions and executing some of the most successful night fighter operations of the Pacific War, the unit furnished close air support for our ground forces, shooting down 495 Japanese planes during this period. A gallant, fighting unit, complemented by skilled officers and men, the Second Marine Aircraft Wing played a major role in achieving the air superiority essential to our success in the Okinawa operation."

For the President.

JAMES FORRESTAL,
Secretary of the Navy.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington.

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the **PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION** to the

MARINE OBSERVATION SQUADRON THREE

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces during the invasion of Okinawa, April 2 to June 21, 1945. The first aviation squadron to land on and operate from Yontan Airfield, Marine Observation Squadron THREE assisted in preparing a landing strip on the field while under enemy fire and, during the first nine days of the operation, provided that field with the only available fire, crash and ambulance service. Despite inclement weather, intense enemy antiaircraft fire and constant bombing of its operational field, this squadron rendered invaluable service for more than two months, conducting extremely low-altitude searches, spotting and photographic missions over organized enemy positions to furnish thorough observation for all the Marine artillery units on Okinawa, serving as many as fourteen battalions during some periods. Though reduced in number by enemy action and operational losses, Marine Observation Squadron THREE effectively pursued its mission throughout a hazardous campaign and, by the indomitable courage and excellent teamwork of its officers and men, contributed immeasurably to the destruction of the Japanese on Okinawa."

For the President.

JAMES FORRESTAL,
Secretary of the Navy.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington.

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

AMPHIBIOUS RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

for service as follows:

"For outstanding heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces in the Gilbert Islands, from November 19 to 26, 1943; the Marshall Islands, from January 30 to February 23, 1944; Mariana Islands, from June 15 to August 4, 1944; and Ryukyu Islands, from March 26 to July 24, 1945. The only unit of its kind in the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, the Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion rendered unique service in executing secret reconnaissance missions on enemy-held islands. Frequently landing at night from submarines and other vessels prior to the assault, the small unit entered areas where friendly aircraft, Naval gunfire and other forms of support were unavailable and, under cover of darkness, moved about in hostile territory virtually in the presence of enemy troops. Despite hazards incident to passage through dark and unfamiliar hostile waters, often through heavy surf onto rocky shores, the Battalion persevered in its mission to reconnoiter enemy islands and obtain information vital to our assault forces and, on several occasions, succeeded in overcoming all enemy resistance without the aid of regular troops. Carrying out its difficult tasks with courage and determination, the Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion contributed materially to the success of our offensive operations throughout four major campaigns and achieved a gallant record of service which reflects the highest credit upon its officers and men and the United States Naval Service."

All personnel attached to and serving with the Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion during one or more of the above-mentioned periods are authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon.

JAMES FORRESTAL,
Secretary of the Navy.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington.

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

FIRST SEPARATE ENGINEER BATTALION

for service as follows:

"For exceptionally meritorious service in support of military operations on Guadalcanal, December 10, 1942, to February 27, 1943; Tinian from August 20, 1944, to March 24, 1945; and Okinawa from April 14 to September 2, 1945. Faced with numerous and difficult problems in engineering throughout two major campaigns, the First Separate Engineer Battalion initiated new techniques and procedures in construction, repair and maintenance, executing its missions under adverse conditions of weather and terrain and in spite of Japanese shellings, artillery fire, bombing raids, sickness and tropical storms. Technically skilled, aggressive and unmindful of great personal danger, the officers and men of this gallant Battalion constructed, developed and maintained vital routes of communication, airfields and camp facilities; they served as combat engineer units in performing demolitions, mine detection and disposal and bomb disposal tasks in support of various units of the Fleet Marine Force; and they built bridges and repaired air-bombed air strips toward the uninterrupted operations of Allied ground and aerial forces. Undeterred by both mechanical and natural limitations, the First Separate Engineer Battalion completed with dispatch and effectiveness assigned and unanticipated duties which contributed immeasurably to the ultimate defeat of Japan and upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

All personnel attached to the First Separate Engineer Battalion during any of the above mentioned periods are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon.

JAMES FORRESTAL,
Secretary of the Navy.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington.

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

III AMPHIBIOUS CORPS SIGNAL BATTALION

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For extremely meritorious service in support of military operations, while attached to the I Marine Amphibious Corps during the amphibious assault on Bougainville, and attached to the III Amphibious Corps during operations at Guam, Palau and Okinawa, during the period from November 1, 1943 to June 21, 1945. The first American Signal Battalion to engage in amphibious landings in the Pacific Ocean Areas, the III Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion pioneered and developed techniques and procedures without benefit of established precedent, operating with limited and inadequate equipment, particularly in the earlier phase of these offensive actions, and providing its own security while participating in jungle fighting, atoll invasions and occupation of large island masses. Becoming rapidly experienced in guerrilla warfare and the handling of swiftly changing situations, this valiant group of men successfully surmounted the most difficult conditions of terrain and weather as well as unfamiliar technical problems and, working tirelessly without consideration for safety, comfort or convenience, provided the Corps with uninterrupted ship-shore and bivouac communication service continuously throughout this period. This splendid record of achievement, made possible only by the combined efforts, loyalty and courageous devotion to duty of each individual, was a decisive factor in the success of the hazardous Bougainville, Guam, Palau and Okinawa Campaigns and reflects the highest credit upon the III Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion and the United States Naval Service."

All personnel attached to the III Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion who actually participated in one or more of the Bougainville, Guam, Palau and Okinawa operations are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon.

JAMES FORRESTAL,
Secretary of the Navy.

Index

- Abe, VAdm Koso, 745
 Acorn, 456, 456*n*. *See also* Navy Units.
 Adams, LtCol John P., 775
 Adjutant & Inspector's Dept, HQMC, 678
 Admiralties, 4
 Advanced Naval Bases, 4, 94, 103, 406, 467,
 550, 650, 653-654, 687-689. *See also* Bases.
 Aerial photography. *See* Air activities.
 Aerial photography interpreters, 61, 687
 Agana, 734
 Agat, 734
 Agina, 128
 Aguijan, 462
 Aguni Shima, 34, 347-348, 381
 Aid stations. *See* Medical activities.
 Aihara, RAdm Aritaka, 455
 Ainoura, 500, 500*n*
 Air activities
 American
 Air attacks, 11, 18, 32, 40, 57, 61*n*, 63, 67,
 60, 104, 134-135, 152, 164, 186, 190, 192-
 193, 209, 211, 220, 343, 352, 371, 495, 529
 air control, 177, 182, 184, 226, 657
 air defense, 26, 69, 177, 183-184, 242, 274,
 373, 381, 410, 465
 air drop, 25, 130, 234, 271, 293, 295, 297,
 304, 328-329, 329*n*, 330-331, 331*n*, 340,
 342, 361*n*, 374, 383, 707, 783, 785
 air evacuation. *See* Medical Activities.
 air liaison parties, 182, 259, 344, 374-375,
 382-383, 386, 670-671
 air observers, 90, 102, 132, 162, 186*n*, 377
 air personnel, 16, 22, 69, 75, 95, 102, 177*n*,
 180, 185-186, 208, 208*n*, 209, 223-224,
 226-227, 227*n*, 228-230, 278, 331, 370-
 371, 373-374, 377, 409-412, 418, 424-426,
 461, 470, 528, 552*n*, 561, 566, 576-578,
 582, 591*n*, 621, 623, 636, 670-671, 704,
 712, 715-716, 731, 745-746, 783
 air photography, 61, 78-80, 102, 185, 252*n*,
 377, 460, 577, 685
 air raid warning services, 177, 182-183
 air tactics, 26, 85, 226, 230, 425
 artillery spotters, 376-377
 bombing, 5, 8, 13, 15, 17, 20, 39, 55, 63, 67,
 97-98, 103, 111, 138, 144-145, 148, 155,
 Air activities—Continued
 American—Continued
 176, 188, 193, 202, 213, 216-217, 231,
 245, 259-260, 265, 275, 284-286, 311,
 344-345, 352, 369, 371, 430, 433, 461, 500,
 503, 635, 767, 772-775, 779
 carrier strikes, 12, 60, 78-79, 96, 98, 106,
 259, 393, 426, 673
 close support, 13, 57, 60-61, 90-91, 111,
 136, 138*n*, 180-182, 193, 202, 230, 305,
 348, 375*n*, 376-377, 380, 383, 390, 410-
 411, 417, 421, 424-425, 427, 561, 586,
 613, 669-672, 717
 combat air patrols, 69, 99, 138, 177, 181,
 186, 224-226, 370, 372, 374, 383, 415,
 577, 601, 623
 losses, 208*n*, 369
 reconnaissance, 77, 337, 377, 564, 566, 577,
 595, 613, 783
 search and rescue, 103
 strafing, 97, 111, 154-155, 167, 417, 586,
 635
 Japanese
 air attacks, 81, 97, 99-100, 102, 109, 116,
 177-179, 183-184, 186, 209, 224, 241*n*,
 274-275, 690
 airborne raids, 227-229
 air personnel, 98, 100, 107, 178, 186, 224,
 370
 air photography, 225
 air support, 675
 air tactics, 177, 223-224
 bombing, 177, 179
 combat air patrols, 21
 losses, 15-16, 100, 178, 180, 180*n*, 184-186,
 186*n*, 209, 227, 229, 242, 251, 274
 reconnaissance, 177, 189
 suicide attacks, 22, 53, 81, 100, 166, 177-
 180, 185, 190, 208, 223, 227-228, 236,
 264, 421. *See also* Kamikazes; Kikusui.
 Aircraft
 American, 21, 32, 41, 60, 75, 97, 103*n*, 104,
 177, 179, 182, 185-186, 192, 193, 211, 271,
 277, 307, 364*n*, 375, 379, 382-383, 411,
 414, 483, 532-534, 561, 566-567, 595, 643,
 670, 715-717, 741, 748, 774, 776-778, 783

Aircraft—Continued

American—Continued

types

B-24s (Liberators), 373, 453*n*

B-25s (Mitchells), 373

B-29s (Superfortresses), 13, 78, 98, 373*n*, 379, 401, 430, 433, 436, 503, 779–780, 783, 785

bombers, 8, 25, 98, 167, 373, 438, 577, 779

carrier aircraft, 16, 61, 78, 98–99, 102, 104, 109, 111, 111*n*, 115, 129, 179, 181, 193, 243, 329, 329*n*, 374–375, 383, 407, 409–410, 431, 436, 484, 538, 561, 566, 645, 776, 779–780

C-46s (Commandos), 786

dive bombers, 716

F4Us (Corsairs), 95, 154, 177*n*, 186, 225, 371, 373, 413, 415, 417–418, 424–428, 431, 495, 566, 588, 608, 613, 621, 624, 716

F6Fs (Hellcats), 91, 128, 225–226, 413, 415, 417, 424–426

FM-2s (Wildcats), 428, 716

fighter bombers, 26

fighters, 8, 13, 25–26, 129, 152, 154, 166–167, 370, 431, 438, 566, 585, 613, 627, 716

gliders, 713

night fighters, 25, 181, 208, 225, 374, 588
observation planes, 25, 117, 120, 219, 277–278, 335, 337, 601, 668, 729

OYs (Sentinels) (“grasshoppers”), 128, 376, 564, 578, 585, 610, 613, 622, 628

patrol bombers, 97, 103

P-38s (Lightnings), 773

P-47s (Thunderbolts), 226–227, 371–372

PBJs (Mitchells), 373*n*PBY-5As (Catalinas), 84*n*

photo-reconnaissance planes, 29, 417, 577–578

reconnaissance planes, 564, 618

R5Cs (Commandos), 629

R5Ds (Skymasters), 636, 642

scout bombers, 25, 564, 576–577

seaplanes, 107, 185*n*, 484, 555–556, 636

TBFs (Avengers), 715

TBMs (Avengers), 91, 226, 293, 304, 329*n*, 374, 383, 424, 428*n*, 431, 781

torpedo bombers, 25–26, 61, 226, 417, 423, 564, 576, 588

Aircraft—Continued

American—Continued

types—Continued

transports, 25, 123, 180*n*, 225, 243, 437, 485, 566, 576, 595, 599, 602, 604, 623, 629, 638, 643, 713, 729

German

Messerschmitt ME-109, 227*n*

Japanese

aircraft, 21–22, 57–58, 69, 76, 100, 109, 166, 177, 179, 224–225, 293, 307–308, 370–371, 503, 665, 731, 741

types

Bettys (light bombers), 415

bombers, 21, 100, 179–180, 208, 227–228, 534

carrier planes, 16

fighters, 21, 179–180, 502

Franks (fighters), 227, 371, 371*n*

Jacks (fighters), 227

reconnaissance planes, 21, 179, 208, 225

seaplanes, 773

suicide planes, 94, 104, 175, 419. *See also Kamikazes; Kikusui.*Tonys (fighters), 227*n*

training planes, 21

Zekes (fighters) (“Zeros”), 227, 371, 371*n*

Airfields

American, 4, 11–12, 25–26, 32, 55, 60–61, 69, 73, 75, 78, 90, 98, 120, 181, 208, 224, 228–229, 251, 299–300, 302, 309, 311, 314, 370, 372, 376, 378–379, 408, 460, 487–488, 538–539, 541, 545–546, 550, 552, 556, 566, 566*n*, 584, 599, 618, 624, 630, 709, 729development, 72, 74–74, 123, 166, 226, 242*n*, 335, 379, 694

Japanese, 21, 32, 46, 66–67, 98, 100, 102–103, 183, 226, 372, 406, 417, 455, 716, 772

Aitape, 4

Aka Shima, 452

Akron, Ohio, 712

Alabama, 479*n*

Alamogordo, N. Mex., 432

Alaska, 763

Albertville, 747*n*

Allied forces, 3, 5, 15–17, 19–21, 31–32, 57, 63, 436–437, 439, 462, 497, 528, 557, 582, 675, 707, 740, 749, 779, 781

- Allied POW Rescue Group, 484. *See also* Prisoners of War.
- Alward, Maj Everett V., 416
- Amami O-Shima, 11, 34, 39, 39*n*, 43, 97, 179, 370, 427
- Amamiya, LtGen Tatsumi, 43, 212, 268, 289, 363
- Amend, Maj Jack R., Jr., 416
- American Civilian Internment Center (Shanghai), 754. *See also* Prisoner of War Camps.
- American Embassy Guards, 543, 583, 732 Peiping, 731
- American flag, 295, 545, 552, 780–781
- Amethyst*, 644, 645
- Amike, 303
- Ammunition
- American, 65, 103, 144, 149*n*, 151, 173, 180*n*, 196, 225, 234, 237, 240, 262, 275, 304, 331, 339, 342, 344, 479, 579, 625, 627, 667, 668*n*, 697. *See also* Supplies and Equipment.
 - Types
 - armor piercing, 316*n*
 - artillery, 192, 192*n*, 211, 217, 241, 338, 459
 - bombs, 148, 152, 154, 192, 211, 249, 277, 352, 373–374, 382, 419, 426–427, 459, 503
 - 81mm mortar, 180*n*
 - .50 caliber, 192, 374, 417
 - 5-inch shells, 385
 - flares, 209, 254, 299, 341, 338, 590
 - 14-inch, 305
 - high explosive shells, 305, 316*n*, 589
 - machine gun, 211
 - mortar, 326, 625
 - 155mm, 240
 - 105mm, 189*n*, 262
 - rockets, 211, 373*n*, 374, 385, 417, 714
 - 75mm, 189*n*, 218*n*, 260, 262, 305
 - smoke, 374
 - star shells, 190, 254
 - .30 caliber, 260
 - tracers, 209
 - 20mm, 142, 374
 - Japanese, 154, 289, 455, 709
 - Types
 - artillery, 222
 - bombs, 208, 419, 737
 - 8-inch, 320
 - 47mm, 353
- Ammunition—Continued
- Japanese—Continued
 - Types—Continued
 - mortar, 211, 262, 511
 - parachute flares, 508*n*
 - 320mm mortar, 45, 308
 - white phosphorous shells, 252, 254
- Amoy, 11, 402
- Amphibious assault operations, 4–5, 11, 12*n*, 40, 60, 66–67, 76, 86*n*, 109, 166, 177, 196, 205, 242, 299, 303, 324, 348, 376, 394, 403, 410–411, 413, 429, 447, 460, 467, 481, 485, 534–535, 615, 653, 655–658, 661–662, 664–667, 669–670, 674–676, 679, 684, 691, 694, 701, 710–711, 725, 728, 778
- Amphibious doctrine, tactics, 382, 429, 654–658, 663, 669, 677, 680, 687
- Amphibious exercises, 468, 630, 635. *See also* Fleet Landing Exercises.
- Amphibious forces, 637, 659–660, 668, 670. *See also* Navy Units.
- Amsterdam*, 479*n*
- Anchorages
- American, 4, 7–8, 22, 94, 103, 184, 208, 455, 539, 542, 552–553, 561
 - Japanese, 31
- Andaman Islands, 178*n*
- Angaur, 4, 240*n*, 450
- Annam, Annamites, 522, 767
- Anping, 610, 612–614, 648
- Ansel, Lt Walter C., 654
- Anshan, 588–589
- Antiaircraft Artillery. *See also* Army Units; Marine Units; Weapons.
- American, 75, 106, 109, 166, 177, 179, 181–184, 185*n*, 208, 228–229, 274, 279, 369–370, 380*n*, 384, 453, 464, 688–690, 692, 692*n*, 695, 707
 - Japanese, 41, 45, 47, 115, 194, 350, 484
- Antonelli, LtCol John W. A., 503
- Anwei Province, 759
- Aola Bay, 710
- Aoyangai, LtCol Tokio, 108, 121
- Aragachi, 344, 357, 363, 368
- Aragusuku, 298
- Arakabesan, 453
- Ara Saki, 351, 361–362
- Arawe, 722
- Ariake Wan, 408
- Arita, 501
- Arlington, Virginia, 678

Armor. *See also* Army units; Marine Units; Weapons.

American, 84*n*, 126, 142, 194, 201, 201*n*, 203, 206, 219, 222, 231, 247, 249–250, 260, 262, 264, 266–267, 273, 284, 306, 310–312, 315–316, 335, 339, 344, 346, 351, 363, 386–387, 390, 467, 563, 576, 598, 629, 684, 691–694, 703, 720, 722, 726

Japanese, 20, 44, 80, 206

Army Air Forces, 13, 60–61, 75, 401, 414

Units

Far East Air Forces, 373, 407–409, 430, 438, 496, 535, 783

Fifth Air Force, 407, 430, 438, 488, 490, 509

Seventh Air Force, 407, 430–431

Eighth Air Force, 430

Thirteenth Air Force, 407, 430

Fourteenth Air Force, 529

Twentieth Air Force, 401*n*, 430, 783

Air Transport Command, 595

Fighter Command, 373*n*

XX Bomber Command, 430

XXI Bomber Command, 430

314th Bombardment Wing, 783

301st Fighter Wing, 372*n*

413th Fighter Wing, 372*n*

507th Fighter Wing, 372*n*

11th Bombardment Group, 372*n*

41st Bombardment Group, 372, 372*n*

319th Bombardment Group, 372*n*

494th Bombardment Group, 372*n*

318th Fighter Group, 229–230, 372*n*

13th Troop Carrier Group, 599

19th Fighter Squadron, 230*n*

73d Fighter Squadron, 230*n*

333d Fighter Squadron, 230*n*

28th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron, 185

Army of the United States. *See also* U. S. Army, 772

Army Units

Army Advisory Group, Nanking, 638

Army Counterintelligence Corps, 122

Army Military Intelligence Training Center, 687

Army Service Command OLYMPIC, 404

Leyte Base Command, 85, 85*n*

10th Military District, 771

First Army, 409

Army Units—Continued

Sixth Army, 399, 404, 408–409, 476, 490, 492–493, 496, 509, 512, 786

Seventh Army, 747

Eighth Army, 408, 438, 476, 481, 484*n*, 488–489, 492, 512, 517, 781, 786

Tenth Army, 350, 353, 354*n*, 356–357, 363, 365, 365*n*, 368–369, 372, 374–375, 378–385, 385*n*, 386, 388–350, 392, 397, 408, 410, 452, 476, 476*n*, 691, 705

Island Command, 58, 71, 75–77, 84, 92–93, 122, 160, 191, 241–242, 348, 365, 378–381

Tactical Air Force, 25, 61, 69, 74–75, 92–93, 95–96, 136, 152, 176–177, 181, 183, 185–186, 192, 228–230, 243, 278*n*, 329*n*, 371–372, 372*n*, 373–374, 430, 671

Air Defense Command, 61, 61*n*, 69, 98, 176–177, 182, 184–185, 226, 229, 243, 372, 372*n*, 431

Air Defense Control Center (ADCC), 176, 182–184, 223, 381

Bomber Command, 61

I Corps, 404, 408, 492, 512, 514, 517

IX Corps, 399, 404, 408

X Corps, 11*n*, 492

XI Corps, 404, 408, 488

XXIV Corps, 60, 66, 68, 72, 80–81, 83–84, 84*n*, 85, 91–93, 96, 112, 117, 125, 128, 131, 136*n*, 138, 158, 160, 164*n*, 166, 169, 176, 181, 183, 188–198, 202, 204, 206–207, 209, 211, 213*n*, 214, 216–217, 233, 236, 240–241, 266, 268–269, 274, 281, 293, 297–298, 300, 303–304, 344, 351, 351*n*, 352, 354, 356, 362, 364, 374–375, 387, 389, 476*n*, 534

Artillery, 68, 103, 106, 189, 195, 216, 216*n*

Americal Division, 408

1st Cavalry Division, 408, 488, 778

1st Infantry Division 656, 681

7th Infantry Division, 60, 68, 92, 112, 112*n*, 117, 120, 125, 128, 131, 188–190, 194, 196, 199, 199*n*, 206–207, 210–211, 213, 270–272, 274, 276, 280–281, 287, 290, 292–293, 293*n*, 297–298, 300, 303, 351–352, 356–357, 362, 368

9th Infantry Division, 656

11th Airborne Division, 404, 408, 438, 475, 481, 483–485, 487

24th Infantry Division, 514, 517

25th Infantry Division, 408

Army Units—Continued

- 27th Infantry Division, 49, 62, 65, 86, 90, 164, 164*n*, 189, 192–199, 199*n*, 216, 380, 412*n*
- 32d Infantry Division, 493, 493*n*, 496, 500, 502–503, 505, 506*n*, 508*n*, 511, 512
- 33d Infantry Division, 408
- 36th Infantry Division, 747
- 40th Infantry Division, 404, 407
- 41st Infantry Division, 408
- 43d Infantry Division, 408
- 77th Infantry Division, 62, 65, 67, 91, 96, 98, 103–104, 106, 142*n*, 166–167, 169, 196–199, 206, 209, 212–213, 233, 244, 256, 263, 265–269, 272, 274, 281–283, 286, 293, 293*n*, 297–298, 368, 408
- 81st Infantry Division, 65, 408
- 93d Infantry Division, 452
- 96th Infantry Division, 60, 68, 85, 92, 96, 125, 128, 131, 188–189, 189*n*, 190, 193–194, 196–199, 199*n*, 206*n*, 220, 233, 236, 244, 256, 266–270, 272, 274, 277, 281, 293, 293*n*, 297–298, 300, 303, 325, 326*n*, 327, 333, 335, 351, 353–354, 356–357, 363, 368
- 98th Infantry Division, 408
- 110th Division, 771–772
- 53d Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade, 183, 274, 691
- 1st Engineer Special Brigade, 160
- 2d Provisional Army Brigade, 655
- Artillery
 - 17th Field Artillery, 655
 - 131st Field Artillery, 763, 766
 - 419th Field Artillery Group, 188
 - 420th Field Artillery Group, 106, 111, 189
- Battalions
 - 104th, 216, 216*n*
 - 105th, 216
 - 106th, 216
 - 145th, 216, 216*n*
 - 148th, 763*n*
 - 249th, 199*n*
 - 149th, 189
- Infantry Regiments
 - 17th, 293, 303
 - 18th, 655
 - 32d, 272, 298, 303, 367
 - 105th, 164, 193, 199
 - 106th, 199
 - 111th, 453–454
 - 112th, 488

Army Units—Continued

- Infantry Regiments—Continued
 - 126th, 505–506
 - 127th, 505, 505*n*, 506
 - 128th, 505–506
 - 158th, 404, 407
 - 164th, 686, 696
 - 165th, 348
 - 184th, 211, 270, 272, 278, 280–281, 303, 357
 - 305th, 167, 169, 233, 263, 267, 269, 293*n*, 303, 364
 - 306th, 212, 269, 282, 295
 - 307th, 91, 202, 204, 216, 267–269, 368
 - 381st, 398, 357
 - 382d, 267–269
 - 383d, 131, 233, 266, 269, 298, 326, 328, 331
- 708th Amphibious Tank Battalion, 305
- 870th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion, 308*n*
- 713th Armored Flamethrower Battalion, 201*n*, 386, 386*n*
- Infantry Battalions
 - 1/127, 496, 507
 - 1/184, 362
 - 1/305, 169
 - 1/307, 282
 - 1/383, 269
 - 2/184, 270
 - 2/305, 298
 - 2/306, 106, 269
 - 2/307, 104, 204
 - 2/383, 267–270, 304, 328
 - 3/105, 164
 - 3/305, 267
 - 3/306, 281–282
 - 3/307, 267
 - 3/381, 268, 270
 - 3/383, 297, 331
- 91st Chemical Mortar Company, 253
- Arnold, MajGen Archibald V., 60
- Arnold, Gen H. H., 303, 351, 401*n*, 403*n*, 430
- Artillery. *See also* Army units; Marine Units; Weapons.
 - American, 63, 79, 86*n*, 88–89, 91, 93, 103*n*, 114, 116–117, 117*n*, 130, 135–136, 144–145, 148, 172, 175, 183, 185, 189–190, 192–194, 209, 211–212, 216, 218, 221, 240, 245, 249, 254, 262, 264, 268–269, 277–278, 298, 305, 352, 376–377, 384, 409, 467, 598, 621, 625, 629, 635, 638, 657, 667–668, 670, 673, 688–690, 692–695, 705, 720–723

Artillery—Continued

American—Continued

operations, techniques, 86, 89–90, 90*n*, 118, 144–146, 150–151, 155, 188, 190, 198, 202, 213, 216–217, 218*n*, 220, 222, 231, 235, 248–249, 253, 254*n*, 259, 265, 275, 280, 286, 289, 296, 305, 311, 320, 326, 333, 339, 341, 343, 345, 351, 358, 369, 374, 380, 382–383, 385, 390, 645, 717. *See also* Tactics.

Japanese, 45, 55, 111, 139, 142, 145, 146*n*, 151–152, 185, 185*n*, 201, 214, 253, 271, 275, 363, 485, 511, 675, 709

operations, techniques, 111, 126, 131, 140, 144, 148, 193–194, 197–198, 201–202, 204, 207, 212, 221, 230–234, 237, 245, 248, 251–252, 259–260, 270, 275, 295, 393, 741

Asa, 202–203

Asa Kawa River, 199, 201, 203, 205, 212, 214, 216, 219–220, 222–223, 223*n*, 230, 234–235, 257, 302, 388*n*

Asama Maru, 734*n*

Asato, 282

Asato Gawa River, 233–236, 247, 251, 254, 256, 271, 273, 275–276, 280, 301

Ashurst, Col William W., 732–733, 751, 753–754, 757

Asia, 60, 475, 528, 589

Assault signal companies, 598, 695. *See also* Army Units; Marine Units.

Assembly areas,

American, 111, 132, 145, 197, 214, 218*n*, 270, 275, 293*n*, 307, 338, 342

Japanese, 193

Astor House, 546

Atlanta, 479*n*

Atlee, Clement, 434

Atoll Commander, Eniwetok, 444*n*

Atolls, 666, 671, 745

Atomic Bomb, 192, 399–400, 428, 432, 433, 436, 452*n*, 459, 476, 536, 780–781

Atrocities, 741, 745

Atsugi Airfield, 438, 481, 483–485, 487, 786

Atsutabaru, 132

Attu, 763

Australia, 87, 696, 760, 770–772, 781, 786

Austria, 746

Awa, 135, 136*n*, 140, 142, 144, 149, 152

Awacha, 199, 204, 217, 220*n*, 259

Awacha Draw, 220–221

Awacha Pocket, 203, 216, 218, 220, 232, 726

Awards and decorations, 729

Aware Saki, 106, 388*n*

Aware Shima, 67

Awase, 372

Awashi Peninsula, 128

Axis, 18

Axtell, Maj George C., Jr., 374*n*

Azuma, 487

Babelthuap, 453

Badger, RAdm Oscar C., 476, 479*n*, 483–484, 487–488; VAdm, 637, 639–640, 642–645, 647

Bailey, Maj Stanley R., 419

Bailey bridge, 223, 223*n*, 231, 275, 307. *See also* Bridges.

Baird, Capt Robert, 226

Balikpapan, Borneo, 427, 429

Ballance, Col Robert G., 112*n*, 158*n*; BGen, 116*n*

Banana Wars, 675, 720

Bangkok, 766

Banika, 70, 74, 93, 391

Bank of Chosen, 502

Banten Bay, 763*n*

Barbey, VAdm Daniel E., 358, 408, 534, 536, 551–552, 555, 559, 559*n*, 561, 563, 565, 569, 574, 604

Barr, MajGen David, 641

Barrett, Maj Charles D. 654–655; Col, 688; MajGen, 690

Barrett, 1stLt Edward M., 739*n*

Barry, 370, 370*n*

Bases

American, 7, 65, 75, 98, 103, 146, 424, 680, 709, 776

Japanese, 39, 57–58, 139, 406, 455

Basic School, Quantico, 724

Basset, RAdm Melvin H., 452*n*

Bataan, 45, 439, 740–741, 786

Bataan, 479*n*

Bataan Death March, 769, 772, 788

Batavia, 740, 763, 765

Battles, Cpl Connie Gene, 754

Bayfield, 639–640, 642

Bay of Chaungzon, 766

Bayler, Col Walter L. J., 459

Beaches, 34, 63–66, 76, 79, 91, 93, 96, 100, 102, 104, 106, 109, 112, 114–115, 125, 136, 160, 162, 167, 272, 306, 323, 330, 332, 379, 485

Black, 118

Green, 485

Beaches—Continued

- Green 1, 115
- Green 2, 112
- Orange, 158, 164
- Purple 1, 158
- Red, 305, 485
- Red 1, 42, 158, 305
- Red 2, 305
- White, 723–724
- Yellow 2, 160
- Yellow 3, 158
- Beachheads, 70, 117*n*, 118, 222, 273, 375, 719, 729. *See also* Beaches.
- Beachmaster, 663
- Beach party, 663–664. *See also* Beachmaster; Shore Party Activities.
- Beans, LtCol Fred D., 145, 149, 151, 174, 256*n*, 476, 485, 488
- “Beast of the East,” 752
- Beecher, Col Curtis T., 769, 776–777; BGen, 769
- Bell, LtCol George B., 254, 310
- Belleau Wood*, 479*n*
- Benedict, LtCol W. E., 128*n*, 303, 342, 345, 358, 364, 364*n*
- Benevolence*, 484, 781
- Benner, Col Kenneth W., 183–184
- Bennington*, 180, 185, 416, 421, 479*n*
- Beppu, 505
- Berger, Lt Col Spencer S., 116, 171–172, 210, 330, 332
- Bergren, Maj Orville V., 144*n*, 145*n*, 320*n*; Col, 479*n*, 489*n*
- Beriberi, 453, 740
- Berlin, 432
- Besena Misaki, 136
- Best, Col William N., 560–561
- Biak, 48
- Bias Bay, 603
- “Big Ben,” 419. *See also* *Franklin*.
- Big Three Meeting, 431
- Bikini Atoll, 444*n*, 459
- Bill, 1stLt Josiah W., 439
- Biloxi*, 496
- Birmingham*, 208
- Bise Saki, 140
- Bishi Gawa, 67, 100, 112, 116, 158
- Bishop, Lewis S., 758–759
- Bismarck Archipelago, 4
- Biwa-ko, 779
- Black List, 484, 783
- Black market, 502, 753, 761
- Blake, BGen Robert, 450, 455, 457
- Blakelock, BGen David H., 65*n*, 72*n*, 123*n*, 158*n*, 162*n*, 166*n*, 180*n*, 240*n*, 242*n*, 272*n*, 392*n*
- Blandy, RAdm William H. P., 60, 99*n*, 100, 102–103
- Bleasdale, Col Victor F., 129, 142, 146
- Block Island*, 424, 426, 427*n*, 429
- Bloody Nose Ridge, 232
- Bloody Ridge, 167, 169, 209
- Boatner, BGen Haydon L., 544
- Boats. *See* Landing Craft.
- Bodnar, Sgt John P., 746–747
- Bombardments, 65, 99, 102, 111, 348. *See also* Naval gunfire.
- Bomb disposal activities, 25
- Bon Homme Richard*, 479*n*
- Bonins, 7–9, 11, 11*n*, 12, 21, 40, 43, 159, 449–450, 452, 460–461, 468, 746
- Bonins Occupation Forces, 450, 460–461
- Boston*, 479*n*
- Bougainville, 4, 25, 27, 88, 372*n*, 410, 412, 535–536, 566, 686, 698, 711, 714, 717–720
- Bougainville*, 564
- Bougainville Milk Run, 670
- Bouker, LtCol John G., 103*n*
- Boundaries, 67, 112, 115, 117–118, 125, 173, 202–204, 214, 233–234, 248, 273, 282, 293*n*, 297–298, 303, 305, 312, 314, 318, 329, 338, 350, 356, 360, 362
- Bourke, MajGen Thomas E., 397*n*, 409, 495, 500
- Boxer Protocol, 732
- Boxer Rebellion, 522, 524, 547
- Boyd, Maj Clay, 489*n*
- Boyington, Maj Gregory, 745, 750, 785; LtCol, 716
- Bradford, BGen William B., 216
- Bradley, MajGen James L., 60, 125, 198, 326*n*
- Bradley, Gen Omar, 685*n*
- Bradshaw, Capt Harvey D., 426*n*
- Brazil Maru*, 777–778
- Bremen, 747
- Bremerton, Washington, 418, 421
- Breton*, 95
- Bridge House, 754
- Bridges, 102, 116, 116*n*, 132, 134–135, 139, 155, 203, 219, 231, 233, 276, 283, 302, 304, 307–308, 310, 312, 325, 326, 327*n*, 330, 346, 590, 599
- Brimmer, Cpl Charles, 754–755
- British Broadcasting Corporation, 757

- British Carrier Force, 60, 100, 406, 431, 435, 479
 British Chiefs of Staff, 3*n*
 British commandos, 707, 707*n*, 708
 British Commonwealth Occupation Force, 514
 British expeditionary force, 522
 British flag, 781
 British Flagship Group, 438. *See also* Task Organizations.
 British forces, 479, 749, 764, 766, 781
 British Government, 436
 British Landing Force, 483, 485, 487
 British Naval Units, 60, 100, 369, 406, 438, 479, 649. *See also* Task Organizations.
 British observers, 382
 British Pacific Fleet, 431
 British Support Force, 438
 Brittain, Commo Thomas B., 551
 Broadcasts, 357, 583
 Brodie gear, 668
 Brown, Col Charles C., 544
 Brown, Maj Luther A., 731, 733, 752-753; Col, 732, 732*n*, 751
 Brown, Col Wilburt S., 116-117, 123, 189, 189*n*, 194; MajGen, 88*n*, 189*n*, 194*n*, 195*n*, 199*n*, 219*n*, 383*n*, 613*n*
 Bruce, MajGen Andrew D., 62, 91, 96, 104, 166, 196, 198, 286; LtGen, 142*n*
 Brunner, Sgt Frederick J., 747, 747*n*
 Buckley, LtCol Edmond J., 685*n*, 686; Col, 686*n*
 Buckner, LtGen Simon B., Jr., 6, 11-12, 12*n*, 58, 60, 62-68, 71, 73, 76, 82, 83*n*, 84-86, 90, 92, 125, 129, 132, 141*n*, 159, 164*n*, 188, 195-199, 218, 240-242, 278, 278*n*, 280-281, 287, 292, 298, 338, 338*n*, 347-348, 350, 353-354, 354*n*, 364, 379, 384, 724
 Bunker Hill, 180, 185, 415-417, 419*n*, 421
 Bureau of Aeronautics, 410
 Burma, 3*n*, 45, 530, 740, 750, 766-768
 Burton, LtCol Custis, Jr., 216
 Bushido, 367, 788
 Butuan Bay, 772
 Byroade, BGen Henry A., 595
 Cabanatuan, 743, 769, 778
 Cactus Air Force, 686*n*, 716, 716*n*
 Cairo Conference (SEXTANT), 3
 Cairo Declaration, 399, 434
 Caldwell, Col Frank C., 707*n*
 California, 647, 681, 699
 Campbell, BGen Harold D., 453
 Campbell, LtCol William R., 427
 Camp Elliott, Calif., 442, 680, 682, 705
 Camp Gillespie, San Diego, Calif., 705
 Camp Lejeune, N. C., 27, 441, 448, 468-469, 616, 681, 687, 689-690, 698, 705, 714
 Camp Pendleton, Calif., 27, 442, 448, 468, 512, 616, 625, 631, 642-643, 647, 680, 698, 721
 Camp Ritchie, Md., 687
 Canals, 276, 283, 537. *See also* Terrain.
 Cannes-Nice area, 747
 Cannibalism, 461-462
 Canton, 407, 521, 525, 534, 603, 631
 Cape Esperance, 91
 Cape Gloucester, 86-87, 676, 686, 696*n*, 720
 Cape Gloucester, 424, 428, 428*n*
 Cape Torokina, 25, 719
 Cargo. *See* Supplies and Equipment.
 Caribbean, 469, 649, 680, 718
 Carlson, Maj Evans F., 698, 707-710, 710*n*; LtCol, 744
 Carney, RAdm Robert B., 483, 487
 Caroline Islanders, 455
 Caroline Islands, 14, 450, 654
 Casualties
 American, 27, 73, 87-88, 99-100, 104, 109, 11*n*, 114, 118, 126, 128, 134, 138*n*, 140, 144-146, 148, 148*n*, 151-152, 155, 158, 160, 164, 166-167, 169, 171, 175, 178-179, 180*n*, 184, 190, 194, 196, 198, 201-203, 204*n*, 205, 208, 212-213, 219-221, 228-229, 231-232, 234-239, 243-245, 249-250, 252-253, 261, 263, 265, 271, 276-277, 278*n*, 281, 283, 296, 298, 304, 309, 311-312, 316, 320*n*, 324, 327, 329, 332-335, 339-342, 344-345, 348, 358, 362, 369, 389, 403, 419, 421, 432, 434, 527, 531, 558, 612-613, 625, 627, 672, 675, 683-684, 699, 704*n*, 709-710, 728-730, 737, 750, 769, 776
 Japanese, 16, 18, 103-104, 120-121, 130, 132, 136, 148, 150, 152, 154-155, 166, 169, 171-173, 175-176, 190-191, 194, 205, 208, 210-213, 213*n*, 221, 228, 230, 234-235, 239, 242, 244, 247, 254, 266, 282, 289-290, 298, 300, 307, 312, 316, 320, 323-324, 330, 345, 356, 360*n*, 368-369, 369*n*, 380-381, 710, 729
 Casualty Division, HQMC, 750
 Casualty evacuation. *See* Medical Activities.
 Cates, MajGen Clifton B., 24, 24*n*
 Catoctin, 551-552, 555, 558-559, 561, 563, 569
 CAUSEWAY Operation, 6, 9, 11-12, 12*n*, 13, 57. *See also* Planning.

- Caves. *See* Terrain features.
- Ceasefire, 436, 574, 594
- Cemeteries
 Arlington National, 678, 730
 77th Infantry Division, 169*n*
- Central America, 697, 720
- Central Carolines, 449, 463*n*
- Central China, 527, 537, 541, 783
- Central Pacific, 4, 4*n*, 5, 14, 20, 24, 26, 410, 412, 429, 454, 654, 665-668, 672-673, 675, 690, 718, 720, 729
 Operations, 4*n*, 74*n*, 239, 390, 690, 704
- Central Solomons, 666
- Centron, 747, 747*n*
- Chamberlain, Maj Clair "C," 181
- Chamorro, 461
- Chan, 274, 290, 292, 298, 300, 325
- Chandler, QMCik Paul G., 733-734
- Changchun, 530, 584, 636
- Chang Chun, Gen, 594
- Changkeichuang Field, 538-539, 546, 550, 556, 566, 566*n*, 584, 599, 618, 624, 630
- Chang-li, 590, 600, 610, 764, 766-767
- Changtien, 577
- Chaplains, 323, 691, 726-727, 742
- Chapman, LtCol Leonard F., Jr., 88
- Chapman, LtCol Max C., 183
- Chappell, Col Kenneth B., 116, 202, 210, 217*n*
- Charts. *See* Maps and Charts.
- Chatan, 50, 117
- Chatan-Futema line, 50
- Chefoo, 541, 545, 559*n*, 561, 563-564, 570, 577, 601, 603, 632
 harbor, 558
 operation, 559
- Cheng Kai Ming, MajGen, 594
- Chennault, MajGen Claire, 529
- Chen Pao-tsang, LtGen, 565
- Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, 437, 525-529, 531-532, 542, 545, 547, 557, 559, 559*n*, 565, 569-572, 579, 584-585, 603, 632
- Chibana, 197, 218
- Chicago, 479*n*
- Chichi Jima, 8, 418, 460-462, 745
- Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 26, 76, 414, 446, 464, 640, 642, 687. *See also* Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet; Adm King.
- Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, 11*n*; *See also* Gen George C. Marshall.
- Chihfeng, 602
- Chikuto, 314
- Chilton, 644, 647
- Chimu, 68, 132, 171, 176, 241
- Chimu airfield, 373*n*, 488, 560
- Chimu Wan, 66, 162, 166
- China, 5, 7, 19-20, 31-32, 36-37, 41, 44, 60, 98, 174, 402, 433, 433*n*, 437, 441, 444, 450, 468-470, 500, 505, 517*n*, 521-522, 524, 526, 528-529, 529*n*, 530-532, 534-536, 539-540, 543-544, 547, 551, 557, 559-561, 566, 569, 572-573, 573*n*, 574, 576, 578, 581-582, 584, 586, 589, 592, 594, 596, 605-607, 610, 613, 617-624, 628-634, 637, 639-641, 645, 647-648, 650, 654, 675, 697, 708, 716, 732, 738, 741, 750, 778
 cities, 527, 532, 540
 coalition government, 573, 601, 632
 coal mines, 541, 574-575, 578, 582, 585-585, 600, 649. *See also* Tangshan mines.
 coast, 3, 5-7, 9, 11, 373, 407, 437, 778
 communications centers, 437
 economy, 531, 582
 ports, 437, 533, 578
 rail facilities, 533, 536, 578-579, 585-586, 617
- China (Okinawa), 371-372
- China-Burma-India Theater, 401, 528-529
- China Sea, 97, 107
- China Theater, 533, 536, 545, 555, 557, 559, 568-569, 574, 596-597, 600, 603, 606. *See also* U. S. Forces, China Theater.
- Chinchow, 584, 639
- Chin Chung River, 627
- Chinen Peninsula, 50-51, 55, 164, 205, 270, 274, 278, 281, 287-289, 292-293, 293*n*, 298, 300, 303
- Chinen Point, 66
- Chinese, The, 37, 455, 499, 499*n*, 508, 527, 531-532, 537, 546-547, 556, 580, 607, 619, 758
 Air Force, 528
 Central Government. *See also* Chinese Nationalists, Kuomintang. 521, 526-527, 531-533, 541, 543, 561, 565, 569, 571-574, 578, 581, 584, 594, 596, 607-609, 614, 616, 620, 631-633, 640-642, 644, 649
 civil war, 437, 521, 532-533, 543-544, 559, 568, 570, 573-574, 578, 603, 623, 631, 633, 636, 641, 645, 648
 Communists, Communist Party, 437, 521, 525-528, 529*n*, 532, 542-543, 545, 556, 558-559, 561, 563-565, 570, 572, 574, 576-580,

Chinese, The—Continued

Communists, Communist Party—Continued

582, 585–586, 588, 590–591, 594–596, 602, 604, 608–610, 612–614, 616–620, 625, 627–628, 630–633, 636, 639–642, 644–645, 647–649

Communist areas, 527, 600–601, 623, 636

Communist forces, 542, 548, 554, 556, 563, 565–567, 569–570, 572, 585, 588, 594–595, 601, 603, 608–604, 612–613, 617, 623, 627, 636–637, 643–644, 647, 759

Communist New Fourth Army, 759

Eighth Route Army, 527, 556, 564, 610, 612, 708, 759

53d Communist Regiment, 619

Road Protecting Battalion, 619

Communist guerrillas, guerrilla tactics, 527, 542, 556, 570, 603, 609, 708, 759

Communist leaders, 548, 563–564, 594–595, 602–603, 610, 614*n*, 623*n*, 633

Communist operations, tactics, 536, 570–571, 584–586, 588–590, 609–610, 612–613, 617, 622, 625, 628, 630, 632, 638, 643–644, 648

Communist propaganda, 609–610

Imperial Government (China), 522

Imperial troops, 522

Military academy, 525

Nationalists, Chinese. *See also* Chinese

Central Government, Kuomintang. 437, 521, 532, 540, 542, 544, 546–547, 559, 568, 571, 573–574, 580, 582, 584–586, 590–591, 594–597, 601–604, 616, 620, 623, 623*n*, 625, 627–628, 631–633, 640, 642–644, 649

Army, 437, 526–529, 532–535, 542, 544–546, 557, 559*n*, 561, 564–565, 568–569, 571, 573–574, 578–579, 581, 585–585, 591, 594, 597, 601, 604, 607–610, 612, 616–617, 623, 627–628, 631–632, 639, 641, 643, 759

Eleventh War Area, 520, 565, 580

Tientsin Garrison Force, 568*n*

8th CNA, 561, 579, 581

13th CNA, 561, 569

52d CNA, 561, 569

92d CNA, 558, 568

94th CNA, 568, 568*n*, 570, 616–617

43d Division, 568, 570, 588

puppet soldiers, 543, 564, 579, 590

Revolution, 524

warlords (China), 525–526

Chinwangtao, 535–536, 541–542, 545, 547–548, 552, 555–556, 563, 568–570, 575, 585–586, 588, 590, 600, 604, 607, 609–610, 615, 617, 621, 624, 628, 649, 731

Chitose, 786

Chiwa, 316

Cho, MajGen Isamu, 40; LtGen, 40, 40*n*, 48, 206, 213, 338*n*, 367, 370

Chocolate Drop Hill, 266–267

Choiseul, 700, 706

Choshi, 408

Chou En-Lai, Gen, 547, 558, 594

Christmas Day, 90*n*, 578

Chuda, 173

Chungking, 528–529, 531–532, 543–544, 546–548, 569, 57–574, 594–595, 601, 604, 755

Churchill, Prime Minister Winston S., 3, 432, 434, 531

Chu Teh, Gen, 708

Cities, 38, 233, 257

Civil affairs, 76–77, 121, 380. *See also* Military Government.

Civil Affairs Handbook for the Ryukyu Islands, 77

Civilians, 77, 78*n*, 80, 87, 101, 118, 121–122, 131–132, 136, 162, 167, 173, 175, 176*n*, 357, 357*n*, 361, 363, 369, 369*n*, 455, 577, 738*n*

Clark, Col Saville T., 498*n*

Clement, BGen William T., 438–439, 476, 478–479, 479*n*, 481, 485, 487–488, 489*n*, 600–601, 606, 608

Coast artillery. *See also* Artillery, Weapons.
American, 183, 688–689, 742
Japanese, 65, 483–485

Cobb, RAdm Calvin H., 62, 370

Colley, LtCol Thomas J., 643

Colmer, LtCol Parker R., 463*n*

Coln, LtCol Royce W., 426, 426*n*, 428, 429*n*

Colorado, 260

Columbia University, 92

Combat efficiency, 74, 109, 249, 615, 623, 682

Combat Intelligence School (Camp Lejeune), 687

Combat readiness, 74, 83, 615

Combined Chiefs of Staff, 3*n*, 7, 9, 399–400

CominCh-CinCPac conferences, 7, 12, 111

Command, commanders

American, 26, 76, 658, 661, 671, 673

Japanese, 14, 18–19, 56, 185, 274, 436, 544, 580

Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, 654, 699

- Commandant of the Marine Corps. *See also* Generals Cates, Shepherd, Vandegrift. 12*n*, 24*n*, 89*n*, 136*n*, 197*n*, 376, 412, 414, 422, 442, 446-447, 465, 468-469, 551, 592, 605-606, 608, 622, 654, 660, 677-680, 682, 687-689, 699, 705, 712-713, 721, 736*n*
 Commander, Aircraft, Pacific Fleet, 7, 74-75, 413
 Commander, Air Support Control Unit, 102, 177, 181-182, 375
 Commander, Amphibious Force, South Pacific, 659
 Commander, Amphibious Forces, Western Pacific, 638
 Commander, Asiatic Fleet, 489*n*
 Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Forces, Pacific Fleet, 673
 Commander, Fifth Fleet, 6, 62, 493*n*
 Commander, Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, 488-489
 Commander, Ie Shima Attack Group, 166
 Commander in Chief, 8, 431. *See also* President Roosevelt.
 Commander in Chief, Army Forces in the Pacific, 401, 403, 430-431. *See also* General MacArthur.
 Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, 468-469
 Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, 3*n*, 4, 9, 11-12, 31, 370, 373*n*, 398-399, 401, 403, 407, 411, 413, 422, 424, 429*n*, 430-431, 439, 450, 452, 459, 462-463, 465-466, 505*n*, 509, 533-535, 544, 569, 660, 707, 783. *See also* Admiral Nimitz.
 Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, 4, 6, 31, 58, 62-63, 65, 65*n*, 76, 240, 280, 347, 354*n*, 373, 399, 401, 430, 436, 439, 449, 450*n*, 783. *See also* Admiral Nimitz.
 Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, 3, 3*n*, 6, 8, 25, 403. *See also* General MacArthur.
 Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, 3, 8, 294, 411, 413-414, 422, 424, 688, 712-713. *See also*, Chief of Naval Operations; Admiral King.
 Commander, Joint Expeditionary Force, 661
 Commander, Marianas, 450, 452*n*
 Commander, Marshalls-Gilberts Area, 457
 Commander, Naval Air Bases, Okinawa, 74-75
 Commander, Naval Air Base, Truk, 457
 Commander, Naval Facilities, Tsingtao, 616
 Commander, Naval Forces, Ryukyus, 370
 Commander, Naval Forces, Western Pacific, 636
 Commander, Naval Port Facilities, Shanghai, 638
 Commander, Northern Attack Force, 152*n*
 Commander, Service Squadron Ten, 242
 Commander, South Pacific Force, 659, 661, 663, 686
 Commander, Support Aircraft, Pacific Fleet, 671
 Commander, Truk and Central Caroline Islands, 457
 Command functions, 659
 Command posts
 American, 91, 112, 125, 134, 140, 146, 556
 Japanese, 49, 236, 304
 Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, 11, 62
 Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops, 24*n*, 661
 Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, 365*n*, 466, 688
 Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Quantico, 468
 Commanding General, Marine Garrison Forces, 14th Naval District, 465
 Commanding General, Marine Garrison Forces, Pacific, 465
 Command relationship
 American, 58, 401, 536, 658-660, 677
 Japanese, 58
Commencement Bay, 26, 413, 424-425
 Committee of Three, 594-595, 601, 604, 608
 Commonwealth of Australia, 439
 Communications
 American, 91, 117, 136, 175, 182, 184, 195, 326, 329, 361, 378, 437, 528, 532, 539, 564, 568, 575, 595, 600-602, 604, 663, 666, 669-671, 718
 equipment, 183, 307, 323, 338, 583, 669, 705, 719, 722
 radio, 136, 182, 195, 305-306, 375, 534, 583, 591, 595, 599, 601, 612-613, 669, 722, 766, 771
 wire, 195
 Japanese, 11, 20, 51, 97, 104, 121, 152, 710
 Conical Hill, 233, 236, 244, 263*n*, 266-270, 274, 277, 281
Consort, 645
Conte Verde, 734*n*

Convoys

- American, 21, 109, 134, 180, 189, 331, 532, 558-560, 612
- Japanese, 20, 178*n*, 776
- Cook, Maj Earl J., 245
- Cooke, VAdm Charles M., Jr., 6, 604-607, 614*n*, 616, 623*n*, 627*n*, 628, 630*n*, 633*n*, 637
- Cooley, Col Albert D., 415
- Coral, coral reefs, 34, 91, 100, 102, 104, 106, 106*n*, 112, 114, 116, 157-158, 167, 176, 207, 209, 231, 260, 305, 324, 346, 667
- Coral Sea, 763
- CORONET Operation, 402, 404, 406, 408, 476.
See also, OLYMPIC Operation; Planning.
- Corregidor, 439, 488, 741-743, 771, 786
- Corwin, 2dLt Douglas A., 612
- Cosgrove, LtCol John J., 699*n*
- Courtney, Maj Henry A., Jr., 237, 244-245
- Cowpens*, 479*n*, 781
- Craig, BGen Edward A., 624
- Cram, LtCol Jack R., 373*n*
- Crawford, RAdm George C., 638*n*
- Crawford, Col William D., 547
- Crist, BGen William E. 76-77
- Croix de Guerre, 747*n*. *See also* Awards and Decorations.
- CROSSROADS Operation, 459
- Culebra, 654, 656
- Cummings, Col Gale T., 454
- Cunningham, Cdr Winfield S., 737, 755
- Cunningham Field (Cherry Point), 681
- Curran, LtCol Michael S., 711
- Curtis*, 370
- Czechoslovakia, 747*n*
- Dachau, 749
- Dailey, BGen Frank G., 415, 415*n*, 419*n*
- Dai Naichi Maru*, 764
- Dairen, 522, 541, 559*n*, 561, 569
- Dakeshi, 199, 203, 216, 217*n*, 220, 222, 231-232, 234-236, 238, 259, 261-262
- Dakeshi Ridge, 221-222, 232, 236, 260-261, 726
- Dakiton, 330, 342
- Davao, 769-770
- Day, Col Karl S., 545-546
- Dayton*, 479*n*
- D-Day (Europe), 16
- Defense battalions, 25, 88-89, 688-692, 712.
See also Marine units.
- Defenses
 - American, 24, 58, 86, 129-130, 140, 146, 148, 152, 184, 238-239, 245, 247-249, 251,

Defenses—Continued

- American—Continued
 - 259-260, 269, 276, 280, 284, 286, 288, 298, 315, 318, 335, 337, 346, 356, 358, 638, 709
- abatis, 134
- airfield, 228
- antiaircraft, 183, 184
- base, 424
- beach, 203, 247, 688
- blocking positions, 117, 212
- camouflage, 132
- foxholes, 343
- observation posts, 277, 338
- outposts, 601, 608
- perimeter, 135, 139-140, 144, 148*n*, 151, 171, 276, 287, 341, 358, 609
- reverse slope, 256, 271
- Japanese, 4, 7, 14, 16-22, 25, 39-41, 45-51, 54-55, 61, 69, 78-81, 93, 96, 98, 102-103, 107, 116-118, 120, 123, 125, 130-132, 134, 138-140, 142, 145-146, 148, 151, 154, 167, 173, 188, 190-194, 204-205, 210, 217, 230-231, 236-237, 239, 239*n*, 244, 250, 252, 256, 269-271, 274, 289, 298, 308, 312, 323, 363, 393, 441, 455, 485, 530, 673, 675, 685, 687, 704, 719, 720, 723-724
- antitank obstacles, 49, 102, 121, 125, 127, 139, 154, 188, 190, 214, 260, 264, 318
- barbed wire, 188
- barricades, 49
- beach, 40, 80, 392
- blockhouses, 276, 723
- bunkers, 49, 151, 167, 216*n*, 361, 718, 720, 725
- camouflage, 79, 154, 167, 192, 310
- cave, 48-50, 115, 118, 149, 151, 154-155, 167, 169, 173, 190, 193, 201, 204, 212, 214, 216*n*, 217-219, 221, 230-231, 236, 244, 248, 253, 261-263, 267-268, 271, 304, 308, 337, 368, 380, 385, 393, 704, 723, 725-726
- coastal, 46
- dummy guns, 115
- fire lanes, 55, 268
- fortified positions, 5, 49-50, 53, 116, 152, 213, 247, 263, 286, 380, 718, 721, 741
- fortified tombs, 162, 169, 212, 260, 267, 276, 296, 337, 725
- forts, 439, 483-485, 487

Defenses—Continued

Japanese—Continued

gun positions, 135, 151, 154, 202, 237, 248, 262, 265, 337, 672, 726
 minefields, 49, 135, 142, 188, 190, 198, 249, 251, 306–307, 312, 320, 386
 observation posts, 54, 111, 125, 138, 197–198, 201, 233, 245, 268, 314, 332, 356
 outposts, 54, 131, 221, 235, 256, 290
 pillboxes, 148, 173, 190, 202, 212, 218–219, 221, 232, 260–261, 267, 296, 364, 393, 720–721, 723
 reverse slope, 217, 245, 247–248, 263–265, 267–268, 273, 276, 281, 337, 340, 345–346, 387, 393
 roadblocks, 132, 135, 139, 362, 567
 spider holes, 167
 trenches, 154–155, 162
 tunnels, 167, 231, 244, 296, 306, 309, 324
 del Valle, MajGen Pedro A., 24, 60, 66, 68, 74, 86–87, 117, 123, 125–126, 129–130, 173, 195, 197, 199, 202, 212, 214, 217, 219–221, 234, 256–257, 278*n*, 286, 293, 295, 325, 329–330, 339, 362, 387, 390, 392, 397, 397*n*, 654, 691; LtGen, 125*n*, 337*n*, 353*n*, 354*n*, 655*n*, 691*n*, 703*n*, 707*n*
 Demolitions. *See also* Supplies and Equipment; Weapons.
 American, 149, 231, 250, 253, 262, 312, 384, 461, 780
 Japanese, 139, 169, 172, 207, 257–228, 296, 315, 498
 Demonstration Group, 95, 347
 Denig, LtCol Robert L., Jr., 114
 Deputy Island Commander, Guam, 454
 Devereux, Maj James P. S., 737–738, 752, 756–757, 781
 Dewey Boulevard, 743
 Deyo, RAdm Morton L., 60, 60*n*, 99, 99*n*
 Dickey, Col Ward E., 95
 Dick Hill, 267–269
 Dilbert Dunker, 425, 427
 Diplomatic corps, 547, 734*n*
 Diplomatic immunity, 733
 Disarmed military personnel, 452, 463–464
 Division of Aviation, HQMC, 678–679, 713, 715
 Division of Operations and Training, HQMC, 678
 Division of Personnel, HQMC, 678
 Division of Plans & Policies, HQMC, 412, 414*n*, 631, 678, 691, 700–701. *See also* “Pots and Pans.”

Division of Public Relations, HQMC, 678
 Division of Reserve, HQMC, 678
 Dobbin, LtCol John F., 427; BGen 424*n*, 425*n*, 426*n*, 427*n*
 Dobervich, 1stLt Michiel, 770–772
 Docks, 553, 555
 Documents, Japanese, 78, 191, 285, 312
 Doma Cove, 91
 Domei news agency, 463
 Dominion of Canada, 439
 Dominion of New Zealand, 439
 Donne, John, 730
 Donohoo, LtCol Malcolm “O”, 115, 129, 175, 248–249
 Dooley, Maj George E., 416
 Doolittle, LtGen James H., 430
 Dorroh, Maj Jefferson D., 374*n*
 DRAGOON Operation, 60*n*
 Draguignan, 748
 Dublon, 454
 Duluth, 479*n*
 Dumps. *See* Supplies and Equipment.
 Dunlap, 460
 Durgin, RAdm Calvin T., 69
 Dutch forces, 740
 Dutch military cantonment, 740
 Dutch nationals, 503
 Dyess, Capt Acquilla J., 712; LtCol 699*n*
 Eagle Mountain Lake, Texas, 713
 Easely, BGen Claudius M., 358
 East Asia, 434
 East Carolines, 449
 East China Sea, 18, 21, 34, 99, 188, 315, 325, 428
 Easter, 96, 109
 Eastern Islands, 34, 66, 68, 164, 381
 Eastern Islands Attack & Fire Support Group, 162, 164
 Eastern Manchuria, 530
 Eastern New Guinea, 665
 East Station, 547, 599
 Easy Hill, 323
 Edenton, N. C., 713
 Edson, LtCol Merriitt A., 708–709
 Edson's Ridge, 709
 Edwards, VAdm Richard S., 422
 Efate, 717
 Eichelberger, LtGen Robert L., 481, 487
 Eighty-Eight Balls, 736
 Eisenhower, Gen Dwight D., 403*n*
 Elbe River, 747

- Eldorado*, 182, 225, 375, 644, 647-648
 Eleventh War Area, 596
 Ellice Islands, 660
 Ellis, Maj Earl H., 654, 666, 691
 Ellis, Maj Henry A., Jr., 416
 Embarkation activities, 95, 391, 595
 Emirau, 25, 88, 712
 Endo, Capt, 752
 Engebi, 225, 225*n*, 230*n*, 459
 Engineer mine removal operations, 123, 204, 264, 306-307, 311, 322, 346
 Engineers. *See also* Army Units; Marine Units; Seabees.
 American, 25, 32*n*, 71, 86*n*, 112, 123, 134-135, 149*n*, 158-159, 176, 223, 242*n*, 271, 275-276, 283, 302, 307-308, 310, 333, 379, 467, 551, 558, 576, 585, 599, 624, 643, 663, 692-694, 702, 720-721, 726
 Japanese, 43-46, 122, 363
 England, 708, 746, 746*n*. *See also* Great Britain; United Kingdom.
 Eniwetok, 70-71, 88, 225, 242*n*, 428, 444, 450, 464, 464*n*
 Enogai, 711
Enoura Maru, 777
 Enright, Col William K., 547*n*
Enterprise, 98, 419
 Entwistle, RAdm Frederick I., 637, 638*n*
 Equipment. *See* Supplies and equipment.
 Ercanbrack, CWO Earl B., 734*n*, 736, 736*n*, 762, 774, 780, 781*n*
 Erskine, MajGen Graves B., 24
 Espiritu Santo, 25, 70, 70*n*, 86, 90, 95, 710, 716-717
Essex, 26, 415-418
Estes, 102
Eureka, 667
 Europe, 13, 15, 218, 409, 430, 525, 528, 589, 746-747
 Evacuation activities, 450, 456, 461, 638-640, 642, 644-645, 650, 728, 731, 741, 781, 786
 Ewa, T. H., 25, 96, 441, 470, 621, 716
 Executions, 459, 741, 745, 768
 Executive Headquarters, 594-595, 599, 601-605, 610, 612-614, 618, 621-623, 677
 Exercises. *See* Fleet Landing Exercises; Training.
 Expeditionary Force, 677. *See also* Task organizations.
 Expeditionary Troops, 60, 354, 354*n*, 558, 661, 674
 Far East, 444, 461, 463-464, 470, 517*n*, 572, 633
 Far East War Crimes Tribunal, 739*n*
 Farrell, BGen Walter G., 600, 606
 Fast Carrier Forces, 16, 21-22, 60, 94, 96-100, 178-181, 185, 192, 280, 404, 406, 411, 415-418, 421, 430-431, 438-439, 461, 534, 561, 566
 Fayence, 748
 Fegan, MajGen Joseph C., 707
 Feldmeier, Maj Allan L., 135, 293, 331
 Fellows, BGen Joseph H., 439, 663*n*
 Fengt'ai, 760
 Fenton, 1stLt Francis I., Jr., 439
 Fertig, Col Wendell W., 771
Field Manual 31-5, 655
 Fighter-director site, 141*n*, 381
 Fike, Col Charles L., 452*n*
 Filipinos, 740-744, 769, 774
 Filipino underground organization, 774
 Fink, Maj Gerald, 561*n*
 Finschhafen, 70*n*
 Fire coordination, 718
 Fire direction, fire direction system, 193, 385
 Fire direction center, 117, 195, 383
 Fire Plan NEGAT, 377, 378*n*
 Fire Plan VICTOR, 377, 378*n*
 Fire support coordination centers, 383, 670
 Fire support operations, 166, 209*n*, 253-254, 287, 305
 First Battle of the Philippine Sea, 4, 16
 First Joint Training Force, 656
 Flamethrowers. *See* Weapons.
 Flanagan, PltSgt Cecil J., 612-613
 Flat Top Hill, 266-267, 269
 Fleet landing exercises (FLEXs), 655-656, 662-663, 677
Fleet Training Publication 167 (FTP-167), 655, 658, 660
 FLINTLOCK Operation, 661
 Florida Islands, 708
 Flycatchers, 201, 209*n*, 210, 233
 Flying Tigers, 716, 758
 Foley, LtCol Ernest P., 216
 Folino, 1stLt Fred C., 226
 Food. *See* Supplies and Equipment.
 Footbridges, 219, 222, 273, 276, 283. *See* Bridges.
 FORAGER Operation, 661
 Forbidden City, 540
 Foreign concessions (China), 521, 546

- Foreign legations, 524
 Formosa, 3, 5-9, 11, 11*n*, 12, 12*n*, 13, 17, 19, 21-22, 26, 32, 34, 38-41, 56-57, 69, 84, 97-98, 100, 178-179, 400, 416, 427, 437, 463, 522, 744, 750, 768, 772-778, 783
 Formosa-first policy, 9, 11*n*
 Formosa-Luzon Line, 7
 Formosans, 499
 Formosa operation, 5-6, 8-9, 12-13. *See also* Planning.
 Formosa Strait, 9
 Forrestal, James V., 3, 725
 Fortifications. *See* Defenses.
 Fort Ord, Calif., 92
 Fort Robinson, Nebr., 713
 Fort Washington, Md., 713
 Forward observers, 117, 259
 14th Naval District, 465
 Frame, Maj Donald P., 415
 France, 746, 746*n*, 747, 747*n*, 521-522
 Franklin, 94, 98, 419, 421. *See also* "Big Ben."
 Fraser, LtCol Angus M., 138*n*
 Freeny, LtCol Samuel W., 777
 Freising (Oberbayern), 748
 French Arsenal, 546, 556, 613
 French coast, 15
 French expeditionary force, 522
 French Foreign Legion, 746
 French Government, 747*n*
 French Indo-China, 20
 French Municipal Bldg., 516, 557
 French officials, 547, 767
 French underground, 731, 746, 746*n*, 747-748
 Fuel. *See* Supplies and Equipment.
 Fujioka, LtGen Takeo, 44, 289-290
 Fukada, Sgt, 774
 Fukien Province, 522
 Fukuoda, 506*n*
 Fukuoka, 493, 493*n*, 499-502, 505, 514
 Fukuoka Base Command, 505
 Fukuoka Occupation Force, 501-502, 505-506
 Fukuoka Prefecture, 502, 506, 512, 514
 Funakoshi, 481
 Funauki Fortress, 39*n*
 Furugen, 117
 Futema, 54, 68, 125, 206, 206*n*, 214
 Futtsu Saki, 483, 485
 GALVANIC Operation, 661
 Gard, BGen Robert G., 189*n*
 Gasoline. *See* Supplies and equipment.
 Gavutu, 706, 708
 Geheime Staats Polizei. *See* Gestapo.
 Geiger, MajGen Roy S., 24, 60, 66-68, 71*n*, 79, 84*n*, 86, 89, 91, 93, 123, 125-126, 129, 159, 175, 195-197, 214, 216, 252, 273, 299, 323, 353, 353*n*, 354*n*, 363, 363*n*, 365, 365*n*, 373, 381-382, 385-389, 397*n*, 534, 545, 571, 605; LtGen, 365*n*, 439, 605*n*
 General Order 241, 677
 Geneva Convention, 739*n*
 Geneva Protocol, 749, 753, 755-756, 760
 Genka, 174
 German forces, 731, 749
 German hospital, 748-749
 Germans, 455, 546-547, 563, 748-749
 Germany, 12, 18, 522, 527-528, 746, 747*n*
 surrender of, 530-531
 Gestapo, 747, 747*n*
 Ghormley, VAdm Robert L., 663*n*
 Gilbert Islands, 240, 390, 450, 665, 690, 710, 724, 744
 Operation, 674-675
 Gilbert Islands, 427, 429
 Gilliam, LtCol William M., 278*n*
 Ginowan-Shuri highway, 194, 268
 Gisushi, 303-304, 326*n*
 Goettge, LtCol Frank B., 686
 Goettge Patrol, 676
 Gormley, LtCol John J., 171, 260, 556, 556*n*
 Grasse, 748
 Great Britain, 433-434, 521-522, 572, 747*n*.
 See also England, United Kingdom.
 Great Harbor, 540, 563, 580
 Great Wall of China, 537, 585, 608
 Green, Maj Bernard W., 134, 144-145
 Green Island, 25, 96
 Grew, Joseph C., 433
 Griebel, Col John H., 116, 128*n*, 212, 217, 257, 342, 345, 378
 Griffith Board, 700
 Griffith, Maj Samuel B. II, 708; LtCol, 699, 709; Col, 616, 699-700
 Griner, MajGen George W., Jr., 62, 193, 298
 Gripsholm, 734*n*
 Guadalcanal, 24, 27, 66, 70, 70*n*, 74, 86-88, 90, 90*n*, 91-92, 95-96, 160*n*, 186, 371, 376, 389, 391, 410, 412, 517, 656-660, 662, 664, 666-667, 667*n*, 670, 673-676, 685-686, 686*n*,

Guadalcanal—Continued

687, 690–691, 694, 696, 696*n*, 702–703, 703*n*,
706, 708, 708*n*, 709–711, 716, 716*n*, 717–
719

Operation, 659, 664–665, 702, 708

Guam, 4, 7, 7*n*, 23–24, 71, 75, 95*n*, 97, 97*n*, 123,
123*n*, 160, 196, 242*n*, 363*n*, 372*n*, 373*n*,
397–398, 412, 428, 441, 444, 448, 452*n*, 454,
456–457, 461–464, 468, 470, 478, 488, 509*n*,
512, 512*n*, 534–535, 544–545, 551–552, 560,
564–565, 620, 624, 628, 630–631, 638–639,
642, 673, 712, 714, 736, 745, 783, 785–786

Operation, 88, 671

Guam Evacuation Unit, 450

Guantanamo, Cuba, 653

Guerrilla Activities, 174, 541, 559, 589, 609,
746, 759, 771. *See also* Tactics.

Guidebook for Marines, 756*n*

Gulf of Chihli, 522, 534, 539, 541, 577

Gunfire and Covering Force, 60, 99*n*, 102

Gushi, 311, 314

Gushichan, 290

Gushikawa, 128

Gustafson, Maj John A., 116

Gusuku, 360

Gusukuma, 199, 203, 205, 220

Hadnot Point, N. C., 705

Hagushi, 51*n*, 55, 63, 68, 73, 109, 241, 298

anchorage, 159, 223

beaches, 51, 54, 64, 67, 70, 91, 100, 103, 107,
109, 111, 158, 160, 162, 166, 241, 393, 421,
551, 685

transport area, 135, 179, 233, 348

Haha Jima, 460

Hai Ho River, 539, 542, 546, 550, 552–553, 556,
621

Hainan, 416, 783

Haiphong, 561

Hai River, 621

Haiti, 654

Hakata, 499

Halazone, 331*n*

Half Moon Hill, 244, 247–253, 256, 264, 271

Halifax, Lord, 436

Hall, RAdm John L., Jr., 60, 91–93, 241

Halmahera group, 452

Halsey, Adm William F., 4–5, 97, 229*n*, 280,
431, 476, 479, 479*n*, 481, 483–484, 484*n*,
487, 493*n*, 660, 663, 781; FAdm, 403*n*, 404,
416, 421, 422*n*

Hamahika Shima, 164, 388*n*

Hamburg, 749

Hanagusuku, 289

Hanchos, 761

Hancock, 128, 421, 479*n*

Hangchow, 530

Hangchow Bay, 7, 428

Hanja, 330

Hankow, 524

Hansen, Maj Herman, Jr., 416

Hanza, 115, 117, 120

Hara, VAdm Chuichi, 454–455

Hara-kiri, 367

Harbors, 4, 271*n*, 299, 460, 522, 540

Harmon, LtGen Millard F., 11

Harriman, W. Averell, 431

Harris, BGen Field, 412

Harris, LtCol Harold D., 691

Hart, Col John N., 623, 631

Haute Savoie, 746–747

Haven, 786

Hawaii, Hawaiian Islands, 24, 66*n*, 141, 397–
398, 407, 448, 452, 465, 468, 470, 493, 500*n*,
636, 654, 672, 704, 709

Hawkins, 1stLt Jack, 770–772

Hay, John, 522

Hayden, LtCol Reynolds H., 144, 146, 174, 253

Heanza Shima, 164, 388*n*

Headquarters Marine Corps, 372*n*, 447–448,
466–467, 597, 655, 677–679, 681, 688, 690

Hedo Misaki, 140–141, 348, 363*n*, 380

Heinl, Col Robert D., Jr., 508*n*, 547*n*, 670

Hemphill, LtCol Bruce T., 173; Col, 254*n*

Henderson Field, 91, 186, 410, 709, 716

Henderson, LtCol Frederick P., 189; Col, 89*n*,
117*n*, 123*n*, 186*n*, 193*n*, 377, 377*n*, 378*n*,
382, 385*n*; BGen, 192*n*, 216*n*, 383*n*

Henderson Group, 189

Hentona, 175

Hermle, BGen Leo, D., 454; LtGen, 454*n*

Heydrich, Reinhard, 747*n*

Higgins, Andrew J., 667

Hill, VAdm Harry W., 229*n*, 242, 370, 372*n*,
408, 672, 704

Hill, LtCol Robert E., 342*n*

Hill 26, 316

Hill 27, 296

Hill 28, 315–316

Hill 52, 343

Hill 53, 320, 323

- Hill 55, 257, 257*n*, 261–262, 264–265, 287, 315–316
 Hill 55–1, 315
 Hill 55–2, 316
 Hill 57, 257*n*, 309, 325
 Hill 58, 320
 Hill 59, 257*n*
 Hill 60, 217, 219
 Hill 62, 320–321
 Hill 69, 335, 340, 344–345, 345*n*, 346
 Hill 72, 360–361
 Hill 79, 346, 354, 358, 361–364, 378
 Hill 80, 360–361
 Hill 81, 354, 358, 361–364, 378
 Hill 85, 362
 Hill 89, 292, 353, 357, 362, 364, 364*n*, 367–368
 Hill 95, 351
 Hill 103, 314, 330
 Hill 107, 325
 Hill 108, 325, 330
 Hill 153, 356
 Hill 165, 120*n*, 131, 131*n*
 Hill 200, 148
 Hill 210, 148–149, 154
 Hill 220, 50
 Hilliard, LtCol Robert C., 385*n*, 668*n*
 Hillyer, Col Roy N., 323
 Himeji, 43, 774
Hinsdale, 109
 Hinunangan Bay, 91
 Hirado Shima, 505
 Hirohata, 736, 761–762, 780, 781*n*
 Hirohito, 436. *See also* Emperor of Japan.
 Hiroshima, 433, 436, 780, 786
 Hiroshima Prefecture, 514
 Hiza, 116
 Hizaonna, 127, 127*n*, 130
Hobbs Victory, 180*n*
 Hochmuth, LtCol Bruno A., 112, 154, 174, 254, 254*n*, 311
 Hodge, MajGen John R., 60, 68, 84, 131, 164*n*, 188–189, 192, 194, 204, 270, 330, 352, 387, 389
 Hogback Ridge, 266, 268–270
 Ho-Hsi-Wu, 567
 Hokkaido, 31*n*, 760, 781
 Holcomb, MajGen Thomas, 655*n*; LtGen, 660, 660*n*, 665*n*, 677, 687–688, 688*n*, 699; Gen, 414, 414*n*
 Holdahl, Col Theodore A., 601
 Hollandia, 4, 6, 70*n*
Hollandia, 96
 Holomon, LtCol Walter, 327*n*, 330*n*
 Home Islands (Japan), 4, 15, 17, 19, 31–32, 36–37, 40, 57, 100, 178, 206, 368, 370, 372, 400–402, 406–407, 409, 418, 430, 438, 455, 459, 461, 463, 511, 529, 533, 737, 779, 783, 788
 Homma, LtGen Masaharu, 741, 768
 Honan Province, 44, 542
 Honda Bay, 773
 Hong Kong, 19, 407, 416, 522, 603, 609, 645, 647, 752, 783, 786
 Honolulu, 752
 Honshu, 5, 7, 31*n*, 98, 180, 402, 406–408, 430–431, 476, 488, 490, 492, 500–501, 736, 760, 765, 783
 Honsowetz, Col Russell E., 117*n*, 120*n*
 Hopeh, 537, 541–542, 544–545, 548, 550, 552, 564, 570, 574–575, 584–585, 588, 593, 596, 599, 609, 614, 616, 620, 622–623, 627, 631–632, 641, 649
 Hopkins, Harry L., 431, 431*n*, 432
 Horie, Maj Yoshitaka, 461
 Horseshoe Hill, 244, 252–254, 256
 Hospitals. *See* Medical activities.
Houston, 739–740, 740*n*, 750, 763
 Howard, MajGen Archie F., 581–582, 601–602
 Howard, Col Samuel L., 744, 768; MajGen, 618, 622–623, 625*n*
 Hsin Ho, 618–619, 625, 627, 632, 648
 Hudson, Maj John S., 337*n*
Hugh W. Hadley, 224
 Huizenga, 1stLt Richard M., 758–759
 Hull, Cordell, 436
 Hulutao, 561, 569–570
 Humphrey, LtCol Gavin C., 602
 Hunt, Capt George P., 723, 724*n*
 Hunt, BGen LeRoy P., 348; MajGen, 496, 506, 514, 517
 Hunt, LtCol LeRoy P., Jr., 602
 Huntington, LtCol Robert W., 653
 Hurley, Ambassador Patrick J., 546, 555, 563, 620
 Hurst, LtCol Edward H., 116, 127, 128*n*, 130, 173, 261; Col, 127*n*
 Hydrographic conditions, 668
 Hydrographic survey, 378
 Ibaru Ridge, 358, 360
 ICEBERG Operation, 13, 31, 57, 60, 63, 63*n*, 64, 69, 71–73, 75, 77, 82–84, 89, 91–92, 94–96, 99–100, 103, 117, 128, 135, 141, 159,

ICEBERG Operation—Continued

160*n*, 178, 183, 207, 224, 229, 240, 242,
354*n*, 369, 373, 381, 389–390, 398–399, 685
alternate plan, 65–66, 196
base development, 58, 70–71, 75, 84, 92, 166,
372, 379
commanders, 166, 280
expeditionary forces, 6, 31, 97, 177
expeditionary troops, 6, 58, 94, 104
floating reserve, 86
forces, 64, 72, 74, 78, 83, 86, 93, 96, 98, 103,
107, 109, 179, 376, 382
initial support, 71
Joint Staff Study, 57–58, 63, 77
landing, 63, 72–73, 111, 202, 239
operations, 103, 158*n*, 181, 382
phases, 62, 70, 77, 162, 378
Plan Baker, 65–66
Plan Fox, 63–64, 66
scheme of maneuver ashore, 57, 102
support elements, 71, 103
Ichi, 174
Ichinomaya, 408
Idaho, 344
Idiot Sticks, 130
Ie, 167
Iegusugu Yama, 166–167
Ie Shima, 34, 50, 55, 58, 62*n*, 66, 68–69, 75, 142,
142*n*, 166–167, 169, 169*n*, 196–197, 226,
229, 230*n*, 370, 372*n*
airfields, 46, 50, 75, 166, 227
anchorage, 223
base development program, 75
invasion, 91
Iheya-Aguni landings, 348
Iheya Retto, 34
Iheya Shima, 347–348, 378*n*, 381
Ike Shima, 164, 388*n*
Ikibaru, 127, 130
Illana Bay, 11*n*
Imadomari, 140
Imperial City, 540
Imperial Rescript, 449, 530, 532
Imperial Russia, 531
Imperial War Council (Japan), 18
Imura, H., 584*n*
Inasomi, 280, 303
Independence, 479*n*
India, 98
India Command, 3*n*
Indiana, 479*n*

Indianapolis, 100

Indochina, 26, 103, 416

Infantry units. *See also* Army units; Marine units.

American, 62, 112, 117, 353, 384, 668, 670,
672, 688, 718, 721–726

battalion landing teams, 88, 88*n*, 109*n*,
552, 635, 638–639

battalions, 112, 114, 131, 479, 555, 628–
629, 635, 647, 671, 692–693, 701–702, 713

brigades, 447, 635

companies, 210, 222, 265, 281*n*, 573, 579,
628–629, 640, 644, 689, 692–693, 695–
697, 702, 718–719, 723

divisions, 24, 58, 67–68, 72, 74, 81, 84–86,
102*n*, 123, 131, 138*n*, 383*n*, 447, 467–468,
533, 579, 635, 656–657, 663, 683, 691–
692, 693*n*, 694, 696, 701–702, 717, 720,
723

fire teams, 265, 693, 697–698, 698*n*, 700–
701, 725

platoons, 586, 629, 640, 645, 647, 692*n*, 693,
696–697, 699, 707, 719, 728

regimental combat teams, 86*n*, 87–88, 88*n*,
90, 102*n*, 109*n*, 164, 214, 467, 476, 478

regiments, 86*n*, 87–88, 129, 135, 467, 550,
599, 635, 657, 570–671, 692–695, 714, 717,
721–722, 725, 727

rifle squads, 692*n*, 696, 698–701, 718–720

Japanese, 4, 45, 54, 80, 312, 608, 686–687,
733, 788

battalions, 41, 44, 50, 80, 207

brigades, 44, 80

companies, 44–45

divisions, 43–44, 80–81

regiments, 44–45, 80–81

squads, 173

Inflation, 582, 532

Initial Occupation Line, 485, 487

Inland Sea, 419, 765

Inoue, LtGen Sadae, 453, 453*n*

Inouye, VAdm Seibi, 15

Inspector General, FMFPac, 581

Inspector General, U. S. Marine Corps, 637

Instrument of surrender, 439, 454

Insular Patrol (Guam), 734

Intelligence

American, 66, 78, 102, 107, 121, 136, 169, 174,
191, 329, 369, 381, 532, 543–544, 551,

588, 617, 676, 684, 686, 709–710

agencies, 31, 78, 176, 565, 686

- Intelligence—Continued
 American—Continued
 estimates, 78, 139, 207, 406, 408
 personnel, 498, 543, 686
 problems, 685
 sources, 20*n*, 565
 studies, 78–79, 433, 479
 training, 685–686
 Japanese, 530
International Concession, 599
International Red Cross, 745, 749–750, 753–755, 761, 764, 781
International Settlement, 698
Interpreters
 American, 121, 296, 357, 485, 580, 589, 603
 Chinese, 544
 Japanese, 580, 776
Intrepid, 419, 715
Inubi, 127, 129–130
Isa, 210
Isahaya, 501, 506
Ishihara, Isamu, 752, 738*n*
Ishikawa, 126, 129–130, 132, 134, 171
Ishikawa Isthmus, 34, 50, 68, 126, 128–129, 132, 135–136, 155, 166, 171, 174, 380
Ishikawa Take, 171
Ishimine, 128*n*, 309
Ishimmi, 206, 267–268
Ishimmi Ridge, 268–269
Island Command
 Guam, 454, 456, 459, 463*n*, 478
 Okinawa, 62
 Peleliu, 453
 Saipan, 453
Italian
 concession, 556
 consulate, 547
 embassy, 583*n*
 hospital, 748
 nationals, 503
Italy, 748
Item Pocket, 49
Itokazu, 54, 298, 303
Itoman, 36–38, 290, 312, 315, 318, 325, 326*n*, 330, 332, 332*n*, 335, 337–338, 345, 351
Itomi, 139–140, 142, 146, 148*n*, 151–152, 154
Itomi-Toguchi road, 142, 154
Iwa, 303, 325–328, 331
Iwahig Penal Colony, 774
Iwakuni, 509*n*
Iwa-Shindawaku ridge, 328
Iwo Jima, 8, 11–14, 21–22, 27, 45, 48, 57, 72, 95–97, 104, 159, 162*n*, 178, 197*n*, 240, 242*n*, 257, 308, 391, 393, 398, 417, 429–431, 438, 460, 461*n*, 503*n*, 512*n*, 621, 666, 670, 670*n*, 672, 674–675, 683, 703, 705, 707, 714, 722–725, 729, 745
Izena Shima, 378*n*
Jajiya, 149
Jaluit, 450, 455, 462
Janiszewski, LtCol George, 703*n*
Japan, 4–8, 11, 11*n*, 13–15, 17–21, 37, 41, 57, 63, 67, 75–76, 78*n*, 93, 98, 178, 226–227, 357, 370, 386, 398–400, 402–403, 416, 418, 430, 432, 434, 436–439, 441, 444, 449–450, 461, 463, 465–469, 475–476, 487–490, 492–493, 495, 499–500, 500*n*, 505, 508–509, 511–512, 517, 518*n*, 522, 525–529, 531, 553, 560, 565, 580, 582, 593, 597–598, 607, 641, 654, 659, 661, 732, 734, 734*n*, 735, 738*n*, 739*n*, 741, 750, 755, 761, 765, 769, 775, 776*n*, 778, 781, 783, 786
 invasion of, 8, 401, 432–433, 576, 763*n*. *See also* CORONET; OLYMPIC.
 occupation of, 437–438, 454–455, 464, 475, 481, 489–490, 493, 496–497, 500–503, 508, 510–511, 518, 533–534, 536, 714
 occupation authorities, 499
 occupation forces, 428, 450, 453, 456, 463, 476, 481, 490, 492–493, 497, 499, 501, 502*n*, 506, 509, 511, 560
 occupation operation, 488, 495, 507, 518
 occupation tasks, 436, 441, 479, 497, 508–509, 511–512, 514
 Japanese, 11–12, 31, 103, 106, 151, 452, 455, 526, 532, 540, 542, 544, 546–547, 564, 568, 579, 589, 596–597, 607, 648, 675, 709, 745, 750
 Army-Navy agreement, 14, 21
 Army-Navy relations, 46
 cities, 492
 civilians, 38, 46–47, 76–77, 106, 172, 251, 452, 456, 557, 565, 567, 580, 584, 608, 763, 775
 economy, 20, 492
 elder statesmen, 15–16. *See also* Jushin.
 Emperor, 18, 321, 357, 367, 433, 436, 439, 449, 475, 485, 497, 518, 530, 752. *See also* Hirohito.
 Empire, 3–5, 11, 32, 35, 58, 76, 78, 370, 432, 654, 675
 forces, demobilization of, 452, 462, 487, 497, 499, 505, 511, 568, 574

Japanese—Continued

- General Staff, 16, 274
- government, 16–17, 19–20, 38, 436, 476, 497, 509, 517, 732–733, 755
- government officials, 14–15, 484, 495, 743, 763, 774, 777
- Home Minister, Ministry, 38, 498, 511
- industry, 5, 14, 20, 98, 417, 492, 546, 571, 744
- intendence service, 40*n*
- interservice, rivalry, 55
- military doctrine, 350
- Military Service Act, 47
- military system, 14*n*, 676
- mines, 492, 501, 552
- munitions, 569, 581
- Naval Headquarters, 487
- operations, 14, 20
- pirates, 36–37
- ports, 21, 492
- schools, 546, 556, 563
- surrender, 393, 400–402, 427–429, 434, 436, 438–439, 441, 449–450, 452, 452*n*, 454, 457, 459–460, 470, 475–476, 484–485, 487–488, 490, 497, 511, 521, 530, 533–534, 556–558, 565, 579, 581, 741, 781, 783, 785–786
- transportation facilities, 51, 492, 502, 502*n*

Japanese Units

- Imperial General Headquarters, 14, 14*n*, 16–22, 39–41, 43, 45, 178, 227, 356–357, 368, 392–393, 438–439, 509, 529
- Army, 14, 17–18, 21, 41, 178, 321, 393, 501, 542, 675, 736, 738, 742*n*, 755, 756*n*, 760–761, 763
- General Staff, 14*n*
- Chinese Expeditionary Army, 44, 529, 532
- Formosa Army, 18
- Kwantung Army, 43, 527, 529–530
- Mongolian Garrison Army, 542
- Nakagusuku Wan Fortress, 39*n*
- North China Area Army, 532, 542, 546, 557, 568
- North China Pacification Army, 542
- Southern Area Army, 178*n*
- First Army, 542
- Sixth Air Army, 21, 178
- Twelfth Army, 542
- Seventeenth Area Army, 530
- 19th Air Sector Command, 46, 54
- Thirty-first Army, 454

Japanese—Continued

Army—Continued

- Thirty-second Army, 18, 22, 39–41, 43–51, 51*n*, 53–55, 55*n*, 106–107, 120, 122, 179, 188–192, 197, 205–208, 210–213, 251, 251*n*, 257, 265–266, 270–272, 274, 280, 288, 292–293, 295, 297, 304, 316, 330, 332, 338*n*, 340, 350–353, 353*n*, 357, 362, 364*n*, 367–368, 379, 386, 393, 675
- Forty-third Army, 542, 565, 579–581
- Forty-seventh Army, 507*n*
- Fiftieth Army, 507*n*
- 2d Armored Division, 44
- 8th Air Division, 21, 100
- 9th Infantry Division, 41, 43, 46, 50, 55
- 24th Infantry Division, 43–45, 50, 54–55, 191, 205–207, 210–213, 220, 268, 289, 292, 350–351, 353, 357, 363, 368
- 62d Infantry Division, 44, 50, 54–55, 188, 190–191, 199, 205, 207, 211–213, 216, 217*n*, 218, 220, 257, 280–281, 289–290, 292, 350, 352
- 84th Division, 43
- 97th Division, 50
- 118th Division, 542
- 63d Brigade, 44, 191
- 64th Brigade, 44, 236, 257
- 5th Independent Mixed Brigade, 542, 565, 581
- 24th Independent Mixed Brigade, 53
- 4th Independent Mixed Brigade, 43–45, 50, 53, 55, 142, 189, 205, 211, 220, 251–252, 289, 292, 297, 350–352
- 1st Specially Established Brigade, 54, 247
- 2d Specially Established Brigade, 54
- 5th Artillery Command, 45, 54, 106, 203, 207, 213, 289–290, 350
- 42d Field Artillery Regiment, 45
- 7th Heavy Artillery Regiment, 45, 292, 295
- 1st Independent Heavy Mortar Regiment, 45
- 15th Independent Mixed Regiment, 43–44, 221, 247, 351–352
- Infantry Regiments
 - 22d, 43, 191, 205–206, 211, 220, 267–268, 347, 363
 - 32d, 43, 206, 211–212, 292–293, 297, 347, 363
 - 89th, 43, 206, 211, 220, 260, 269, 351, 363
- 1st Infantry Unit, 43
- 2d Infantry Unit, 43–44, 49–50, 55
- 1st Medium Artillery Regiment, 45

Japanese—Continued

Army—Continued

- 23d Medium Artillery Regiment, 45
- 24th Reconnaissance Regiment, 352
- 23d Shipping Engineer Regiment, 207, 292, 295
- 26th Shipping Engineer Regiment, 207, 221
- 11th Shipping Group Headquarters, 54
- 1st Specially Established Regiment, 54, 108, 120
- 27th Tank Regiment, 44–45
- 24th Transportation Regiment, 289
- 81st Field Antiaircraft Battalion, 257
- 7th Independent Antitank Battalion, 221
- 100th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion, 45
- Independent Infantry Battalions
 - 1st, 53, 221
 - 2d, 53, 221
 - 3d, 53
 - 11th, 44
 - 12th, 44, 191
 - 13th, 44, 191, 352
 - 14th, 44, 191
 - 15th, 44, 257
 - 21st, 44
 - 22d, 44, 265, 290, 292, 297
 - 23d, 44, 216, 257
 - 26th, 53
 - 27th, 53
 - 28th, 53
 - 29th, 53
 - 272d, 44
 - 273d, 44, 257
- 14th Independent Machine Battalion, 216, 257
- Infantry Battalions
 - 1st Bn, 1st SpecEstabRegt, 120
 - 1/32, 212, 268
 - 2d Bn, 1st SpecEstabRegt, 120
 - 2/22, 191
 - 2/32, 212
 - 3d Bn, 1st SpecEstabRegt, 120
 - 3d Bn, 2d InfUnit, 217*n*, 221
- 1st Light Mortar Battalion, 45, 191
- 2d Light Mortar Battalion, 45
- Special Guard Companies
 - 223d, 47
 - 224th, 47
 - 225th, 47

Japanese—Continued

Army—Continued

- Special Guard Engineer Units
 - 502d, 47
 - 503d, 47
 - 504th, 47
- Navy, 14, 18–19, 21, 31, 81, 99, 191, 252, 290, 321, 393, 400, 738
- General Staff, 14*n*
- Air Fleets
 - First, 21
 - Third, 21
 - Fifth, 21–22, 178, 207
 - Tenth, 21
- Combined Fleet, 18, 178
- First Mobile Fleet, 16
- First Naval District, 484
- Fourth Fleet, 454
- Okinawa Naval Base Force, 46, 54, 55*n*, 220, 242, 290, 321, 507*n*
- Sea Raiding Squadrons
 - 26th, 207
 - 27th, 207
 - 28th, 207
 - 29th, 207
- 4th Surface Escort Unit, 46
- Special Attack Unit, 100, 106, 177, 227.
See also Kamikazes; Kikusui.
- Special Naval Landing Party, 489*n*.
- Fleet, 4, 11, 16, 22, 63, 654, 673
- Miscellaneous Units
 - antitank group, 41, 44–45, 107
 - Boeitai*, 47, 53–54, 120, 132, 141, 175, 220, 350, 357*n*, 363
 - coast defense, 47
 - Giretsu* (Act of Heroism) Airborne Raiding Force, 227
 - Imperial Reservists Association, 47
 - Iwao Force, 251*n*
 - labor forces, 53, 122, 191, 530, 770
 - local defense units, 47, 80, 120, 174
 - midget submarine unit, 46
 - Nakagusuku Wan Fortress Artillery Unit, 39, 45
 - Okinawan conscripts, 43, 53, 80, 142, 171
 - shipping engineers, 46, 107*n*, 122, 209–210, 351
 - suicide sea-raiding squadrons, 46, 53, 56, 81, 103, 106, 209, 220, 351, 380*n*
 - suicide swimmers, 81

Japanese—Continued

- Miscellaneous Units—Continued
 - Tekketsu* (Blood and Iron for the Emperor Duty Units), 47
 - Udo Force, 142, 148*n*, 174
 - volunteer youth groups, 47
- Java, 3*n*, 739–740, 786
- Jehol Province, 595, 602
- Jessfield Road Jail, 754
- Jewell, LtCol Duncan H., 507*n*
- Jichaku, 199, 203, 212
- Johnson, Col Byron F., 25; BGen, 552, 576, 600
- Johnson, Maj John G., 296
- Johnston Island, 465
- Joint Assault Signal Companies, 182. *See also* Army units; Marine units.
- Joint Board, 664
- Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3*n*, 4–7, 9, 13, 31, 57, 63, 76, 82, 84*n*, 197, 399–401, 401*n*, 402–403, 429–430, 432–433, 437, 498, 529, 531, 533, 561, 572, 596–597, 659
- Joint Expeditionary Force, 58, 93, 242, 390, 661. *See also* Task Organizations.
- Joint Logistics Committee, 12
- Joint Mobilization plans, 467
- Joint operations, 481, 485
- Joint planning, 62–63
- Joint staff planners, 7, 62
- Joint Staff Study LONGTOM, 399
- Joint U. S. Military Advisory Group, 573, 633, 641
- Joint War Plans Committee, 6–7, 9
- Jones, Maj James L., 104, 162, 164, 167, 381, 388*n*
- Jones, BGen Louis R., 548, 553, 567, 599, 606
- Jungchen, 578
- Jungle. *See* Vegetation.
- Jushin*, 15–16
- Kadena, 36, 43, 50, 68, 164, 184–185
- Kadena airfield, 46, 50, 54–55, 117, 120, 158, 158*n*, 159, 176–177, 184, 190, 228, 274
- Kadena Pete, 185, 186*n*
- Kagamisui, 302, 306
- Kagoshima, 406, 408, 427, 493*n*, 499–500, 507, 507*n*, 514
- Kagoshima Prefecture, 500, 507
- Kagoshima Wan, 406, 408, 507
- Kahoolawee Island, 673
- Kailin Mining Administration, 541, 545, 547, 552, 563, 585, 590, 599–600, 604, 609, 617, 621, 649
- Kaimon-Dake, 408
- Kakazu, 188, 194
- Kakazu Ridge, 190, 193–194
- Kakibana, 303
- Kaluf, Col John, 557*n*
- Kamikazes*, *Kamikaze attacks*. *See also* *Kikusui*; Special Attack Forces. 26, 100, 107, 157, 177, 178*n*, 179–181, 185–186, 189–190, 196, 207–208, 211, 223–224, 227, 229–230, 240–241, 274, 278*n*, 348, 369*n*, 370–371, 372*n*, 374, 383, 406, 415, 419, 421, 427, 508*n*, 665, 671, 673, 675
- Kaminokawa beach, 408
- Kamiyama Shima, 106*n*
- Kamizato, 300, 303
- Kanchanburi, 767
- Kaniku, 188, 194
- Kanoya, 226, 496, 507, 508*n*
- Kantner, Maj George B., 249
- Kanto Plain, 5, 408
- Karadera, 290, 292, 298, 300
- Kase, Toshikazu, 16
- Katchin Peninsula, 125, 127–128, 130, 132, 162, 172, 176
- Katsuren Wan (Bay), 125
- Kawabe, LtGen Torashiro, 178*n*
- Kawada, 140–141, 173–175
- Kawatana, 501, 505
- K-Day, 303
- Keisan Sho, 106*n*
- Keise Shima, 63–64, 67–68, 100, 103, 106, 106*n*, 107*n*, 111, 388*n*
- Kelley, 1stLt Alfred E. W., 439
- Kelley, Capt John W., 439
- Kellum, Maj William C., 181
- Kenney, Gen George C., 407, 430
- Kerama Retto, 22, 34, 46, 56, 64–67, 73, 91, 96–100, 103–104, 106–107, 122, 164, 166, 177, 180*n*, 370, 380, 380*n*, 407
- Kerby, Col Kenneth D., 181
- Kerman, Maj John R., 316*n*
- Kiangsi Province, 526
- Kiangwang, 738, 757
- Kiaochow Bay, 540, 561, 636
- Kijak, SupSgt Henry, 733
- Kikai Shima, 196, 347, 378
- Kikusui attacks*, 179*n*, 180, 189, 223, 369*n*. *See also* *Kamikazes*.
- Kikusui* No. 1, 179, 180, 185, 190
- Kikusui* No. 2, 186
- Kikusui* No. 5, 208

- Kikusui* No. 7, 227, 274
Kikusui No. 8, 370
Kikusui No. 9, 370
Kikusui No. 10, 370
 Kiland, RAdm Ingolf N., 62, 92, 104, 550
 Kimmu Wan, 130. *See also* Chimu Wan.
 King, RAdm Ernest J., 664; Adm, 5–8, 9*n*, 11*n*, 12, 12*n*, 13, 56, 653, 660, 660*n*, 712; FAdm, 3, 394, 402, 403*n*, 411–414, 424, 432–433, 446
 Kinkaid, Adm Thomas C., 534–535, 555–556, 558, 559*n*, 561, 563, 569, 574
 Kinney, 1stLt John R., 758–759
 Kinsman, Cdr Otto, 416
 Kitamura, MajGen, 462*n*
 Kiyamu, 289–290, 292, 304, 316, 337, 350, 360, 384
 Kiyamu-Gusuku Ridge, 360–361, 368
 Kiyamu Peninsula 288, 292, 303, 350
 Kiyan Point, 55
 Klingman, 1stLt Robert R., 225
 Knob Hill, 263*n*, 276
 Kobakura, 36
 Kobe, 94, 98, 419, 760
 Kochi, 206, 211
 Koiso, Gen Kuniaki, 17
 Kokuba, 36, 274, 276, 283–284, 296–297, 299–300, 309, 312, 325
 Kokuba Channel, 302
 Kokuba estuary, 280, 283, 305, 320
 Kokuba hills, 283
 Kokuba Gawa, 252, 298–299, 314, 325, 329
 Kokumba River, 290
 Kokumbona, 709
 Kokura, 433, 514
 Komesu, 340, 356, 360, 362
 Komesu Ridge, 362, 368
 Korea, 31, 103, 437, 463, 499–500, 505, 530, 534, 551, 553, 672, 760, 769, 778, 783
 Korean
 occupation, 476, 533
 Occupation Force, 476*n*
 civilians and laborers, 104, 455–456, 499, 499*n*, 500, 502, 505, 596, 763
 Koror, 453
 Koshiki Retto, 407, 507
 Koshiwabaru, 408
 Kouri Shima, 173
 Kowloon, 522, 561
 K-rations, 295, 295*n*, 326, 328
 Krueger, Gen Walter, 404, 408, 492, 496
 Krulak, LtCol Victor H., 283, 700; LtGen, 658*n*
 Kuba Saki, 68, 128
 Kubiri, 481
 Kubo, 126
 Kuefu Shima, 106*n*
 Kumamoto, 493*n*, 506–507, 514
 Kumamoto Prefecture, 500, 506
 Kumi Shima, 34, 348, 378*n*
 Kunishi, 290, 338, 340–343, 345
 Kunishi Ridge, 290, 333, 337, 338*n*, 340–345, 347, 351, 351*n*, 354, 356, 358, 362, 388*n*
 Kunming, 583
 Kuomintang, 525–527, 531, 543, 620. *See also* Chinese Nationalists; Chinese Central Government.
 Kurawa, 126
 Kure, 94, 419, 509*n*
 Kuribayashi, LtGen Tadamichi, 460, 725
 Kurile Islands, 17
 Kuro Shima, 67, 106, 388*n*
 Kurume, 502
 Kusaie, 455, 462
 Kushikino, 408
 Kutaka Shima, 164, 388*n*
 Kuwan, 198, 203, 207, 209–210
 Kuwanga-Makabe road, 346
 Kuwanga Ridge, 345–346, 360
 Kuyeh, 585, 599, 600, 617
 Kwajalein, 70*n*, 242*n*, 412, 444, 450, 459, 463–464, 464*n*, 667, 674, 715*n*, 745, 721
 Kwantung, 19, 522
 Kwantung Peninsula, 522, 531
 Kyoto, 512, 514, 517
 Kyushu, 6, 9, 11, 18, 22, 31*n*, 32, 34, 36, 43, 57, 98, 100, 178, 226–227, 371–372, 399–400, 402–404, 406–409, 418–419, 421–422, 428–431, 476, 490, 492–493, 493*n*, 496, 499–501, 502*n*, 505–507, 507*n*, 508, 508*n*, 510–511, 514, 517–518, 783, 778, 785
 Kyushu occupation, 492, 517
 Kyushu operation, 402–404
 Laboehan, 740
 Lake Geneva, 747
 Lakehurst, N.J., 705
 Lamotrek, 462
 Lamson-Scribner, Col Frank H., 631
 Landing Craft. *See also* Ships.
 American, 91, 94, 111, 114, 122, 157–158, 164, 211, 293, 392, 417, 483, 485, 550,

Landing Craft—Continued

American—Continued

551, 553, 555–556, 628, 640, 657, 666–668, 724, 786

LCIs (Landing Craft, Infantry), 104, 104ⁿ, 357, 361, 553, 668

LCMs (Landing Craft, Mechanized), 111, 114–115, 305, 555

LCSs (Landing Craft, Support), 208

LCTs (Landing Craft, Tank), 114, 152, 305, 311, 550, 553

LCVPs (Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel), 667, 781

rubber boats, 162, 164, 299, 307, 644, 709, 744

self-propelled barges, 158, 158ⁿ

Japanese, 207, 209, 739

Landing forces. *See also* Army units; Marine units. 60, 80–81, 467, 560, 656, 658, 661, 663–664, 667, 669, 781

Landing signal officer, 546

Langfang, 567, 599

Lantienchang, 599

Lantienchang Field, 539, 566

Lantz, LtCol William T., 479ⁿ

Larkin, MajGen Claude A., 552, 560, 566

Larsen, MajGen Henry L., 450, 454

Larson, LtCol August C., 253ⁿ, 356

Laureta, Capt Claro, 771

L-Day, 57, 64, 66–67, 98, 104, 107, 347, 391

Leaflets, leaflet drops, 436, 595

League of Nations, 526

Leahy, FAdm William D., 400, 403ⁿ, 433, 687

Legation Quarter, 540, 547

Legion d'Honneur, 747ⁿ

Lei-chuang, 599–600

Lejeune, MajGen John A., 654

Lend-Lease supplies, 528

Levy, 457

Lexington, 479ⁿ, 716

Leyte, Leyte operation, 5, 8–9, 11–12, 18, 41, 70, 72, 81, 84, 84ⁿ, 85, 92–93, 96, 178, 223, 240, 240ⁿ, 390, 415, 422, 427, 431

Leyte Gulf, 8, 18, 91, 93

Liaotung Peninsula, 569

Liberation, 773, 787, 789. *See also* Recovered Allied Military Personnel.

Lidice, 747ⁿ

Li Huang airstrip, 759

Lines of communication,

American, 169, 548, 584, 594, 603, 607, 608, 631, 649

Japanese, 31, 58, 125, 351

Lingayen Gulf, 12, 26, 64, 777

Lin-Shou-Ying, 609

Linsi, 586, 599, 601, 617

Lisbon, Portugal, 746

Little, MajGen Louis McC., 655ⁿ

Little Sugar Loaf, 310–311

Little White House, 708

Litzenberg, LtCol Homer L. Jr., 699ⁿ

Litzenberg Board, 699

Liversedge, LtCol Harry S., 710

Loading activities. *See also* Supplies and Equipment. 27, 95–96, 478, 551, 662

Logan Victory, 80ⁿ

Logistics, 38, 51, 62, 64, 71–75, 167, 120, 129–130, 239–240, 293, 295, 302, 304, 343, 378–379, 390–392, 448, 466, 548, 550, 555, 598, 662, 664–667, 674

London, 434–435, 658ⁿ

London, 645

Longaog, 771

Long Island, 418

Long March, 526

LONGTOM Operation, 398

Loomis, Col Francis B., Jr., 66, 71ⁿ, 302

Loomis Harbor, 302

Loudspeakers, 121, 296

Louisville, 559

Lourenco Marques, 734ⁿ

Louther, LtCol Karl K., 253ⁿ

Love Hill, 266, 269–270

LST 628, 114

LST 884, 109

Luanhsien, 586, 590

Luan River, 590, 599

Lubeck, 749

Luckey, Col Robert B., 116

Ludwig, Capt Verle E., 172ⁿ, 332ⁿ

Lunga Point, 710

Lunga River, 709–710

Lutai, 599, 617

Luzon, Luzon operation, 3, 5–7, 9, 11, 11ⁿ, 12–13, 18, 21, 26, 41, 72, 85, 85ⁿ, 97, 399, 416, 475, 742, 763ⁿ, 769, 776–777

Luzon-Formosa controversy, 9ⁿ

Mabuni, 292, 352, 356–357, 364, 368

MacArthur, General Douglas. *See also* Commander in Chief, Army Forces in the Pacific; Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area; Supreme Commander, Allied Powers. 3, 3ⁿ, 4–6, 8–9, 11, 11ⁿ, 12–13, 25,

- MacArthur, General Douglas—Continued
 41, 57, 64, 84, 84*n*, 177, 372*n*; General of the Army, 393, 401–403, 403*n*, 430, 436, 438–439, 463, 470, 475, 476*n*, 481, 483, 484*n*, 485, 487, 497–498, 508, 617, 671, 707*n*, 744, 778, 783
- MacGillivray, George C., 696*n*, 702*n*
- Machisi, 273, 275
- Machinato, 188, 232, 302
 Airfield, 49, 198, 203, 209, 283
- MacNulty, LtCol William K., 734
- Madaira, 173
- Maeda, 198, 205–206, 220
- Maeda Escarpment, 197
- Mae Shima, 67, 106, 388*n*
- Maeta Saki, 118
- Magee, LtCol James C., Jr., 117, 281, 335
- Magic Carpet, 463
- Magruder, Commo John H., Jr., 460
- Magruder, LtCol Marion M., 225, 225*n*
- Majiya, 146, 154
- Majuro, 26, 441, 450, 452
- Makabe, 290, 340, 352–354, 358, 362–365
- Makin, 70*n*, 242*n*, 710–711, 744–745
- Malakal, 453
- Malaria, 740, 757, 767
- Malaya, 11, 750, 768
- Malnutrition, 452–453, 455, 459, 740–741, 754, 757, 766, 768–769
- Maloelap, 455, 462
- Manchester, 647
- Manchu Dynasty, 521–522, 524, 540
- Manchuria, 20, 41, 43–45, 525–526, 530–531, 533, 537, 541, 561, 569–572, 574, 579, 584–585, 590, 594–596, 602, 604, 608, 628, 631–633, 636, 639, 649, 750, 769, 783
- Manila, 403, 436, 438, 489*n*, 497, 533, 743–744, 768–769, 773, 775*n*, 776–778, 783, 786
- Manila Bay, 741, 775
- Manila Bay, 715*n*
- Manna, 139–142, 152, 154
- Manus, 25, 70*n*, 95
- Mao Tse-tung, 526–527, 532, 609, 632–634, 636, 639, 643–644, 708
- Maps and Charts
 American, 61, 78–79, 96, 103, 120*n*, 332*n*, 625, 719
 Japanese, 79, 154, 191, 199, 686
- Maquis, 746, 746*n*, 747. *See also* French guerrilla activities.
- Marcus Island, 452–453, 464
- Marcus Island Command, 452
- Marianas, 4–5, 8, 14, 16–17, 21–22, 26, 39, 56, 74, 85, 93–95, 98, 159, 162, 166, 240, 411, 429–430, 448–450, 450*n*, 463, 493*n*, 624, 639, 666, 672, 690, 722, 724, 783
 operation, 5–6, 72, 391, 668, 671, 674, 683, 704
- Surrender Acceptance and Occupation Command, 450
- Marine Deputy Chief of Staff, Tenth Army, 62, 83*n*, 85, 192
- Marine units
- Air
 Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, 469
 Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 25–26, 74, 228, 372*n*, 376, 412–413, 441, 448, 469–470, 488, 509, 552, 600, 605–606
 Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific, 623, 629–631, 636, 642–643
 Marine Aircraft Wings, Pacific, 412–413
 Marine Air Training Command, East Coast, 424
 Marine Fleet Air, West Coast, 26, 414, 422, 442, 606
 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 25, 372*n*, 441, 469–470, 535–536, 550–552, 552*n*, 560, 563–564, 566, 588, 599, 600, 606, 615–616, 623–624, 629, 716–717
 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, 25, 61, 75, 95, 365, 373, 373*n*, 431, 441, 469–470, 566, 716, 786
 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, 25–26, 441, 470
 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, 25–26, 225*n*, 230*n*, 424, 424*n*, 441, 457, 476
 9th Marine Aircraft Wing, 26, 422–423, 442
- Marine Carrier Groups, Aircraft, FMF-Pac, 414–415, 424
- Marine Aircraft Group 11, 716
- Marine Aircraft Group 12, 566, 588, 595, 599
- Marine Aircraft Group 14, 371
- Marine Aircraft Group 15, 470
- Marine Aircraft Group 21, 509*n*, 545, 716
- Marine Aircraft Group 22, 230, 230*n*, 370–371, 495, 509
- Marine Aircraft Group 24, 470, 566, 588, 595, 599, 606, 613, 615, 621, 624, 642
- Marine Aircraft Group 25, 25, 535, 558, 566, 576, 583, 595, 605

Marine Units—Continued

Air—Continued

Marine Aircraft Group 31, 95, 95*n*, 136, 177, 181, 229, 469–470, 488, 490, 495, 509
 Marine Aircraft Group 32, 560–561, 564, 566, 576, 577, 605
 Marine Aircraft Group 33, 93, 95, 136, 177, 373, 374*n*
 Marine Aircraft Group 43, 95
 Marine Aircraft Group 62, 423
 Marine Aircraft Service Group 48, 415
 Marine Aircraft Service Group 51, 414–415
 Marine Base Defense Aircraft Group 48, 414
 Marine Carrier Aircraft Group 1, 424, 426–427
 Marine Carrier Aircraft Group 2, 427
 Marine Carrier Aircraft Group 3, 426, 428
 Marine Carrier Aircraft Group 4, 424, 427–428
 Marine Carrier Aircraft Group 5, 429
 Marine Carrier Aircraft Group 6, 429
 Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 7, 642
 Marine Glider Group 71, 713
 AWSs, 61, 182, 226, 381, 413, 448
 AWS-1, 348
 AWS-7, 95
 AWS-8, 95
 AWS-11, 381
 HqSqn-1, 551, 558
 HqSqn-2, 95
 HqSqn-3, 25
 HqSqn-12, 599
 HqSqn-22, 230*n*
 HqSqn-24, 588
 HqSqn-71, 713
 SMS-1, 560
 SMS-22, 230*n*
 SMS-71, 713
 VMB-612, 373, 373*n*
 VMB-621, 423
 VMB-622, 423
 VMB-623, 423
 VMB-624, 423
 VMD-254, 577–578
 VMF-112, 180, 414, 421
 VMF-113, 230*n*, 495
 VMF-115, 566, 608, 621

Marine Units—Continued

Air—Continued

VMF-123, 180, 416, 421
 VMF-124, 415–416, 418, 716
 VMF-211, 566, 623–624, 630, 635, 642, 737–738, 787
 VMF-213, 415, 417–418
 VMF-214, 371, 419, 421, 745
 VMF-216, 416, 418
 VMF-217, 416, 418
 VMF-218, 371, 566, 624, 630
 VMF-221, 180, 416
 VMF-222, 371
 VMF-224, 95
 VMF-311, 95, 177
 VMF-312, 95, 152, 154, 225
 VMF-314, 320*n*, 364*n*
 VMF-322, 95, 152, 154
 VMF-323, 95, 152, 224*n*, 364*n*, 374
 VMF-351, 428
 VMF-422, 230*n*
 VMF-441, 95, 186, 264*n*, 488
 VMF-451, 180, 416, 421
 VMF-452, 419, 421
 VMF-511, 414
 VMF-512, 414
 VMF-513, 414
 VMF-514, 414
 VMF(CVS)-112, 414
 VMF(CVS)-321, 429
 VMF(CVS)-351, 428
 VMF(CVS)-511, 427
 VMF(CVS)-512, 427
 VMF(CVS)-513, 428
 VMF(N)-533, 225, 225*n*, 230*n*, 374, 566, 621
 VMF(N)-541, 566, 588, 599
 VMF(N)-542, 181, 374
 VMF(N)-543, 96, 181, 374
 VML-71, 713
 VMO-2, 376, 376*n*, 377*n*
 VMO-3, 335, 376, 376*n*, 564, 585, 613, 627
 VMO-6, 376, 376*n*, 564, 577–578, 606, 616, 618, 621
 VMO-7, 89, 335, 377
 VMO-351, 414, 414*n*
 VMR-152, 566, 576, 605
 VMR-153, 566, 576, 605–606, 673–624, 629–630, 636, 632
 VMR-353, 509*n*
 VMR-952, 509*n*

Marine Units—Continued

Air—Continued

VMSB-231, 716
 VMSB-244, 560, 577
 VMSB-343, 577-578
 VMTB-131, 230*n*, 331, 331*n*, 373-374
 VMTB-132, 414
 VMTB-134, 560, 577, 599, 715, 715*n*
 VMTB-143, 414
 VMTB-232, 185, 226, 293, 304, 328, 331, 373-374
 VMTB-233, 414
 VMTB-234, 414
 VMTB-454, 414
 VMTB(CVS)-132, 428
 VMTB(CVS)-143, 327
 VMTB(CVS)-144, 429
 VMTB(CVS)-233, 427
 VMTB(CVS)-234, 428
 VMTB(CVS)-454, 429
 CASD-1, 427
 CASD-2, 427
 CASD-3, 428
 CASD-4, 428
 CASD-5, 429
 CASD-6, 429

Ground

Fleet Marine Force, 12*n*, 23-24, 27, 410, 441-443, 447-448, 450, 464-468, 483, 550, 592, 598, 605, 635, 655-656, 665-667, 677, 679-680, 682-683, 687, 698, 700, 705, 707, 712, 729
 Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet, 656
 Department of the Pacific, 453-454, 565, 618
 Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, 448, 469
 Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 23-25, 74, 83, 95, 348, 397, 397*n*, 398-399, 413, 439, 441, 443-444, 444*n*, 461, 465-466, 468-469, 475-476, 489-490, 506, 571, 579, 598, 605, 620, 637, 647-649, 692, 714
 Fleet Marine Force, San Diego Area, 699
 Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific, 624, 628-631, 635, 637-639, 642-644, 650
 Marine Garrison Forces, 14th Naval District, 465
 Marine Garrison Forces, Pacific, 464*n*, 465-466, 466*n*, 618
 Marine Forces, China, 534, 597, 604, 606, 616-617, 621
 Marine Forces, Tsingtao, 606, 616
 Marine Group, Peiping, 567, 599, 612, 617

Marine Units—Continued

Ground—Continued

Marine Supply Service, FMFPac, 391
 Marine Training and Replacement Command, 441-442
 Service Command, FMFPac, 598, 636, 692
 South Pacific Echelon, FMFPac, 391
 Troop Training Command, Amphibious Forces, Atlantic Fleet, 581
 I Marine Amphibious Corps, 660, 690, 707, 709, 714
 III Amphibious Corps, 24-25, 27, 60, 65-68, 72, 79, 80-81, 83*n*, 86, 88, 90-91, 93, 95, 103, 103*n*, 112, 114-118, 126, 129-130, 132, 134-135, 155, 158-160, 160*n*, 167, 169, 174-175, 183-184, 188, 195-197, 201*n*, 214, 216, 220, 235-236, 241, 252, 266, 271, 273, 277-278, 281, 299-300, 302, 302*n*, 303-305, 330, 345, 350, 358, 362-363, 363*n*, 364-365, 374-376, 382-383, 387, 388*n*, 391, 397, 397*n*, 398, 408, 441, 449, 476*n*, 533-534, 534*n*, 535-536, 542-548, 550-552, 553*n*, 555*n*, 561, 563, 566-567, 569, 571-573, 575-576, 579, 579*n*, 581-583, 583*n*, 585-586, 591*n*, 592-593, 596-598, 600-601, 604-605, 615, 648-649, 694, 725
 V Amphibious Corps, 24-25, 27, 104, 162*n*, 398-399, 404, 408-409, 417, 441, 449, 492-493, 493*n*, 496, 499-500, 500*n*, 501-502, 505, 505*n*, 506-508, 508*n*, 509, 511-512, 518, 544, 704-705, 707, 721
 III Corps Artillery, 68, 88-89, 90*n*, 117, 123, 136*n*, 169, 181, 188-189, 199*n*, 216*n*, 217-218, 249, 377, 382, 397, 535
 III Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 2, 95*n*
 II Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 3, 208
 III Corps Service Group, 160
 III Corps Shore Brigade, 550, 553, 555, 567
 1st Marine Division, 24, 49, 60, 63, 66, 68, 74, 79-80, 83*n*, 84*n*, 86, 86*n*, 87, 91, 93, 112, 114-116, 116*n*, 120-122, 125-126, 128, 128*n*, 130, 132, 141, 158, 172, 174, 183, 194-195, 197-199, 201*n*, 202, 206-207, 210-214, 216, 216*n*, 218, 218*n*, 221-222, 230-232, 234-235, 238-239, 244, 247, 256, 262-263, 266, 271-273, 277, 281-284, 286, 293, 295, 297, 299, 304, 314, 325, 328, 328*n*, 330, 332, 344, 346-

Marine Units—Continued

Ground—Continued

1st Marine Division—Continued

347, 351, 353, 354*n*, 356, 358, 361, 363,
376–377, 380, 383–384, 385*n*, 386, 389,
391, 397, 441, 468, 517*n*, 535, 547, 550–
553, 557, 557*n*, 560, 564, 567–568, 574–
575, 575*n*, 583–585, 588–589, 596, 599–
600, 605–606, 613–617, 621–625, 627,
631, 635, 642–643, 650, 656, 659–660,
662–663, 680–682, 686, 686*n*, 691, 693,
695–696, 701, 703, 706, 708–709, 716,
718, 720, 723, 725, 727

2d Marine Division, 23–24, 62, 65, 67, 72,
74, 84, 88–90, 95, 107, 109, 195–196, 347–
348, 378*n*, 397, 408–409, 441, 492–493,
496, 500–501, 505*n*, 506–507, 509, 511–
512, 514, 517, 517*n*, 616, 680, 682

3d Marine Division, 23–24, 398, 408–409,
441, 456, 460, 468, 492, 493*n*, 535, 670,
698, 705–706, 711, 719

4th Marine Division, 24, 398, 441, 468, 535,
699, 705, 721, 729

5th Marine Division, 24, 397*n*, 398, 408–
409, 441, 492–493, 495–497, 499–502,
505, 505*n*, 506, 509, 511, 512*n*, 705, 707

6th Marine Division, 24, 27, 60, 66, 68, 74,
79, 79*n*, 83*n*, 88, 93, 101, 114–115, 117–
118, 120, 126, 128–130, 132, 134, 134*n*,
135–136, 138, 138*n*, 141–142, 149, 151,
154–155, 158, 160, 166, 171–173, 173*n*,
174, 176*n*, 183, 197, 214, 216, 218, 222,
223*n*, 230–231, 233–235, 244, 247, 249–
252, 254, 256, 271, 275–276, 280, 284,
296–297, 299–300, 302, 302*n*, 303–304,
307–308, 310–311, 318, 320, 323–325,
330, 344–346, 356, 357*n*, 360, 361*n*, 363,
368, 376, 380, 384, 385*n*, 387, 389, 391,
397, 438, 441, 476, 487, 487*n*, 488–490,
514, 535, 545, 547, 552, 558–561, 563–
565, 567–568, 575, 578, 580–581, 584, 592,
596, 598–600, 616, 685, 695, 712, 725

1st Provisional Marine Brigade, 88, 468–
469, 469*n*, 487*n*, 624, 631, 638–639, 642,
712

3d Marine Brigade, 599, 605–606, 616, 710

1st Field Service Command, 74

2d Field Service Command, 74

Fleet Landing Force, 438–439, 476, 481,
485, 487–488

Marine Units—Continued

Ground—Continued

1st Marines, 68, 91, 116, 130, 195, 199,
201–204, 209, 212, 214, 216–218, 218*n*,
220, 220*n*, 221, 231, 234–235, 239, 257,
262, 264, 266, 269, 277, 282, 287, 325–
326, 329, 331–332, 340–343, 368, 388*n*,
550, 556, 558, 567–568, 583, 599, 608,
612, 617, 621–622, 624, 635, 637, 643,
683

2d Marines, 496, 506–507, 512–514, 517

3d Marines, 635, 637, 640, 642–645, 647,
711

4th Marines, 68, 88, 112, 115, 117–118, 120,
120*n*, 126, 129–130, 132, 134–135, 138,
141–142, 144, 146, 148–152, 154, 174,
235, 252–254, 254*n*, 256*n*, 271, 273, 275–
276, 280, 283, 302, 305, 307–308, 310–
312, 314–316, 318, 320–321, 356, 358,
360, 360*n*, 361, 363, 438, 441, 476, 478,
478*n*, 479, 483, 485, 487–488, 489*n*, 490,
543, 565, 593, 598, 606, 608, 616, 618,
711–712, 731, 733–734, 740–741, 744,
765, 768, 770, 778

5th Marines, 68, 112, 116–117, 125, 128,
130, 173, 199, 202–203, 211–212, 214,
216, 218, 218*n*, 219–220, 220*n*, 221, 234,
239, 253, 257, 259–260, 262, 264, 266,
277, 282, 284, 286–287, 296–297, 300,
303–304, 326, 326*n*, 344, 354, 354*n*, 358,
388*n*, 550, 558, 567, 599, 617, 622, 624,
627, 709

6th Marines, 272, 496, 505*n*, 506, 512

7th Marines, 68, 112, 115–117, 120*n*, 125–
127, 130, 134, 171, 173–174, 176, 203,
210, 212, 214*n*, 218, 218*n*, 220, 220*n*, 221,
231–233, 235–236, 239, 259*n*, 261, 265*n*,
299, 304, 308, 311, 325–326, 329–333,
337, 339–344, 347, 351*n*, 353, 362–363,
388*n*, 548, 553, 556, 556*n*, 575–576, 586,
588, 590–591, 600, 610, 617, 621, 647, 696

8th Marines, 90, 347–348, 353, 353*n*, 354,
354*n*, 358, 360–363, 388*n*, 397, 506–507,
512, 514, 517

9th Marines, 639–642, 644, 711

10th Marines, 506, 512, 514

11th Marines, 87, 89, 90*n*, 116–118, 123,
125, 189, 189*n*, 194–195, 195*n*, 199, 199*n*,
216, 330, 333, 376*n*, 383, 385*n*, 550, 556–
557, 599, 613, 617, 621

Marine Units—Continued

Ground—Continued

- 12th Marines, 89
- 13th Marines, 495, 505, 511–512
- 15th Marines, 88–89, 90*n*, 117, 136, 149–150, 216, 308, 563
- 21st Marines, 456–457, 460, 468
- 22d Marines, 68, 88, 112, 115, 117–118, 126, 129, 129*n*, 132, 134, 138, 172, 173*n*, 174, 218–219, 222, 230–231, 234–235, 237, 245, 247–249, 252–253, 253*n*, 254, 276, 283–284, 296, 299, 304, 311, 314–315, 318, 320–321, 323, 344–346, 353, 356, 360, 363*n*, 388*n*, 563, 565, 598
- 24th Marines, 699
- 26th Marines, 454, 495, 505, 505*n*, 506
- 27th Marines, 495, 512, 683
- 28th Marines, 495, 501, 505–506, 512
- 29th Marines, 68, 91, 115, 117, 129–130, 134–135, 138, 138*n*, 139–142, 144, 146, 149, 151, 154, 174, 235, 237–238, 247, 249, 251–252, 280, 283–284, 296, 302, 307, 309–310, 312, 314, 318, 320–321, 323, 323*n*, 361, 363, 559–560, 563, 565, 580
- 1st Marine Parachute Regiment, 706
- 1st Marine Raider Regiment, 710–711
- 2d Marine Raider Regiment (Provisional), 711, 714
- 7th Service Regiment, 550–551, 567, 598, 606, 616, 624–625, 627–628, 630–631
- 4th Base Depot, 74, 391
- 7th Field Depot, 95*n*
- 5th Field Service Depot, 478
- 1st Provisional Antiaircraft Artillery Group, 83–84, 274, 456
- 2d Provisional Antiaircraft Artillery Group, 456
- 2d Provisional Combat Service Group (Light), 640, 642–643
- 2d Provisional Field Artillery Group, 89, 136, 136*n*, 216, 216*n*
- Amphibian Tractor Battalions
 - 4th, 302*n*, 478
 - 9th, 302*n*
- Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion (FMF), 67, 104, 106*n*, 162, 164, 167, 173, 303, 378*n*, 381, 388

Marine Units—Continued

Ground—Continued

Antiaircraft Artillery Battalions

- 2d, 95*n*, 183, 690
- 5th, 183, 690
- 8th, 183–184, 690
- 9th, 95*n*, 183, 690
- 16th, 183

Armored Amphibian Battalions

- 1st, 136, 149, 397
- 3d, 210

Barrage Balloon Squadrons

- 1st, 712
- 2d, 712
- 3d, 712
- 5th, 712
- 6th, 712

Corps Artillery Battalions

- 1st 155mm Howitzer, 188, 216
- 3d 155mm Howitzer, 89, 188, 216, 216*n*
- 6th 155mm Howitzer, 89, 188, 216
- 7th 155mm Gun, 136*n*, 149, 216
- 8th 155mm Gun, 89, 188, 216
- 9th 155mm Gun, 188, 216

Defense Battalions

- 1st, 737
- 3d, 688
- 6th, 690
- 51st, 688–689
- 52d, 688

Divisional Artillery Battalions

- 1/11, 123, 189, 189*n*, 218*n*, 385*n*, 599, 612–613
- 1/15, 172, 478*n*
- 2/11, 189, 194, 216*n*, 218*n*, 599, 612, 638, 642
- 2/15, 144, 576
- 3/10, 506
- 3/11, 189, 194, 318*n*, 600, 621
- 3/12, 616
- 4/11, 189, 621
- 4/15, 173, 254*n*, 598

Engineer Battalions

- 1st Separate, 95*n*, 598, 606
- 6th, 120, 128, 135, 139, 172, 219, 222–223, 223*n*, 230, 273, 275, 283, 478*n*

Headquarters Battalions

- FMFPac, 628
- FMFWesPac, 643
- HQMC, 678
- IIIAC, 605–606

Marine Units—Continued

Ground—Continued

Infantry Battalions

1st Separate, 708, 741

1/1, 117, 125, 128, 198, 201–203, 203*n*,
209–211, 214*n*, 219–220, 220*n*, 222,
222*n*, 238–239, 262, 265, 287, 295, 325–
326, 328, 331, 333, 335, 342, 621, 624,
628

1/2, 507

1/3, 460–461, 468, 643–644, 647, 718

1/4, 120, 126, 132, 134, 144–146, 148–
152, 154, 174, 254, 271, 273, 275–276,
280, 283, 305–306, 309, 311, 314, 316,
318, 320, 323, 361, 363, 483, 485, 487,
489, 598, 7111/5, 112, 116, 128, 204, 217, 220–221,
257, 264–265, 282, 284, 286–287, 297,
299, 303–304, 353–354, 358, 361–363,
599, 617, 619, 625, 627–628, 708

1/6, 514

1/7, 120*n*, 127, 130, 171, 203, 220*n*, 221,
232–234, 236, 238, 239*n*, 259–262, 332–
333, 337, 339–340, 343–344, 381, 548,
552, 556, 556*n*, 570, 600, 610, 621, 647,
648, 709

1/8, 348, 353, 507

1/9, 644

1/22, 115, 129, 140, 146, 149–152, 154,
173, 173*n*, 174–175, 218–219, 222, 222*n*,
223, 231, 233, 235, 245, 247–249, 251,
283–284, 296, 308, 315, 318, 330, 345–
3471/26, 512*n*

1/27, 495, 502, 505

1/29, 88, 115, 117–118, 126, 129, 129*n*,
138–140, 142, 146, 151, 238, 247–250,
275–276, 280*n*, 283–284, 296, 323,
323*n*, 360–361, 363, 575–576, 588, 599

2d Separate, 709

2/1, 117, 125, 128, 174, 203–204, 210,
216–217, 219, 231, 234–235, 239, 257,
263, 263*n*, 264–265, 281–282, 295, 328,
330–333, 335, 341–342, 599, 624, 629,
631, 635

2/2, 507

2/4, 68, 115, 132, 134–135, 144–145, 148–
152, 154, 174, 247, 252–253, 256, 271,
273, 275–276, 280, 283, 302, 305–307,
312, 315, 318, 320, 323, 360–361, 363,
483–484, 489, 598, 711

Marine Units—Continued

Ground—Continued

Infantry Battalions—Continued

2/5, 128, 128*n*, 199, 202, 204, 216–217,
221, 232, 257, 259–262, 264, 297, 303–
304, 326–327, 342, 344–345, 358, 361–
364, 567, 599, 708–709

2/6, 512, 516

2/7, 116, 120*n*, 127, 130, 171, 203, 210,
214, 214*n*, 221, 232, 234, 236, 238,
239*n*, 262, 299, 329–330, 332*n*, 337,
339–345, 548, 553, 555, 590–591, 600,
610

2/8, 348, 353, 358

2/21, 456–457, 460, 468

2/22, 115, 129, 141, 234–235, 237–238,
245, 247, 276, 280, 280*n*, 283–284, 296,
314–316, 318, 356, 363, 579, 598

2/26, 454, 506, 707

2/27, 502–503, 512

2/28, 495

2/29, 138–140, 146, 152, 154, 245, 247,
249–252, 252*n*, 283, 307, 309–310, 312,
320, 323, 578, 5983/1, 125, 130, 173*n*, 174, 198, 201–202,
204, 212, 216–217, 219, 222, 231, 234–
235, 239, 257, 262–263, 265–266, 281–
282, 286–287, 293, 325–328, 331, 342,
723

3/2, 109, 496, 507

3/3, 686

3/4, 112, 118, 120, 126, 134–135, 141–
142, 144–146, 149–152, 154, 174–175,
252–254, 254*n*, 256, 271, 273, 275, 280,
283, 307–309, 311–312, 314–315, 318,
320–321, 323, 356, 360–361, 363, 464,
483, 485, 487–489, 598, 616, 618, 624,
629, 635, 711, 7753/5, 116, 128, 164, 172, 199, 202, 204,
218, 220, 220*n*, 221, 232, 252, 257, 273,
275, 284, 299, 303–305, 342, 342*n*, 345,
358, 361–362, 364, 567

3/6, 514

3/7, 116, 127, 127*n*, 128, 130, 171, 173,
203, 212, 220, 220*n*, 221, 232, 236,
260–262, 299, 327*n*, 328–332, 339, 344–
347, 358, 548, 553, 555, 555*n*, 590, 708

3/8, 348, 353, 358

3/22, 129, 140, 142, 144, 146, 154, 174–
175, 218–219, 222, 233–234, 237, 245,
247–249, 275, 280, 284, 296, 311, 314–
316, 318, 320, 345–346, 598

Marine Units—Continued

Ground—Continued

Infantry Battalions—Continued

- 3/24, 698
- 3/26, 495, 512*n*
- 3/28, 502
- 3/29, 138–142, 144–146, 148–150, 152, 154, 234–235, 238, 245, 247–250, 283–284, 307, 309–310, 312, 323, 323*n*

7th Separate, 441

Medical Battalions, 623–624, 728

3d, 616

6th, 478*n*, 563

Military Police Battalions

1st, 550

1st Provisional, 95*n*

5th Provisional, 464

8th Provisional, 464

Motor Transport Battalions

6th, 283*n*, 478*n*

11th, 550, 598

Parachute Battalions

1st, 698, 705, 708

2d, 700, 705–706

3d, 706

4th, 706

Pioneer Battalions

1st, 548, 552, 567, 624, 628, 665

5th, 500

6th, 478*n*

Raider Battalions

1st, 698, 700, 707*n*, 708–710

2d, 698, 707, 709–711, 744

3d, 710–711

4th, 710

2d Replacement Battalion, 682

Replacement Drafts

55th, 345*n*

57th, 281

59th, 281

62d, 345*n*

63d, 281

12th Service Battalion, 598, 606, 616, 628, 635, 640

Tank Battalions

1st, 114, 195, 198, 201, 201*n*, 259–260, 339, 621, 693, 703, 703*n*, 722

5th, 495, 503, 506

6th, 114, 126, 222*n*, 248, 253, 306, 478*n*

6th Assault Signal Company, 478*n*

Marine Units—Continued

Ground—Continued

3d DUKW Company, 551

Joint Assault Signal Companies, 25, 375, 375*n*, 383, 383*n*, 657

Medical companies, 467, 598–599, 692, 729

11th Military Police Company (Provisional), 453

Reconnaissance Companies

1st, 125, 127, 210, 304, 329, 624, 694

6th, 118, 132, 134, 136*n*, 140, 173, 247, 272, 275–276, 278, 299, 305, 307, 323, 360, 388*n*, 563

3d Island Base Headquarters, 453

Landing Force Air Support Control Units

LFASCU–1, 95*n*, 96, 181, 375, 378

LFASCU–2, 96, 193, 375

LFASCU–3, 96, 181, 375

Marine Air Base, Iwakuni, 509*n*Marine Air Base, Omura, 509, 517*n*

Marine Barracks

Guam, 465, 466*n*

Kwajalein, 464*n*, 466*n*

Marcus, 453

New River, N. C., 680

Olongapo, 741

Peiping, 547*n*

Peleliu, 466*n*

Saipan, 464, 466

Sangley Point, Philippine Islands, 464

Sumay, Guam, 734

Naval Air Facility, Honolulu, T. H., 466*n*

Naval Air Stations

Barber's Point, Oahu, 466*n*

Ford Island, Pearl Harbor, 466*n*

Johnston Island, 466*n*

Kahului, Maui, 466*n*

Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, 466*n*

Naval Ammunition Depot, Oahu, 466*n*Naval Base, Pearl Harbor, 465, 466*n*

Naval Operating Bases

Midway Island, 466*n*

Okinawa, 466*n*

Subic Bay, P. I., 466*n*

Marine Camp, Ainoura, 506

Marine Corps Air Facility, St. Thomas, V.I., 448

Marine Corps Air Stations, 448, 465, 651

Cherry Point, N.C., 26, 442, 469–470, 642, 681

Eagle Mountain Lake, Texas, 713

- Marine Corps Air Stations—Continued
 El Centro, Calif., 26, 421, 429*n*, 681
 El Toro, Calif., 429*n*, 681
 Miramar, Calif., 442
 Mojave, Calif., 26, 424, 429*n*, 681
 Santa Barbara, Calif., 415, 424, 681
 Marine Corps Base Depot, Norfolk, Va., 441
 Marine Detachments
 Commander, Naval Forces, Philippines, 464, 466*n*
 Fita-Fita Guard, Samoa, 466*n*
 Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, 444*n*, 466*n*
 Truk, 466*n*
 USS *Houston*, 739–740, 767–768
 USS *Missouri*, 439
 Marine Detachments (Provisional)
 Commander, Philippine Sea Frontier, 444*n*, 464
 Eniwetok, 444*n*, 459, 464*n*
 Peleliu, 454, 464
 Samar, 44*n*, 464
 Truk, 457
 Marcus Island, 466*n*
 Wake, 459, 464*n*
 Marine's Hymn, 557, 759
 Marine Legation Guard, Tientsin, 731
 Marine Corp Recruit Depots
 Parris Island, S. C., 442, 448, 682
 San Diego, Calif., 442, 445, 680, 682
 Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va., 441, 447, 467, 655, 689, 699–700, 724
 Marine ships detachments, 23, 439, 447–448, 467, 489, 496, 647, 739
 Marshall, Maj David E., 417
 Marshall, Gen George C., 11*n*, 402, 432, 508;
 General of the Army, 573–574, 585, 593–594, 596–598, 600–606, 608, 614, 616, 618–620, 622, 712; Secretary of State, 627*n*, 632
 Marshalls, 4, 26, 95, 240, 450, 452, 654, 673, 690, 704*n*, 724, 745
 Marshalls-Gilberts Area, 449–450, 463
 Marshalls Operations, 4*n*
 Mason, Col Arthur T., 217, 217*n*, 219, 221, 262–263, 282, 282*n*, 295, 327, 327*n*, 328
Massachusetts, 479*n*
 Matanikau River, 709
 Matsuzaki, 408
 Maui, 24, 398, 441, 468, 493, 535
 McAlister, LtCol Francis M., 160*n*
 McAlister, 1stLt John A., 758–759
 McBrayer, 1stLt James D., 758–759
 McBridge, BGen Robert B., Jr., 506
 McCain, VAdm John S., 96–97
 McCaulley, Maj Edwin F., 733, 734*n*
 McGovern, Commo John B., 62
 McLish, LtCol Ernest E., 771
 McMillin, Capt George J., 734
 McMorris, VAdm Charles H., 373*n*
 McQueen, Col John C., 323
 Medal of Honor, 371, 707, 712, 716, 729–730, 745. *See also* Awards and Decorations.
 Medeira, 290, 352, 356–357, 362–363, 368
 Medical Activities
 American, 23–25, 40, 73, 77, 85, 123, 141, 149*n*, 150, 160*n*, 175, 208, 231, 256, 261, 271, 273, 297, 304, 309*n*, 325, 332, 335, 345, 353, 369, 377, 511, 535, 550, 556, 580, 663, 689, 691, 726–729, 737, 769
 Japanese, 49, 290, 292, 363, 556*n*, 760
 Medina, 771
 Megee, Col Vernon E., 62, 181, 375, 375*n*, 376, 415, 417; Gen, 193*n*
 Meka, 298
 Meteorological data, 64
 Metzger, BGen Louis, 476*n*, 481*n*, 484*n*, 485*n*
 Mezado, 339, 344, 345*n*, 346
 Mezado Ridge, 289, 338, 341–343, 345, 351, 353, 356, 388*n*
 Micronesia, 654
 Midway, 26, 470, 690, 709, 716, 763
 Military government, 58, 76–77, 92, 121–122, 348, 378–380, 456, 497–498, 507*n*. *See also* Civil affairs.
 Military Police, 77, 220*n*, 464, 500, 565, 663, 692. *See also* Army units; Marine Units.
 Mille Atoll, 450, 452, 455
 Miller, LtCol John C., Jr., 116, 172
 Miller, Maj Lyle H., 654
 Millington, LtCol William A., 415–417; BGen, 416*n*
 Milne Bay, 70*n*
 Minamata, 406
 Minami, 188
 Minami Daito, 97
 Minami-Uebaru foothills, 206
 Minatoga, 51*n*, 66, 109, 205
 Minatoga beaches, 51, 54–55, 98, 100, 107, 109, 112
 Mindanao, 4, 6, 9, 11*n*, 441, 535–536, 769, 771–772
 Mindoro, 773
 Ming Dynasty, 32

- Minna Shima, 388*n*
Missouri, 438–439, 452, 479, 479*n*, 483–484, 488, 781
 Mitchell, MajGen Ralph J., 25, 372*n*, 412
 Mitscher, VAdm Marc A., 16, 60, 97–98, 415–419
 Mitsushima, 765
 Miura Peninsula, 438–439, 481
 Miyagusuku, 198, 201–203
 Miyake, Maj Tadao, 41
 Miyako Jima, 45, 197, 378, 398
 Miyakonojo, 507
 Miyazaki, 408, 493*n*, 501, 507*n*, 514
 Miyazaki Prefecture, 500, 507, 517
 Mizell, LtCol Maxwell H., 602
 Moen, 455
 Moji, 499, 502, 778
 Mongolia, 537
Monterey, 479*n*
 Montford Point, N. C., 689
 Montgomery, Col Edward A., 371
 Moore, Sgt Balthazar, 757
 Moore, RAdm Charles J., 662
 Moore, MajGen James T., 25, 228, 376, 534, 552*n*
 Moosburg, 749
 Moreau, LtCol Jean W., 115, 126, 129, 139, 146, 248
 Moran, LtCol Sherwood F., 544*n*
 Mori, VAdm Kunizo, 461
 Morotai, 4, 40, 452
 Mortlake, 455
 Moscow, 431*n*
 Motobu Peninsula, 34, 46, 50, 55, 69, 132, 135–136, 138–140, 142, 144, 152, 154–155, 166, 169, 171–173, 173*n*, 174–175, 184, 379–380, 384, 397, 551, 725
 Motor transport
 American, 25, 77, 84*n*, 123, 159–160, 392, 467, 500, 576, 599, 623–624, 643, 664, 667, 692–693, 695. *See also* Army units; Marine units; Vehicles.
 Japanese, 44
 Moulmein, 766
 Mou Ting Fang, Gen, 568
Mt. McKinley, 493
 Mugikura, LtGen Shunsaburo, 454
 Mukden, 439, 530, 572, 584, 636, 783
 Mukue Gawa, 331–332, 332*n*, 333
 Mulcahy, MajGen Francis P., 25, 60–61, 69, 75, 95, 176, 180–181, 185, 372, 372*n*
 Muncie, LtCol John D., 117*n*
 Munda, 718
 Munich, 749
 Munn, Col John C., 95, 181, 488
 Murray, VAdm George D., 450, 454
 Murray, LtCol James C., Jr., 117, 220*n*
 Myers, Maj Thomas J., 115, 129, 150, 245, 245*n*, 699
 Nagahama, 118
 Naganna Shima, 106*n*
 Nagano, MajGen Eiji, 542, 565, 581*n*, 607, 608*n*
Nagaru Maru, 744
 Nagasaki, 428, 433, 436, 492–493, 493*n*, 495–496, 500–501, 503, 506–507, 514, 786
 Nagasaki Prefecture, 500, 505–506
 Nagato, 483, 485
 Nago, 37, 50, 135, 138–139, 160, 173
 Nago Wan, 136, 142, 172, 184, 241
 Nagoya, 18, 98, 418
 Nagusuku, 360*n*
 Naha, 34, 36–39, 46, 50, 75, 96, 106*n*, 176*n*, 205, 207, 232–236, 248, 251, 271, 271*n*, 274, 276, 278, 280, 284, 292, 296, 299, 305, 307, 309, 381
 Naha Canal, 302, 388*n*
 Naha City Command, 283*n*
 Naha Estuary, 252, 323
 Naha Harbor, 299, 300, 307, 312, 323
 Naha-Yonabaru highway, 270, 300, 368
 Naha-Yonabaru valley, 54, 205, 270, 274, 293*n*, 298
 Naiki, Lt Hisakichi, 745
 Nakadomori, 126, 129*n*, 134, 136
 Nakagusuku Wan, 51, 75, 81, 128, 162, 166, 241, 270
 Nakama, 132, 188, 218*n*, 220*n*
 Nakama Valley, 351
 Nakanishi, 198, 202
 Nakaoshi, 136, 138, 172–173
 Nakasoni, 139
 Namoluk, 455
 Namur, 95
 Nanashino, 43
 Nanking, 526–527, 533, 541, 609, 623*n*, 629–632, 640, 642, 644–645, 758–759
 Nansei Shoto, 18, 31, 34, 37, 39, 39*n*, 56, 58
 Nan Yuan Field, 539, 547, 566, 588, 599
 Naoetsu, 785
 Napalm, 26, 148, 154, 167, 201, 218, 260, 263, 364*n*, 374, 417, 703–704, 704*n*
 Napunja, 127, 130
 Narashido, 138
 Nasipit, 772

- Nationalist China, 528, 531-532, 648-649. *See also* Chinese Central Government.
- National Security Act of 1947, 466
- Natives, 121, 173, 348, 361, 378*n*. *See also* Chamorros; Okinawans.
- Nauru, 462, 455
- Naval
- Air Base, Marcus, 453
 - Air Station, Lakehurst, N.J., 705
 - blockades, 20, 32, 81, 400-402, 433, 763*n*
 - Forces, Ryukyus, 62
 - gunfire, 32, 39, 55, 57, 60, 63, 65-67, 87, 90-91, 98-100, 102-103, 103*n*, 104, 106, 109, 111-112, 135-136, 140, 144-147, 152, 152*n*, 155, 164, 167, 176, 190, 192-193, 202, 211, 213, 216, 218, 220, 222, 231-232, 238, 242, 245, 247, 259-260, 265, 274, 277-278, 296, 305, 311, 326, 341, 343-345, 348, 352, 369, 374, 375*n*, 377, 382-384, 390, 417, 461, 478*n*, 483, 561, 635, 645, 666, 669-670, 672-674, 717, 721, 774
 - Occupation Force, 535
 - Operating Base, Ryukyus, 378
- Navy Cross, 707, 729-730, 747*n*. *See also* Awards and Decorations.
- Navy Department, 605
- Annex, 678
- Navy Units. *See also* Task Organizations.
- Civil Engineer Corps, 691
 - Transportation Service, 448
 - Asiatic Fleet, 540
 - Atlantic Fleet, 664
 - Pacific Fleet, 448
 - Third Fleet, 229*n*, 280, 404, 404*n*, 406-407, 409, 415-416, 422, 431, 438, 475-476, 478-479, 483-484, 488, 781, 786
 - Fifth Fleet, 16, 57, 60, 64, 114*n*, 280, 354*n*, 404, 404*n*, 406-407, 416, 419, 421, 428, 490, 492, 786
 - Seventh Fleet, 533-534, 544, 561, 565, 569, 574, 580, 582, 604, 606-607, 614*n*, 616, 623*n*, 628, 673
 - Support Aircraft, Pacific Fleet, 671
 - Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, 708
 - Amphibious Force, South Pacific, 660
 - Amphibious Support Force, 99
 - Fleet Naval Landing Force, 483
 - Naval Forces, Western Pacific, 628, 634, 648
 - Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, 20, 97
 - Battleship Division 7, 476
 - Carrier Division 27, 441
- Navy Units—Continued
- Fleet Air Wing 1, 373, 373*n*, 639, 643
 - Transport Divisions, 93, 478, 550-551, 558, 560
 - Transport Division 60, 478
 - Amphibious Group 2, 704
 - Amphibious Group 7, 550
 - Fleet Flagship Group, 438
 - Group Pacific 13, 550, 556, 567, 628
 - Mine Group One, 98
 - Acorn 52, 456
 - Destroyer Squadron 52, 98
 - Naval Construction Battalions (Seabees), 32*n*, 72, 158, 166, 176, 454, 535, 556, 692, 692*n*, 694
 - 29th, 456
 - 32d, 599
 - 58th, 128
 - 96th, 599, 606
 - Transport Squadrons, 90, 93, 493, 495, 563
 - 15, 95
 - 17, 551-552, 555, 561
 - 24, 560-561
 - VC-7, 715*n*
 - Underwater Demolition Flotilla, 99
 - Underwater demolition teams, 99, 102, 102*n*, 104, 106, 164, 167, 657
 - Group Able, 99-100
 - Group Baker, 99-100
- Nazis, 218, 589, 749
- Negro Marines, 688
- Nelson, Capt Albin F., 603
- Nemoto, LtGen Hiroshi, 542
- Neuffer, Maj Robert P., 248, 283*n*
- Neuse River, N.C., 680
- New Britain, 4, 87, 665, 686, 696, 716, 720
- operation, 86
- New Caledonia, 65, 717
- New Delhi, 757
- New Georgia, 70*n*, 88, 410, 489*n*, 706, 711, 719
- Occupation Force, 711
 - operation, 700, 710, 718
- New Guinea, 4, 659*n*, 763
- New Hebrides, 25, 86, 95
- New Ireland, 4, 659*n*
- Newman, 560-561
- New Navy Building, 678
- New Orleans, 277
- New Orleans, La., 667
- New River, N. C., 680-682, 702, 705, 713
- New York, 188, 277

- New York, N.Y., 76, 94, 421
 New Zealand, 86*n*, 87, 662–663, 706, 719
 Nicaragua, 645, 697–698, 708
 Night illumination, 136, 184, 209, 237, 254, 338, 590
 Niigata, 433
 Niland, Calif., 680
 Nimitz, Adm Chester W., 3*n*, 4, 6, 8–9, 9*n*, 11, 11*n*, 12–13, 31, 56–58, 62, 64–65, 76, 82, 195–196, 354*n*, 369, 372*n*, 373*n*, 399, 401–402; FAdm, 97, 97*n*, 403, 403*n*, 411–414, 430, 436–437, 446, 475–476, 484, 484*n*, 487, 533–534, 544, 660*n*, 707*n*. *See also* Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet; Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas.
 Nimmer, BGen David I., 89, 102, 123, 216, 382
 Nishibaru, 194
 Nishikoku, 300, 303–304
 Nishi Omote-Jima, 39*n*
Nitta Maru, 738
 Nobeoka, 406
 Noble, Maj Alfred H., 655; BGen, 618, 624
 No Man's Valley, 340
 Nomoi, 455
 Norfolk, Va., 441, 517, 616
 Normandy, 15, 60*n*, 653
 North Borneo, 402
North Carolina, 479*n*
 North China, 468, 490, 500, 521–522, 524, 527, 532–537, 539–546, 550–552, 567–567, 571–572, 574–576, 578–579, 582–583, 588–589, 592–593, 595, 597–598, 601–602, 604–605, 607–608, 615, 618, 621, 623, 627, 632, 637–640, 643, 648–649, 708, 732, 758, 783
 Northeast China Command, 584–585, 588
 Northern Attack Force, 60, 93–95, 108, 166. *See also* Task Organizations.
 Northern Solomons, 666, 719
 Northern Tractor Flotilla, 93–94
 North Korea, 530
 Notogawa, 779
 Noumea, New Caledonia, 660, 686, 706, 708–710, 712
 Oahu, 25, 70, 83, 93, 95, 441, 621
 Obara, Capt Yoshio, 745
 Oberbayern, 749
 Oboe Hill, 266, 268–269
 Observers, 102, 159, 250, 704
 Occupation forces, 463, 490, 510, 529*n*, 561, 582
 Truk & Central Caroline Islands, 457
 Ocean, 455, 462
 Oceanside, Calif., 680
 OCTAGON Conference 9, 400–401
 Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 731, 746–747, 769
 Ofuna, 745
 Ogasawara Gunto, 460
 O'Halloran, LtCol James S., 183–184
 Ohka, 186*n*
 Oita, 493*n*, 500, 503, 507*n*, 514
 Occupation Force, 506
 Prefecture, 502, 506, 514, 517
 Okamura, Gen Yasuji, 529
 O'Keefe, 1stLt Jerry J., 374*n*
 Okinawa, 9, 11–13, 18–19, 21–22, 25, 27, 31–32, 32*n*, 34, 36–39, 41, 43–46, 48, 56–58, 60–63, 63*n*, 64–65, 65*n*, 66–67, 70, 72–73, 75–78, 78*n*, 80–82, 85, 85*n*, 87–100, 102–104, 106–107, 109, 117, 123*n*, 177, 179, 240, 390, 393, 407, 410, 416, 418, 421, 427–430, 438, 441, 463, 470, 475–476, 484, 487*n*, 488, 495–496, 509, 535, 545, 551–552, 558, 560–561, 566, 576–577, 581, 591, 598, 621, 624, 648, 653, 664–666, 670–675, 683, 685, 691, 694–695, 703, 703*n*, 705, 712, 714–715, 722–725, 783, 786, 789
 agriculture, 36–38
 beaches, 72, 80, 85
 cities, 36–38, 87
 coast, 56, 66, 80, 125
 government, 32, 34, 38
 history, 32, 37–38
 population, 36–37, 43, 53, 77, 87, 121–122, 141, 164, 172, 175, 251, 312, 508
 tombs, 233, 262, 267, 273, 296
 villages, 36–37, 87
 Okinawa Gunto, 34, 46, 79, 185
 Oklahoma City, 479*n*
 Oldendorf, VAdm Jesse B., 60*n*
 Olongapo, 776
 OLYMPIC Operation, 399, 402–404, 404*n*, 406–407, 408*n*, 409, 429, 429*n*, 430–432, 476, 502*n*, 508*n*, 685
 Omori, 781
 Omura, 495, 500, 506, 509, 517, 517*n*
 Omura airfield, 373, 428
 Onaga, 206, 211
 110 Meter Hill, 263, 263*n*, 264–265, 268–269, 281–282
 Onna, 132, 134, 169
 Onna Take, 380

- Ono Yama, 302-303, 305, 307-308, 310
 Onslow Beach, N.C., 656
 Open Door Policy, 522
 Operation Plan 712, 654
 Operation Spring-Em, 781
 Ora, 135, 138, 141, 174
 Oradour-sur-Vayres, 747
 Order of the British Empire, 747*n*. *See also*
 Awards and Decorations.
 Order of Battle
 American, 23, 71, 207, 478, 594, 608, 639,
 779, 695-696, 717
 Japanese, 18, 20, 44-47, 50-51, 53-54, 56,
 68-69, 78-81, 90, 97, 107, 121, 125, 130-
 131, 142, 148, 152, 191, 205, 213, 221, 230,
 250, 251*n*, 252, 266, 268, 274, 312, 530, 542-
 543, 675, 685
 Ordnance. *See* Supplies and equipment.
 Oroku
 airfield, 55, 66, 307-308
 landing, 302*n*, 303, 305, 314
 Mura, 309, 309*n*, 310, 312, 314, 320-321, 323
 Peninsula, 34, 36, 46, 54-55, 66, 290, 292,
 299-300, 302-304, 307-308, 310, 312, 314,
 320, 323-325, 330, 344, 350-351, 360, 388*n*
 Orote Peninsula, 734
 Ortiz, Maj Peter J., 746, 746*n*, 747, 747*n*, 749
Oryoku Maru, 775-776
 Osaka, 8, 98, 512, 734, 736, 738*n*, 760, 765, 779,
 785-786
 Osumi, 34, 507
 Ota, RAdm Minoru, 46, 54-55, 205, 207, 390,
 292, 297, 310, 312, 314, 316, 321, 330
 Ouki, 188, 190
 Outer Mongolia, 531
 OVERLORD Operation, 60*n*
 Owsley, Maj Roy, 439
 Oyama, 206-207, 209
Ozark, 478
 Ozato, 50, 332-333, 345*n*
 Ozato Hills, 270, 272, 251
 Pace, Maj Nat M., 144, 172; LtCol, 144*n*
 Pacific Islands, 444, 530, 576, 582, 698
 Pacific Ocean, 3*n*, 7, 11, 13, 15-16, 23-25, 34,
 60, 67, 70-71, 78, 93, 98-99, 188, 441, 443,
 475, 653-654, 657, 662, 665-667, 669, 672,
 674-676, 679-680, 686, 691, 698, 702, 707,
 713, 716, 788
 Pacific Ocean Areas, 3*n*, 6, 60, 84*n*, 399, 441,
 452, 465
 Pacific War, 3, 5, 11, 14, 449, 530, 653, 658,
 666-667, 670, 674, 676-677, 684, 690, 694,
 717, 723, 725, 730, 744
 Pagan, 428, 455
 Pakanbaru, 768
 Palaus, 6, 8, 16, 26, 87, 94, 96, 98, 159, 240,
 240*n*, 449-450, 452*n*, 453-455, 505, 505*n*,
 654, 690, 724
 Palau Occupation Unit, 450
 Palawan, 772-774
 Palmyra Island, 465
 Pan American Airways, 459
Panamint, 91
 Parachute troops. *See also* Marine units.
 American, 692-694, 698, 705-707, 709, 711
 Japanese, 126
 Parmelee, Col Perry O., 61
 Parris Island, S.C., 680-681, 702, 712-713. *See*
 also Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris
 Island.
Pasadena, 479*n*
 Patrols
 American, 99, 117, 122, 125-126, 129-130,
 132, 134, 136, 141-142, 146, 149, 151, 154,
 171, 174-175, 175*n*, 192, 198, 201, 204*n*,
 219, 222, 233, 271, 273-274, 276, 278, 293,
 298-299, 303, 315, 325, 332, 339-340, 362,
 380-381, 500, 563, 567, 610, 612, 624, 686
 Japanese, 128
 Pavuvu, 24, 70, 74, 86-88, 93, 389, 397
 Paymaster Department, HQMC, 678
 Peale Island, 459
 Pearl Harbor, 6, 61*n*, 63, 66, 80, 92, 94, 96, 97*n*,
 370, 372*n*, 398, 412, 418, 422, 427-428, 449,
 528, 577, 600, 605, 647, 658, 673-675, 679,
 682, 691, 703*n*, 710, 716, 718, 744, 749
 Conference, 8, 12
 Peck, Maj DeWitt, 655; MajGen, 397*n*, 551,
 555*n*, 556, 558*n*, 567*n*, 568, 568*n*, 575*n*,
 583*n*, 584, 584*n*, 586, 586*n*, 600, 606, 655*n*,
 659, 660*n*
 Peiping (Peking), 524-527, 532, 536, 539-540,
 542-547, 547*n*, 548, 550, 556, 558, 558*n*,
 566-568, 572, 575, 575*n*, 576, 579, 583,
 483*n*, 585, 588, 591, 594-594, 599-600, 602-
 604, 606-609, 612-613, 615, 617, 622, 624,
 627, 637, 639, 641, 649, 731-732, 760, 783
 Peiping-Mukden Railroad, 541-542, 547-548,
 567-568, 570, 574-575, 584-585, 588, 591,
 609
 Peiping-Tientsin road, 558, 610, 613

- Peiping Union Medical College, 595
 Peitaiho, 556, 556*n*, 570, 576, 590, 599–600, 607, 610, 617, 621, 628
 Peleliu, 4, 40, 48, 87, 158–159, 242*n*, 450, 453, 464, 505, 512*n*, 675, 683, 701, 704, 714, 722–723, 727
 Island Command, 452*n*, 453
 operation, 4*n*, 5, 8, 63, 72, 86, 89, 232, 232*n*
 Penglai, 577–578
 Pentagon, 687
 Penzoll, LtCol August F., Jr., 183
 People's Liberation Army, 609
 Pepper, LtCol Robert H., 688
 Percival, LtGen Arthur E., 439
 Perry, Commo Matthew C., 32, 461
 Perth, 739–740
 Pescadores, 11, 416, 522
 Pfeiffer, BGen Omar T., 628, 631; MajGen, 660*n*, 667*n*
 Philadelphia, Pa., 503
 Philippine Islands, 4–5, 9, 9*n*, 11*n*, 12, 17–19, 25, 41, 45–46, 70, 83–84, 91, 98, 129, 177–178, 178*n*, 223, 389, 392, 401–402, 407, 422, 429–430, 437, 463, 476, 493, 496, 670, 674, 676, 712, 718, 733, 741, 744, 750, 763*n*, 765, 768–769, 771–773, 775, 778, 788
 Philippines operation, 57, 94, 476, 671
 Photographs, 78–80, 97, 138. *See also* Air activities; Maps and charts.
 Picardi, Maj Robert J., 456
 Pickett, BGen Harry K., 465
 Pingtu, 577–578
 Pioneers, 467, 551, 692, 692*n*, 694. *See also* Marine Units.
 Pistol Pete, 186
 Pittsburgh, 421
 Planning
 American, 3–9, 11–14, 21, 24, 31–32, 57, 61*n*, 63–65, 65*n*, 66, 68–71, 78, 81, 95–96, 100, 102, 106–107, 114, 131, 158*n*, 164, 166, 177, 196–197, 244, 298, 338, 347, 399, 460, 464, 492, 530, 534, 545, 654, 657, 662, 728
 Japanese, 21, 39, 50, 100, 103, 178, 206–107, 188, 191, 197
 Point Cruz, 709
 Point discharge system, 442, 591–592. *See also* Demobilization.
 Political Consultative Conference, 573, 601
 Ponape, 455, 462
 Pontoon bridge, 310. *See also* Bridges.
 Port Arthur, 522
 Portland, 454
 Ports, 70, 72, 75, 406, 499, 540, 545, 553, 569, 597
 Portugese nationals, 503
 Poshan, 582
 Post, BGen Elwyn D., 353
 Pots and Pans, 678–679, 700. *See also* Division of Plans and Policies, HQMC.
 Potsdam, 432
 Potsdam Conference, 403, 433–434
 Potsdam Declaration, 434, 436, 462
 Powell, 1stLt Robert J., 125, 127
 President Harrison, 731
 Pressley, Col Orin K., 602
 Preston, 140
 Price, MajGen Charles F. B., 707
 Princeton University, 92
 Prisoner of War Information Bureau, HQMC, 750
 Prisoners of War
 Allied, 77–78, 122, 131, 310, 450, 452, 453*n*, 461, 492, 502, 518, 533, 566, 686, 731, 733–734, 736, 736*n*, 737–738, 738*n*, 739, 739*n*, 740–745, 749–755, 756*n*, 757–758, 760–761, 761*n*, 762, 764–781, 783, 785–789
 Australian, 428, 763
 British, 484, 749, 763–764
 Chinese, 499
 Commonwealth, 783
 Corregidor, 742, 744, 769
 Dutch, 763
 Filipinos, 770
 Guam Marines, 736, 750, 760–762, 765, 779
 Indians, 453
 Indonesians, 760
 Javanese, 453
 North China Marines, 731–733, 750–752, 760
 Wake prisoners, 737–738, 738*n*, 750, 785
 Prisoner of War Camps
 American, 454
 German, 756–757
 Marlag-Milag Nord, 747
 Westertimke (Tarmstadt Oest), 747
 Japanese, 175, 439, 484, 492, 503, 547, 734, 737–739, 743–746, 748, 750, 753–754, 756, 760, 763–767, 769–770, 773–774, 778–781, 783, 785, 787–788
 Bicycle Camp, 740, 763–764
 Bilibid Prison, 743–744, 769, 775, 778
 Cabanatuan #1, 744, 769

Prisoner of War Camps—Continued

Japanese—Continued

Cabanatuan #2, 744

Cabanatuan #3, 744, 722

Davao, 769–770, 775

Formosa, 499

Hirohata, 761–762, 774

Hokkaido, 760, 785

Karenko, 768

Kiangwan, 753–758, 760

Mukden, 769

Omori Camp 8, 745, 784

Osaka Camp 1, 760–762, 779

Puerto Princesa, 772

Santo Tomas, 778

Tarlac, 744

Woosung, 751

5 Kilometer, 760

25 Kilometer, 766

26 Kilometer, 766

30 Kilometer, 767

40 Kilometer, 766

100 Kilometer, 768

Prisoner of War

escapes, escapees, 731, 749, 752*n*, 755–756, 758–759, 766, 770–771, 774, 779

evacuation, 490, 786

rescue, 427, 484*n*, 767, 779, 781

guards, 579, 648–649, 740, 757–759, 762, 765–767, 769, 773, 775–776, 779, 787

Japanese, 104, 121, 132, 296, 398, 323–324, 357, 357*n*, 360*n*, 361, 361*n*, 368–369, 676, 788Propaganda, 107, 121, 256, 338, 357*n*, 543

Prospective CG, Occupation Forces Truk & Central Carolines, 455

Prospective Island Commander, Truk, 455

Provisional Government of the French Republic, 439

Provost Marshal General of the Army, 750

Psychological warfare, 338, 357, 361

Puerto Princesa, 741, 772–774

Puget Sound, 429

Puluwat, 455

Pusan, 760

Putnam, Maj Paul A., 738; BGen, 737*n*Pyle, Ernie, 169*n*Quantico, Va., 441, 446, 606, 655, 680–681, 689–690, 699, 705, 712, 716, 723. *See also* Marine Corps Schools.

Quartermaster Department, HQMC, 678

Quebec Conference, 9, 400

Quincy, 479*n*

Qui Nhon, 20

Quonset huts, 591, 591*n*Rabaul, 659*n*, 665, 676, 715–716, 718, 745, 781Radar, 61, 89, 99, 118, 140, 141*n*, 182–184, 186, 208, 223, 226, 228, 232, 274, 345, 381, 424, 657, 668

Radio Tokyo, 157, 434

Radio towers, 284, 296

Raider battalions, 660, 694, 698–699, 705, 707–710, 710*n*, 711. *See also* Marine units.

Railroads, 203, 231–232, 249, 259, 296, 300, 522, 539, 541–542, 547–548, 551, 565–566, 574, 577, 585–586, 588, 590–591, 599–600, 602, 617, 649, 766, 768

Railway guards, 567–568, 575–576, 580, 582–584, 586, 588–591, 591*n*, 609, 614–618, 635RAMPS (Recovered Allied Military Personnel), 484, 488, 490, 492, 496, 779, 781, 786, 789. *See also* Prisoners of War.*Randolph*, 479*n*

Rangoon, 766

Rations. *See* Supplies and Equipment.

Rawlings, VAdm Sir H. Bernard, 60, 100, 479

Reconnaissance activities, 80, 85, 100, 102, 104, 106, 118, 126, 130, 132, 135, 164, 201, 219, 234, 273, 280, 298, 329, 710. *See also* Patrols.

Reconnaissance units

American, 91, 126, 127*n*, 135, 140, 276, 299, 302, 467, 505, 558, 628, 694. *See also* Army units; Marine units.

Japanese, 44

Red Cross, 583, 583*n*, 753, 757, 772. *See also* International Red Cross.Reef formations, 67, 234, 241. *See also* Coral Formations.Rehearsals, 89, 90–91, 93, 389, 719. *See also* Training.Reifsnider, RAdm Lawrence F., 60, 91, 166, 348; VAdm, 152*n*

Reinforcements

American, 231, 271, 339, 364, 481

Japanese, 20

Rendova, 642–643

Repatriation activities, 450, 452, 456, 461, 463, 499–500, 502, 505, 512, 514, 517–518, 533, 561, 565, 568, 571–572, 574, 576–577, 579–

- Repatriation activities—Continued
 582, 584–585, 593, 595–597, 600, 607–608,
 648, 732–733, 734*n*, 775, 786
- Replacements
 American, 24, 27, 85–86, 88, 90, 149*n*, 160,
 219, 237, 281–282, 345, 369, 389–390, 398,
 409, 450, 468, 511, 517*n*, 615, 635, 680, 682–
 684
 Japanese, 20, 220
- Repose*, 645
- Republic of China, 434, 436, 439, 525–526, 594.
See also Chinese Central Government.
- Reusser, Capt Kenneth L., 225
- Revolutionary Army, 525–526
- Rhone Valley, 746
- Richardson, LtGen Robert C., Jr., 354*n*
- Rineer, Capt Francis D., 220*n*
- Risler, Sgt Jack R., 746–747
- Rivers, 68, 219, 222, 235, 271, 273, 275*n*,
 284, 299, 323, 329, 332, 539, 551, 599, 709
- Rixey, Col Presley M., 450, 460–462; BGen,
 461*n*
- Roads, 36, 72, 86*n*, 87, 122–123, 126, 129, 134–
 135, 139, 142, 144, 149*n*, 155, 158, 160,
 169, 171, 203, 221–222, 242*n*, 268–271, 274,
 278, 282, 288–289, 304, 308, 310, 316, 325–
 326, 331, 333, 338, 346, 379, 536–537, 577,
 599
- Robb, LtCol William O., 139
- Roberts, Maj Edwin S., Jr., 416
- Roberts, Col Harold C., 253, 253*n*, 316, 353,
 356
- Robertson, Walter S., 594
- Robinson, BGen Ray A., 501–502
- Rockaway, N.Y. 712
- Rockey, MajGen Keller E., 24, 55, 397*n*, 534–
 536, 544–546, 550–553, 557–559, 561, 563,
 563*n*, 565, 569–571, 573–574, 576, 578–579,
 582–583, 586, 589, 589*n*, 600, 601*n*, 604–
 606, 608, 613, 616, 618, 622, 649; LtGen
 57*n*, 529*n*, 534*n*, 535*n*, 547*n*, 552*n*, 553*n*,
 559*n*, 569*n*, 583*n*, 597*n*, 616*n*, 622*n*
- Rogers, Col Ford O., 25; BGen, 450, 453, 452*n*;
 MajGen, 61*n*, 427*n*, 452*n*, 453*n*
- Rogers, BGen William W., 508*n*; MajGen,
 493*n*, 500*n*, 506*n*
- Roi-Namur, 95, 95*n*, 242*n*, 713, 721–722
- Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 3, 8–9, 12,
 141, 400–402, 403*n*, 431, 431*n*, 528–529,
 531, 698, 707–708, 713, 779
- Roosevelt, Maj James, 709–710
- Ross, LtCol Richard F., Jr., 220*n*, 265, 295,
 326–327
- Rota, 428, 454–455
- Roth, Maj Martin C., 116; LtCol, 202*n*
- Rowell, MajGen Ross E., 412
- Royal Marines, 439, 479, 487, 749. *See also*
 British forces.
- Rubber pontoons, 307
- Rupertus, MajGen William H., 720, 723, 723*n*
- Russell Islands, 24, 74, 391, 412, 710
- Russia. *See* Soviet Union; Union of Soviet
 Socialist Republics.
- Russian Concession, 556
- Russo-Japanese War, 41, 531
- Ryukyu Islands, 7, 9, 11*n*, 12–13, 17, 21–22,
 31–32, 34, 37–40, 57–58, 64, 76, 93, 96–99,
 177–178, 225*n*, 280, 347, 371–372, 378,
 393, 402, 418, 430, 452, 462, 499
- Ryukyus Area Command, 369, 373
 TAF, Ryukyus Command, 372–373
- Sabol, LtCol Stephen V., 117, 173*n*, 263, 265*n*
- Sabotage, 172, 176, 559, 764–766
- Saddle & Parker Island groups, 428
- Saga, 493*n*, 500, 502, 512, 514
- Saga Prefecture, 502, 505, 512
- Sagami Wan, 438, 483, 488
- Saidor, 4
- Saigon, 416, 767–768
- Saipan, 4, 7, 7*n*, 16–18, 23–24, 48, 67, 70, 70*n*,
 71–72, 84, 86, 90, 94–95, 95*n*, 96, 122, 195,
 240, 242*n*, 347–348, 376*n*, 393, 397, 411–
 412, 428, 441, 461, 464, 493, 496, 560, 674–
 675, 683, 714, 721–723, 734, 745
 operation, 88, 729
- Sakaibara, RAdm Shigematsu, 457, 459, 738
- Sackett, Maj Paul F., 120
- Sakhalin, 531
- Sakishima Gunto, 34, 97, 100, 197, 371, 398,
 416, 427
- Salerno Bay, 429
- Salerno, Italy, 669
- Salzman, Col Elmer H., 550
- Samar, 5
- Samoa, 708, 712
- Samurai, 338*n*, 356, 367, 370, 581, 788
- Sanderson, BGen Lawson H. M., 457, 606, 615
- San Diego, 483–484, 487
- San Diego, Calif., 26, 414, 427–428, 442, 512,
 512*n*, 628, 648, 680–682, 706, 709, 714
- Sandino, Augusto, 697

- San Fernando, La Unio, 777
 San Fernando, Pampanga, 777
 San Francisco, 6, 12, 518*n*
Sangamon, 208
San Jacinto, 479*n*
San Juan, 484
 San Pedro, Calif., 647
 San Pedro, Bay, Calif., 8
 Santa Barbara, Calif., 415, 429*n*
 Santa Cruz Islands, 659*n*
Santa Fe, 94, 98
 Santee, Calif., 680
 Santiago, 653
 Santo Domingo, 654
 Sasebo, Japan, 493, 493*n*, 495-496, 499-500, 500*n*, 501-503, 505, 505*n*, 506-507, 508*n*, 509, 512, 514, 517
 Naval Air Station, 503*n*
 Sashiki, 293
 Satsudo, 32
 Savo Island, 708
 Savory, Frederick Arthur, 461
 Savory, Nathaniel, 461
 SCAJAP (Shipping Control Administration, Japan), 596, 607
 Scaling operations, 85
 SCAP General Order, No. 1, 436-437
 Scheme of maneuver, 67-68, 314, 330
 Schick, BGen Lawrence E., 63, 365
 Schilt, BGen Christian F., 453
 Schmidt, MajGen Harry, 24, 398-399, 408, 493, 496, 512, 699
 Schneider, SSgt Loren O., 733
 Schneider, Col Merlin F., 112, 115, 175, 249, 253*n*
 Schofield Barracks, 66
 Scouts, 118, 140, 162, 164, 167, 173, 272, 275-276, 283, 299, 692. *See also* Patrols; Reconnaissance activities.
 Scout-snipers, 694
 Seabees. *See* Navy units.
 Seattle, Washington, 390
 Seawalls, 112, 222, 302, 307-308, 315, 332
 Sechibara, 501
 Secretary of State, 620
 Secretary of the Navy, 3, 394, 410, 442, 447, 615, 622, 653, 688, 725
 Segi Point, 711
 Seitetsu Steel Mills, 736
 Senaga Shima, 311, 323
 Sendai, 404, 406, 408
 Senior Officer Present Afloat, 99*n*, 241
 Senzaki, 499, 502, 514
 Seoul, 437, 534
 Serang, 739-740, 763
 Service and supply activities. *See also* Army units; Logistics; Marine units; Supply and Equipment.
 American, 11, 24, 74, 84, 160, 210, 242*n*, 467, 550, 598-599, 616, 621, 624, 636, 657, 692, 692*n*, 693, 695
 Japanese, 46, 53, 116, 120-121, 220, 251, 542
 Sesoko Island, 173, 388*n*
 Settle, Radm Thomas G. W., 558-559
 SEXTANT, 3-4, 7, 9, 400
 Shana Wan, 140
 Shanghai, 32, 399, 428, 526, 530, 533-534, 539-541, 543, 545, 552, 561, 566, 572, 574, 576, 582-583, 585, 595, 597, 609, 618, 621-622, 624, 629-630, 640-642, 644-645, 647, 675, 698, 731, 733-734, 738, 740, 750, 752*n*, 754-755, 757-758, 778
 Shanhaikuan, 570-571, 584
 Shansi, 542
 Shantung, 537, 541-542, 544-545, 547, 560-561, 564, 574-575, 577-578, 582, 584-585, 593, 596, 598, 60, 608, 631-632, 636, 639, 647, 759
 Peninsula, 522, 530, 540-541, 546, 564, 577, 630
 Province, 522, 759
 University, 563
 Shapley, LtCol Alan, 711; Col, 112, 115, 118, 129, 134-135, 144-145, 174-176, 254, 275, 280, 283, 302, 306, 309, 311, 314, 356, 360
 Shawnee, Okla., 713
 Sheetz, BGen Josef R., 189, 189*n*, 194
 Shelburne, LtCol Charles W., 112, 286
 Shensi City, 632
 Shepherd, MajGen Lemuel C., Jr., 24, 60, 88, 115, 117, 120, 126, 129, 135, 138, 140, 142, 142*n*, 144, 154-155, 169, 173, 173*n*, 214, 218, 234-236, 247, 252, 256, 273, 275, 283, 297, 299-300, 302, 314, 320, 323-324, 330, 344, 350, 356, 361, 363, 386, 391, 397, 476, 559-561, 561*n*, 563-565, 575-577, 579, 581, 581*n*, 584, 607; Gen, 24*n*, 68, 115, 136*n*, 152*n*, 223*n*, 245*n*
 Sherman, RAdm Forrest P., 8, 12, 196, 412, 534
 Shibushi, 408
 Shichina, 274, 284, 297, 299

Shigemitsu, Foreign Minister Mamouri, 439
 Shikoku, 31*n*, 95, 407, 418, 431, 492, 734, 783
 Shimajiri, 50
 Shimizu, 503
 Shimonoseki, 5, 493, 499, 502
 Shimonoseki-Moji Occupation Group, 502
 Shinagawa, 781
 Shindawaku, 325–326, 328, 331, 342
 Shinzato, 281, 293
 Shipping losses
 American, 100, 179, 208
 Japanese, 15–17
 Ships. *See also* Landing Craft.
 American, 13, 21, 46, 57, 64, 70–74, 76–77,
 81, 83, 93–95, 97, 99–100, 104, 109, 135–
 136, 162, 162*n*, 177–178, 180, 186, 210,
 224, 240, 240*n*, 382, 450, 462–463, 479,
 532–534, 560–561, 569–570, 575, 596–
 597, 600, 607, 657, 662, 664–665, 667,
 669, 716
 ammunition ships, 250
 amphibious command ships, 164, 166, 447–
 448, 561, 648, 657, 669–670
 battleships, 16, 94, 104, 111, 192–193, 209,
 211, 305, 384, 467, 476, 479, 479*n*, 674
 cargo vessels, 72, 95, 123, 158, 162, 180*n*,
 478, 551, 582, 640
 carriers, 16, 26–27, 91, 94, 97–98, 100, 128,
 178, 406, 410–419, 421–422, 424, 426–
 427, 467, 476, 479, 479*n*, 674
 cruisers, 16, 94, 98, 104, 111, 192–193, 209,
 305, 384, 467, 479, 479*n*, 483, 496, 534,
 647–648
 destroyer escorts, 225, 427, 454, 479*n*, 552,
 560
 destroyer minesweepers, 99
 destroyers, 99, 104, 111, 192–193, 208–209,
 224, 228–229, 305, 384, 483, 495–496,
 534, 672
 destroyer transports, 99, 106, 162, 164,
 167, 228, 488, 493, 495, 640, 781
 escort carriers, 26, 95, 177, 411, 414–415,
 422–428, 428*n*, 441, 448, 468, 642, 657,
 672
 hospital ships, 73, 73*n*, 243, 668, 729, 781,
 786
 Liberty ships, 493, 596
 LSDs (landing ships, dock), 111, 478
 LSMs (Landing ships, medium), 72, 93,
 104*n*, 114, 208, 228, 493, 551–553, 555,
 628, 647

Ships—Continued

American—Continued

LSTs (Landing Ships, Tank), 72–73, 93–
 94, 96, 104, 111, 114, 114*n*, 158–159, 162,
 166, 169, 180*n*, 239–241, 272, 390, 450,
 463, 478, 493, 500, 507, 552, 558, 560,
 578, 580, 583–584, 596–597, 603, 607,
 657, 668, 729
 LST(H)s (Hospital Landing Ships), 73,
 158, 729
 LSVs (Landing Ships, Vehicle), 478
 minelayers, 208
 minesweepers, 60, 98, 102*n*, 104, 162, 208,
 406, 428, 483, 492, 534, 656
 patrol craft, 60, 179, 211, 233–234, 553
 radar pickets, 99, 177, 179, 181, 186, 208*n*,
 224, 348, 484
 repair ships, 668
 submarines, 21, 41, 43, 58, 80, 97, 180,
 709–710, 744, 765, 771, 774, 778
 tenders, 643
 transports, 21, 60, 70–72, 93–96, 103, 109,
 123, 157, 162, 179–180, 196, 239, 243,
 347, 390–391, 438, 444, 447–448, 467,
 478–479, 479*n*, 484, 488, 493, 495–496,
 506, 512, 517, 535, 545, 551–553, 556, 558,
 560, 563, 579, 585, 640, 647, 656–657,
 662, 666, 684, 728
 tugs, 545
 Japanese, 20–21, 53, 58, 64, 94, 97, 107, 180,
 400, 450, 484, 580, 596, 739, 741
 battleships, 180
 cargo vessels, 97, 776
 carriers, 16, 22
 cruisers, 776
 destroyers, 22, 776
 merchant ships, 20, 463, 580, 584, 596
 minesweepers, 483, 508
 motor torpedo boats, 56, 100
 submarines, 56, 63–64, 76, 81, 107, 745
 suicide boats, 53, 102
 tankers, 463
 transports, 97, 463, 739–740, 768–769
 Ship-to-shore movement, 159, 728
 Shisler, LtCol Clair W., 275, 296, 316
 Shoals, 106*n*
 Shofner, Capt Austin C., 770–772; LtCol, 220*n*,
 326, 327*n*, 328, 333
 Sho-Go operations, 18
 Shore fire control parties, 375*n*, 670, 673. *See*
 also Air activities; Naval gunfire.

- Shore party activities. *See also* Beach party activities. 27, 112*n*, 157–160, 160*n*, 184, 240–241, 389, 478*n*, 548, 637, 663–664, 670, 683, 728
- Shore-to-shore operations, 12, 69, 304–305
- Short, Commo Edwin T., 560–561, 563
- Shuri, 36, 38, 40, 49–51, 54–55, 169, 188–190, 194–196, 205, 211–212, 216*n*, 220, 231–234, 238, 240–241, 244, 247, 250, 252–254, 256–257, 263–270, 272, 274, 276–278, 280–282, 286–289, 292–293, 293*n*, 297–298, 300, 325, 327, 331, 350, 388, 393
- Castle, 206, 264, 284, 286–287, 293, 295, 427
- defense systems, 54, 192, 198, 205, 214, 219, 230, 232, 236–237, 244, 261, 268, 288–290, 293, 384–393. *See also* Defenses.
- Shutts, Sgt Kenneth A., 128*n*
- Siberia, 530, 541, 608
- Silver Star, 729. *See also* Awards and decorations.
- Silverthorn, Col Merwin H., 66, 66*n*; BGen, 83*n*, 397*n*; LtGen, 354*n*, 363*n*
- Simpson, Commo Rodger W., 781
- Singapore, 439, 764, 767–765, 786
- Sino-Japanese War, 34, 522, 708
- Siskin, Chaplain Edgar E., 727
- Sitkoh Bay, 95
- Smith, Maj Bernard L., 712
- Smith, LtCol Harry O., Jr., 183
- Smith, MajGen Holland M., 656, 664; LtGen 23, 197*n*, 397*n*, 412*n*; Gen, 24*n*, 411, 657, 661, 674, 721
- Smith, 1stSgt Nathan A., 733
- Smith, BGen Oliver P., 62, 155, 155*n*, 175*n*, 365, 468; Gen, 62, 66–67, 84*n*, 85, 90, 175*n*, 259*n*, 271*n*, 353, 680*n*
- Smoke screens
- American, 111–112, 179, 182, 201–203, 221–222, 236–238, 248, 259, 314, 332, 339, 341, 354, 358, 362
- Japanese, 341, 374
- Snedeker, Col Edward W., 112, 116, 127, 127*n*, 130, 220, 236, 238, 259, 262, 299, 337, 337*n*, 338; BGen, 120*n*, 127*n*, 130*n*, 132*n*, 329*n*, 332*n*, 340*n*; LtGen, 36*n*, 339*n*, 351*n*
- Sobe, 116, 125, 208
- Soerabaja, 763*n*
- Soida, 508*n*
- Solomon Islands, 4, 67, 74, 84*n*, 93, 129, 410–411, 659*n*, 665, 667, 690, 711, 716, 718, 763
- South China, 11, 84, 97, 522, 524, 526–527, 534–535, 544, 603, 644
- South China Sea, 18, 416
- South Dakota, 479*n*
- Southeast Asia, 3*n*, 31, 779
- Southeast Asia Command, 354
- Southern Attack Force, 60, 93, 108
- Southern Landing Force, 85, 96
- Southern Marianas, 6, 8
- Southern Tractor Flotilla, 96
- South Field, 599, 624
- South Korea, 530, 534
- South Pacific, 4, 71, 84–85, 87, 180*n*, 331, 412, 659, 665–666, 710, 729
- South Pacific Combat Air Transport Command, 25. *See also* MAG-25, Marine Air Units.
- South Seas Government, 455
- South Siak River, 768
- Southwest Pacific, 5, 20, 60, 71, 429
- Southwest Pacific Area, 3*n*, 9, 12, 401, 430, 659, 703, 720
- Soviet Far East General Army, 530
- Soviet occupation, 569, 571, 584, 604
- Soviet Union, 431, 434, 436, 525, 531, 569, 584, 603, 632–633. *See also* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
- Spaatz, Gen Carl A., 430, 433, 436
- Spaniards, 455
- Spanish-American War, 503, 653
- Special Operations Executive, 746*n*
- Special Weapons Battalion, 692–693, 702. *See also* Marine units.
- Special Weapons Group, 689. *See also* Marine units.
- Speckman, LtCol Peter J., 183*n*
- Springfield, 479*n*
- Spruance, Adm Raymond A., 6, 11, 16, 24, 57–58, 97, 100, 226, 242, 280, 404, 406, 416, 419, 421, 492, 493*n*, 509, 658, 661, 674
- Spurlock, Maj Lyman D., 699; LtCol 456
- Staging areas, 24, 67, 92–93, 662, 707
- Stalin, Marshal Josef, 399, 431, 431*n*, 432, 434, 530–531
- Star Spangled Banner, 759
- State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 433
- St. Cezaire, 748
- Steman, Col Louis H., 426*n*
- Stent, Col Howard N., 454
- Stewart, PFC Charles, Jr., 754–755
- Stilwell, LtGen Joseph W., 368–369, 373*n*, 393, 430, 528–529, 529*n*, 533; Gen, 354, 786

- Stimson, Secretary of War Henry L., 432
St. Louis, 521
 St. Nicholas Point, 739, 763*n*
 Stockades, 118, 121–122, 172, 333, 361, 380.
 See also Prisoner of War Camps.
 Stockholm, 434, 436
 Stolley, MSgt Fred, 765
 Story, Cpl Jerold, 752*n*, 754–755
St. Paul, 647
 Straits of Malacca, 768
 Straits of Shimonoseki, 501
 Strategy
 American, 5–9, 11, 17, 70, 399
 Japanese, 13–14, 17, 206
 Stratemeyer, Gen George C., 535, 555–556, 559, 569
 Stretcher bearers, 150, 287, 329, 365*n*. *See also* Medical activities.
 Strike Command, Commander Air Solomons, 410
 St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, 448
 Stuart, LtCol Arthur J., 114, 703*n*
 Stuart, Ambassador John Leighton, 639–641
 Subic Bay, 740, 776
 Sugar Loaf Hill, 237–238, 244–245, 247–252, 254, 266, 269–270, 725
 Sugawara, LtGen Michio, 178*n*
 Sulu Sea, 773
 Sumatra, 3*n*, 786
 Sumay, Guam, 734
 Sunabe, 50
 Sunda Straits, 740
 Sun Yat-sen, 524–526
 Supplies and equipment. *See also* Ammunition; Logistics; Shore Party Activities.
 American, 65, 65*n*, 70–76, 90, 103, 118, 122–123, 128, 130–132, 134–135, 141, 149*n*, 150, 152, 157, 159, 160*n*, 166, 171, 172*n*, 180*n*, 231, 234–235, 237, 240–242, 256, 261, 270–275, 277, 282, 293, 295, 297, 302–304, 309, 342, 382, 391–392, 481, 512, 528, 551, 553, 555, 560, 565, 567, 602, 640, 654, 657, 663–664, 678, 723, 762
 ammunition, 150, 192, 240, 242, 250, 267, 293, 295, 297, 579*n*, 625
 aviation, 74–75, 705
 barge cranes, 157–158, 241
 belts, 697
 bridging material, 219
 cargo, 73, 95, 104, 122, 158–159, 162*n*, 240, 240*n*, 390, 550–551, 555, 558, 560, 576
 Supplies and equipment—Continued
 American—Continued
 cargo parachutes, 329, 374, 783, 785
 cargo slings, 489
 clothing, 75, 551–552, 576, 601
 communications, 595, 705
 construction, 157, 166, 318
 dumps and storage, 74, 144, 149*n*, 157–158, 160, 172, 175, 180*n*, 184, 192, 208, 240–241, 256, 271–272, 325, 331, 379, 541, 551, 567, 576, 618, 625, 627, 664
 early-warning equipment, 208
 electronic, 226
 equipment, 72–76, 111, 136, 557, 479, 551, 583, 657, 678
 explosives, 102, 218, 296, 701, 720, 724
 food and rations, 74, 86*n*, 128, 130, 196, 234, 262, 275, 293, 295, 295*n*, 304, 326, 330–331, 339, 342, 344, 551, 553, 555, 591, 601, 742, 761–762, 769, 775
 fuel and lubricants, 74–75, 103, 158*n*, 228, 241, 379, 419, 426, 541, 551, 555, 565, 606, 703, 716
 gas masks, 697
 heavy equipment, 551
 helmets, 697
 maintenance, 65*n*
 medical, 234, 275, 293, 331*n*, 339, 769, 777
 ordnance, 705
 sound-ranging equipment, 185*n*
 spare parts, 716
 stretchers, 150
 T-6 flotation equipment, 111*n*, 114
 water, 74, 128, 149*n*, 150–151, 172, 175, 234, 293, 295, 297, 331*n*, 742
 Japanese
 ammunition, 152, 288–289, 557, 581, 632
 clothing, 152
 dumps, 139, 152, 174, 193, 231, 251, 503, 710, 744
 equipment, 139, 152, 312, 557, 581, 596
 food and rations, 152, 709, 743, 763
 fuel and lubricants, 51, 65
 medical, 289
 ordnance, 151
 signal, 511
 supplies, 53, 65, 98, 139, 289, 312, 557, 596
 Support Air Direction net, 383, 671
 Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), 393, 436, 439, 488, 490, 492–493, 497–498, 500, 506, 508, 786. *See also* Gen MacArthur.

Surf, 91, 109, 164
 Suzuki, MajGen Shigeji, 43, 289
 Swatow, 416
 Swedish Government, 436
 Swedish Legation, 781
 Swedish Minister, 434
 Swiss Consulate, 753
 Swiss diplomatic channels, 732, 755
 Swiss government, 436, 732–733, 739*n*
 Swiss Legation, 781
 Swiss nationals, 503
Swordfish, 80
 Szechwan Province, 528
 Tables of Allowance (T/A), 478
 Tables of Equipment, Marine Corps, 692, 696, 701–702
 Tables of Organization, Marine Corps, 470, 478, 635, 663–664, 689, 691–692, 693*n*, 694–696, 698, 711
 D-Series, 693, 695, 702, 717
 E-Series, 693, 695–696, 698, 704
 F-Series, 467, 693–696, 698, 702, 704
 G-Series, 353*n*, 384, 467–468, 598, 693–696, 702, 714
 Air, 606, 717
 Ground, 444, 635, 688–689, 691, 695–696, 700
 Tachibana, LtGen Yosio, 460–462
 Tactics
 American
 airborne operation, 484
 amphibious raid, 65, 97, 706, 709–710, 744, 772
 armor, engineer, and infantry teamwork, 264
 armor, infantry, and artillery cooperation, 86, 131, 335, 721
 assault demolition teams, 218, 222, 256*n*, 265, 315, 364, 721, 723–724
 assault of a fortified position, 724
 base of fire, 697, 701
 bayonet assault, 312
 chemical warfare, 663
 “contact imminent,” 719
 converging attack, 234
 coordinated attack, 298–299
 “corkscrew and blowtorch,” 218, 364, 384, 724
 counterbattery fire, 68, 214, 216, 308, 343
 counterguerrilla operations, 175, 697

Tactics—Continued

American—Continued

 diversion, 51*n*, 97
 double envelopment, 196, 253, 287, 310
 engineer-infantry teams, 386
 feint landing, 64, 67, 90, 107, 109, 259, 347
 fire and maneuver, 142, 199, 329
 flanking maneuver, 236
 frontal attack, 146
 harassing and interdiction fire, 68, 189*n*, 216, 218*n*, 277–278
 infiltration, 332
 jungle warfare, 697–698, 700, 718–720
 mopping up, 85, 155, 199*n*, 210, 231, 247, 344, 362
 night attacks, 86, 190, 267, 269, 271, 337, 337*n*, 338, 341, 387–388, 388*n*
 penetration, 199, 201, 219, 256, 268, 290, 358
 search-and-kill missions, 718
 skirmish line, 171, 323
 sniping, 320
 supporting arms coordination, 68, 86*n*, 144, 151, 182, 238, 249, 259, 261, 265, 267, 286, 330, 335, 344, 351–352, 384, 386, 669, 673, 719, 721–722, 724–726
 tank-infantry assault, 132, 141, 217, 235–236, 239, 247, 249, 251, 261, 264–265, 268, 270, 288, 299, 306, 312, 320, 333, 337, 345, 354, 362, 364, 386–388, 718, 721–723, 725–726

Japanese

 airborne attack, 81, 87, 126, 274
 ambush, 125, 138*n*, 142, 145, 171, 174
 banzai attack, 118, 151, 245, 393
 bayonet charge, 250
 cave warfare, 393, 695
 counterattack, 80–81, 98, 150, 197, 204, 206–207, 210, 212–213, 220–221, 230, 234, 238–239, 244–245, 247–248, 250, 252, 252*n*, 254, 254*n*, 265, 270, 272, 274, 276–277, 300, 309, 320, 335, 339, 343, 345–347, 352, 356, 393
 counterbattery fire, 142
 counterlanding, 207, 209, 234
 delaying, 18, 54–55, 146, 207
 envelopment, 207, 210
 guerrillas, 47, 86, 121, 148, 169, 171–175
 hit-and-run attack, 100, 172
 infiltration, 117, 125–126, 130, 146, 148*n*, 171, 174, 197–198, 202, 207, 210, 221,

Tactics—Continued

Japanese—Continued

infiltration—Continued

232, 236, 239*n*, 252, 277, 282, 303, 308,
321, 335, 341, 347, 356, 360

jungle warfare, 675, 719

mopping up, 23

night attack, 121, 139, 235

penetration, 238, 254

raid, 100, 419

sniping, 115, 121, 125, 172, 220, 231, 234,
236–237, 260, 263, 276, 296–297, 308,
328–329, 340–341, 344, 346, 356, 358,
362

suicide attack, 21–22, 100, 179, 194, 222,
380

supporting arms, 44

withdrawal, 121, 152, 290

Tahara, Mr., 774–775

Taian, 577

Taira, 173–174, 176

Taiwan, 197

Takabanare Shima, 164, 388*n*

Takagi, RAdm Sokichi, 15

Takamotoji, 248

Takanyuta, 329

Takao, 777

Takasu, 507

Takeo, 501

Taku, 533–534

Taku Bar, 539, 545, 552, 621

Talienwan, 522

Tanabaru, 206

Tanambogo, 708

Tanega Shima, 407

Tangku, 535, 539, 541–542, 548, 550–551, 553,
555, 558, 560, 566–568, 575, 584–585, 590,
592, 597–599, 617–619, 622, 625, 628, 641,
670

Tangshan, 547–548, 556, 568, 575, 585–586,
590–591, 599, 602

Tarawa, 27, 55, 242*n*, 410–411, 450, 460, 500*n*,
658, 661, 666–667, 669, 670, 672–674, 720–
722

Tarawa, 621

Target information centers, 102, 103*n*, 382–
383, 670

Tartar City, 540

Tasimboko, 686, 709

Task Organizations. *See also* Army units;
Marine units; Navy units.

Central Pacific Task Forces, 4, 6, 57, 109

TF 31, 229*n*, 370, 372, 438, 476, 479, 481,
483–485, 487–488

TF 35, 438

TF 37, 431, 438

TF 38, 94, 96–97, 280, 416, 421, 431, 438–439

TF 40, 407

TF 50, 57–58, 63

TF 51, 58, 60, 80, 192, 229*n*, 242–243

TF 52, 56, 60, 69, 99, 99*n*, 102, 102*n*, 103,
192

TF 53, 60, 91, 93–94

TF 54, 60, 99*n*, 102

TF 55, 60

TF 56, 60, 354, 354*n*

TF 57, 60, 100

TF 58, 60, 97–100, 178–181, 185, 192, 280,
411, 415–418, 421

TF 59, 98

TF 71, 534

TF 72, 534, 561, 566

TF 78, 534

TF 79, 535

TF 95, 373

TF 96, 449, 450*n*

TF Able, 476, 478, 488

TG 30.2, 438

TG 30.6, 781

TG 31.2, 428

TG 31.3, 438

TG 35.9, 438

TG 51.1, 62

TG 51.2, 62, 90

TG 51.3, 62

TG 52.1, 69

TG 94.3, 450

TG 99.2, 373

TG Able, 534

TU 32.1.3, 427

TU 58.1, 97

TU 58.2, 97

TU 58.3, 97

Tateyama Naval Air Station, 488

Taxis, Col Samuel G., 507*n*, BGen, 507*n*

Taylor, 2dLt Walter W., 746–749

Teeters, Nathan Dan, 755

Tengan, 128

Tennessee, 152

Tenryu River, 765

- Tentative Landing Operations Manual*, 655, 663
- Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*, 655, 663*n*
- Tent Camp #1, New River, N.C., 680
- Tera, 300, 303, 325, 326*n*, 333, 335, 337, 339
- Terabaru, 126
- Terauchi, Field Marshall Count Hisaichi, 177*n*
- Terrain
- boulders, 112, 360
 - caves, 49, 116, 128, 148, 203, 247, 252*n*, 265, 288–290, 295–296, 307, 310, 312, 314–316, 321, 324, 346, 357, 361–362, 364, 367, 377
 - cliffs, 34, 36–37, 139, 158, 169, 201, 233, 288–289, 360–361, 704, 726
 - coastal plains, 233, 267
 - creek, 326
 - defiles, 134, 203
 - depressions, 244, 254
 - description, 32*n*, 34, 36, 49, 51, 69, 78–79, 86–87, 106, 112, 115–116, 118, 120*n*, 123, 126, 129–132, 134–135, 142, 145, 148, 149*n*, 151, 155, 167, 169, 171, 175, 197, 203–204, 238, 265, 270, 311, 337, 358, 386, 460, 697, 705, 720, 722–723, 725
 - draws, 118, 150, 205, 217, 221, 257, 259, 262, 264–265, 321, 726
 - escarpments, 204, 335, 337, 351, 351*n*
 - flatlands, 34, 323
 - gorges, 171, 259
 - hills, 34, 36–37, 49–50, 111, 116, 121, 128*n*, 131, 145, 148, 151, 172, 174, 197–198, 202, 204, 216–217, 231, 233, 250–253, 263, 265–266, 269, 271–272, 281, 284, 287–290, 297–299, 303, 306, 309–310, 312, 321, 324–325, 330, 333, 380, 537
 - isthmus, 34
 - jungles, 87–88, 697, 719–720, 767
 - marshes, 323, 537
 - mountains, 34, 130, 134–135, 138, 146, 162, 171, 174, 406, 537, 541, 546, 564, 603
 - mud flats, 537
 - peninsulas, 126, 135, 138, 154–155, 299–300, 302, 306, 311, 316
 - plateaus, 36, 166, 260–261, 306, 346
 - ridges, 50, 87, 126, 131, 144–146, 162, 171, 188, 194, 198–199, 202, 205, 216, 222, 232–233, 236, 248–249, 260–263, 265, 267–269, 273, 276, 286, 289–300, 304, 306, 310–312, 315–316, 318, 326, 328, 330, 332–333, 338–341, 343–345, 358, 360, 393, 709, 725
- Terrain—Continued
- river flats, 323
 - rivers, 201, 212, 276, 537
 - slopes, 114, 144, 146, 150, 204, 217, 232, 236–237, 248, 251, 253, 261–262, 266, 269, 271, 277, 282, 312, 337, 346, 356, 363, 393
 - soil, 34, 85, 106*n*, 158
 - streams, 34, 36, 116, 219, 257, 273, 330, 333, 537
 - swamps, 307, 719–720, 770–771
 - valleys and ravines, 36, 50, 118, 130, 136, 139, 145, 151, 201–203, 247–248, 250–251, 271–272, 274, 296, 310, 325–326, 335, 337–339, 345, 537, 577, 726
- Teton*, 92
- Thailand, 750, 767–768
- Thanbyuzayat, 766–767
- The North China Marine*, 583
- The Pinnacle, 343–344
- The Stars and Stripes*, 583
- Thomas, Col Gerald C., 690; BGen, 196, 412, 631, 635, 637–639, 643; Gen, 414*n*, 638*n*, 688*n*, 690*n*, 701*n*
- Ticonderoga*, 479*n*
- Tides, 112, 114, 157, 551
- Tientsin, 531, 533–536, 539, 541–544, 546–547, 550–552, 555*n*, 556–558, 563–564, 566, 568, 575*n*, 576–577, 583–585, 588, 590, 598–599, 602, 607–608, 610, 612–613, 615, 617–618, 622, 627–631, 637, 639, 641, 731, 733, 759
- Tientsin-Peiping road, 567
- Tientsin Race Club, 553*n*
- Tinian, 4, 71, 95*n*, 242*n*, 412, 674, 704, 704*n*, 722
- Tobaru, 125
- Toguchi, 139–141, 144, 146, 151–152
- Tojo, Gen Hideki, 15–17, 20
- Tokara, 34
- Tokashiki Shima, 106, 452
- Tokuyama Naval Base, 180
- Tokyo, 5, 14*n*, 16, 18, 21–22, 40, 97–98, 207, 321, 368, 400, 409, 416–418, 428*n*, 431, 434, 436, 439, 452, 475, 483, 485, 488, 490, 496, 498, 500*n*, 596, 673, 745, 760, 774, 781*n*, 783, 785–786
- Tokyo Bay, 438, 470, 479*n*, 481, 508, 781
- Tokyo Plain, 7, 9, 403. *See also* Kanto Plain.
- Toma, 308–309
- Tomb of the Unknowns, 730
- Tolman*, 56
- Tomigusuki, 47, 300, 318, 320–321
- Tominaga, LtGen Kyoji, 732

- Tomui, 298
 Tomusu, 290, 328
 Tonachi Shima, 99
 Tongking, 522
Topeka, 479*n*
 Tori Shima, 348, 381
 Torrey, Col Daniel W., Jr., 230*n*, 495
 Toshino, 776, 776*n*, 777
 Totsuka, VAdm, 484, 487*n*
 Tower, VAdm John H., 7-8, 412
 Townley, Capt Edward F., Jr., 407*n*
 Towns, 38, 120*n*, 139, 199
 Townshend, Sir Charles, 655
 Toyama, 303
Toya Maru, 43
 Toyoda, Adm Soemu, 178-179
 Trails, 126, 134-135, 171, 175, 325. *See also* roads.
 Training
 American, 23, 26-27, 83, 83*n*, 84-89, 92, 94, 195, 276, 281, 389, 398, 411, 423-425, 466-467, 579, 590, 592, 615, 623, 630, 635, 650, 654, 656, 663, 672, 679-684, 686-687, 689-690, 700, 705-707, 712, 718-721, 726
 Japanese, 46, 53, 120, 251
 Transfer lines, 91, 114, 116-117, 157
 Transport areas, 99, 104, 108, 111-112, 116, 158, 179, 184, 241, 665
 Transport quartermasters, 95-96, 391, 447, 467, 662, 664. *See also* Loading operations; Logistics Activities.
 Treasury Islands, 668
 Treaties, 521-522, 531, 569
 Trilling, Sgt Paul, 128*n*
 Truce agreement, 594-596, 601, 604, 608, 620
 Truce teams, 595, 601, 603-604, 610
 Truk, 4, 39, 444, 449-450, 454-457, 464, 468-745
 Truk Occupation Force, 450, 456, 460
 Truman, President Harry S., 400, 402-403, 431-434, 436, 498, 532, 572-574, 619-620, 632, 633*n*
 Tsangkou, 541, 566, 579-580, 623, 629, 636
 Tsangkou Field, 560, 563-564, 575-577, 600, 608, 616, 618, 623, 627, 638, 643
 Tsinan, 541-542, 565, 577, 579-580, 623, 639
 Tsingtao, 490, 522, 533-534, 536-537, 540-541, 544, 547, 559-561, 563-566, 568, 575-583, 592-593, 597-598, 600, 602, 604-608, 615-616, 622-623, 627-632, 635-640, 642-644, 647, 650
 Tsugen Shima, 162, 164, 166, 193, 388*n*
 Tsukasan, 40, 55, 290, 297-298, 303-304
 Tsuno, 404, 406, 408
 Tsuwa, 188, 207
 Tuberculosis, 754, 757
 Tulagi, 658, 659*n*, 706, 707*n*, 708
 Tu Li Ming, LtGen, 584, 586
 Turner, RAdm Richmond K., 659; VAdm, 6, 11, 58, 60, 62-64, 65*n*, 71, 73, 78*n*, 92, 103, 109, 118, 140, 158-160, 162, 166, 177, 180, 196, 209*n*, 225, 229*n*, 242, 348, 407, 660-661, 667*n*, 674
 Tutuila, 707*n*, 708
 Twining, Gen Merrill B., 430*n*
 Twining, LtGen Nathan F., 430, 430*n*
 Uchida, LtGen Ginnosuke, 542, 557
 Uchima, 199, 203, 219
 Uchitomari, 203
 Udo, Col Takesiko, 49, 55, 141, 148, 171, 362
 Uebaru, 188
 Uibaru, 314, 316, 320
 Ulithi Atoll, 4, 21-22, 60*n*, 65*n*, 70*n*, 71, 93-95, 97-98, 415-419, 421, 427, 450
 Umezu, Gen Yoshijiro, 439
 Unconditional surrender, 432
 UNION, 746
 UNION II, 747, 747*n*
 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. *See also* Soviet Union. 193, 399, 431, 434, 436, 439, 476, 522, 525-526, 528, 530, 533, 573, 769, 781
 United Kingdom, 434, 436, 439
 United Kingdom of the Netherlands, 439
 United Nations, 600, 633
 Charter, 572
 Relief & Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), 600-601, 612, 623
 United States, 19-20, 26, 39, 70-71, 78, 78*n*, 87-88, 434, 436, 439, 441, 443, 447-448, 468, 470, 490, 509, 512, 514, 517, 521-522, 524-528, 531-532, 537, 566, 572, 598, 600, 616, 633, 648, 653-654, 656, 658, 662, 665, 668, 675, 679-681, 706, 710, 714, 716, 729, 732-733, 739*n*, 746, 749, 755, 757, 759, 762-786
 aid programs, 528, 574
 Congress, 503, 523*n*, 592, 623*n*, 633, 657, 687
 Consulates, 636, 639
 Department of State, 573, 618, 622, 628, 631, 638, 645, 650, 733, 750, 755
 Personnel, 546-547, 597, 636, 639
 Economic missions, 528

- United States—Continued
 - Embassies, 544, 639–640
 - Foreign Policy, 532–533, 561, 573–574, 590, 648
 - Government, 573–574, 755
- U. S. Army, 3*n*, 74–76, 400–401, 407, 484, 497, 505, 509, 514, 517, 583, 591, 601, 607, 655, 667, 703, 712–713, 786. *See also* Army units.
- U. S. Army Forces, China, 604
- U. S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, 354*n*, 438, 783
- U. S. Coast Guard, 664
- U. S. Forces, China Theater, 533, 536, 545, 555, 557, 559, 568–569, 574, 596–597, 600, 603, 606. *See also* China Theater.
- U. S. Marine Corps, 12*n*, 23, 74, 365, 387, 411, 413, 442–444, 446–449, 466–468, 518, 544, 592, 598, 605, 635, 649, 653–654, 656–658, 662, 666, 670, 675–677, 679–681, 687–688, 691, 695, 697, 699, 701–702, 705, 707, 711–715, 726, 741, 746, 789. *See also* Marine units.
- Equipment Board, 606
- Programs
 - barrage balloon, 712
 - defense battalion, 688
 - demobilization, 442–443, 445, 450, 469–470, 499, 556, 571, 590–592, 615
 - escort carrier, 649
 - FMFPac base roll-up, 445
 - glider, 713
 - mobilization, 689
 - parachute, 707, 713
 - personnel procurement, 442, 445–446
 - postwar garrisons, 463
 - Women's Reserve, 23, 678
- U. S. Naval Station, Olongapo, 740
- U. S. Naval Training Center, Bainbridge, Md., 443
- U. S. Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Ill., 443
- U. S. Navy, 3*n*, 8, 63, 75, 78, 209, 382, 400–401, 411, 439, 460, 467, 484*n*, 490, 553, 591*n*, 622, 642, 647, 656–658, 660, 667, 707, 712. *See also* Navy units.
- Basic Post-War Plan No. 2, 446
- personnel, 24, 479, 507*n*, 552, 546, 600, 664, 670, 691, 726, 755
- V–12 College Program, 445–446
- U. S. Strategic Air Force in the Pacific, 430, 433
- U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, 684
- U. S. War Department, 13, 76, 351*n*, 354*n*, 655, 687
- Units of fire, 74, 579
- Unjo, 125
- Unloading activities, 63, 93, 111, 118, 122–123, 125, 135, 155, 157–160, 166, 241, 272, 556
- Unten-ko, 46, 56, 139, 142
- Uraga, 481, 489
- Uragashira, 499
- Uraga Strait, 483
- Urasoe-Mura escarpment, 194, 205, 211
- Ushijima, LtGen Mitsuru, 40–41, 43, 46–48, 50–51, 53–55, 97, 103, 107, 120, 177, 194, 205, 210–211, 213, 217*n*, 219–220, 247, 251, 257, 264, 270, 274, 278, 280–281, 284, 287–290, 292, 298, 321, 338, 338*n*, 340, 350–352, 356–357, 364, 367, 370, 386, 392–393, 675
- Vandegrift, MajGen Alexander A., 657–660; LtGen, 12*n*, 84*n*, 196, 412, 412*n*, 413–414, 414*n*, 422, 448; Gen, 570*n*, 589*n*, 592*n*, 605*n*, 606*n*, 615*n*, 621*n*, 622*n*, 624*n*, 656, 663, 664, 676, 686, 686*n*, 690, 691, 709
- Vegetation, 34–35, 38, 86, 135, 145, 166, 171, 307, 310, 360, 537, 719. *See also* Terrain features.
 - bamboo, 171
 - banana trees, 769
 - cereal grains, 537
 - citrus trees, 770
 - coconut groves, 86
 - kaoliang, 527, 539, 610
 - kunai grass, 88
 - palmetto, 307
 - papaya, 770
 - rice paddies, 38, 139, 204*n*, 323, 337, 346, 492, 502*n*, 527, 537
 - rubber trees, 764
 - sweet potatoes, 38, 455, 492
 - sugar cane, 38, 210, 323, 704
- V–E Day, 218, 767
- Vehicles
 - American, 74, 111–112, 123, 135, 174, 241, 270, 293, 325, 333, 551, 555, 560, 612, 625, 667, 693, 703, 705
 - ambulance jeeps, 335, 729
 - amphibian tractors, 90, 93, 104, 111–112, 114, 116–117, 123, 141, 157–158, 176,

Vehicles—Continued

- American—Continued
 - amphibian tractors—Continued
 - 241, 272, 275*n*, 302, 302*n*, 304–306, 309–310, 315, 330, 551, 667–669, 704, 723
 - amphibian trucks, 112, 114, 116, 157–158, 303, 305, 667–668
 - armored amphibian tractors, 86, 104, 111–112, 114, 140, 193, 209–210, 218*n*, 222, 235, 269, 302, 305, 324, 332, 360*n*, 384–385, 385*n*, 704
 - automobiles, 612, 742
 - bulldozers, 134, 325, 392, 551, 723
 - cargo carriers (Weasels), 123, 705
 - jeeps, 123, 259*n*, 353, 558, 586, 612–613, 625, 694, 727
 - prime movers, 123, 392
 - tractors, 112, 160, 325, 478, 742
 - trailers, 123, 169, 705
 - trucks, 123, 235, 372, 325, 346, 528, 612, 625, 664, 714, 742
- Japanese, 139, 277–278
 - trucks, 132, 230, 289, 545, 563
- Vella Lavella, 706
- Vella Gulf*, 426, 428
- Veterans Administration, 503
- V–J Day, 441, 445–446, 448–450, 682, 785
- Vladivostok, 522
- Vogel, MajGen Clayton B., 699, 707
- Volcano Islands, 14, 461
- Wachtler, Col Walter A., 66, 197
- Wada, MajGen Kosuke, 45, 289
- Wade, LtCol Sidney S., 66
- Wainwright, LtGen Jonathan M., 439, 744, 768
- Wakayama, 492, 786
- Wake Island, 450, 452, 455, 457, 459, 464, 464*n*, 690, 733, 737, 737*n*, 738, 755–756, 758, 786
- Waldorf, LtCol Harry A., 353
- Walker, Maj Anthony, 118, 135, 173, 275–276, 280*n*, 283, 299; LtCol, 136*n*
- Wallace, Col Clarence R., 347, 350, 353*n*, BGen, 500*n*
- Wallace, MajGen Fred C., 62, 160, 378–380
- Wallace, LtCol Ricard W., 123
- Wallace, BGen William J., 61, 95, 176–177, 181, 183, 226, 241
- Walsh, Capt Kenneth A., 371
- Walt, Col Lewis W., 723
- Wana, 203, 231, 234, 236, 238, 256–257, 262, 264, 266
- Wana Draw, 234, 236, 257, 258–263, 265–266, 281–282, 287, 293, 296–297
- Wana Ridge, 232, 238–239, 257, 259–266, 287, 726
- War Area Service Corps (WASC), 583
- War Crimes Commission, 464
- War crimes trials, 462, 745, 752, 775*n*, 787
- War crimes tribunals, 457
- War criminals, 456, 463–464, 498, 499, 752
- War Criminal Stockade, Guam, 464
- War Dogs, 25, 171, 360*n*, 695, 713–714
- Ward Road Gaol, 755
- Warm Springs, Ga., 708
- Warner, LtCol Jack F., 602
- War Plans Section, Div P&P, HQMC, 688
- Washburn, Maj Richard T., 364
- Washington, D. C., 5, 9, 13, 56, 431, 437, 448–449, 508, 532, 546, 555, 569, 571–572, 547, 604, 621, 623, 627*n*, 628, 633*n*, 641–642, 677–678, 706
- Wasp*, 26, 98, 416, 418–419, 479*n*
- Watanabe, LtGen Masao, 34–40
- Watson, MajGen Thomas E., 24, 62, 65–67, 90, 95, 195, 347
- Wavell, General Sir Archibald V., 3*n*
- Weapons
 - American, 74, 85, 479, 579, 590, 664, 695, 703–704, 720, 724. *See also* Ammunition; Army units; Marine units; Vehicles.
 - antiaircraft guns, 784*n*
 - assault guns, 217
 - automatic rifles, 697–698, 701
 - automatic weapons, 697
 - bangalore torpedoes, 724
 - bayonets, 267, 697, 721
 - bazookas, 286, 701–702, 723
 - BARs, 692*n*, 696–700, 724
 - carbines, 184, 696, 700
 - crew-served weapons, 235, 269, 282, 314, 364
 - 8-inch howitzers, 186*n*, 189, 193, 211, 249, 385, 385*n*, 386
 - 81mm mortars, 74*n*, 127, 140, 142, 204, 235, 259–260, 333, 341, 343, 387, 692*n*, 695
 - 11.75-inch rockets (Tiny Tims), 421, 715
 - .50 caliber machine guns, 74*n*, 177*n*, 184, 690
 - 5-inch guns, 104, 689
 - 5-inch rockets, 340, 348, 364*n*, 715
 - 57mm recoilless rifles, 351, 387

Weapons—Continued

American—Continued

flamethrowers, 231, 250, 253, 262–263, 258, 312, 361*n*, 386*n*, 667, 701–704, 704*n*, 720–721, 723–724

flamethrowing tanks, 201, 201*n*, 221, 260–261, 267, 320, 343, 351, 362–364, 384, 386*n*, 703, 705, 718, 722–723, 725

flat trajectory cannon, 201, 222

4.2-inch mortars, 112, 238, 259, 364, 387, 703

4.5-inch rocket, 714

14-inch rifles, 188

40mm guns, 672, 690

.45 caliber pistols, 184

grenades, 149–150, 217, 237, 244, 247, 251, 267, 296, 612, 725

grenade launchers, 191, 696, 696*n*, 697, 700

guns, 192, 274, 667

half-tracks, 236, 384, 384*n*, 695, 702

howitzers, 116, 192, 384, 387, 667

light tanks, 703–704, 722

Long Toms, 106

machine guns, 150, 184, 209, 228, 263, 267, 277, 590, 613, 619, 689, 692*n*, 695–696, 700, 720–721, 723

medium tanks, 111*n*, 201*n*, 235, 259, 262, 264–265, 267–268, 309, 312, 333, 339–340, 354, 358, 503*n*, 703, 705, 722, 725

mines, 627

mortars, 146, 201, 209, 216–217, 220, 248, 260, 263, 265, 277, 314, 339, 345, 384–385, 387, 586, 589–590, 613, 619

naval guns, 382

90mm guns, 183, 184*n*, 689–690, 692, 712

155mm guns, 24, 106, 186*n*, 189, 211, 385, 385*n*, 386, 689

155mm guns (self-propelled), 385

155mm howitzers, 74*n*, 167, 211, 320, 385, 385*n*, 386

105mm guns, 725

105mm howitzers, 74*n*, 114, 144, 167, 189, 194, 216*n*, 262, 267, 320, 355*n*, 613, 625, 629, 635, 668*n*, 692–694

105mm howitzers, self-propelled (M–7s), 218*n*, 257, 263–264, 305–306, 309, 311, 314, 318, 362, 384, 384*n*, 385, 385*n*, 695, 725

pole charges, 724, 724*n*

recoilless rifles, 351*n*, 387

rifles, 74*n*, 184, 696, 696*n*, 697–698, 700, 702, 724–725

Weapons—Continued

American—Continued

rocket launchers, 25, 104*n*, 154–155, 192, 217, 238, 264, 296, 305, 316, 343, 363, 413, 419, 426, 695, 714–715

7-inch guns, 689

75mm guns, 201*n*, 385*n*, 692*n*, 695, 703, 723

75mm howitzers, 86, 114, 189*n*, 193, 216*n*, 218, 218*n*, 267, 385, 385*n*, 689, 692, 694, 725

75mm recoilless rifles, 351*n*, 387

200mm guns, 690, 692*n*, 702

240mm howitzers, 385

2.36-inch bazookas, 387

16-inch mortars, 249

60mm mortars, 74*n*, 320*n*, 589–590, 692*n*, 695–696, 711

submachine guns, 696–698

tank dozers, 134, 306, 318, 340, 345, 360, 362, 723

tanks, 86*n*, 93, 111–112, 114–115, 120, 126, 131–132, 135, 158*n*, 190, 194, 199–201, 201*n*, 203, 204*n*, 214, 217, 218*n*, 221–222, 222*n*, 231–232, 235–238, 247–249, 251, 253, 256–257, 259–265, 267, 269, 271–272, 298, 302, 305–306, 308–310, 314–315, 316*n*, 318, 320, 324–325, 335, 337, 339–346, 353–354, 357–358, 360, 362–363, 384–385, 385*n*, 386, 386*n*, 409, 503, 551, 558, 579, 675, 703*n*, 704, 718, 721–725

37mm guns, 236, 264, 305, 308, 311–312, 318, 384*n*, 692*n*, 695, 696*n*, 703, 723

3-inch guns, 689

12-inch rifles, 175

20mm cannon, 177*n*

Japanese, 19, 45, 152, 289, 312, 557, 581, 720, 724

antiaircraft guns, 144, 374

antipersonnel land mines, 172

antitank guns, 194, 201, 236, 239, 248, 251, 260, 265, 337, 341, 354, 386

automatic weapons, 45, 232, 237, 248, 251, 308, 310, 312, 330

“Baka” bomb, 186

bamboo spears, 130

bayonets, 130, 221

booby traps, 134

cannon, 350

depth charges, 511

Weapons—Continued

Japanese—Continued

dual-purpose guns, 484
8-inch guns, 152, 324
8-inch rockets, 308
81mm mortars, 44, 45, 49, 54
field guns, 308
15cm guns, 50, 106, 186*n*
57mm guns, 45
flat-trajectory cannon, 282
14cm guns, 47
47mm antitank guns, 44–45, 49, 199, 231, 259, 296, 344
grenades, 128, 130, 146, 150, 172, 202, 207, 227–228, 232, 236–237, 248, 250, 260, 339, 341, 343
grenade launchers, 49, 120, 150*n*, 237, 251*n*, 262, 309
guns, 207, 407, 484
harbor mines, 506*n*
howitzers, 207
knee mortars, 150, 150*n*, 172
light tanks, 45
machine cannon, 45, 47, 304
machine guns, 44–46, 49, 54, 115, 117–118, 120, 126, 128–129, 131, 138–139, 142, 144–145, 148, 150, 162, 173, 188, 191, 193–194, 201–202, 204, 212, 221–222, 231, 234–236, 238, 239*n*, 244, 248–249, 251, 251*n*, 253, 260, 262–263, 265, 267, 273, 281, 284, 309, 335, 350, 393, 511, 723, 773
medium tanks, 45
mines, 64, 99–100, 102, 114, 125, 131, 134, 139, 154, 194, 203, 204*n*, 222*n*, 236, 265, 275*n*, 310–311, 318, 324, 344, 346, 511, 726
mortars, 44–45, 111, 114, 117–118, 126–128, 131, 139–140, 144–146, 148, 150–151, 162, 164, 173, 188, 193–194, 198, 201, 204, 207, 212, 221, 230–234, 236–238, 244–245, 248–252, 254, 256, 259–260, 263, 265, 267, 271, 275–276, 281, 284, 286, 309, 311, 341, 350–351, 383, 485
mountain guns, 148, 150
90mm mortars, 191
150mm guns, 451, 350
105mm howitzers, 45, 142, 247, 350
120mm guns, 47, 308
rifles, 120, 130, 138, 145–146, 150, 248, 251*n*, 262, 273, 773

Weapons—Continued

Japanese—Continued

rockets, 186
75mm guns, 44–45, 49, 142, 191, 316, 718
70mm howitzers, 44, 49
6-inch guns, 142, 142*n*, 308
smoke grenades, 254, 262, 276
tanks, 82, 206, 212, 278
torpedoes, 511
13mm anti-aircraft guns, 47, 54
37mm guns, 44
320mm spigot mortars, 45, 308
12cm guns, 47
20mm cannon, 45, 120, 127, 137, 142, 146, 151, 310–311, 692*n*
25mm anti-aircraft guns, 54
Weapons companies, platoons, 135, 171, 305, 692, 692*n*, 695–696, 702, 711. *See also* Army units; Marine units.
Weart, MajGen Douglas L., 545
Weather, 36, 64, 66, 78, 90–91, 109, 118, 129, 132, 182, 201, 219, 223, 229, 266, 275, 292–293, 297
climate, 86, 537
clouds, 79, 109, 223
dust storms, 537
fog, 118, 222
gales, 64
humidity, 129
monsoons, 64
rain, 36, 132, 160, 190, 201–202, 218, 229, 241*n*, 265–266, 271, 275, 293, 325
storms, 293
temperature, 109, 537
typhoons, 38, 201, 241*n*, 483, 503, 560–561, 566, 603
winds, 64, 109, 560
winter, 551, 734
Wedemeyer, MajGen Albert C., 529; LtGen, 437, 533, 535, 544–545, 555, 571–574, 579, 585–586, 596–597, 603–604, 632–633; Gen, 529*n*
Weihaiwei, 522, 544, 564, 578
Weihsien, 547, 566, 577, 579
Weiland, Maj Charles P., 419
Weir, Col Kenneth H., 181, 378
Wellington, N.Z., 663, 663*n*, 710
Wensinger, Col Walter W., 493, 495
Weser River, 747
Western Carolines, 449
Western Islands Attack Group, 92, 104, 178

- Western Manchuria, 532
 Western Pacific, 3*n*, 18, 94, 97, 430, 462, 470
 Westertimke, 749
 West Field, 599
 Westphalia, 541
 Whaling, Col William J., 146, 146*n*, 148*n*, 151, 283, 307, 360, 694
 Whampoa, 525–526
 Whangpoo River, 642, 644–645, 733
 White House, 402
White Plains, 96
 White, Maj Robert O., 186
Wichita, 496
 Wieseman, LtCol Frederick L., 628, 631
Wilkes Barre, 479*n*
 Wilkes Islands, 459
 Wilkinson, VAdm Theodore S., 408
 Window, 185, 185*n*, 201*n*, 208
 Winslow, SgtMaj Robert R., 785
Wisconsin, 479*n*
 Woleai Atoll, 450, 455, 462, 463*n*
 Woodhouse, LtCol Horatio, C., Jr., 115, 129, 141, 237, 245, 247, 280, 296
 Woodruff, MajGen Roscoe B., 514, 517
 Woods, MajGen Louis E., 26, 373–373, 376, 430, 566, 576, 578, 608; LtGen, 225*n*, 372*n*, 373*n*, 376*n*, 552*n*, 566*n*, 583*n*, 586*n*, 591*n*, 686*n*, 704*n*, 786*n*, 789
 Woosung, 734, 734*n*, 752
 Woosung Prison Camp, 733, 738, 750, 752–757, 760, 781
 World War I, 525, 653, 662, 691, 712
 World War II, 39, 573, 653–654, 656, 658, 663, 667–668, 670, 672, 677–678, 682, 685, 689, 693*n*, 702, 705, 712, 715, 717, 727, 730–731, 787–788
 Worton, BGen William A., 397*n*, 465, 534, 544–548, 552, 553, 558, 573, 606, 618; MajGen, 465*n*, 534*n*, 553*n*, 554*n*, 555*n*
 Wotje, 455, 462
 Wright, LtCol Erma A., 139, 189
 Wright, RAdm Jerauld, 62
 Wyckoff, Maj Don P., 239*n*
 X-Day, 404, 407–408
 Yabuchi Shima, 132
 Yae Take, 142, 142*n*, 144, 146, 148, 148*n*, 150–151, 154, 169, 172
 Yaeju Lake, 351–352
 Yaeju Lake-Yuza Lake Escarpment, 289
 Yagachi Shima, 139, 173, 388*n*
 Yagihara, 501
 Yahara, Col Hiromichi, 41, 41*n*, 51*n*, 190–191, 206–207, 213, 338*n*, 357, 389
 Yaka, 129, 134
 Yakabi Shima, 104
 Yakada, 129, 134
 Yakamaru, Maj, 51*n*
 Yalta Conference, 399, 432, 530–531
 Yamadadobaru, 138
 Yamaguchi Prefecture, 493, 500–502, 506, 514
 Yamashita, Gen Tomoyuki, 775*n*
Yamato, 180
 Yamazaki, 408
 Yangtze River, 372, 522, 528, 533, 594, 640, 642–645, 758
 Yangtze Valley, 637–638
 Yap, 9, 84*n*, 449–450, 453, 462
 Yeaton, LtCol Samuel S., 283*n*
 Yeh-Chien-Ying, Gen, 594
 Yehhsien, 577
 Yellow List, 783
 Yellow Sea, 534, 561
 Yen-an, 526–527, 532, 548, 564, 588, 609–610, 632
 Yingkow, 569
 Yofuke, 142, 144
 Yokohama, 484, 488, 492, 509, 738, 745, 760, 781, 783
 Yokosuka, 45, 438*n* 439, 441, 464, 470, 481, 483–485, 487–490, 495, 509, 509*n*
 Air Station, 479, 481, 485, 488
 Naval Base, 438, 475, 481, 483–484, 489*n*
 Occupation Force, 438, 464, 476, 484
 Yonabaru, 36, 50, 66, 233, 236, 266–270, 272, 290, 293, 296
 Yonabaru-Naha road, 272
 Yonai, Adm Mitsumasa, 15
 Yonawa, 272, 274
 Yontan airfield, 46, 50, 54–55, 68, 115, 117, 120, 120*n*, 123, 126, 128, 129*n*, 130, 158, 158*n*, 159, 176–177, 181, 183–184, 227–228, 228*n*, 230*n*, 274, 379
 Yontan Hill, 126
Yorktown, 419, 479*n*
 Yoron Shima, 34
 Yost, LtCol Donald K., 428, 428*n*; BGen, 424*n*, 428*n*
 Young, Sir Mark, 752
 Yunagusuku, 290

Yuan Shih-K'ai, 525	Zamboanga, 535, 552
Yuza, 331, 333, 335	Zampa Misaki, 118, 126
Yuza Dake, 335, 337, 351-352	Zawa, 330-331, 333
Yuza Dake-Yaeju Dake Escarpment, 333, 351-352	Zentsuji Prison Camp, 734, 736 <i>n</i> , 760
Yuza Hill, 333, 335, 342	Zillig, Edward, 503
	Zushi area, 481

DEFENSIVE DISPOSITIONS AGAINST AMPHIBIOUS ATTACK OF THE 14TH INDEPENDENT INFANTRY BATTALION


MARCH 1945


Showing the organization of the ground in the
Item Pocket-Machinato Airfield Area
Adapted From A Japanese Sketch Map in
Tenth Army G-2 Intelligence Monograph
Only Approximate Form Lines Shown

SCALE
500 0 500 1000
YARDS

LEGEND

- ♂ BATTALION COMMANDER
- ♀ COMPANY COMMANDER
- ⚡ GRENADE DISCHARGER
- HEAVY MACHINE GUN
- LIGHT MACHINE GUN
- 47MM ANTITANK GUN
- ◆ 70MM HOWITZER OR 75MM GUN
- ANTITANK TRENCH
- TRENCH
- ooo MINES
- ◆ 81MM MORTAR






HEDO MISAKI
SECURED L+12


L+8/L+12 PATROLLING
TO FIX ENEMY DEFENSIVE
POSITION IN MOTOBU PENINSULA

PATROLS
MEET L+18

DESTRUCTION OF REMNANT
GROUP (123 MEN) FROM
UDO FORCE L+27









MAP V

T. L. RUSSELL




BATTLE FOR SUGAR LOAF HILL

16-17 MAY 1945



Contour Interval 10 Feet

Adapted From 6th Mar Div SAR



MAP VII

T. L. RUSSELL

